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Abstract
Following the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, a persistent policy of urban 
containment has been pursued throughout rural areas of the United Kingdom. In 
spite of growing evidence that the effects of containment are incompatible with key 
aspects of public policy towards housing, agriculture and the environment, there is 
little sign that government agencies are considering the possibility of a serious 
policy re-think. This thesis represents the first attempt to analyse the continued 
commitment to this core of the British land use planning system from the 
perspective of public choice theory.
The thesis begins with an outline of the institutional focus of public choice analysis, 
considering the fundamental questions of 'market failure', 'government failure' and 
the theoretical case for state intervention in the market for land. Having examined 
the evolving context of urban containment in the post-war period, the thesis 
proceeds to apply key elements of public choice to decision-making incentives in the 
planning system. The empirical analysis commences with an account of interest 
group behaviour on the 'demand side' of the political system. A subsequent section 
turns to the 'supply side', examining bureaucratic incentive structures and the role of 
regulatory agencies in the management of land use change. A still further section 
considers the role of legislative incentives on the 'supply side'. Finally, the empirical 
analysis concludes with a case study of a major planning dispute.
The evidence presented suggests that a combination of institutional incentives on 
both the 'demand' and 'supply' sides of the 'political market' has led to the continual 
growth of restrictive land use regulation at the expense of a diffuse and unorganized 
mass of urban taxpayers and consumers. The thesis concludes by outlining a 
possible institutional alternative based on private property rights, which might help 
to avoid these undesirable elements of the British planning system.
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Property Rights, Public Choice & Land Use Planning
1.0 Introduction
The 1947 Town & Country Planning Act introduced in the United Kingdom what 
remains one of the most comprehensive systems of land use planning anywhere in the 
modem world. Throughout the post-war period the system has spawned a plethora of 
statutory land use designations which have become a dominant feature of British 
environmental policy. Green Belts, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty, Sites of 
Special Scientific Interest and National Parks, to name but a few, all play a part in an 
administrative system which regulates the pattern of land use throughout the country.
Control over property rights in land lies at the heart of the British planning system. 
The 1947 Act nationalized development rights, replacing private planning 
arrangements with a system of bureaucratic administration. The wholesale powers 
granted under this legislation enabled policy-makers to pursue initiatives which have 
fundamentally affected the character of both rural and urban environments. By far the 
most significant of these has been a strategy of 'urban containment', pursued with 
little deviation for almost half a century. Following prominent figures such as 
Ebenezer Howard, Patrick Abercrombie and Duncan Sandys, the principles of 
separating town and country, preventing 'urban sprawl' and the protection of open 
countryside have lain at the very heart of planning policy (Hall et al 1973, Simmie 
1993). So vigorously have these principles been enacted, that in the 1980s England & 
Wales witnessed the lowest rate of rural land development since the implementation of 
the 1947 Act (Cullingworth & Nadin 1994).
The adoption of containment policies within the planning system is most frequently 
justified with reference to the various 'failures' of unfettered markets, but there is now 
growing recognition of significant policy failures imposed by land use planning itself. 
For example, it is well accepted that containment regulation in the United Kingdom 
has so reduced the supply of land for development that both the price and density, in 
particular of residential developments has increased significantly and that the 
phenomena of over-development and traffic congestion in towns owe much to a 
restrictive regulatory regime in the countryside (Hall et al 1973, Herington 1984,
1990, Evans 1988, 1991, Simmie 1993, Bramley et al 1995). In addition, the 
increase in property values associated with containment has resulted in a negative
11
redistribution of wealth. Wealth has been transferred to high income home owning 
groups and the agricultural sector, at the expense of low income housing opportunities 
in rural areas and an inner city population excluded from economic participation in the 
suburban /rural fringe.
Likewise, the once sacred cow of Green Belt policy has come under attack. Analysis 
suggests that if cities are not allowed to expand outwards because of a tight 'green 
girdle', then development is forced out, beyond the designated zones, and ironically in 
the context of the current environmental agenda, increasing the commuting distance to 
work and hence the demand for more roads and long distance travel (Herington 1984, 
1990, Simmie 1993).
Nor is it apparent that the planning system has succeeded in the goal of 'countryside 
protection'. Many studies have demonstrated the disasterous consequences of farm 
subsidies under the 1947 Agriculture Act and the Common Agricultural Policy of the 
European Union, which have seen the conversion of the landscape (irrespective of 
environmental designations) into an arable monoculture at the expense of the 
traditional rural scene (Bowers & Cheshire 1983, Munton 1983, Lowe et al 1986). 
Other studies have documented the failure of government policies targeted specifically 
at landscape conservation (Pennington 1996). In short, it is far from clear whether the 
benefits of the urban containment actually outweigh the costs imposed by the 
regulatory regime (Evans 1988, Simmie 1993).
Given the presence of these policy failures, it is surprising that there has been no 
attempt to examine the planning system from the one perspective which explicitly 
seeks to explain examples of 'government failure'. Public choice theory provides a 
compelling account of why people join pressure groups, how politicians respond to 
electorates and how bureaucratic agencies deliver policy outputs. Following the 
tradition of Buchanan & Tullock (1962), theorists in this tradition focus on 
institutional incentives within representative democracy and have developed an 
analytical framework to account for examples of 'government failure' and to question 
the virtues of intervention by the state.
Set in this context, the following pages represent the first attempt to examine the 
dynamics of urban containment policy from the perspective of public choice theory. 
The central question is to what extent the costs imposed bv urban containment are a 
product of institutional incentives inherent in regimes of state-regulated property 
rights? By exploring this question in depth, the thesis offers an opportunity to assess
12
the theoretical and empirical contributions of public choice theory and to re-evaluate a 
key aspect of British environmental policy.
This introductory chapter sets out a review of the public choice paradigm, beginning 
with an outline of the key assumptions underlying the approach. The bulk of the 
chapter sketches out the institutional focus of public choice, examining the central 
questions of 'market failure' and 'government failure' and the theoretical case for state 
intervention in the market for land. Given the centrality of the rational actor model in 
public choice analysis, a separate section examines some of the theoretical, empirical 
and methodological objections to the approach. Finally, the chapter concludes with an 
outline of the thesis structure and methodology.
1.1 Individual Action and the Importance o f Institutions
In recent years the public choice school has presented a detailed account of the 
economic and environmental benefits to be derived from alternative institutional 
arrangements. According to this school of thought, the appropriate unit of analysis in 
the social sciences is the rational individual and her motivations and beliefs (Buchanan 
& Tullock 1962, Elster 1985). Individuals, not large groups or societies make 
decisions and they do so in such a way as to achieve their personal goals. Even where 
individual action takes place in a collective setting such as an interest group or the 
state, the individual actor must always be the focus of concern. As Buchanan & 
Tullock (1962,p.l3) put it, collective action is nothing more than, "the action of 
individuals when they choose to accomplish purposes collectively rather than 
individually." Institutions such as the state therefore are, "nothing more than the set of 
processes, the machine, which allows such collective action to take place."
If individual agents form the core of the public choice paradigm the following set of 
assumptions about their behaviour provide the building blocks for a theory of 
economic and political processes :
*Individuals are predominantly self-interested - they choose how to act on the basis o f 
achieving their personal goals.
*In pursuit o f these goals agents act as maximizers’ who seek the biggest possible 
benefits and the least costs in their decisions.
* Individuals have stable sets o f preferences which they can compare and rank easily.
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*Individuals order their preferences transitively. The condition o f rationality implies 
that if  an individual prefers a to b, and b to c, she will also prefer a to c.
*The chosen course o f individual action will be affected by changes in the structure o f 
costs and benefits a t 'the margin'. The marginal principle implies that ceteris paribus, 
any increase in the cost o f an action will decrease the likelihood o f that action taking 
place.
*Information is a 'cost' - the more time spent on information gathering the less will be 
available for alternative courses o f action. As the cost o f information rises ,the more 
likely it is that individuals will be less than perfectly informed about their decisions.
Building on these assumptions, the public choice paradigm analyses the ways in 
which institutional structures of property rights affect the pattern of individual 
incentives. In particular, what matters from this perspective is the importance of who 
owns property rights and under what institutional conditions (Baden & Stroup 1979, 
1983 Libecap 1989). Thus, the different incentives which individuals face under 
different regimes will fundamentally affect the content of their behaviour and the 
nature of the outcomes derived from the decision-making process. If efficiency entails 
the co-ordination of people's actions to achieve mutually compatible goals, then 
differing arrangements vary in their capacity to achieve this aim.1 Ceteris paribus, 
institutions which allow individuals to reap the rewards and to bear the costs of their 
actions and which transmit information about these decisions, will be advantageous 
from the viewpoint of the individual and society. Where institutional defects allow 
costs to be passed on to others, where wealth is not dependent on the nature of 
decisions made and where there is a lack of information, efficient resource allocation 
is less likely to result (Buchanan & Tullock 1962, Libecap 1989, Eggertsson 1990, 
North 1990).
The foregoing analysis provides the basis for an institutional account of how the 
incentives which face individual decision-makers affect the pattern of economic and 
environmental results. In particular, the public choice paradigm clarifies the ways in 
which incentives differ between regimes of privately owned and transferable property 
rights operating through the marketplace and state owned or state regulated property 
operating through the institutions of representative government.
1 According to Israel Kirzner (1992), an economic process is efficient to the extent that it harmonizes 
the plans of individuals in pursuit of their goals. This definition is particularly appropriate to a 
'comparative institutions' approach. It does not require that a process is 'perfect' as in many welfare 
economics and equilibrium theories, but that it facilitates co-ordination in a superior way to 
alternative institutional frameworks. The significance of this approach will become apparent when 
comparing the 'efficiency' of government and market decision-making later in the chapter.
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Land use planning in the United Kingdom represents an example of state regulated 
property rights and has often been justified on the grounds that market institutions 
based on private property cannot be relied upon to ensure that individual actors bear 
the full costs of their actions. According to this perspective examples of 'market 
failure' provide a prima facie case for government intervention. Public choice theorists 
however, question this perspective arguing instead that institutional incentives within 
governments may actually compound rather than ameliorate examples of market 
failure. It has been one of the major achievements of public choice to provide a 
theoretical framework which can be used to evaluate the relative merits of government 
and market decision-making and it this framework which is necessary for any analysis 
of policy such as land use planning designed to improve on the workings of the 
market system.
1.2 Private Property Rights and the Merits o f the Market
Adopting the rational choic^assumption of individual utility maximization under 
constraints, many public choice theorists and their colleagues in the property rights 
school contend that a system of privately owned and transferable property rights 
operating through the sphere of market exchange offers the most appropriate 
framework for resource management. Because individuals are assumed to act 
rationally and in accordance with their self interest, these authors argue that control 
over property is most valuable to an individual when its ownership is outright and 
easily transferable in exchange for other goods and services. Likewise, a system of 
private property rights is considered to have a greater capacity to generate information 
and an appropriate stucture of penalties and rewards to link individual incentives with 
desireable social results (Buchanan 1975,1986, Anderson & Leal 1991).
Private property rights are a fundamental requirement of a functioning market order, 
for the simple reason that without clear rights of ownership people are unable to 
engage in voluntary exchange (Fumbotn & Pejovich 1972, Baden & Stroup 1979). 
So long as private property rights are clearly defined and enforced, the market system 
is considered a prerequisite for successful resource management for the following 
reasons;
First, markets provide an efficient mechanism for the discovery and disemmination of 
information. Because the values individuals attach to resources are known only to the 
individuals concerned, it is only through trade and the rejection of available 
alternatives that the value of choices may be ascertained (Buchanan 1969, Coradato
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1992). By generating information in the form of prices, the market indicates the 
relative scarcity of goods, the value of inputs used in producing goods and the 
foregone opportunity costs of utilizing the inputs. This information is dependent on 
the specialist individual knowledge of market participants, is dispersed in its very 
nature and cannot be acquired by any central coordinating authority .When a clear set 
of private property rights exist however, the decentralized interaction of buyers and 
sellers in the market generates a spontaneous order, maximizing the subjective values 
of all the individual participants through the medium of price (Hayek 
1948,1982,1988).
Second, when property rights are held privately, individuals have a clear idea of what 
actions they may take regarding the use of resources. Under private ownership all the 
rewards and penalties resulting from resource use accrue to the individual owners. 
Because the profitability of a project is determined by the price consumers are willing 
to pay, private property rights ensure that individuals face the full opportunity costs of 
their actions. Consumers pay directly for the resources they use, are informed by 
prices of the relative value placed on resources by other individuals and have an 
incentive to monitor alternative suppliers in order to make the best choice possible. 
Similarly, the price system and the institution of private property allow entrepreneurs 
who accurately acquire knowledge of consumer preferences to reap the rewards of 
their actions. Profits reward those who display foresight and initiative, whilst losses 
discipline those who divert resources away from consumer preferences (Alchian & 
Demsetz 1973).
Finally, the transferability of resource rights under private ownership, provides the 
opportunity for the individual to continually adjust the pattern of use to capture its 
highest value. This flow of goods and services ensured by the market system is 
essential for economic efficiency when relative scarcities are subject to constant 
change (Kwong 1990).
1.3 Welfare Economics and the Case for Land Use Planning
The economic benefits which flow from the establishment of private property rights 
are now widely appreciated.2 Nonetheless, land use planning and environmental 
policy in general, continue to be premised on the f e u m p ti^ thatjnarkets_and private 1 
property are responsible for resource(misallocation) and environmental degradation.
2 See for example the views of the distinguished neo-Marxist Robert Heilbronner (1990).
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Drawing on neo-classical welfare economics, advocates of land use planning judge the 
performance of markets by the Pareto standard (Harrison 1977) where according to 
Musgrave & Musgrave (1976, p.67), "A given economic arrangement is efficient if 
there can be fio othef arrangement which will leave someone better off without 
worsening the position of others." The conditions for the attainment of this standard 
are perfect competition, perfect information, equalities between prices and marginal 
costs and the internalization of all externalities. Judged by this standard, markets are 
considered prone to institutional failure in the following ways ;
Monopoly
The problem of monopoly arises where conditions of 'perfect competition' break 
down. Instead of a market consisting of numerous buyers and sellers, none of whom 
have sufficient control over resources to affect the pattern of prices and outputs, an 
individual firm or group of firms controls the entire market for a product and may 
increase prices and reduce output to a level incompatible with the pareto standard. 
Examples of industrial concentration in property development are often presented as 
instances of monopoly power which must be subject to regulation by the state 
(Nuffield Foundation 1986).
Externalities, Collective Goods and Public Goods
Following the tradition of A.C Pigou (1920), another oft cited cause of market failure 
is the presence of externalities. An externality exists when the results of an action, be 
they positive or negative, are not visited upon the decision-maker. The creation of an 
attractive landscape through the adoption of traditional farming methods is a good 
example of a positive externality. In this case, the farmer receives no payment for the 
external benefits resulting from her action and so in the absence of government 
intervention has little incentive to produce the good in quantities which accord with a 
pareto optimal level. By contrast, the construction of urban developments on green­
field sites is often considered a negative externality. Consumers of new buildings and 
construction companies do not take into account the loss of open spaces resulting from 
their actions and in the absence of land use planning these developments are 
'overproduced' with respect to the pareto standard.
Related to the concept of externalities are two qualities characteristic of many 
environmental goods : non-excludability and nonrivalrous consumption. The former
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occurs when the producer of a good is unable to keep non payers from its 
consumption, the latter, when the marginal cost to a seller of providing a good to an 
additional consumer is zero.
Those goods which exhibit both non-excludability and non-rivalrous consumption are
known as collective goods and according to welfare theory will be underproduced . 4-n
unless there is a system of land use planning. Scenic views are often cited as an 1 Ave w'< H Af
C  ^example - it is difficult to exclude non-payers from the benefits of a view and one 
person's consumption of the view does not detract from the consumption of others.
Public goods by contrast, exhibit nonrivalrous consumption but the exclusion of non:f c ^  
payers is possible. From the perspective of welfare theory the operation of the free 
market will result in an inefficient exclusion of potential consumers from these goods.
Thus, the owners of a country park may be able to exclude non payers from access, 
even though the cost of admitting extra patrons is practically zero.
Information Asymmetry
A third instance of market failure stems from the presence of information 
asymmetries. Paretian economics stipulates that for markets to allocate resources 
efficiently all buyers and sellers must be perfectly informed about the consequences of 
their actions. However, it is often suggested that lack of information on the part of 
consumers results in a sub-optimal pattern of resource use (Harrison 1977, 
Shucksmith 1990).
For example, because of the complexities of the housing market in terms of the size, 
type and quality of units available, consumers may have insufficient information to 
evaluate the consequences of exercising choice in different ways. In these 
circumstances, producer interests with a monopoly of expert information are 
structurally advantaged in the market process and may be able to charge prices which 
do not fully reflect individual preferences. Thus, land use planning is required to 
regulate the supply of housing in order to properly satisfy the interests of consumers.
Markets and Short-Termism
A fourth and final example of market failure is said to result from the incapacity of 
market institutions to consider long-term over short-term interests. According to this 
view, in the absence of government regulation, the dominance of the profit motive
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leads individuals to maximize the short term use of resources with insufficient 
attention to longer term interests. For example, concerns that agricultural land will be 
irrevocably lost to urban development to the detriment of future food production, stem 
from a belief in the incapacity of the price system to allocate resources efficiently and 
equitably between present and future generations (Shucksmith 1990).
1.4 Welfare Economics and the Nirvana Fallacy
The instances of market failure highlighted above result in a breach of the conditions 
for pareto-optimality and according to welfare analysis provide adequate grounds for 
the introduction of land use planning. By regulating monopolies, limiting externalities, 
ensuring the provision of collective goods and so on, government regulation can bring 
all the relevant costs and benefits into alignment.
How then have the public choice theorists responded to the prevailing orthodoxy ?
Drawing on important theoretical developments from the property rights school 
(Coase 1960) and the works of Hayek (1988), many public choice authors and 
especially those of the Virginia school, reject the standard interpretation of the pareto 
principle as an appropriate benchmark to judge the performance of markets.3 
According to Buchanan (1975) and other writers, welfare theorists confuse 
statements about what the world would look like in the perfect equilibrium conditions 
which characterise the abstract neo-classical system, with statements about how the 
world should actually be. If the real world is in fact characterized by disequilibrium 
then it is legitimate to argue that under pareto conditions there would be no 
opportunities to improve the allocation of resources, but it is not acceptable to suggest 
that public policy be formulated on the basis of such unattainable goals. It is to commit 
the 'nirvana fallacy' to suggest that the alternative to markets is a government immune 
from institutional failure (Demsetz 1969).
Consider first the case of monopoly. Under pareto conditions no individual firm could 
attempt to set prices at a level which would yield a supernormal profit because
3 It should be noted that not all public choice theorists accept all the components of this critique. The 
works referenced here are drawn from the 'Virginia school1 following Buchanan & Tullock (1962) and 
Buchanan (1986). The Chicago school following Stigler (1975) is somewhat closer to conventional 
neo-classical analysis and though accepting much of the transactions costs analysis of institutional 
failure within government as outlined pp.22-26 below, does not draw on the Hayekian critique of 
central planning.
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consumers could simply choose from an unlimited supply of alternative 
producers.The Austrian school following Hayek however, (1982) has long argued 
that this model is devoid of behavioural content and abstracts away from the real 
quality of markets which is their ability to generate information by providing 
incentives for innovation in a world of imperfect knowledge.
The existence of supernormal profits, where price exceeds marginal cost is in fact the 
product of entrepreneurial response to conditions of imperfect information. The 
returns of entrepreneurs will be driven to normal levels by competitive profit seeking 
as some earn supernormal profits which promote entry and others make losses which 
cause exit. Because of the impossibility of perfect information in any real world 
setting, markets will never attain a perfect equilibrium, but the signals of profit and 
loss do provide informational incentives which encourage innovation and the 
movement of resources in the direction of equilibrium and hence a degree of economic 
co-ordination which would not be possible under a centrally planned alternative.
Judged by the standards of welfare economics virtually all markets fall short of the 
perfectly competitive ideal. In real world markets however, supernormal profits are a 
temporary but necessary spur to competition, innovation and the development of new 
organizational forms. If governments intervene by way of regulation they may reduce 
the attractiveness of new entry and thus paradoxically protect the position of 
incumbents. Thus, examples of concentration should be viewed as a product of 
superior entrepreneurship by way of improving the goods and services supplied or a 
reflection of underlying cost conditions. In short, it is one thing to complain about the 
high price of a product due to 'monopoly power' if the alternative is more at a lower 
price, but it is to commit the nirvana fallacy to talk of 'market failure', if the alternative 
means that no one has the incentive to discover or invent the product in the first place 
(Littlechild 1986).
Turning to the question of externalities, information problems and the remaining 
instances of market failure, land use planning is advocated on the grounds that 
governments may regulate the market according to pareto criteria. From a public 
choice perspective however, this approach begs the question how do we know what a 
pareto optimal allocation of resources actually is (Buchanan 1969, Anderson & Leal 
1991) ? Thus, if government planning is to correct for market failures due to 
externality and information problems, then state officials must themselves possess the 
necessary information to decide how the reallocation of resources is to occur. 
However, theorists influenced by Hayek (1948), argue that it is precisely because this
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information is diffuse and cannot be acquired by a central co-ordinating authority that 
any form of government economic planning is impossible (Anderson & Leal 1991).
As Hayek (1948, p.519-520) has pointed out,
"The economic problem of society is ... not merely a problem o f how to allocate 
’given resources' - if  'given' is taken to mean given to a single mind which 
deliberately solves the problem set by these 'data'. It is rather a problem o f how to 
secure the best use o f resources known to any o f the members o f society, fo r ends 
whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a 
problem o f utilization o f knowledge not given to anyone in its totality."
Consequently, far from interfering with the market system the institution of private 
property should be extended to encompass all resources, because it is only through the 
actual process of exchange in the market that the relative value of resources can be 
made known. To the extent that markets 'fail', attention should focus on the reasons 
why trading of these goods does not actually occur. The major contribution in this 
regard is contained in the seminal work of Ronald Coase (1960).
In a famous article, The Problem o f Social Cost, Coase (1960) produced a classic 
rebuttal of Pigovian welfare theory. According to Pigovians, under equilibrium 
conditions markets produce negative externalities and these should be dealt with by a 
system of corrective taxation/regulation. It was the contribution of Coase to note, that 
if the conditions of equilibrium do indeed apply there is no need for intervention. If 
property rights are assigned, either to the 'damaging agent' or the 'affected party', the 
problem of externality will be resolved through bargaining until all opportunities for 
trade are exhausted. Where the damaging agent owns the property rights, then the 
affected agent can compensate her not to continue the activity in question. Meanwhile, 
if the affected party owns the rights the damaging agent can pay compensation for the 
damage. Under equilibrium conditions all externalities will be internalised and the 
overall pattern of resource allocation will be the same irrespective of who owns the 
relevant property rights.
Coase's followers argue that the presence of externalities means that general 
equilibrium conditions do not actually exist in the real world (Dahlman 1979). The 
relevance of externalities and collective/public goods problems is that they indicate the 
presence of obstacles to market exchange, in particular the high cost of establishing 
property rights in certain resources. It is these obstacles or transactions costs which 
are the principal causes of market failure.
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Transactions costs prevent individuals in the market from making voluntary 
agreements with one another and prevent the effective monitoring of individual 
behaviour. However, it is to commit the 'nirvana fallacy' to suggest that the alternative 
to markets is a world where governmental actors are immune from these same costs.
If the effectiveness of markets is dependent on the reward structure facing consumers 
and producers, so the effectiveness of government is dependent on the ability of 
citizens to monitor the politicians and bureaucrats who supply goods and services. 
What is needed is a comparative institutions framework to examine the extent to which 
institutional provisions in the state sector encourage or inhibit the internalization of 
external costs. This represents a modified version of the pareto principle, but it implies 
a fundamentally different focus to the traditional concerns of welfare economics. In 
particular, it suggests an examination of the institutional arrangements which are more 
likely to facilitate the flow of information and the internalization of costs. If 
transactions costs and incentive structures in the political process themselves lead to 
institutional failure then the case for government intervention is far from clear.
1.5. Public Choice and the Economics o f Government Failure
Welfare economists have long assumed that the axioms that define the rational actor in 
neo-classical theory cease to apply behind the office doors of the bureaucrat or the 
politician. As Tullock (1977, p.3) puts it,
"The conventional wisdom holds that the market is made up o f private citizens trying 
to benefit themselves but that government is concerned with something called the 
public interest."
The Hayekian analysis of dispersed information exposes the illusive nature of the 
'public interest', but it is the principal contribution of the public choice school to note, 
that even if these difficulties could be overcome (which they cannot) there is no reason 
to believe that political actors within the state will ever act in order to achieve the 
desired goals. On the contrary, political actors are not 'economic eunuchs' concerned 
to maximize social welfare, but instead are rational actors pursuing individual self 
interest in the same way as market participants. The ability of governments to correct 
for 'market failures' therefore, is dependent not only on the informational 
requirements of central planning, but on the institutional incentives provided by the 
democratic polity.
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The starting assumption of public choice theory is that state actors maximize their own 
interests and npt the public interest. The concept of rational self interest need not infer 
the specific motivations of individual actors, whether they are focused on expected 
pecuniary income, power or status, but it does suggest that individuals respond to 
changes in perceived net wealth (however conceived) at the margin and do so 
irrespective of other arguments in their utility functions.
When markets 'fail' this is a product of high transactions and information costs which 
prevent trade in environmental resources. To the public choice theorist, there is no 
reason to believe that governments will correct for these failures because the political 
process is characterized by its own set of information and transactions costs which 
may replace 'market failure' with 'government failure'. The 'political market' contains
c
institutional incentives on both the 'demand' and 'supply' sides, which allow voters, 
members of interest groups, bureaucrats and politicians, to affect decisions without
t
bearing the full cost of their actions. The principal sources of government failure are 
examined below;
Rational Ignorance
In public choice theory, politicians are viewed as suppliers of legislation to the 
electorate in order secure votes for re-election and the associated benefits of 
government office. If the effectiveness of markets is dependent on the information 
available to consumers on the 'demand' side, so the ability to monitor politicians is 
dependent on the information voters possess (Aranson 1990, Buchanan 1975, 
1986,Tullock 1977, 1989,1993). Because the gathering and processing of 
information is a cost, individuals will seek detailed information only to the extent that 
they can influence the relevant decisions. Consumers in the marketplace, even if not 
'perfectly' informed, have an incentive to discover information, because payment is 
direct and individuals are faced with the immediate consequence of any purchasing 
errors. In representative politics however, voters 'underinvest' in political information 
because the costs of acquiring accurate data are extremely high, compared to the 
infinitesimal influence any individual has on the outcome of an election (Downs 1957, 
Tullock 1989). Why should an individual seek to examine the effects of land use 
regulation when her vote is unlikely to have any direct influence on that policy and she 
will have to bear the cost of taxation irrespective of her support ?
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In short, it is rational for voters to remain 'ignorant' of the political process, a 
tendency which accounts for the failure of many individuals to know even the name of 
their own MP, let alone the small print of legislation.
The Bundle Purchase Effect
In modem democracies the rational ignorance effect is magnified because the state 
intervenes in so many areas of economic and social life that it is virtually impossible 
for voters ever to be informed across the whole policy spectrum (Mitchell 1988, 
Tullock 1989). Voters do not vote on individual issues but instead are presented with 
a 'take it or leave it' set of policy bundles. One cannot choose which particular land 
use regulations to support, but instead must elect a representative who will speak on 
every single issue. Not only is the chance of each voter affecting the result of an 
election reduced to almost zero, but there is equally little opportunity to influence the 
content of the political agenda.
Rent Seeking and Collective Action - Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs
A third source of government failure in the public choice model, stems from the 
disproportionate ability of special interest groups, or 'rent seekers' on the 'demand' 
side to obtain legislative privileges from the state. This power results from institutional 
constraints and incentives which favour the mobilization of concentrated interests at 
the expense of the dispersed, unorganized mass.
If a group of voters wishes to express demands through the state, it must first lobby 
the political authorities. As Olson (1965) has observed however, there is a substantial 
'collective action problem' in mobilizing groups and in particular large interest groups. 
Political lobbying is a costly affair and for individuals to mobilize into an effective 
force the per capita gains derived from collective action must be very substantial. For 
most individuals however, the per capita stake in each of the multitudinous policies 
'supplied' by modem government is so discounted by the irrelevance of an individual 
contribution, that the optimal strategy is to 'free-ride' on the participation of others. 
Because most rational individuals will act in the same way, collective action on behalf 
of large groups is unlikely to occur.
The incentive structure is rather different for smaller subsets of voters in a particular 
industry or with a special interest in a narrow area of policy. Here, the personal
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benefits from successful collective action are highly concentrated on a relatively small 
set of individuals and the costs of mobilization are outweighed by the greater size of 
the individual stake (Buchanan & Tullock 1982, Tullock 1989).
Combined with the effect of voter ignorance, these incentives allow political markets 
to be dominated by concentrated interests. This explains the tendency for policy in 
representative democracies to reflect the interests of business and labour lobbies, at the 
expense of consumers, taxpayers and other diffuse interests, each of whom loses only 
a little from the various regulations imposed by the state. It also explains the 'capture' 
of regulatory agencies by the very interests they are supposed to regulate (Kolko 
1963,1965, MacAvoy 1965, Stigler 1975, Buchanan & Tullock 1982, Poole 1985, 
Bartel & Thomas 1987, Benson 1990, Robinson 1993). In turn the possibility of 
achieving state privileges encourages the diversion of resources towards rent seeking 
and away from productive economic activity (Tullock 1967).
Politics and Short-Termism
A fourth case of government failure results from the short term perspective of political 
actors on the 'supply' side.
Under a market system, resources are owned privately and the individual owners have 
an incentive to reduce current consumption in favour of the future in order to make a 
larger profit by selling to speculators when a resource is becoming more scarce. In the 
'political market' however, politicians do not possess property rights in resources and 
as a consequence are unable to reap a financial return from successful management 
(Baden & Stroup 1979). Politicians cannot 'sell shares' in the government of a 
nation's resources to future political actors. On the contrary, benefits of decisions 
taken in the present may well accrue when the originating administration is long gone 
and when a different party is in power. As a result, the time horizon of the politician is 
unlikely to extend significantly beyond the date of the next election and policy will be 
based on short-term political gain rather than long-term sustainable management 
(Baden & Stroup 1979, Anderson & Leal 1991).
Political Monopoly
The tendency towards government failure on the 'supply' side is exacerbated by the 
monopoly characteristics of the political market. In most representative democracies
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power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of political parties. Unlike private 
markets, competition (actual or potential) is severely limited, because elections are 
held over discrete periods of time and once elected, the party/parties in power may use 
the coercive monopoly of the state in order to access a deep purse which consists of 
other people's money. The limited scope of competition reduces the level of 
information generated by the political process and further allows politicians to disguise 
the extent to which the business of government is based on the short term demands of 
special interests. Instead political markets are characterized by sloganizing, political 
advertising and a reliance on crude identifictaion strategies similar to advertising 
campaigns in oligopolistic and particularly duopolistic industries (Robinson 1993).
Bureaucratic Monopoly
A sixth and final aspect of government failure results from the monopoly power of the 
administrative bureaucracy. Bureaucrats do not hold private property rights in the 
resources they control and so cannot capture the benefits or bear the costs of their 
decisions (Baden & Stroup 1979). Accordingly, they do not have the same incentives 
as profit-making firms or private voluntary associations to allocate resources on the 
basis of economic or environmental success. Rather, the success of the bureaucrat is 
dependent on increasing control over discretionary resources which are often a 
function of budget size (Niskanen 1971). Consequently bureaucrats have strong 
incentives to support those policies and interest groups which will expand the size of 
the agency irrespective of the economic and environmental externalities which result.
Nor do politicians have sufficient incentive to keep budget appropriations down, 
because the benefits of growth are concentrated on organized bureaucrats and other 
special interests, with the costs in terms of higher taxes, thinly dispersed across the 
voting population, minimizing electoral rewards. Under these circumstances 
government services are not so much 'demanded' as 'supplied'.
1.6 Evidence o f Government Failure
The theoretical framework outlined above has proved to have considerable explanatory 
power in a range of applications, with many policies and regulations often justified on 
'public interest' grounds, shown to be operated at the behest of organized interests 
working in a closed relationship with various arms of the state. From this perspective,
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public choice theorists have exposed numerous cases of maladministration, regulatory 
capture and bureaucratic expansionism, where the benefits of government action have 
been concentrated on organized interests and bureaucrats with the costs dispersed 
across an unsuspecting and unorganized mass.
Early studies of the regulatory state showed that the regulation of airlines, transport, 
electric utilities, telephones and pharmaceuticals had all increased costs to consumers 
and taxpayers and that the principal beneficiaries had been the bureaucratic agencies 
and the regulated industries themselves (Stigler 1975). More recent public choice 
work has applied this analysis to the study of land use and environmental policy. 
Anderson (1983) for example, examines the performance of the Bureau of 
Reclamation, the US federal agency responsible for the prevention of desertification. 
This agency has used billions of dollars to subsidize water provision to organized 
farmers in California and Nevada, characterized by huge projects such as the building 
of the Glen Canyon and Hoover Dams. These dams have contributed to the 
dewatering of natural lakes and rivers with the resultant loss of wildlife such as geese 
and wild ducks. In this case, farming interests supported by an expansionist 
bureaucracy, rushed to fill the information vacuum created by the rational ignorance 
effect, diffusing the economic and environmental costs across an unsuspecting 
populace (see also Reisner 1986).
Baden & Stroup (1983) and Deacon & Johnston (1985) meanwhile, focus attention on 
the US Forest Service, the largest natural resource agency in the United States. Here, 
a combination of incentives towards bureaucratic growth has produced destructive 
policies. With budgets and staffing positively related to the expansion of timber 
logging the Forest Service has pursued appropriations to further the development of 
road building, rather than comply with its conservation objectives which are less staff 
intensive. Consequently, in areas such as Yellowstone National Park and the Tongass 
National Forest in Alaska, logging has expanded into marginal lands, on steeper 
slopes which has produced soil erosion and river sedimentation.
As a further example of 'government failure', Anderson & Leal (1991) cite Ackerman 
& Hassler's (1981) classic study of US Clean Air legislation. In an effort to reduce 
Sulphur Dioxide emissions, the US Congress introduced the 1977 Clean Air Act 
which required the strict application of 'best available technology' standards for new 
coal-fired generating plants. In the event, S02 reductions could have been achieved at 
much lower cost, but a 'clean air - dirty coal' coalition made up of eastern coal 
producers and environmentalists lobbied for the high cost technological solution. The 
reasons for this were straightforward. Eastern coal producers feared that electricity
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utilities would buy increasing amounts of low-sulphur Western coal in comparison to 
the high sulphur Appalachian alternative. However, requiring all new generating 
plants to install high-tech sulphur scrubbers, irrespective of the sulphur content of the 
coal burned, removed this competitive advantage. As a consequence, the Clean Air 
Act became a mechanism for redistributing wealth from electricity consumers, who 
paid higher rates, to eastern miners, who feared losing their jobs. Again, the 
imperatives of special interest politics ensured an outcome with minimal benefits but a 
high cost to the dispersed mass of the voting public.
These and other instances of 'government failure', lead public choice theorists to 
question the ability of state institutions to correct for instances of market failure.
Critics of the market argue that problems of high transactions costs will always result 
in an element of 'market failure', but from a public choice perspective the evidence of 
'government failure' suggests that the transactions costs involved in the government 
administration of property rights are an equal if not greater threat.
The transactions costs approach of public choice theory appears to offer a powerful 
analytical framework to examine examples of 'government failure'. The central 
question of this thesis is to what extent the external costs imposed by the British land 
use planning system through its commitment to urban containment are a product of 
institutional incentives inherent in regimes of state regulated property rights. If the 
existence of policy failures can be attributed to an asymmetric distribution of costs and 
benefits on both the 'demand' and 'supply sides', through rational ignorance, 
problems of collective action/ concentrated benefits and dispersed costs and 
bureaucratic expansionism, then the theoretical case for land use planning in its 
present institutional form must be subject to serious question.
1.7 Pathologies o f Public Choice Theory ?4
Largely because of the theoretical elegance of public choice theory and its ability to 
provide explanations for policy failures within the modem state, the 
application of public choice analysis to the study of political institutions has become 
increasingly popular within the discipline of political science. However, the
4 Although entitled "Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory", most of the critiques summarized in the 
recent volume by Green & Shapiro and addressed in this section, are in fact focussed against 
specifically public choice models - rather than rational choice theory, which is the broader tradition 
from which public choice (the political application of rational actor models) derives.
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assumptions, empirical claims and methodological devices of public choice are not 
without their critics. These objections, crystallized in a recent volume by Green & 
Shapiro (1995) must be examined, before proceeding to apply public choice theory to 
the study of the British planning system in the subsequent chapters
The publication o f "Pathologies o f Rational Choice Theory," (1995) has prompted 
vigorous debate within political science and at first sight appears to represent a 
fundamental challenge to the public choice mode of analysis (Friedman 1995). The 
basis of this critique is twofold, focusing on alleged empirical and methodological 
'pathologies' of the rational actor model.
The first plank of Green & Shapiro's critique, questions the empirical worth of public 
choice analysis. According to this perspective, the self interest/rational action 
assumption has had relatively little success in explaining many of the empirical 
realities which characterize the political economy and where there have been apparent 
'successes', these are largely the product of poorly specified hypotheses, which allow 
public choice advocates to claim support for their theories without providing precise 
statistical measures of observed phenomena which can be attributed directly to the 
process of rational action. The response to Olson's (1965) theory of interest group 
mobilization is instructive in this regard.
In the Logic o f Collective Action, Olson (1965) argues that in the absence of selective, 
personal incentives, self-seeking individuals are less likely to engage in political 
activity on behalf of large interest groups, because there is always an incentive to 'free 
ride' on the participation of others. The critics respond by pointing out that large scale 
political mobilizations do occur on a regular basis and that the only way the public 
choice theorist may account for observed behaviour is to import some aspect of 
altruistic motivation into individual utility functions. Moreover, to the extent that 
interest groups do mobilize because of selective incentives, public choice itself offers 
no hard and fast statistical predictions of what the precise rate of mobilization will 
actually be.
Writing in a similar vein, Green & Shapiro (1995) highlight the failure of public 
choice to account for the paradox of votings In a real world election it is formally 
irrational for anyone to vote because each individual may have no more than an 
infinitesimal chance of affecting the final result (Downs 1957). However the 
experience of elections in most modem democracies shows that many millions of 
people do vote and hence appear to exhibit irrational behaviour.
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Public choice accounts of bureaucratic behaviour have received equally short shrift 
from the critics. Lewin (1991) for example, argues that the growth of the public sector 
cannot be convincingly attributed to 'budget maximizing' bureaucrats as public choice 
theory suggests. On the contrary, bureaucrats may be motivated by altruistic motives 
and to the extent that they are self interested, it is not always clear that budget 
maximizing behaviour will result. Again, it could be argued that public choice offers 
no precise predictions of the different magnitudes of bureaucratic growth which can be 
attributed directly to rational choice processes.
A further group of critics focus their attention on the reliance on the fixed preference 
assumption (exogenous preferences) within some public choice models. According to 
these authors, individuals do not exhibit fixed preferences, but rather preferences are 
often shaped endogenously within institutions rather than given as exogenous 
variables. Thus, the presence of political advertising by both interest groups and 
political parties and the reliance of parties on crude identification strategies suggests 
that individual preferences are in fact malleable (Plamenatz 1973, Linblom 1977, 
Kuran 1991).
Green & Shapiro (1995) extend their critique, moving on from the alleged empirical 
difficulties of public choice, to focus specifically on the methodological response of its 
advocates when confronted with disconfirming evidence. According to this view, 
public choice scholarship is characterized by a tendency towards post hoc theorizing in 
which, faced with evidence which contradicts the assumptions of theory, the author 
simply designs a new model to fit the existing data.
The attempt by Downs (1957) to save his account of voting is cited as the classic 
example in this regard. Faced with the reality that voters do actually go to the polls and 
therefore appear to act irrationally, Downs responded by arguing that rational 
individuals participated in elections because of a 'desire to preserve the democratic 
system.' But, the critics argue, what exactly is left of a distinctive public choice 
approach if any conceivable form of motivation may be included in the cost calculus of 
the individual actors? If the public choice account cannot be confined to such 'hard 
edged' assumptions as the maximization of pecuniary gain then it assumes the status 
of an irrefutable tautology and is devoid of all explanatory power.
Related to the methodological critique advanced by Green & Shapiro is a still further 
charge directed at public choice analysis - that in its focus on the workings of 
representative government and in particular examples of 'government failure', the 
approach is ideologically driven with a pronounced bias towards the support of market
30
mechanisms over collective forms of decision (Self 1989, Lane 1990). According to 
this perspective, the preponderance of 'right wing' ideology is sufficient to disqualify 
the approach in terms of legitimate social science, given the propensity of public 
choice theorists to examine only that evidence which is supportive of their wider 
political convictions.
The apparent empirical and methodological defects of public choice lead the critics to 
the conclusion that this approach offers limited scope for explaining the complexities 
of political economy and that scholars should consider the role of alternative, non­
economic or sociological approaches to the study of political institutions.
At first sight, the above critiques may appear to mount a fundamental challenge to the 
foundations of public choice analysis. However, on closer reflection it should be 
apparent that their focus is based on a serious misunderstanding of what public choice 
attempts to achieve and a very narrow view of successful empirical contribution within 
the social sciences (Chong 1995, Fiorina 1995, Ferejohn & Satz 1995, Shepsle
1995). In so doing, these critiques neglect the capacity of public choice to generate 
key insights to the understanding of representative democracies.
Consider again Olson's theory of interest groups. Most public choice theorists, 
including Olson, do not purport to explain all human behaviour in terms of individual 
self interest, but they do contend that this assumption allows the development of 
generalized predictions which may usefully account for observable realities in the 
political economy. Thus, Olson's theory of groups does not predict that no large 
interest groups will organize to achieve collective goods; nor does it predict that no 
individual would join such a group in the absence of selective incentives. Rather, 
Olson suggests that ceteris paribus, it will be more difficult to mobilize larger than 
smaller groups, but the absolute level of mobilization will be determined by a host of 
other factors, which may include altruistic motivations (Fiorina 1995).
Green & Shapiro object that the empirical power of the public choice approach is 
minimal, given the inability of scholars to specify with quantitative precision what the 
rate of mobilization will be in the absence of selective incentives and other 
countervailing forces. However in so doing, they imply that no social scientific 
research which does not utilize 'state of the art' statistical methods to quantify the 
effect of specific variables may legitimately be considered as a useful empirical 
contribution. This is a rather odd position, given the notorious difficulty within social 
science of controlling for the multitudinous and often unobservable variables affecting 
the nature of social outcomes, which simply cannot be controlled for without the
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'laboratory conditions' available in the natural sciences (Caldwell 1994, Fiorina,
1995, Shepsle 1995).
Given these constraints, the empirical power of public choice lies not in the 
quantitative measure of specific variables, but its ability to provide explanations for a 
variety of otherwise unexplained phenomena. In this sense public choice can make 
useful empirical contributions by following Hayek's (1959) advice on the appropriate 
method of social science research, i.e. that it should focus on 'prediction in principle' 
rather than attempt to 'predict in detail' the quantitative magnitude of social 
phenomena. Thus, the self interest postulate in Olson's theory does not account for 
the observed mobilization of all interest groups, nor does it have the capacity to predict 
the precise level of mobilization in any given situation, but it does provide one of the 
most compelling explanations for the empirical finding that the full spectrum of 
economic interests and in particular consumer and taxpaying interests are not fully 
represented by organized groups.
Likewise, the Downsian analysis of voting has failed to provide a complete 
explanation of why it is that individuals vote, but the insight that each individual has 
only an infinitesimal influence on the final result, provides a convincing account of the 
empirical fact that the vast majority of voters in modem democracies are largely 
'ignorant' of the political process. Similarly, public choice accounts of bureaucratic 
behaviour, though not able to generate quantitative estimates of the magnitude of 
public sector growth which can be attributed to 'budget maximizing' behaviour and 
bureaucratic inefficiency, do offer a powerful explanation of the tendency for 
government agencies to expand and, in the absence of competitive forces, to produce 
outputs more expensively than private sector alternatives (Savas 1987, Wolf 1988).
Green & Shapiro dismiss this line of reasoning with the contention that in so far as 
public choice has made any empirical contributions the results are trivial and in many 
cases a statement of the obvious. Thus, the public choice 'insight' that voters are 
ignorant of politics is simply a restatement of fact already well established in the 
broader political science tradition. However, as Chong (1995, p.41) responds, even 
when deductions from a particular model reproduce what is already known, this need 
not lessen the empirical power of a theory. In the particular instance of public choice, 
the theory is valuable in specifying a causal mechanism behind various unexplained 
phenomena, the exploration of which can yield valuable insights to a range of 
circumstances. Thus, the theory of rational ignorance, dismissed as trivial by Green & 
Shapiro, posits a specific cause of voter ignorance not offered by any alternative 
account - i.e., the inordinate cost of acquiring accurate and detailed political
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information. This theory has in turn yielded insights on the areas of policy where 
voters are likely to be better informed. In particular, the tendency for greater 
awareness of policies which transfer resources directly in the form of subsidies, than 
those which do so through the indirect mechanism of regulation, the latter being a far 
less visible form of wealth transfer (Tullock 1989,1993).
It is the ability of public choice to specify the causal mechanisms which lie behind 
social phenomena which distinguishes it so clearly from alternative theoretical 
standpoints within social science. Structural/functionalist and sociological accounts for 
example, focus on the contribution of social institutions to the maintenance of society 
or people's attachment to social norms and practices and as a result offer at times 
vague and unspecified causal explanations.5 Thus, neo-Marxist and Corporatist 
theories of the state posit that state actors undertake policy actions in order to maintain 
the legitimacy of the economic system and in so doing fail to provide any account of 
whv individuals within the state should support particular economic and social 
arrangements. Similarly, sociological accounts of state decision-making attribute the 
behaviour of key actors to the influence of social norms and professional values 
without fully specifying why individuals might adopt these particular norms. By 
contrast, public choice focuses specifically on the intentions of individuals who 
choose among alternative courses of action depending on the relative set of rewards 
offered by each. In the case of theories of the state, the particular economic and social 
rewards available to bureaucrats and politicians from the support of organized 
interests.
Turning to the question of the fixed preference assumption in public choice theory, the 
adoption of the public choice approach need not ignore the possibility that individual 
preferences are in certain circumstances malleable. Thus, recent theoretical and 
empirical work on party competition has stressed the ability of politicians to use the 
enormous powers provided by the modem state in an attempt to shape or mould the 
preferences of the electorate (Dunleavy & Ward 1981, Dunleavy 1991). The 
possibility of such behaviour may be of particular importance from a public choice 
perspective, given the tendency towards rational ignorance on behalf of the electorate 
and its reliance on information provided by pressure groups, bureaucrats and 
politicians themselves. In these circumstances, it is possible to accept that individuals 
within the electorate might be actively persuaded to support particular policies, whilst 
maintaining a basic public choice framework which focuses on the attempts by
5These approaches have recently been applied to the study of the British land use planning system and 
are considered at greater length in terms of the policy context to urban containment discussed in 
chapter 2.
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politicians to secure re-election, of interest groups to engage in rent-seeking and the 
overall structure of incentives which discriminate against dispersed interests in the 
political game (Kuran 1991).
With respect to the critique of post-hoc theorizing, Green & Shapiro are right to 
criticize 'bolt-on' reformulations of rational actor models, but only in so far as these 
reduce the approach to a vacuous set of tautologies, devoid of any problem solving 
power. This was clearly the case when Downs argued that voters go to the polls in 
order to do their share in preserving the democratic system. In so doing, Downs 
violated the central assumption of public choice analysis, that individuals choose 
among alternative courses of action according to the relative advantage to themselves 
and thus removed any problem solving potential which might be attributed to the 
rational actor approach (Chong 1995 p.45). However, as Chong (1995) proceeds, the 
fact that Downs engaged in post hoc theorizing in a tautological way, does not 
discredit the entire enterprise of post hoc theory modification as such. On the contrary, 
post hoc modification in the light of discontinuing evidence is an essential part of the 
research process and so long as it avoids tautological explanations, by definition 
increases the empirical power of theory.
It remains the case that there will often be conjecture within public choice theory 
concerning which motivations should be included in the category of individual self 
interest. To what extent should this refer purely to the maximization of power, status 
or wealth - the so called 'thick' rational account, or should the concept encompass 
broader motivations such as religious or ideological convictions - the 'thin' rational 
account ? (see Green & Shapiro 1995). The closer the definition of self interested 
behaviour accords with the full range of possible human motivations, the lesser will 
be the potential for problem solving. However, so long as the assumptions are laid out 
clearly, it remains a matter of empirical enquiry, which particular assumptions 
augment the problem solving power of public choice theory from those which 
diminish it to an unfalsifiable tautology.
Turning finally to the charge of ideological bias in public choice analysis, it remains to 
be seen how any form of theory construction in social science can take place in a 
political vacuum in the way these critics appear to suggest. Are not alternative 
perspectives imbued with ideological predispositions ? As Fiorina (1995) argues, all 
social scientists have perspectives and commitments which inevitably show up in their 
work. What prevents these biases from downgrading the value of social science is the 
possibility of theoretical and empirical challenges to a given interpretation from other 
practitioners in the field. So long as scholars can challenge a contribution by offering
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conflicting evidence and argument, then ideological manipulation can be avoided by 
way of informed debate. It may well be the case that many public choice theorists 
(though not all - see for example Dunleavy 1991) are motivated by an ideological bias 
against the intervention of the state and towards the exposure of 'government 
failures', but it is open for any other social scientist to challenge these interpretations 
with conflicting evidence and for the relative merits of the rival ideological 
interpretations to be judged on the basis of all the available evidence.
The adoption of the public choice paradigm to the study of political processes seems 
certain to generate continued controversy. Ultimately however, the contribution of any 
theory or research paradigm must be assessed by its ability to generate insights into 
observable social phenomena and it is in this sense that public choice continues to 
prove its worthiness as a method of analysis. The contribution of the public choice 
school to the analysis of 'government failures' reviewed in this chapter, provides a 
persuasive account of the different social outcomes we observe when individuals act 
within a market system framed by secure property rights, from their action within the 
confines of representative politics. It is this framework which is necessary for any 
examination of policy designed to improve on the workings of the market system and 
it is for this reason that the public choice approach is adopted for the duration of this 
thesis and its examination of urban containment policy within the British planning 
system.
1.8 Thesis Structure and Methodology
This introductory chapter has sought to review the theoretical perspective offered by 
the public choice paradigm to the analysis of 'government failures'. The following six 
chapters attempt to apply key aspects of this paradigm to understand the dynamics of 
policy failure within the British planning system.
Chapter 2 examines the evolving policy context of the planning system, focusing on 
the economic and environmental consequences of containment policy as a possible 
example of government failure. The chapter reviews existing accounts which have 
sought to explain the operation of the system and outlines more specifically how 
public choice with its unique focus on institutional incentives on the 'demand' and 
'supply' sides of the political process can provide new insights to the operation of the 
British planning system.
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The subsequent four chapters constitute the empirical core of the thesis in their 
application of public choice models to urban containment policy. Each chapter sets out 
in depth a public choice account of decision-making incentives which is then used as a 
refractive lens through which to view the available evidence.
Chapter 3 focuses on the 'demand side' of the political process, drawing attention to 
the importance of collective action problems and rational ignorance in the mobilization 
of interest groups and in particular the problems of mobilization facing the 'losers' in 
the planning system. Chapter 4 turns to the 'supply side', presenting a public choice 
account of bureaucratic behaviour, distinguishing the peculiar institutional form of 
planning bureaucracies in an attempt to explain the growth of containment oriented 
regulation. Chapter 5 examines the role of legislators on the 'supply-side', 
considering the potential sensitivity of politicians to the electoral and patronage power 
of special interest groups with a stake in urban containment. Chapter 6 presents a case 
study of a major planning dispute which appears to differ in key respects to the overall 
account of decision-making in earlier chapters. The case study was chosen specifically 
to see how far the public choice approach can be reconciled with some apparently 
discontinuing evidence. Finally, chapter 7 provides a summary of the key research 
findings and sets out a possible institutional alternative to the planning system.
The data presented in chapters 3-6 was derived from a variety of sources. Chapters 3 
and 4 rely in part on a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with leading 
members of interest groups and senior civil servants which are listed in the Appendix. 
Unless otherwise stated, the statistical material in these chapters was computed from 
interest group/ agency annual reports, the Annual Abstract of Statistics and the 
Monthly Digest of Statistics. The material in chapter 5 was extracted from the House 
of Commons Parliamentary Directories and the FT Profile Media Database. Chapter 6 
draws on a further set of semi-structured interviews conducted with interest group 
representatives, bureaucrats and politicians in Chester and statistical material computed 
from the Chartered Institute for Public Finance and Accounting (CIPFA), Planning 
and Development Statistics.
Some of the empirical material in chapters 3 to 6 is quantitative in nature and some 
simple tests of significance are used where appropriate. In general however, a precise 
statistical approach which attempts to quantify the magnitude of specific variables in 
the rational actor model is avoided. As was noted above, this is due to the inherent 
difficulty within social science of attempting to quantify effects which can be attributed 
directly to particular categories of rational action in the absence of ceteris paribus 
conditions. Instead, the thesis seeks to tightly integrate the available evidence into a
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public choice framework and thus its empirical contribution should be judged not by 
the precise measurement of specific effects, but by its ability to provide coherent 
explanations for the existence of policy failure within the British planning system.
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2.
Urban Containment & British Land Use Planning
2.0 Introduction
The introductory chapter outlined the contribution of the public choice paradigm to 
the analysis of 'government failures'. This chapter proceeds to examine the specific 
policy context of urban containment within the British planning system - a possible 
example of government failure.
The purpose of the chapter is threefold. First, by sketching out the evolving context 
against which urban containment has been pursued, it emphasizes the remarkable 
resilience of this policy in the wake of the substantial political and economic 
changes which have characterized the post-war period. Second, in noting the 
external effects generated by urban containment and the various contradictions 
within the planning system, it highlights the importance of avoiding the 'nirvana 
fallacy' when considering the case for government intervention in the market for 
land. Third, in reviewing the contribution of existing perspectives, it sets out more 
clearly how a public choice approach can augment understanding of land use 
planning with its distinctive account of transactions costs and institutional incentives 
within representative democracy.
2.1 Urban Containment: The Evolving Policy Context
In 1973, Hall et al completed the first comprehensive analysis of the British 
planning system, the title of which - "The Containment o f Urban England", reveals 
the very essence of post-war land use regulation. First proposed in the Barlow 
Report (1940), a key priority of planning controls in the post-war era has been an 
attempt to restrict the outward growth of urban areas. The principal mechanism for 
the achievement of this objective has been the designation of special areas in which 
planning permissions involving new urban developments are unlikely to be allowed. 
Probably the most famous of these is the Green Belt, originally recommended to 
local planning authorities by Duncan Sandys in the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government Circular 42/1955.
Throughout the post-war period the emphasis on containment has been justified, at 
least in part, in terms of the 'market failure' arguments discussed in chapter 1 
(Klosterman 1985,Thomley 1991). According to this perspective, externality and
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collective goods problems associated with the land market, mean that 'countryside 
goods' will be 'under produced' if competitive market forces are allowed a free reign. 
Thus, initial arguments for land use planning as advanced in the Barlow Report and 
its subsidiary Scott (1942) on Rural Land Use, suggested that restrictive land use 
controls were an essential mechanism to avoid the loss of open landscapes and 
fertile agricultural land. The protection of the countryside and the avoidance of 
negative externalities associated with urban growth has thus long been considered an 
essential task for the land use planning system (Shucksmith 1990).
At present, approximately 1.64 million hectares (ha) of England & Wales or 11% of 
the total land area is devoted to urban land uses. (Cullingworth & Nadin 1994).
The major impact of planning regulations has been a reduction in the rate at which 
land transfers from rural to urban uses. Some of this reduction is attributable to the 
effects of population stabilization and economic slowdown, but the planning system 
would appear to have had a very significant impact, given that the demand for 
housing in rural and suburban locations has risen continually in recent years (Evans 
1988, 1991, Bramley et al 1995).
The policy of urban containment is probably the most long standing and highly 
developed aspect of environmental policy in the United Kingdom (McCormick 
1991), but the specific nature of its implementation has varied according to the 
changing political and economic context over the years. Simmie (1993) 
distinguishes between three broad phases ; 1947-68, a period of economic growth in 
which the implementation of the first post-war planning policies came to fruition; 
1969-78, a period of recession and reform to the planning system within the context 
of changes to the organization of local government; and 1979 -1990, the decade of 
'Thatcherism'. To these must now be added a fourth phase, 1991 to the present, a 
period which has witnessed the growth of environmental planning.
1947-68
The implementation of post-war planning legislation under the Labour 
administration of Clement Attlee, saw a massive transfer of property rights from 
private individuals to the state. Under the provisions of the 1947 legislation private 
ownership of land was maintained, but urban development rights transferred to local 
authority planning departments and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
(since 1970 the Department of the Environment - DoE). Thereafter, anyone wanting 
to develop his/her property had to apply to the local authority for planning
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permission which would be approved or rejected according to a local development 
plan. Under this new system only agricultural related developments were exempt 
from statutory planning controls. The magnitude of this change is captured 
eloquently by two leading planning lawyers;
" It is impossible to exaggerate the importance o f July 1st 1947from the viewpoint 
o f the local planning authority, the landowner, or the building developer, fo r  the 
1947 Act conferred some o f the most drastic and far reaching provisions ever 
enacted affecting the ownership o f land and the liberty o f the owner to develop and 
use his own land. Indeed, after 1947 ownership o f land carries with it nothing more 
than the right to go on using it fo r existing purposes." (Grant & Heap 1991, p. 18).
The instigation of such fundamental change owed much to the growing faith in 
socialist, rational planning at the time. The inter-war years in particular had 
witnessed substantial economic changes which created a broad consensus 
throughout the major political parties in favour of increasing intervention by the 
state (Hall 1975, Ambrose 1986, Thomley 1991, Cherry 1996). With respect to 
urban containment, several trends were cited in justification of the new planning 
system. These included, a massive suburban housing boom in the inter-war period, 
which saw the construction of 2.7 million new homes between 1930 and 1940; the 
rapid loss of agricultural land, running at approximately 30 000 ha per year ; 
growing problems of urban congestion, especially in South East England and around 
Greater London; and increasing economic disparities between an expanding 
Midlands and South East and declining areas of the old industrial North (Hall 1975).
These problems were seen as two sides of the same coin and imbued with the ideas 
of rationalist planning, post-war politicians pursued the goal of urban containment in 
the name of reducing pressure on the countryside and in particular agricultural land; 
and by restricting development opportunities in the more prosperous regions sought 
to shift economic activity to the depressed areas (Hall 1975). Within this context a 
substantial role was envisaged for the state in the actual process of development and 
on a number of occasions in the 1950s and early 1960s, public sector developments 
and especially house building represented the majority of new construction projects. 
Urban developments were to be provided in the form of self-contained New Towns, 
built by the public sector and surrounded by green belts to enable a controlled and 
contained dispersal of the population out of the older urban areas (Hall 1975, Cherry
1996).
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As Simmie (1993) has argued, the instigation of these initial policies received 
political support from a range of different interests. These included the newly 
emerging planning professions - the Town and Country Planning Association 
(TCPA) and the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI), which sought to prevent the 
coalescence of urban areas as part of a strategy of rationalist planning to control the 
land use system as a whole (Simmie 1993, Cherry 1996). The agricultural sector and 
in particular the National Farmers Union (NFU), which sought an expansion of 
domestic food producing capacity and the protection of farmland from the threat of 
urbanization (Newby 1980, Herington 1984, Shucksmith 1990). And, the 
environmental interest represented by groups such as the Council for the Protection 
of Rural England (CPRE) consisting of existing rural dwellers who sought to protect 
the countryside from the perceived threat of urban sprawl (Herington 1984, Simmie 
1993).
1969-78
The introduction of the post-war planning system took place against a background of 
continuing economic growth and political consensus, but the years 1969-78 were to 
witness substantial changes, especially with respect to the economic context 
(Simmie 1993).
A prolonged period of economic recession, exacerbated by the 'Oil Crisis' in the 
early 1970s appeared to expose a fundamental conflict of interest within the system. 
Thus, the desire to protect the countryside from urban encroachment ran against the 
trend for economic activity, in the wake of technological restructuring, to move out 
from the inner urban locations in search of suburban or rural sites. These trends 
were especially significant given the reduced role of the state in the development 
process, characterized by the abandonment of the New Towns project in response to 
the growing financial crisis of the public sector. The continuation of strict 
containment policies against this background ran the risk of stifling the only sectors 
which appeared to show any potential for prolonged economic growth (Simmie 
1993).
In turn, these conflicts were exacerbated by changes in the institutional structure of 
the planning system itself, as part of local government reform. The 1968 Town & 
Country Planning Act had already replaced the 1947 local development plan system 
with a new framework dividing responsibility between Structure (at the county 
level) and Local plans (at the district level). Within this context, subsequent
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legislation (1971 Town & Country Planning Act) introduced a system of public 
participation in the plan making process following the recommendations of the 
Skeffington Report (1969). This Act extended the right of members of the public to 
make objections to the policies laid out in plans and for the first time to be consulted 
during the actual process of plan preparation. According to Elson (1986), the 
adoption of this approach reflected a political response to the growing power of anti­
development groups in rural and suburban areas, which increasingly sought to use 
the planning system as an exclusionary device to preserve the character of their 
lifestyles. Thus, at the time when economic processes were indicating a shift of 
activity into new locations, the institutional form of the planning system increasingly 
appeared to reflect the power of interests which sought to resist these very trends 
(Hall 1975, Simmie 1993, Cherry 1996).
1979-1990
In response to the economic difficulties of the 1970s, the general election in May 
1979 saw the election of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative administration which 
was to herald the 'decade of Thatcherism'. Whereas previous administrations be they 
Conservative or Labour, had offered broad support for the political principles 
underlying land use planning, the Thatcher government was the one post-war 
administration openly to challenge the scope of the town & country planing system. 
In line with its ideology of minimizing state intervention and freeing up the 
operation of market forces to stimulate greater economic activity, the Conservative 
government attempted to adopt a number of reforms to the planning system aimed at 
reducing regulatory red-tape and to create a more flexible regime which would 
respond more quickly to the changing economic circumstances.
A number of authors have suggested that these reforms amounted to a dismantling of 
the post-war planning framework in a crude attempt to further the scope of market 
forces (Ambrose 1986, Thomley 1991), but as Healey et al (1989) have suggested, 
there is an unfortunate tendency for many commentators to confuse the rhetoric of 
the Thatcher administration with the actual implementation of policy on the ground 
(see also Marsden et al 1993). Thus, the Conservative government did reduce the 
scope of traditional land use planning in inner city areas with the adoption of 
Simplified Planning Zones (SPZ's) and Urban Development Corporations (UDC's), 
which effectively bypassed local planning authorities in favour of selected business 
interests. However, a cursory glance at the rest of the system shows the remarkable 
extent to which planning was left untouched and indeed by the late 1980s, in terms
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of countryside planning appeared to have actually expanded.
In the first years of the Thatcher administration attention focused on a series of 
policy circulars issued by the Department of the Environment (DoE). These circulars 
- 9/80, 16/84 and 14/85 advised local planning authorities to pay greater heed to the 
concerns of developers and especially groups such as the House Builders Federation 
(HBF), and to presume in favour of development proposals unless serious planning 
objections could be raised. Facilitating the expansion of private house building was 
considered a major aspect of Conservative policy given the intention to substantially 
reduce the scope of public sector provision in this field (Rydin 1986). Together with 
a revised draft policy on Green Belts issued in 1983, which suggested that green belt 
boundaries be drawn back, these proposals appeared to point towards the relaxation 
of the more stringent urban containment policies and were interpreted as an attempt 
by central government to curtail the regulatory powers of local authorities (Thomley 
1991). Although the advice put forward in circulars had never represented a 
compulsory element to be reflected in the policies of local planning authorities, they 
were significant in so far as authorities which rejected central government planning 
guidelines had always been more likely to have their decisions overturned should 
developers turn to the DoE appeals procedure (now performed by the Planning 
Inspectorate) - (Rydin 1986).
In practice however, the introduction of the DoE circulars had little effect in terms of 
how the planning system actually operated on the ground. The proposal to relax 
Green Belt policy was dropped almost immediately following protests from groups 
such as the Council for the Protection of Rural England and the National Farmers 
Union and the number of planning appeals from developers which were accepted by 
the DoE increased by only 4% following the issue of the circulars - this at a time 
when local authorities were expanding the coverage of environmental designations 
at an unprecedented rate, the coverage of statutory green belts alone doubling from 
1.5 million ha in 1979 to over 3 million ha by 1987 (Ehrman 1988).
The introduction of the so called ALURE (Alternative Land Use and the Rural 
Economy) proposals in 1987 represented a second ineffectual attempt to relax the 
controls over urban developments in the countryside. Faced with the growing 
financial crisis of the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the government 
proposed that farming should cease to have the first claim to land use in the 
countryside and that alternative uses, such as leisure and housing developments be 
given greater weight. At the same time a number of private sector house building 
consortia proposed the development of 'new settlements' in green belts and other
43
designated zones, typified by the plans from Consortium Developments to build 
4800 new houses intruding onto a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) at Foxley 
Wood in North East Hampshire (Ehrman 1990, Shucksmith 1990).
As with the proposals in the first half of the Thatcher decade however, these 
schemes were to have little by way of impact on the system as a whole. Thus, the 
ALURE proposals introduced by the then Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Nicholas Ridley, were watered down within two months of publication, with all 
references to increased house building effectively removed and of over 200 schemes 
for new settlements proposed by 1989, a mere 7 were eventually granted with 
planning permission (Ehrman 1990, Pennington 1996). The final announcement to 
refuse permission for the Foxley Wood development, made by the subsequent 
Secretary of State, Chris Patten, brought to an end any attempt by the Conservative 
government to challenge the adherence to containment policies. Indeed, the 1980s as 
a whole saw the lowest rate of rural land development since the implementation of 
the 1947 Act. Between 1980 and 1990,5000 ha (or 0.03%) of the land area) 
transferred out of agricultural production and into urban uses, a third of the figure in 
the 1950s and 1960s and a mere fifth of the rate witnessed in the inter-war period 
(Cullingworth & Nadin 1994).
1991-1997
The abandonment of Conservative attempts to liberalize the planning system in the 
late 1980s, was to herald the arrival of an apparently strengthened commitment to 
urban containment in the 1990s. Speeded by the growth of concern over 
environmental degradation, both within and outside the United Kingdom, the 
passage of legislation in the early years of the decade marked an expansion of the 
regulatory regime and a pronounced tightening of existing restrictions. The Planning 
and Compensation Act (1991) for example, makes an explicit commitment to 
countryside protection, and has been hailed by a Council for the Protection of Rural 
England (CPRE) spokesperson as, "one of the most important pieces of 
environmental legislation in the last twenty years," (Burton 1991, p.70).
In addition to the existing argument for containment on the grounds of countryside 
protection, the new legislation and a raft of policy guidance's (now known as 
Planning Policy Guidance Notes - PPG's) issued by the DoE, suggest a need to 
integrate land use policies with a wider environmental strategy aimed at the 
achievement of 'sustainable development'. In response to the international
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environmental agenda set by the 'Earth Summit' in Rio de Janeiro (1992 ), a new 
argument has been advanced which suggests that the land use planning system 
should be utilized as a strategic device to minimize the use of non-renewable 
resources which would otherwise be overexploited in the context of a market 
economy (DoE PPG 12). The planning system should, through a strategy of urban 
containment, discourage the use of 'non-renewable' green field sites and concentrate 
new developments on 'recycled' brown-field sites in existing urban centres. In so 
doing, it is argued that land use planning can contribute to a reorientation of the 
urban system, moving it away from an emphasis on low density suburban 
developments, heavily reliant on road transport and in particular the private car, 
towards a more high density, compacted form of development serviced by public 
transport. By reducing transport distances, it is suggested that planning can help to 
reduce the emmittance of pollutants and 'green house' gases such as Carbon Dioxide 
(DoE PPG2, PPG6, PPG12 & PPG 13).
The most recent manifestation of this restrictive policy stance can be seen in the 
DoE response to the latest projections on the demand for housing land, in which the 
then Secretary of State for the Environment, John Gummer MP, set a target that 
65% of new dwellings should be built on land within the boundaries of existing 
towns and cities, rather than on greenfield sites (DoE 1996).
Table 2.1 Land Use Designations in the United Kingdom
AGLQ Area of Great Landscape Quality
AGLV Area of Great Landscape Value
AONB Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty
ASI Area of Scientific Interest
ASSI Area of Special Scientific Interest
ESA Environmentally Sensitive Area
CPZ Coastal Protection Zone
GB Green Belt
HC Heritage Coast
LCA Local Conservation Area
LNR Local Nature Reserve
NNR National Nature Reserve
NP National Park
NSA National Scenic Area
RS Ramsar Site
SSSI Site of Special Scientific Interest
SCA Special Conservation Area
SPA Special Protection Area
Source : Pennington (1996, p.58).
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Figure 2.1 Statutory Land Use Designations in England and Wales
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Table 2.2 Major Designations in England &Wales as a Percentage of Land Area
Designation Area/millions ha. % of Land Area
Green Belt 2.18 14.5
AONB 2.25 15.0
National Park 1.35 9.0
SSSI 1.05 7.0
Total 6.83 45.5
England &Wales 15.03 100.0
Source : Computed from Cullingworth & Nadin (1994, Ch. 5 & 8).
Together with the already substantial catalogue of special designations, documented 
in Table 2.1,Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1, the British land use planning system would 
now appear to be present a bigger obstacle to urban developments in the countryside 
than at any point since 1947.
2.2 The Consequences o f Containment
The above discussion of the evolving policy context reveals the extent to which the 
commitment to urban containment has remained at the very heart of the planning 
system throughout the post-war period. From the early years following the 1947 Act, 
through to the present day, the restriction of urban development has been the clearest 
manifestation of land use regulation in the United Kingdom. It is quite remarkable 
that the Thatcher government, supposedly committed to a policy of 'deregulation', 
actually presided over the biggest increase in the area of statutory designated land in 
the history of the system (Ehrman 1990).
However, whilst government support for urban containment appears to have been 
maintained for a period of fifty years, it is far from clear that the balance of benefits 
derived from this policy actually outweigh the costs imposed on consumers of both 
urban and rural environments. In particular, it appears that containment has 
produced various 'negative externalities' of its own, in terms of the effect on the 
price and density of new developments, the impact on transport patterns and the
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effect of alternative land uses on the environment. In turn, these external effects 
have given rise to a series of contradictions which beset contemporary land use 
policy. The sources of these contradictions are examined below.
Containment & House Prices
Economic theory teaches that given a constant demand, restrictions in the supply of 
a commodity will increase the price of that commodity. Rising prices, will in turn 
act to choke of demand to ensure that the quantity demanded equals the quantity 
supplied. Environmental designations and other restrictions under the land use 
planning system effectively remove substantial areas of the countryside from the 
urban land market and so one would expect to witness an upward effect on the price 
of land for housing and other urban developments as a result of planning controls.
Empirical evidence in support of the view that containment policies increase prices 
has been provided by Evans (1988, 1991) who examines data from the Department 
of the Environment's index of housing land prices between 1965 and 1985. 
According to this analysis, housing land prices increased by over 1000% during this 
period, compared to only a 400% increase in general prices (Evans 1988, p. 17-22). 
This data confirms the earlier work of Hall et al (1973), which suggested that the 
proportion of land costs in the price of new housing units increased from between 
4% and 8% in 1960 to between 18% and 38% a decade later (Hall et al 1973, p.399- 
400) - by the late 1980s the figure was well over 40% (Ehrman 1988, p. 17). In short, 
it appears that the market for land responded to the increasing relative scarcity 
brought about by containment policies in precisely the way the economist would 
predict. As a consequence, the principal beneficiaries of land use planning have been 
existing owners of property who have seen a continual appreciation of their assets at 
the expense of increased housing opportunities in rural and suburban areas. Thus, 
wealth has been redistributed in favour of a relatively wealthy section of the 
population at the expense of a relatively poorer set of consumers (Simmie 1993).
As Veljanowski (1988) observes, one would expect at the very least that planning 
restrictions would lead to relative shortages of land and as a result higher prices - but 
this position has not been exempt from theoretical challenge. On the contrary, it is 
often argued that since the supply of undeveloped land is fixed, its value is 
determined by the demand for land, which in turn is derived from the economic 
value of its uses - and not the availability of land itself (Neuberger & Nicol 1975, 
Ball 1983, Grigson 1986)). This line of reasoning derives from the application of
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Ricardian rent theory which states, "Com is not high because a rent is paid, but a 
rent is paid because com is high." Thus, in the specific case of housing land, prices 
are determined by the supply and price of the existing housing stock and not the 
availability of land itself.
As Evans (1988) proceeds however, the theoretical challenge to the contention that 
planning controls increase prices is based on a misapplication of the Ricardian 
analysis. In particular, the land use planning system restricts the supply of all 
developed land and it is this restriction which must contribute to increased house 
prices at least in the long run. In the short run, the supply of housing is likely to be 
relatively inelastic because it takes time for housebuilders to assemble land and to 
increase production in response to a price rise; and as Goodchild & Munton (1985) 
note, the extent to which landowners bring forward development land may be 
constrained by a range of non-pecuniary personal motivations, including 
attachments to a particular plot. In the long run however, the supply of land for 
development is elastic, because land can be transferred from less valued uses such as 
agriculture to more valued uses such as housing. It is this process that the land use 
planning system restricts and thus contributes to increased prices. As Evans (1988) 
argues, accepting the Ricardian analysis that the price of housing land is determined 
by the supply and price of housing does not alter the fact that the existing supply of 
housing is affected by the supply of housing land." Both land prices and house 
prices are determined simultaneously by demand and by supply. Restricting the 
supply of land, i.e. through planning controls, will raise the price of both ," (Evans 
1987, p.3).
Empirical support for the Evans thesis is provided by comparing the difference 
between the price of land for housing and the price of land for the next most valued 
use - usually agriculture - ie. the opportunity cost of housing land. Table 2.3 displays 
the results of the most recent research which compares land prices for agriculture 
and housing in four case study areas. The effect appears to be most marked in South 
East England where restrictions are often most severe, but even in the North of 
England planning controls have constrained supply to such an extent that the price of 
land for housing far exceeds its agricultural value. The difference in the two prices is 
maintained by restricting the transfer of land from one market to the other, which is 
precisely the intention of urban containment.
Further support for this position has been marshalled by Simmie (1993) in a 
comparative analysis of land use regulation in California (USA) and the United 
Kingdom. Taking the experience of California and using secondary sources, Simmie
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Table 2.3 Housing Land and Agricultural Land Prices in Four Case Study Areas
Housing 
£ per ha
Agriculture 
£ per ha
Agricultural as a % 
of Housing
Reigate
1975 75 000 1 620 2.2
1990 972 000 4 940 0.5
Wokingham
1975 67 000 1 980 3.0
1990 1 070 000 6 790 0.6
Beverley
1975 19 000 1750 9.2
1990 480 000 4 940 1.0
Barnsley
1975 27 000 1450 5.4
1990 210 000 6 180 2.9
Source : Gerald Eve and Cambridge Department of Land Economy (1992, p.26).
examines the impact of containment policies by first looking at the pattern of house 
prices before growth management policies were introduced; second comparing these 
with the pattern of prices after regulation increased; and finally comparing this 
experience with the still more stringent containment regime operating in the United 
Kingdom. The studies summarized by Simmie conclude that housing land prices in 
California increased substantially after the introduction of land use controls, but that 
in turn these increases were not of the order often experienced in the UK and 
especially in South East England.
It is not only via the designation of environmental sites that land use planning may 
have contributed to increases in the price of housing. Additional research suggests 
that the system barely responds to increases in market demand by increasing the 
number of planning permissions approved (Bramley et al 1995). The length of time 
taken to evaluate planning applications and the complex procedures involved in the 
drafting of local development plans all impose substantial cost and time delays on 
developers, which reduce their ability to respond to increases in demand. In recent 
times these delays have become particularly severe following the 1991 Planning & 
Compensation Act, which as Cullingworth & Nadin (1994, p.59) note, increased the 
length of the public inquiry procedure, where it is not uncommon for developers to
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pay out over £500,000 in consultancy and legal fees, from about 7 weeks in 1988 to 
22 weeks in 1992. Research suggests that it can take as long as four years for 
developers to proceed from the plan consultation stage to the commencement of new 
building (Simmie 1993). As the supply side response of developers to market 
demand is constrained by land use regulation, so the relative scarcity of housing 
stock increases and prices rise.
The evidence on prices supports the view that the restrictions imposed on urban 
development are responsible for higher housing costs. What does remain a matter of 
contention however, is the magnitude of the price increases which can be attributed 
to containment oriented policies. Cheshire & Sheppard (1989) use econometric 
techniques to compare the relatively more relaxed planning regime in Darlington, 
Durham with the more restrictive policies in Reading, Berkshire to examine the 
impact of restrictive controls. The results of their analysis suggested that housing 
costs in central Reading would be 12% lower in the town centre and 4% lower in the 
suburbs if the more relaxed policies were adopted (p.469-485 - see also Cheshire & 
Sheppard 1997). In a further study however, Bramley et al (1995) suggest in their 
econometric model that a relaxation of Green Belt designations would result in only 
a 2% reduction in housing costs across South East England (Bramley et al 1995, Ch. 
7). According to this analysis, if planning controls were relaxed substantially, the 
fall in housing costs would not be that significant because consumers would respond 
to lower prices by consuming more land which would in turn force up the cost of 
housing units.
Cheshire & Sheppard (1989) and Evans (1988,1991) accept that 'density effects 1 
may be in operation and that the effect of containment policies may be not so much 
on the numbers of housing units and the price per unit (those these may be 
significant depending on which econometric analysis one is to believe), but more on 
the type, size and density of the units which are developed. It is this 'density effect' 
which appears to represent the second major externality associated with urban 
containment in Britain.
Containment, Dwelling Densities and Town Cramming
If there remains debate concerning the extent to which land use restrictions have 
forced up the price of housing, there is little doubt that containment policies have 
been responsible for a substantial increase in the density at which people live. 
Economists such as Evans (1988, 1991) argue that when planning restricts the
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supply of land for housing, it inevitably tends to raise densities as developers cram 
more units onto ever smaller plots and that this obliges households to consume less 
space than they would otherwise prefer - the 'Rabbit Hutches on Postage Stamps' 
syndrome (Evans 1991). Moreover, as opportunities for new building on greenfield 
sites are restricted, developers respond to the shortage by seeking out any remaining 
open land within existing urban areas. The resultant 'infilling' of urban open space 
and the loss of garden space in suburban estates, increases the density of urban 
development above the level which accords with consumer preferences and adds to 
urban congestion (Simmie 1993).
There is now a substantial body of evidence which supports the above interpretation. 
Recent research by Gerald Eve and Cambridge Department of Land Economy 
(1992) compares the density of new detached housing in four case study areas over 
the forty year period from 1950 to 1990. The empirical results, presented in Table 
2.4 indicate a significant increase in densities over the period of study.
A second manifestation of this effect has been examined by Cheshire & Sheppard 
(1989), Evans (1988, 1991) and Bramley et al (1995), all of whom note the 
increasing trend towards low space consuming developments such as flats and 
maisonettes and away from more spacious dwellings such as detached houses and 
bungalows. According to Evans (1988) between 1969 and 1985 the proportion of 
newly constructed buildings mortgaged with building societies which were 
bungalows, fell from 25% of the total to only 11%, whereas the proportion which 
were flats, maisonettes or terraced houses increased from less than 10% to over 25% 
(p.20-22). This shift has occurred because of the increase in the relative price of 
housing land and not because the size of households is becoming smaller and hence 
requiring smaller units of housing. If the latter had been the dominant reason for the 
shift in dwelling types, one would have expected the price of the smaller units to 
have increased faster than the larger units, when in fact the evidence points to the 
opposite effect.
Bramley et al (1995) concur with this analysis by observing the different proportions 
of dwelling types in different regions of the country. In South East England, where 
land prices are highest and containment controls tend to be the toughest, the 
proportion of flats and maisonettes is substantially higher than in areas of lesser 
demand and relatively more liberal policies, in particular parts of the West Midlands. 
Thus, flats formed nearly a third of new output in Berkshire, compared to only 3% in 
Staffordshire.
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Table 2.4 Density of Detached Housing in Four Case Study Areas
Density per hectare
1950s 1960s 1970s Early
1980s
Late
1980s
Reigate 20.14 9.75 18.16 23.86 29.92
Wokingham 16.72 15.65 25.55 23.11 21.77
Beverley na 14.38 22.09 na 27.38
Barnsley na 39.44 27.11 40.94 na
Source : Gerald Eve & Cambridge Department of Land Economy (1992, p.31).
In further work Bramley et al (1995) offer additional support for this thesis with an 
econometric analysis of planning restraints and dwelling densities from which they 
conclude that there is a positive relationship between the degree of planning restraint 
and the density of new development - the more restrictive is the planning policy, the 
higher is the density of new housing construction (Bramley et al 1995, Ch.8).
Evans (1988) adds and interesting twist to the density thesis in suggesting that 
falling architectural standards in general, can also be attributed to the effect of 
restrictive planning controls. According to this view, given the restricted supply of 
land the profitability of obtaining planning permission for a developer is far higher 
than the profits to be made from the design of attractive buildings. Or, as 
Veljanowski (1988) puts it, given the absolute shortage of development land due to 
planning the value of a house, or any building per se is exceptionally high, but the 
marginal profitability of that house or building being well designed is low. Since 
property has been made an artificially scarce commodity more or less any kind of 
building can be put up and sold.
Containment and Transport Patterns
In addition to the price and density effects, it is now increasingly apparent that 
policies of strict containment have been responsible, at least in part, for a shift in the 
nature of transport and commuting patterns. Although much of the growth in 
demand for long distance commuting may be attributed to the effects of a subsidized 
road system and in particular the absence of pricing mechanisms for road use (Hibbs
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1992, ASI 1988), analysis has confirmed that Green Belts and equivalent controls 
exacerbate these trends (Downs 1992, DoE 1993).
The major effect of planning controls in the UK has been the physical containment 
of urban areas, but this has not prevented the functional decentralization of cities and 
of the population itself (Simmie 1993). On the contrary, throughout the entire post­
war period there has been an important shift in the pattern of residential location, 
away from the major conurbations towards the smaller 'commuter' towns outside the 
traditional metropolitan areas. In turn, as people have left the older cities they have 
been accommodated in high density suburban estates or in rural villages. This 
outward flow of resident populations has not however been matched by a concurrent 
shift in the pattern of employment. Employment levels in the inner cities have fallen, 
but not to the same extent as population levels. The result has been an increase in the 
proportion of employment opportunities taken by commuters, often living a 
substantial distance away from their place of work. These distances have been 
increased by green belts and other designations which restrict development on the 
rural/urban fringe and hence shift development pressure further out, which in turn 
increases the demand for long distance commuting and hence more roads (Herington 
1984, 1990, DoE 1993, Simmie 1993).
As Simmie (1993) observes, the trend towards increased commuting has been 
particularly marked around the free-standing cities beyond the green belts. In these 
areas, population has remained fairly stable, but there has been a significant increase 
in the level of employment opportunities. The new jobs have been taken by 
individuals living outside the areas concerned, usually in neighbouring towns or 
rural villages. Environmental designations have contributed to an increase in 
commuting distances, because they prevent families from living in homes within 
close proximity of their chosen place of work. Instead, people must commute 
between towns or between towns and rural villages and as a consequence there has 
been an increase in the demand for road links between these areas (Simmie 1993, 
DoE 1993).
Containment: Environmental or Agricultural Protection ?
A fourth external effect which may be attributed to the planning system, concerns 
the impact on the countryside of the land uses which have been favoured in the 
pursuit of urban containment and especially the privileges granted to the agricultural 
sector.
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Although it is often thought that planning controls and site designations are 
primarily an act of environmental policy, in practice the environmental focus of 
land use planning has been confined purely to the preoccupation with urban 
containment to the neglect of what actually happens in the countryside itself (Evans 
1991, 1996, Pennington 1996). Existing uses of land in rural areas and agriculture in 
particular, have been exempted from the controls governing alternative forms of 
development. Thus, planning permissions for farm buildings, fences and hedgerow 
grubbing are often not required. In reality, the town planning legislation has been 
inextricably linked to the regime of subsidised farming also introduced in 1947 (via 
the Agriculture Act) and since 1973, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the 
European Union. The designation of green belts, and other controls on rural land 
development has prevented the spread of urban developments into the countryside, 
but the countryside has not been conserved for environmental purposes, but rather 
for the expansion of subsidised farming which has in turn had a devastating impact 
on the rural landscape.
The environmental impact of agricultural support policy is now well documented 
(Bowers & Cheshire 1983, Munton 1983, Lowe et al 1986) and can be summarized 
as follows; with farm subsidies positively related to the level of production, land 
prices have risen as the possession of agricultural land has become in effect a license 
to receive subsidies. In turn, higher land prices have raised the real cost of land 
above that of labour and heavily subsidised capital inputs, thus encouraging farmers 
to intensify the use of land which has usually meant the removal of hedgerows, the 
adoption of 'prairie farming' techniques and the widespread use of chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides. As a result, agricultural production has increasingly 
extended onto marginal lands, otherwise unsuitable for farming with a concurrent 
loss of habitats, including an 80% reduction in chalk downland, a 60% reduction in 
heathland, and a 50% reduction in meadowland (Lowe et al 1986 p.65-68).
By designating sites which effectively forbid the development of non-agricultural 
uses, the planning system has for half a century reinforced the privileged position of 
subsidised farming and it can be argued, has prevented the transfer of land to more 
highly valued and in many cases less environmentally damaging uses (Evans 1996, 
Pennington 1996). Low density housing or leisure developments for example, 
interspersed with woodland are compatible with maintaining habitat and species 
diversity. Moreover, even if the rate of rural to urban conversion had continued at 
the pre-planning level of 30,000 ha per annum, which is highly unlikely, the 
proportion of the land area which is urban would still be under 20% and a case can
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be made that the loss of habitat due to the extra 8 or 9% of urbanization would not 
have been as great as the +50% losses due to agricultural support (Pennington 1996, 
p.22, Evans 1996).
In the immediate post-war period, policy-makers justified the introduction of 
subsidies on the grounds of avoiding food shortages, but in the intervening years 
transfer payments have been expanded to such an extent, in particular under the 
CAP, that there is now massive overproduction and a surplus of agricultural land 
which could be as high as 12 million acres (Shucksmith 1990). By restricting the 
development of non-farm businesses in the countryside, the planning system has 
added substantially to the burden of taxation by maintaining the dependence of 
farmers on subsidies and the continual expansion of the CAP budget - £3.2 billion 
in 1996. On the one hand farmers are subsidised to produce food for a market which 
does not exist, whilst on the other, the relative shortage of building land drives up 
house prices and dwelling densities still further.
Containment as Government Failure
The foregoing analysis has sought to summarize the principal consequences of urban 
containment and in so doing has highlighted the external effects generated by a key 
aspect of the British land use planning system. In particular, planning has 
contributed to an increase in the relative cost of housing and therefore a transfer of 
wealth from consumers to property owners, has increased dwelling densities and 
urban congestion, has lengthened commuting distances and has provided a context 
for the protection of subsidized, environmentally damaging farming practices.
The presence of these externalities does not prove that they outweigh the potential 
benefits of planning - principally the maintenance of open countryside. Nor has any 
attempt been made here, to measure the costs and benefits associated with 
containment, as might be required by an adherent of cost/benefit analysis. On the 
contrary, from the perspective of Virginia public choice theory attempts to assign 
precise monetary values to non-traded goods are essentially arbitrary. The relative 
values which individuals attach to environmental goods are known only to the 
individuals themselves and it is only through the actual exchange of goods in a 
genuine market where property rights are assigned that the relative value of goods 
can be made known.1
^The fundamental difficulty with cost/ benefit analysis is the assumption that money is a unit of 
measurement when in fact it is a medium of exchange. When an individual exchanges money for a
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What the existence of possible external effects associated with land use planning 
does suggest, however, is the need to avoid the 'nirvana fallacy' when considering 
the merits of government intervention in the market for land. Consequently, 
attention should focus on the general structure of incentives provided by the 
institutions through which land use planning policies are carried out. Individual 
action always takes place in an institutional setting which affects the ability of 
rational actors to achieve their desired goals and the compatibility of these goals 
with those of other individuals. If institutional incentives associated with land use 
planning allow costs to be passed on to others and if there is a lack of information, 
then it is possible to challenge the merits of the policies produced by such a system 
on the grounds of institutional failure.
Within this context, the importance of avoiding 'nirvana solutions' appears all the 
more pertinent given the changes within the British planning system towards a still 
stronger emphasis on containment, which evidence suggests runs contrary to stated 
policy intentions. In particular, all major political parties and the planning profession 
continue to profess a desire to increase the affordability of housing, when 
commitment to containment implies an increase in the relative cost of land and 
hence higher prices for both private and public sector housing developments.
Second, politicians and planners claim to seek an improvement in the quality of 
urban environments, when the desire to provide the majority of new housing in 
existing urban areas points to a further increase in dwelling densities, a reduction in 
urban open space and increased congestion. Third, policy suggests that containment 
should encourage a more compact form of development to reduce commuting 
distances, when all the available evidence suggests that green belts and equivalent 
controls actually increase the tendency toward long distance commuting. Finally, 
politicians claim to support a reduction in the burden of agricultural support when 
containment restricts alternative business development and thus seems more likely 
to increase the burden of taxation.
good or service, she does so because she values the good concerned more than the money - it is not 
possible however, to say how much more, because the opportunity cost is subjective. Because money 
is a medium of exchange rather than a precise measure of value, attempts to measure the value of 
goods which are are not actually traded are of little if any use (Formaini 1991).
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2.3 Perspectives on Containment
The above contradictions suggest that political actors may be motivated by concerns 
other than the correction of 'market failures'. As discussed in chapter 1, it is the 
analysis of these motives and their likely impact on the nature of the policy process 
that has been the major concern of public choice theory. Public choice focuses on 
the institutional incentives within representative democracies which lead to instances 
of 'government failure' and as a consequence questions the virtue of intervention by 
the state. The presence of policy contradictions within the planning system has 
however, already stimulated contributions from a number of alternative perspectives 
which have attempted to explain the pattern of decision-making. The theoretical and 
empirical contributions offered by these perspectives must be assessed before setting 
out the more specific contribution of a public choice approach. Four perspectives are 
of particular relevance in this regard; Structural Political Economy, Pluralist 
Political Economy, Elite Theory and Weberian Sociology.
Structural Political Economy
Since the 1970s, structural political economy perspectives have been of growing 
significance in the study of the planning system. These schools of thought draw on 
aspects of neo-Marxism and Corporatism in their analysis of the modem state. In its 
Marxist variant, following the seminal contributions of Harvey (1973, 1985) and 
Castells (1977), Ball (1983) and other theorists in this tradition, explain policy 
contradictions within the planning system in terms of the desire of the state to 
maintain social stability in the face of the fundamental class divisions between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In its Corporatist variant (Dunleavy 1981, Cawson 
1986), the focus is on the power of sectoral economic interests representing 
agriculture, construction or finance. Either way, from a structural political economy 
perspective, corporate business interests are considered to be the dominant force in 
the political system and the evolution of policy will reflect the structural advantage 
of these interests within the economy.
Within this context, the state intervenes in the urban development process through 
the instrument of the planning system to create the environmental conditions 
necessary to maintain the legitimacy of the capitalist order. Policies such as urban 
containment are construed as an attempt by the state to preserve environmental 
amenities and other aspects of 'collective consumption' from development pressure. 
According to this view, these interventions are necessary to ensure a balance
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between the provision of new housing and other developments and the preservation 
of amenities which is commensurate with continued political stability. Ultimately 
however, the autonomy of the state will always be limited by the structural context 
of the capitalist economy which requires that government's do not pursue policies 
which run against the fundamental desire of business to make profits (Ambrose 
1986).
Following Harvey (1973, 1977), Short et al (1986) posit an 'intemal-contradiction' 
central to the process of state intervention, which in turn contributes to continued 
political instability and conflict. Thus, on the one hand the state must intervene in 
the market to maintain social legitimacy, but on the other it is duty bound to act in 
the economic interests of the capitalist class (Marxism) or particular sectors of 
private business, such as house builders (Corporatism). In the case of urban 
containment, the economic interests of business lie in the growth of owner-occupied 
housing and in particular suburban residential development - in order to stimulate 
the demand for housing and household goods, as a way of encouraging consumption 
and boosting profit rates. However, if the state is to facilitate suburbanization, which 
requires a relaxation of regulatory controls on the building industry, this will in turn 
run against the need to maintain social legitimacy as the 'collective consumption' of 
amenity is threatened (Ambrose 1986, Short et al 1986).
Short et al (1986) apply this frame of reference to understand the periodic conflicts 
between central and local government over the appropriate degree of planning 
restraint, which typified the 1980s. According to this perspective, the publication of 
various policy circulars issued by central government, for example DoE 9/80 and 
15/84, which urged local authorities to adopt a more liberal attitude to development, 
represented a response by the national state to the imperative of capital 
accumulation. In turn, the attempt by the local state to resist these pressures was a 
reflection of the legitimating function, in response to social protest at the prospect of 
urban developments in the countryside. As such, Short et al (1986) adopt a version 
of what Saunders (1981) has termed the 'dual state' thesis, which posits a distiction 
between corporatist forms of decision making at the level of the central state and 
more pluralistic processes operating at the local level.
Within the structuralist tradition, it is accepted that occasions may occur when the 
political system makes concessions to non-business interests, but in general it is 
considered more likely that the demands of the corporate sector will result in a 
fragile commitment to urban containment and the frequent relaxation of regulations 
which restrict the activities of large capitalist corporations (Ball 1983, Ambrose
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1986). The only exception to this line of argument is reflected in the work of Rydin 
(1986), which suggests that the interests of large private sector developers are 
actually commensurate with the maintenance of containment regulation, because 
restrictions on development artificially inflate the value of corporate land banks.
Pluralist Political Economy
Whereas the structuralist analysis is based on the conception of dominance by one 
set of interests over another, pluralist political economy views policy making as an 
inherently more open process with competition between different groups ensuring a 
more balanced outcome. According to pluralist theory, politics is a bargaining 
process between autonomous, often competing groups and a fragmented state, where 
competition provides an inbuilt set of checks and balances which prevents any one 
set of interests becoming too powerful (Truman 1951, Latham 1952, Dahl 1961).
Applying this approach to the planning system, the apparent contradictions within 
land use policy are not contradictions at all, but reflect an attempt by the state to 
balance the demands of a range of differing groups including agricultural interests, 
house building interests, and conservationists (Healey 1990). The effects which 
flow from the resultant policies may be contradictory and inefficient from a purely 
economic point of view, but from a pluralist perspective these 'inefficiencies' are 
acceptable so long as they are arrived at through the normal operation of the 
democratic process (Bramley et al 1995).
Pluralist political economy does not deny the existence of inequalities of access to 
the political process, but contends that these inequalities are merely a reflection of 
the underlying pattern of social preferences as represented by the relative strengths 
of organized groups. Within this context, many pluralists see the state itself as 
neutral, essentially acting as a referee between competing groups (Latham 1952, 
Healey 1990), but others consider government agencies to act as pressure groups 
themselves, choosing which interests to support on the basis of their own 
preferences (Dahl 1961). However, given that the political system is viewed as 
inherently open and competitive, government agencies will themselves rise and fall 
according to the overall balance of power within society. Thus, from a pluralist 
perspective urban containment represents the outcome of a competitive political 
system in which there are no structural advantages, favouring one set of interests 
over another.
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Elite Theory
A third theoretical perspective on containment and land use planning - elite theory - 
developed out of a critique of pluralism originally put forward by authors such as 
Schattschneider (1960),and Bachrach & Baratz (1962 & 1970). Theorists in this 
tradition put considerably more emphasis on the importance of inequalities between 
interest groups and in particular differential access to resources.
Unlike pluralists, who see the political process as essentially open to all groups in 
society, elite theorists stress the ability of powerful interests to manipulate the 
political system in particular with respect to the flow of information. As a result of 
this manipulation, elites can succeed in thwarting the ability of weaker groups to 
mobilize their interests. Thus, these theorists conceive of political power in a two- 
dimensional way, where power includes not only the ability to influence the political 
process overtly by way of particular decisions, but also the ability to influence 'non­
decision-making' by subverting or squashing at their earliest stages efforts to get 
latent interests mobilized. Unlike Marxism however, elite theorists do not consider 
political power to be monopolized by the members of one particular class, but rather 
allow for an element of competition between different elite groups which 
periodically seize control of the state.
In the case of land use planning, conflicts over urban containment policy might be 
viewed as a reflection of competition between different elite groups and in particular 
house builders and agriculturalists for control of the regulatory state. House building 
interests seek a weakened commitment to containment in order to increase profits 
through the speculative release of rural land, whilst farmers wish to continue to 
protect the privileged position of the agricultural sector. In turn, both of these groups 
are able to minimize opposition to their interests by actively suppressing attempts by 
the losers from land use planning (such as tenants in the rented sector) to mobilize in 
the political system.
Weberian Sociology
The fourth perspective on containment derives from the Weberian school of 
sociology, fundamental to which are the concepts of class and status. For Weber 
(1968) class was an analytical category in which individuals were grouped together 
on the basis of their common economic situation in relation to commodity and 
labour markets. Unlike Marxist analysis, Weberian sociology does not define class
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in relation to the means of production, but instead according to an individuals' 
chance of procuring goods and services, gaining a position in life and achieving 
personal satisfaction. Thus, Weberians locate the analysis of class in the sphere of 
distribution rather than production relations, in the market, rather than the mode of 
production (Shucksmith 1990).
Given the unequal access to resources which result from the processes of the market 
economy, classes may mobilize in the political process on the basis of these 
inequalities, which may in turn be reflected in the subsequent policies. However, 
whilst class organization is an important factor in political mobilization, Weberians 
stress that there is no automatic reason why individuals should establish 
organizations on this basis. Instead, other forms of organization may play a role in 
politics and in particular those formed on the basis of 'status'. Status groups consist 
of individuals mobilized according to their special styles of life and consumption, 
patterns which may, or may not be class related.
With respect to urban containment, Weberians have typically focused on the role of 
housing classes or housing status groups and the role of professional 'gatekeepers' 
such as land use planners in the decision-making process (Pahl 1965,1979).
Housing class analyses suggest that containment policies reflect the interests of 
higher class groups and in particular the owners of rural/ suburban property who 
seek to use the planning system to restrict the supply of housing and therefore to 
inflate the value of their assets - the principal losers in this process being the lower 
class groups in the rented sector who experience a greater difficulty in achieving 
access to housing as a result (Shucksmith 1990). Housing status analyses also 
emphasize the interests of rural residents in restricting development, but with the 
focus on common lifestyle characteristics - living in the countryside - rather than the 
ownership of rural property per se (Shucksmith 1990).
Additional Weberian perspectives and some versions of elite theory have focused on 
the importance of urban managers or gatekeepers within the state and in particular 
planners and local councillors. According to this view 'gatekeepers' play a pivotal 
role in the allocation of urban resources and may use their privileged position within 
the state to pursue their own professional values (Reade 1987). Within this tradition 
there is some dispute over the actual degree of autonomy which planners and other 
gatekeepers are held to possess. The original contribution of Pahl (1975) suggested 
that gatekeepers exercised considerable discretion in terms of gaining access to 
resources and their subsequent allocation. A large number of empirical studies 
devoted to analysing the role and effects of various urban managers, especially in the
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field of housing, appeared to confirm that gatekeepers could indeed exert a major 
influence over distributional outcomes (Niner 1975, Gray 1976, Kam 1976). 
Subsequent work however, including that of Pahl (1978) himself, suggested that in 
its initial formulation the gatekeeper thesis underemphasized the extent to which 
wider political and economic forces and the actions of central government constrain 
the actions of urban managers. In these later Weberian perspectives it is suggested 
that gatekeepers do exercise discretion in the pattern of resource allocation but are 
not able to influence the level of resource availability, which is rather a function of 
central government power (Pahl 1978, Morcombe 1984).
Shucksmith's (1990) contribution represents one of the more comprehensive 
applications of Weberian principles to the planning system, in which he explains the 
contradiction between the policy objective of providing affordable housing with the 
goal of continued containment, in terms of the power exerted by rural home owning 
groups organized on the basis of both class (ownership of property) and status 
(countryside lifestyle). In turn this power has been reinforced by the professional 
ideology of planners which is often grounded in a conservationist ethos (Reade 
1987, Bramley et al 1995).
A Public Choice Critique
The perspectives outlined above represent the major theoretical attempts to move 
beyond the dominant welfare economics paradigm in land use planning. As with the 
public choice critique of welfare theory outlined in chapter 1, these approaches 
highlight the important relationship between interest groups and the state in policy­
making. However, in their attempt to explain the pattern of decision-making in the 
British planning system, each of these perspectives suffers from a number of 
empirical and theoretical difficulties which substantially reduces their explanatory 
power. In what follows these shortcomings are exposed using public choice concepts 
with respect to the 'demand* and 'supply' sides of the political system. In so doing, 
this critique sets the scene for the more specific application of public choice models 
to the analysis of 'government failure' within the planning system which are the 
empirical focus of the chapters to follow.
Of the three perspectives, the structuralist school suffers from the most obvious 
theoretical and empirical problems. Setting aside the manifest shortcomings of the 
labour theory of value and the falling rate of profit thesis (Bohm-Bawerk 1937, 
Steedman 1977) which most contemporary socialists now accept (Dunleavy &
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O'Leary 1987), the neo-Marxist variant has still to provide a convincing account of 
why it is that political action on the 'demand' side of politics should occur on the 
basis of 'class'. In the case of both capitalists and workers the principal concern of 
these individuals is likely to be that of their own personal wealth and in many cases 
the greatest threat to each is likely to be the presence of other capitalists and other 
workers. In practice, capital and labour are not homogenous entities, but consist of 
individuals and groups with heterogeneous interests. Thus, exporting capitalists 
versus importing capitalists, transport buying capitalists versus transport selling 
capitalists, lending capitalists versus borrowing capitalists, agricultural capitalists 
versus industrial capitalists ; and so the list goes on - both sides of the 'class divide'. 
In the specific case of urban containment, the interests of agricultural capital - 
increasing the level of food production, conflict with the interests of construction 
capital in developing agricultural land. In these circumstances it is difficult to 
conceive how the state can respond to the demands of 'capital' or 'labour' when no 
such unified interests exist.
Moreover, even if there were unified class interests, neo-Marxism has still to provide 
a satisfactory response to Olson's (1965) public choice analysis of the 'collective 
action problem'. Capital and labour are groups representing hundreds of thousands 
and in some circumstances millions of individuals, none of whose individual 
contribution to political action is likely to have any direct impact on the actions of 
the state. As Olson suggests, where the per capita stake is so discounted by the 
irrelevance of an individual contribution then the optimal strategy is to free ride on 
the participation of others and collective action in terms of class or any other large 
group is unlikely to occur.
For the above reasons, the corporatist variant of the structuralist perspective seems 
more plausible - it is easier to identify common economic interests on the basis of 
sectors rather than class and since sectors may be smaller than classes, the collective 
action problem may be more easily overcome. However, the corporatist approach 
alongside its neo-Marxist cousin, suffers from a second theoretical defect, this time 
on the 'supply side'.
Structuralist approaches suggest that the state acts in order to preserve the 
'legitimacy' of the economic system - capitalism, but without specifying why 
individual actors within the state should act in this way. No account is given of why 
it is that senior officials should prefer one set of social arrangements over another, a 
defect clearly evident in Short et al's (1986) account of urban containment in the 
1980s. In this particular case, no explanation is given of why it was in the interests
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of individual actors within the central government to adopt an apparently more 
liberal stance to development than those at the local government level.
On an empirical level too, the structuralist analysis is found wanting. Contrary to the 
implication that the commitment to urban containment will be subject to de­
regulation in the interests of business and in particular house builders, regulation has 
continually increased, even under an administration which advocated a 'rolling back 
of the state' and other interests such as rural homeowners have been major 
beneficiaries. Rydin's (1986) contention that large building interests actually benefit 
from regulation, might be squared with the empirical evidence in order to save a 
corporatist perspective, but again this approach lacks an adequate account of why it 
is in the personal interests of state officials to 'supply' the relevant regulation. Public 
choice by contrast would seek to explain the growth of regulation in terms of the 
economic pay-off to bureaucrats from expanding the regulatory regime.
Turning now to pluralism, the major difficulties here are less empirical than they are 
theoretical. A pluralist account of competing interest groups might appear 
appropriate given the apparent contradictions in policy over urban containment, but 
on a theoretical level there are a serious weaknesses which public choice theory has 
exposed.
On the 'demand' side pluralists focus on the observable competition between 
different sets of organized interests such as house builders, agriculturalists and 
conservationists, but in so doing neglect the possibility that due to individual 
incentives, some sets of interests may remain latent and as a result be excluded from 
the decision-making process. Thus, public choice analysis suggests that consumers, 
taxpayers and other diffuse interests, will fail to mobilize and have their interests 
represented because of the collective action problem and the effect of rational 
ignorance.
On the 'supply ' side pluralist perspectives which view the government as a neutral 
arbiter, acting to balance out competing interests neglect the potential for actors 
within the state to have interests of their own. Moreover, those pluralist accounts 
which do see state actors as having independent objectives stress the role of 
competition within the state. Public choice by contrast focuses on the monopoly 
power of the administrative bureaucracy in selecting which groups to support on the 
basis of their contribution to bureaucratic growth. Bureaucrats have an information 
monopoly over their political overseers, which allows them discretion in pursuit of 
their own economic objectives, often associated with bureau growth. Moreover, due
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to the rational ignorance effect and the relative infrequency of elections, politicians 
themselves have a structural monopoly advantage over the electorate which 
increases their ability to pursue personal objectives through the support of 
organized groups.
For elite theory and Weberian accounts of interest groups, the theoretical difficulties 
are not dissimilar to those of pluralism. Both elite theorists and Weberians have a 
tendency simply to observe which groups have benefited from the planning system, 
such as farmers and rural homeowners and then attribute political power to these 
groups without specifying where the source of this power actually resides. Public 
choice on the other hand focuses on the differential ability of various groups to 
overcome the collective action problem, the phenomena of concentrated benefits / 
dispersed costs and rational ignorance and thereby to engage in political exchanges 
with bureaucrats/ politicians to the detriment of groups unable to overcome these 
constraints. Thus, if rural homeowners have received benefits from the planning 
system there may be structural incentives favouring this group over other interests in 
the political process.
In turn the public choice analysis of the collective action problem calls into question 
the claim of elite theorists that the power of interest groups results from their ability 
actually to surpress the interests of losers in the political process. From a public 
choice perspective the failure of latent interests to mobilize is not necessarily a 
reflection of their being supressed into 'non-decision making' but is merely a 
reflection of their members having insufficient personal incentive to overcome the 
costs of mobilization (Dowding et al 1993).
On the 'supply side' Weberian accounts which suggest that urban containment 
policies reflect the professional values of 'gatekeepers' as allocators of resources 
within the state, lack a fully specified account of where the power to exercise these 
values lies. Again, the transactions costs framework of public choice theory is able 
to address this question by focusing on the monopoly and informational advantages 
of the administrative bureaucracy over other actors within the democratic polity.
By contrast, more recent Weberian accounts which argue that gatekeepers are not 
able to affect the total level of resources available to them, neglect the public choice 
insight that bureaucrats have an information monopoly in the political process when 
making bids for budget appropriations. Bureaucrats act within the constraints 
provided by the wider political and economic context, but they also have a 
privileged monopoly position compared to other groups in the political process,
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which they might exploit to their own advantage. For example, whilst it is 
implausible to suggest that all of the increase in the proportion of UK GDP taken by 
local government services in the last thirty years (from 5.2% to 8.2%) is attributable 
to bureaucratic power, it seems empirically suspect to claim that bureaucrats, given 
their monopoly position did not play any part in this expansion (Seldon et al 1982).
2.4 Conclusion : Public Choice and Urban Containment
This chapter has sought to examine the policy context of urban containment in the 
post-war period emphasizing on the one hand, the remarkable resilience of 
containment in the wake of political and economic change and on the other, the 
external effects and policy failures resulting from continued adherence to this central 
core of the British planning system. The chapter has also considerd existing 
theoretical perspectives which have sought to explain the policy contradictions 
associated with containment and has developed a public choice critique of these 
approaches. The theoretical and empirical difficulties exposed by this critique may 
be summarized as follows;
On the 'demand' side, existing accounts fail to consider the organizational incentives 
facing different sets of actors who may gain or lose in terms of the externalities 
produced by the planning system. In particular, transactions costs are important 
factors which affect the ability of groups to mobilize and hence to bargain with the 
state.
On the 'supply' side, current perspectives lack an adequate account of the motivating 
forces which drive the actions of individual bureaucrats and politicians within the 
state and fail to specify the organizational advantages which allow these actors to 
ensure that their interests are reflected in the decision-making process.
As a result, the literature on urban containment is unable to provide a convincing 
account which links the external effects of containment - higher house prices, higher 
dwelling densities and congestion, longer commuting distances and agricultural 
overproduction - to institutional incentives within the decision-making process. 
Public choice by contrast, can with its account of 'government failure', link the 
externalities produced by land use planning directly to the structures of costs and 
benefits faced by individual actors within the planning system. Thus, three general 
hypotheses shape the focus of the chapters to follow ;
67
1. The commitment to urban containment reflects an asymmetric distribution o f  
costs and benefits between different groups o f individuals on the 'demand' side o f the 
political process. Groups which are able to overcome the transactions costs o f 
association - the problems o f collective action and rational ignorance - are able to 
bargain with state and to benefit from the planning system, whereas as those unable 
to do so are the principal bearers o f the costs.
2.The commitment to urban containment, reflects the economic interests o f 
bureaucratic actors on the 'supply side' o f the political process and in particular the 
monopoly power o f the administrative bureaucracy to support those policies which 
will expand the size o f the planning budget.
3. The commitment to urban containment, reflects the economic interests o f 
politicians on the 'supply side' and in particular the desire o f legislators to secure 
electoral and patronage benefits from the passage o f planning legislation.
In turn the evaluation of these hypotheses will allow consideration of the central 
question outlined in chapter 1 - to what extent are the external costs imposed by the 
British planning system a product of institutional incentives inherent in regimes of 
state regulated property rights? If the production of externalities can be attributed to 
institutional failures characteristic of representative democracies, then the theoretical 
case for state intervention in the market for land must be open to serious question.
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3 .
Rent Seeking, Collective Action &
Urban Containment
3.0 Introduction
This chapter presents a public choice analysis of interest group activity with respect to 
urban containment. The first section provides an exposition of the key theoretical 
concepts in the rent-seeking theory of politics, which are then used as a refractive lens 
through which to view the behaviour of interest groups within the arena of town and 
country planning. The chapter contends that the transactions costs of association 
within the political process favour those interest groups and coalitions of groups 
seeking to restrict the rate of new development. The benefits from reduced levels of 
development and in particular house building are concentrated on the membership of 
key groups, while the costs which are often invisible, are widely dispersed across a 
'rationally ignorant' electorate. The analysis throws particular light on the superior 
ability of the environmental lobby to restrict urban development, compared to its 
relative failure to control the environmental excesses of subsidised agriculture.
3.1 A Theory o f the Rent Seeking Society
In the rent-seeking theory of politics, the focus of interest group activity is aimed 
predominantly at the transfer of wealth. The central objective of lobbying is the 
pursuit of privileges which restrict access to markets and hence create monopolistic 
rents, ends which cannot be obtained through market mechanisms, but which may be 
achieved through the coercive powers of the state. Typical examples of rent-seeking 
policies include price supports, occupational licensing laws, minimum wage laws, 
rent controls and import/export quotas.
An example of the wealth transfer effect is displayed graphically in Figure3.1. A 
competitive industry produces output OQo at price OPo and thus creates the consumer 
surplus given by the triangle ACPo. Following the influence of political lobbying and 
the introduction of price controls, quotas or other forms of legislative privilege, a 
monopolistic scenario emerges , where output is reduced to OQi and price rises to 
OPi.The rectangle PiBDPo depicts a simple transfer of surplus from consumers to the 
new monopolist, creating a loss of welfare given by the triangle BDC.
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Figure 3.1 Rent Seeking and Monopoly Privilege
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Interest groups will devote resources to political lobbying up to the value of Pi BDPo 
in order to obtain the relevant rents.
Access to the political market in wealth transfers is asymmetric and the ability to 
extract rents is dependent on two key factors. On the one hand the influence of what 
Olson (1965) has termed the 'logic of collective action' - the ability of groups to 
mobilize - and on the other the effect of what Downs (1957) and Tullock (1989 & 
1993) have termed 'rational voter ignorance' - the ability of voters to perceive the 
presence of rent-seeking behaviour.
The Logic of Collective Action
The effective mobilization of any interest group is a key factor which determines the 
potential to extract rents. Where large numbers of individuals remain unorganized, 
their ability to demand support from politicians and bureaucrats is seriously 
undermined and they are likely to lose out in any political battle with a highly
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organized opposition.
According to Olson (1965), small groups (above a certain minimum size), with a large 
per capita stake, will be disproportionately organized than those with a large potential 
membership and a low per capita stake. Structural constraints facing large groups are 
the product of the following incentive structure. For a rational individual to join an 
interest group, the conditions given in the following inequality must be met in fu ll:
(Gi * P/N) + Ii >  Ci
Where Gj is the net gain to the individual if the interest group is successful, eg. from a 
tariff, import quota, or regulation; P is the group's overall probability of achieving its 
aims; N is the potential membership of the interest group; Ii is the private benefits of 
membership and Q  is the cost of group membership.
For groups with a high value of N, the value of P/N is minuscule and the total 
benefits of membership so discounted that it is seldom rational to join such a group. 
Rather, the optimum strategy is to free-ride on the participation of others and where 
enough individuals perceive the structure of incentives in this way collective action 
will fail to occur.
In groups with a low value of N by contrast, the value of P/N is high and the surplus 
of benefits over the costs of membership may be sufficient to provide an incentive for 
the effective mobilization of potential members.
Large groups often fall into Dunleavy's (1991) category of 'endogenous' interests and 
occur where the potential membership might include any individual within society .The 
membership is not directly associated with any homogenous economic interest or 
social situation and as a result is especially prone to the 'logic of collective action' - it 
is virtually impossible to decipher which sections of the population are genuine free 
riders, from those who do not support the group's aims.
The experience of consumer oriented interests throughout the western democracies 
illustrates the collective action problem for endogenous groups. Typically, these 
interests suffer from chronic undermobilization and in many instances remain 
completely latent. By contrast, their principal adversaries in business and labour 
lobbies although relatively small are often highly organized. They have a potential 
membership which is defined in terms of certain fixed, 'exogenous' characteristics - 
only miners are potential members of the National Union of Mineworkers. Exogenous
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groups tend towards small and well defined interests and are consequently less 
susceptible to the imperatives of free riding.
Smaller groups are also advantaged because the costs of reaching agreement within 
the membership tend to decline with falling group size and politicians are more likely 
to perceive vote potential from groups with clearly articulated demands (Benson 
1990). Larger groups with potentially more clout are often less focused in their 
demands because a bigger membership increases the potential for internal differences.
Additional work in collective action theory suggests that the heterogeneity of actors 
within a population is an important variable determining the rate of mobilization. 
Research suggests that if the population from which potential group members are 
drawn is homogenous in its interests and social characteristics the collective action 
problem is more likely overcome. Ceteris paribus the more homogenous the 
population the easier it is to identify free riders. Moreover, in heterogeneous 
populations, there is less chance that individuals themselves will identify a particular 
interest base around which to mobilize (Libecap 1989,Ostrom 1990).
Given the free-rider problem, Olson suggests that for larger groups to attain a 
satisfactory degree of mobilization they must provide benefits on an individual basis 
or rely on the willingness of individuals who will benefit disproportionately from the 
groups’ activities to bear the bulk of the organization costs. Groups may offer positive 
'selective incentives' through services such as specialized insurance or health care 
benefits, available as a by-product of membership. Alternatively, where a group has 
attained a degree of political power and established access to the state, group leaders 
may 'colonize' particular agencies and render group membership a prerequisite for 
access to rents. On the negative side, penalties might be developed which can be 
applied to recalcitrant individuals, as when trade union dues are extracted through 
closed shop or union shop arrangements, which effectively make membership of the 
organization compulsory (Dunleavy 1991, Tullock 1993). For ultra-diffuse interests 
however, with a low per capita stake, even the presence of selective incentives may 
not be sufficient to stimulate mobilization.
Professional organizations are the one form of lobby group which remain almost 
totally immune from the logic of collective action. Typically, these groups exist to 
provide services to individual members and may effectively license entry into a 
particular profession or trade. Individuals who have organized themselves for reasons 
unrelated to lobbying enjoy a comparative advantage in rent-seeking, because 
organization costs once bome, do not add to the marginal cost of lobbying and the
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free rider problem does not occur (Rowley 1992, p.l 11).
It should be emphasized at this point, that Olson's (1965) theory of collective action 
does not suggest that no individuals will join potentially large interest groups in the 
absence of selective incentives, but rather suggests that it will be much more difficult 
to mobilize these groups. The absolute level of mobilization, however, may be 
affected by a host of other factors which may include altruistic motivations (Fiorina 
1995).
Voters and Rational Ignorance
The second determinant of rent seeking power is the phenomenon of 'rational 
ignorance'. In order to obtain rents, it is important that large sections of the voting 
population, either positively support the proposed transfers, or more likely, are 
sufficiently ill-informed about their existence, as to make any gains to politicians and 
bureaucrats from removing them, less than the gains from those to whom the transfers 
are made. Public choice authors and especially those of the 'Virginia school' (see 
chapter one), contend that structural incentives lead the vast bulk of the voting 
population to 'under invest' in the acquisition of political information and it is the 
resultant state of ignorance which allows rent-seeking activity to thrive (Aranson
1990).
The conditions for rational voter ignorance may be set out as follows;
For an individual voter deciding whether to cast her vote or to abstain in an election, 
the incentive structure may be written as;
R = P (Ui - U2) - C
where R is the citizens expected utility from voting; P is her subjectively estimated 
probability that her vote will be decisive - ie. will make or break a political tie; Ui and 
U2 are her levels of utility derived from the election of candidates 1 and 2 (Ui > U2) 
and C is her cost of voting.
In this scenario, if R > 0 then the individual will vote for candidate l,but as many 
authors have noted, electorates in most democracies are so large that the probability of 
casting the decisive vote is derisory and discounts the benefits to such an extent, that it 
is hardly worth the cost (eg. time and travel) of voting. (Downs 1957). Given that
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voters clearly do participate in elections, a more plausible line of tack is to suggest that 
while the costs of voting itself are insufficient to encourage mass abstention, the costs 
of obtaining accurate political information are so great that it is seldom rational to be 
informed about the specifics of policy platforms on other than a superficial level.
For example, for the voter facing the incentive structure;
R = P(Ui  - U 2) - C
she must first work out her personal utility associated with candidates Ui and U2, 
which is a function of their respective policy platforms;
Ui = U ( p n , p  i2,p i3 v -P  i n) 
where Ui is a function of candidates position on a number of n issues.
If the voter is unsure about the policies of the candidates or is unaware that they have 
a position on particular issues or even that these issues exist, then the voter must 
decide whether or not to search for more political information. The acquisition of 
political information is a costly affair, a cost which increases the greater the number of 
issues (n) decided through the political process. Given the 'bundle purchase' nature of 
voting, one would have to hire a personal team of research assistants to be fully 
informed across the whole policy spectrum. In order for this to be worthwhile the 
voter must have a substantial stake in the outcome of the election. As we have seen 
however, the individual stake is so discounted by the probability of exercising 
genuine influence that the search for detailed information is simply not worthwhile. It 
is rational for the voter to remain 'ignorant' of politics save for the superficial 
information derived from political sloganizing(Aranson 1990, Tullock 1993).1
Rational ignorance is crucial to the political market in rents, because the extent of voter 
ignorance varies according to the nature of the transfers obtained. Certain rents are
2 As Aranson (1990) notes, the nearest thing one gets to the concept of rational ignorance in political 
science is the 'vulgar' Marxist notion of 'false consciousness'. However, whereas the Marxist theory is 
an irrefutable tautology, immune from empirical analysis, rational ignorance is a profoundly 
empirical phenomenon. For example, Miller's (1983) analysis of American science policy revealed 
that only 7% of the population had even the basic level of "scientific literacy" required to grasp the 
detail of policy matters proposed by science bureaucrats - quoted in Aranson (1990, p.34). In a market 
context where consumers are faced directly with the consequences of their purchasing decisions there 
might be an incentive to purchase 'expert' advise, but few such incentives exist for voters in the 
sphere of representative politics.
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more readily identifiable than others and are consequently more likely to penetrate the 
rational ignorance of voters and to stimulate retaliatory political action. Ceteris 
Paribus, the more visible the transfer, the greater is the potential for a politician to 
court votes by seeking to remove it, or to extract concessions from the recipients 
(Tullock 1993).
There are two basic types of rent-seeking transfer - direct and indirect rents. The 
former are derived through the requisition of financial resources, transferred from one 
group of citizens to another. Resources are extracted through taxation and are 
dispensed in the form of subsidy payments or governmental contracts. Indirect 
transfers by contrast, do not involve any immediate transfer of monetary wealth, but 
are nonetheless to the monetary benefit of some individuals and at the expense of 
others. Indirect rents involve the statutory control of an individual's behaviour with 
respect to person or property and are usually supplied via regulation or licensing.
The basic transfer types can be divided into sub-categories according to the situation 
of the respective winners and losers in the political market. Three scenarios are of 
particular relevance in this regard: i) the winners and losers are not easily identifiable, 
either to themselves or to each other, ii) the winners and losers are well identified and 
know who each other are, iii) winners are easily identifiable, but losers are not. The 
classification of rents is summarized (with examples) in Table 3.1.
Ceteris paribus, there is little if any governmental activity where both winners and 
losers in the political market are difficult to identify. Transfers falling into this 
category are characterized by benefits and costs thinly dispersed across a substantial 
proportion of the voting population. Because each voter attains only a minuscule 
benefit or incurs a minuscule cost, both winners and losers are unlikely to mobilize 
into a political force, so there is little prospect of any gain for utility maximizing 
politicians and bureaucrats supplying transfers on this basis.
The bulk of governmental activity occurs where both winners and losers are easily 
identifiable and are known to each other, or where winners are identifiable but losers 
are not. Within this context, the rational ignorance effect is at its weakest where 
transfers are direct and at its most potent where they are indirect.
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Table 3.1 Rents and Rational Ignorance
Rents Direct Indirect 1 2 3 Salience of 
RI
Minimum Wage * He ++
Airline Regulation * He ++
Tariffs/Ouotas * He ++
Industrial Subsidy * He +
Science Research * * +
Education * He 0
Health * He 0
Key : 1 = Losers and Winners are invisible. ++ = High
2 = Losers and Winners known to each other. + = Medium
3 = Winners are visible, Losers are invisible. 0 = Low
Direct transfers are less protected by rational ignorance because they are derived 
through general taxation. Although the cost of each tax funded programme may be 
barely detectable (perhaps a fraction of a penny on the income tax), the sum total of 
wealth transfer activity is much more visible - the voter need only consult the monthly 
tax return to assess the overall level of rent seeking. Because subsidies must be 
equalled by tax payments (Becker 1983), at some point the electoral gains to 
politicians from reducing the level of transfer payments and hence the level of 
taxation, will exceed those derived from the recipient interest groups.
Within the category of direct transfers, rational ignorance is at its weakest in the case 
of subsidized public service provision, such as health and education (Tullock 1993). 
These services are used on a regular basis by substantial sections of the voting 
population and the potential winners and losers, for example teachers and parents, are 
easily identifiable. If the quality of education was to deteriorate rapidly due to rent 
seeking by teachers, this would be visible to many voters and there may be electoral 
gains for politicians promising to extract concessions from the interest group. The 
power of voters is not as great as that of consumers in the market, where there is 
greater competition and scope for 'exit', but the relative lack of voter ignorance 
overcomes the transactions costs problem, at least to some extent (Tullock 1993).
Direct transfers, where subsidies are concentrated on identifiable winners and costs 
thinly dispersed across the tax paying populace are more prone to voter ignorance
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(Aranson 1990, Tullock 1989 & 1993). In these instances, for example industrial 
subsidies and subsidized government research, benefits are concentrated on organized 
interests. The cost to each voter is small and because most voters do not use the 
services on a regular basis there is little incentive to seek out information concerning 
the level of rent seeking exploitation, subject to the maximum level of taxation that 
voters are prepared to tolerate.
Indirect transfers provide the most fertile arena for rent-seeking and are protected by 
an almost impenetrable veil of rational ignorance. A large proportion of governmental 
activity is focused in the area of statutory regulations which produce concentrated 
benefits and invisibly disperse costs. Consider the case of airline regulation in the 
United States.
The US. Civil Aeronautics Board is responsible for the regulation of air travel and in 
particular has the power to license entry into the airline market. Under pressure from 
organized trunk carriers the board refused to certify a single new trunk airline between 
1938 and 1976. The subsequent reduction in competition produced increased profits 
for the existing carriers, with the costs in terms of higher air fares, thinly dispersed 
across the vast bulk of potential airline users (Becker 1985, p. 100).
In such a situation it is difficult for the individual voter to blame higher airfares on the 
existence of regulation, because no direct transfer of wealth appears to have taken 
place.2 For the voter to trace the source of fare increases would require a considerable 
degree of research, which given the relatively small loss is not worthwhile. It is 
rational for most voters to remain oblivious to the existence of regulatory transfers and 
for politicians to cater instead to the highly organized interests which seek their 
implementation. Given the pervasiveness of rational ignorance there is virtually no 
upper limit to the rents which can be extracted from the voting population via 
regulation, save for the taxes required for the funding of enforcement agencies. 
Consequently, it is more than likely that interest groups seeking regulatory transfers 
will be successful in their demands (Tullock 1993).
2 Likewise, it is difficult for voters to attribute the source of higher import prices and higher 
unemployment to the impact of quotas and minimum wage laws respectively. In these cases, benefits 
are concentrated on readily identifiable groups - eg. trade union members employed in a minimum 
wage industry, whereas costs are dispersed invisibly on consumers - through higher prices and higher 
unemployment. In many cases, losers in the rent-seeking game will not even know that they are 
losers - as in the case of workers who are employed in one industry when the minimum wage is 
introduced, but in future years are not able to find jobs in an alternative industry because of its 
existence.
For a full empirical analysis of the costs of regulation and the lobbying activities of the beneficiaries, 
see Stigler (1975), Block & Olsen (1982) and Tucker (1990).
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3.2 Rent Seeking, Collective Action and the Political Market in Urban Containment
Having outlined the key factors which may affect the nature of rent-seeking, the 
remainder of this chapter sets out to examine the characteristics of the political market 
in land use planning and in particular the central question of urban containment. Each 
of the key interest groups is analysed in terms of the logic of collective action, the 
likely impact of rational ignorance on the ability to extract rents and the changing 
characteristics of interest group behaviour over time. The concluding section 
summarizes the interest group data and considers the character of planning policy in 
terms of the peculiarities of the political market.
The Agricultural Lobby
The agricultural lobby in the United Kingdom is the preserve of the National Farmers 
Union (NFU) and the Country Landowners Association (CLA), the former the 
traditional representative of the tenant farming community and the latter, the interests 
of landowning farmers.
Both of these groups are exogenous interests - the NFU has a potential membership 
which is more or less confined to the farming population and the CLA, although in 
theory more endogenous (anyone within the population may purchase land in the 
countryside), is targeted at landowning farmers and especially the large estates.
In accordance with the the ‘logic of collective action’ the farming lobby is highly 
organized, with the vast majority of farmers subscribing to one or both of the major 
lobby groups. The NFU had a total membership of 114,000 in 1993, representing 
approximately 80% of all farmers in the United Kingdom (Interview 1 NFU, NFU 
Annual Report 1993), and the CLA had a further 50,000 members ranging from small 
owner occupier fanners to the large commercial estates 
(Interview 2, CLA).
High levels of mobilization are reflected in terms of financial strength with NFU 
coffers totalling £21.4 million in the year 1992/93, sufficient to employ 800 staff 
nation-wide, including a full time team of political lobbyists (NFU Annual Report 
1993). The CLA meanwhile had a total income of £4.2 million in 1992/93 and 
employed 50 full time staff, including ten professional advisors, a political lobbyist 
and a specialist media consultant (CLA Annual Report 1993).
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Both of the agricultural lobby groups also employ selective incentives to encourage 
continued participation. The NFU offers low cost insurance policies and legal services 
to members only, whereas the CLA offers advice services for those engaged in 
landlord/tenant disputes. In addition, both groups have benefited enormously from the 
complicated system of agricultural support which they have helped to create. The 
technical nature of the regulatory controls which emanate from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), requires a team of policy experts to broker 
advice to individual farmers (usually through the regional branches of NFU/CLA) in 
order to gain access to agricultural grants. In short, most farmers cannot afford not to 
be a member of the NFU/CLA (Howarth 1990).
The rent seeking activities of farmers are central to the release of land for development 
and their lobbying behaviour within the town and country planning system. The 
principal form of rent extraction has occurred through farm subsidies following the 
Agriculture Act (1947) and more recently (since 1973) the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) of the European Community/European Union (EC/EU).
Within the context of agricultural support the NFU has always advocated restrictive 
planning controls and hence a reduced level of urban development, because planning 
permissions for non-agricultural uses often result in a notice to quit for their tenant 
members. The NFU were strong supporters of the 1947 planning legislation which 
redistributed development rights away from landowners in favour of tenants and 
combined with agricultural support guaranteed the incomes of farmers (Newby 1977). 
Landowning farmers meanwhile were prepared to tolerate the loss of development 
rights so long as subsidies provided an income which could compensate for the lost 
ability to diversify out of agricultural production (Evans 1991, Marsden et al 1993).
The persistence of agricultural support may be related to the character of the wealth 
transfers involved. Farm subsidies are a direct rent extracted from a diffuse mass of 
voters. The cost to each voter is relatively small and the transfer effect is likely to be 
subject to a relatively high degree of rational ignorance. Farmers on the other hand are 
a highly visible interest group of the type which is vital to bureaucratic and political 
interests. It is probably for this reason that the uninterrupted growth in the level of 
subsidy - from £197.3 million in 1954/55 to £267 million in 1972 (at current prices) 
and then from £392 million in 1973 following entry into the CAP to £1.6 billion in 
1983 (current prices) went virtually unchallenged (Howarth 1990). As with all direct 
tax transfers however, the overall level of rent extraction is subject to the maximum 
general taxation which the voters are prepared to tolerate. Should this threshold be 
exceeded and tax reductions enacted, the ability of the agricultural lobby to maintain
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its income from rents is dependent on its relative strength vis a vis the other recipients 
of direct transfers within the wider political market.
When farm subsidies are growing, both the NFU and CLA are supportive of a strict 
system of planning control and urban containment. However, if subsidy levels and 
consequently farm incomes start to decline, the pattern of rent seeking assumes a 
somewhat different character as members search for alternative sources of revenue. 
The NFU has tended towards the development of an alternative rationale for farm 
subsidies and in particular has sought support from the environmental lobby to 
support subsidies for landscape conservation, the first example of which was the 
introduction of conservation subsidies in the 1986 Agriculture Act. CLA members on 
the other hand, whilst supporting conservation subsidies, have tended to shift their 
emphasis to a selective liberalization of planning controls to enable diversification out 
of agricultural uses, which includes the release of land for residential development. In 
more recent times and as the proportion of owner occupier farmers within its ranks 
has risen, the NFU position has moved towards that of the CLA in supporting a 
selective liberalization -though to a lesser extent in order to placate their tenant 
members (Marsden et al 1993). As with the CLA, they do not support a total 
liberalization because the speculative gains derived from the scarcity value of land are 
dependent on the maintenance of regulation and the avoidance of a full free market 
(Marsden et al 1993).
The shifting pattern of rent seeking is depicted in Table 3.2, which shows the trends 
in MAFF farm subsidies, conservation subsidies and farm incomes over the period 
1982-1995 and the major changes in governmental policy which have formed the 
focus of lobbying activity. Of particular interest is the shift in farmers' lobbying, first 
from a defence of agricultural support and opposition to deregulation of planning, 
second to an emphasis on selective liberalization and third, a shift back towards farm 
support, but reoriented towards a ‘conservation’ agenda.
In 1980/1981 the principal focus of NFU/CLA lobbying was the Wildlife and 
Countryside Act, which brought farmers into direct conflict with environmentalists in 
the Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE) and a host of other groups 
such as The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) and Friends of the 
Earth (FoE). Subsidies at this time were at an all time high and the farmers sought to 
defend the basis of support from an assault by the environmentalists who highlighted 
the destructive impact of subsidized agriculture on habitats such as hedgerows and 
wetlands. The environmental lobby failed in its attempt to enact statutory planning
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Table 3.2 Subsidies. Farm Incomes and Lobbying
Year Agri.
Subsidies
Conserv.
Subsidies
Farm Incomes Policy
1981 2.20 0.012 140 W&C
1982 2.00 0.015 130
1983 1.97 0.015 124 GB
1984 2.22 0.018 165 GB
1985 1.95 0.030 96
1986 2.17 0.040 111 Agri. Act
1987 2.72 0.042 115 ALURE
1988 2.64 0.046 93 ALURE
1989 1.67 0.076 107
1990 1.81 0.080 100
1991 1.77 0.129 95
1992 1.86 0.133 113 MacSharry
1993 3.00 0.097 154
1994 3.00 0.141 160
1995 na. 0.150 180
Notes : Subsidies in £billions (1993 prices). Incomes in Index form : 1990 =100
Source : Computed from MAFF/Countryside Commission and English Nature Annual Reports and 
Farm Income Survey.
controls over agriculture and the eventual outcome was a net increase in farm 
subsidies as payments were offered for conservation activities on top of existing farm 
support.
The victory of the farm lobby in this regard was predictable within a public choice 
framework. The farmers were a highly mobilized and homogenous interest group, 
concentrated on the defence of price support, whereas the environmentalists were 
relatively undermobilized because the effects of habitat loss are widely dispersed 
across the bulk of voters, few of which actually live in the areas concerned. 
Moreover, even when these groups are able to mobilize large numbers of individuals 
as they did during the 1980s, agricultural subsidies are the lifeblood of the farm 
lobby, whereas subsidized habitat destruction is but one of many issues of concern to 
a heterogeneous and diffuse environmental lobby, again reducing the per capita stake 
and the incentive for politicians to respond to the groups demands.3
3This final point is more a reflection of politicians vote seeking incentives on the supply side rather 
than a demand side collective action problem and will be addressed in greater detail in chapter 5.
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By 1983, the agriculturalists and especially the NFU were joining forces with the 
conservationists as the focus of lobbying shifted to the defence of Green 
Belt policy from the prospect of liberalization. Tenant farmers saw a threat to 
their tenured/subsidized position if the rural land market was liberalized and having 
joined in a national campaign with the CPRE, secured the signatures of well over one 
hundred, mostly Conservative members who saw to it that the proposals were thrown 
out (Elson 1986).
The attitude of the farmers was somewhat different in the period 1987/88 when the so 
called ALURE proposals (Alternative Land Use and the Rural Economy) were 
introduced. The growing burden of the CAP on the European Community budget 
made the issue of agricultural subsidies more visible than at any time since the war 
and subsidy levels were reduced for the first time in 1984. As can be seen from Table 
3.1, the index of farm incomes fell from 140 in 1983 to 93 in 1988.4 Faced with 
declining incomes, farmers sought alternative sources of revenue, including the 
potential for housing and leisure developments in the countryside which were 
suggested in the ALURE proposals.
Once again, the farm lobby, now allied with property developers, was at odds with 
the environmentalists, but unlike the experience of the Wildlife and Countryside Act, 
the latter were to win the day and the ALURE proposals were ditched. This outcome 
was again predictable within the public choice framework - whereas habitat losses due 
to farm support are widely dispersed and the conservation interests relatively 
undermobilized, the ‘loss’ imposed by property developments in rural areas is 
concentrated on those within the vicinity and conservationists are relatively well 
organized in socially homogenous NIMBY style interest groups (see pp.80-90, 
below).
With the conservation lobby preventing the deregulation of the rural land market, the 
focus of agricultural lobbying shifted again during the 1990s. The NFU/CLA joined 
forces again with the environmental lobby to defend farm subsidies, but instead 
reoriented towards landscape conservation. Indeed, with its new ‘Countryside 
Membership Scheme’ the NFU has sought to attract small landholders as new 
members in order to obtain conservation payments (NFU Annual Report 1993 p.20).
4 As can be seen from the table, subsidies did increase briefly in the mid 1980s, however farm 
incomes declined because world market prices for farm products collapsed to an all time low. For 
incomes to have been maintained, subsidies would have had to increase on an unprecedented scale. The 
rapid increase in farm incomes from 1992 results from a enormous increase in the level of subsidy and 
relatively high world market prices for grain and other arable crops.
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The farmers have thus gained an important new ally in the pursuit of direct rent 
extraction and have thus strengthened their position within the wider competition for 
transfer payments.
An indication of the strength of the agri/conservation axis was provided by the so 
called MacSharry reforms of the CAP. These reforms, originally introduced to reduce 
subsidies have actually increased the level of agricultural transfers through a mix of 
production subsidies and an explosion of agri/environment schemes such as set 
aside,where farmers are paid to take land out of production and conservation schemes 
such as Environmentally Sensitive Areas and the Farm Woodlands scheme. As can be 
seen from Figure 3.1 the level of farm subsidies has exploded since the most recent 
‘reforms’ and farm incomes are higher now than at the previous peak of transfer 
activity in the early 1980s. It is not possible to attribute the increase in subsidies 
purely to the actions of these groups because of European control of the CAP, but the 
substantial growth of domestic MAFF subsidies for conservation on top of existing 
farm support, suggests that the British farm lobby is not without political clout.
To summarize, the agricultural lobby is the archetypal concentrated interest group, 
extracting direct rents from the dispersed mass of the voting population. The 
persistence of rent extraction discriminates against new urban development, as land is 
kept artificially in agricultural use. The lobbying activities of the farmers appear to 
reflect a rational response to shifts in economic and political circumstances and 
therefore exhibit a sensitivity to relative ‘prices’ in the political market. In particular, 
when farm incomes are low, farmers and especially land owners seek a redistribution 
of property rights through the planning system to facilitate non-agricultural 
development, but when incomes are high the lobby appears willing to accept the status 
quo. The ability of the farmers to maintain the level of rent extraction in a period when 
governments have sought to reduce the overall level of direct rent seeking/taxation, 
appears to have been aided by an alliance with the conservation lobby to which 
attention must now turn.
The Conservation Lobby
The Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE)5, founded in 1926 by 
Patrick Abercrombie, is the pre-eminent environmental interest group involved in the 
formulation of land use policy, a lesser role is played by other groups including
5 Formerly ‘Preservation’ of Rural England.
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Friends of the Earth (FoE) the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) and 
the Royal Society for Nature Conservation (RSNC).
The CPRE provides an interesting exception to the general contention within public 
choice theory, that environmental groups are structurally disadvantaged by the free 
rider problem and suffer chronic undermobilization in relation to business and labour 
interests. The ability of CPRE to mobilize is directly related to the nature of the rents it 
attempts to extract and the subsequent institutional structure which it is able to forge.
Environmental groups are often considered as underorganized endogenous interests, a 
contention which rests on the assertion that environmental protection is the classic 
example of a non-excludable public good (Olson 1965 chapters 3 & 6, Smith 1992, 
pp 36-37). Consider the case of air pollution. The effects of atmospheric pollutants 
are widely dispersed across the population of a city and the potential membership of 
an interest group lobbying for reductions in emissions could include any individual 
within the affected area. If the group were to secure a reduction in the level of 
pollution the benefits would accrue to all inhabitants, irrespective of their 
membership. Consequently there is a powerful incentive to free ride, a tendency 
which is difficult to counteract given the impossible task of distinguishing between 
those individuals who seek a given reduction in pollutants from those who do not 
(Olson 1965 op cit, Smith 1992 op cit).
Factory owners within the polluting industry, are by contrast a relatively smaller and 
more well defined interest. The benefits from industrial pollution are heavily 
concentrated in the industry concerned and it is relatively easy to identify free riders, 
who could easily be penalized should member firms seize control of the regulatory 
apparatus. Thus, business interests are structurally advantaged in the political process 
and are likely to win out in any conflict with environmentalists (Olson 1965, op cit 
and Smith 1992, op cit).
The above argument has considerable force with respect to many aspects of 
environmental policy and as suggested earlier, may have accounted for the farmers’ 
ability to defeat conservation interests in the battle over subsidized habitat destruction. 
However, the free-rider/public good analysis does not apply equally to all areas of 
policy and the experience of CPRE activity in the field of planning regulations 
illustrates a rather different set of incentives.
The CPRE lobbies for the extension and enforcement of statutory planning controls 
such as Green Belts, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONBs) and Sites of
84
Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), to prevent the transfer of land from rural uses such 
as agriculture to urban uses such as housing.The goods for which it campaigns, far 
from non-excludable, are in fact site specific goods, and thus create a relatively more 
concentrated interest.
Consider the residents of a village living within a designated Green Belt. They derive 
the daily amenity value of a scenic view as a consumption good and if they are 
homeowners, higher property values associated with an area adjoining open space, 
which may account for a substantial proportion of their personal wealth. Although 
passers-by may benefit occasionally from the designation, most of the benefits are 
available only to individuals within the site specific area. If the fields adjoining the 
houses are allocated for development then free access to the amenity good and 
property values are immediately threatened. The number of individuals within the 
vicinity is relatively small and the potential membership of any group attempting to 
secure Green Belt preservation is likely to be homogenous in its interests (middle 
class home owners) and concentrated on site. Potential free riders may easily be 
identified by a political entrepreneur and pressurized into joining the group, hence the 
much vaunted phenomena of NIMBY (Not in My Backyard) anti-development groups 
in areas of high private amenity value.
The CPRE is not a purely exogenous interest - the potential membership does include 
individuals concerned with conservation who live outside the areas concerned or who 
are affected in a lesser way, but the relative concentration of benefits associated with 
specific sites creates a rather different incentive structure compared to that facing 
purely endogenous environmental groups.
The mobilization of CPRE groups is often facilitated by the presence of residents 
associations organized for non-lobbying purposes. These provide site specific 
community services such as crime prevention schemes, the potential membership is 
site specific and the groups may be transformed into nimby lobbies at virtually no 
additional cost.
CPRE capitalizes on these incentives in its mobilization strategy. The lobby is 
nationally based, with a headquarters in London, but the membership campaigns are 
carried out in conjunction with 45 county based branches which are in turn split into 
district societies (CPRE Annual Report 1994). The county branches focus their 
membership and fund raising on site specific issues and the national office provides 
detailed advice on planning legislation, including a ‘Campaigners Guide to Local 
Plans’ and a media training programme for local group leaders (Annual Report 1993
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and Interview 3, CPRE). This appears to be a successful strategy. For example, 
during preparations for the Surrey Structure Plan 1990, a major campaign was 
launched by the local CPRE against proposed housing developments and membership 
increased from 250 to 2500 within just 6 months (Surrey CPRE Annual Report
1991).
In 1993 membership by individuals stood at 46 000, but more important some 2 574 
local amenity societies and residents groups (average membership about 200) were a 
part of the membership fold, bringing the total population associated with CPRE to 
approximately 560 000 (Interview 3).6 The campaigning success is illustrated by 
financial contributions, which through a combination of individual and group 
membership and donations/legacies totalled £3.1 million in 1993, a budget which 
employed 34 staff in London including 9 specialist policy analysts (Interview 3, 
Annual Report 1994).
An indication of the importance of nimby incentives and the significance of potential 
group size and population heterogeneity in determining the rate of mobilization, can be 
obtained by comparing relative rates of mobilization between anti-development groups 
in rural and urban areas. One would expect that ceteris paribus, the rate of 
mobilization would be higher in small villages than in large towns.
The population in most small villages is relatively homogenous in its interests - home 
owners opposed to development, who usually work outside the area concerned and is 
also relatively small. Likewise, small population and the effects of relative rural 
isolation make it more likely that individuals will be known to their neighbours, thus 
raising the visibility of free riding. In urban areas by contrast, the potential 
membership is more heterogeneous - a high proportion of people may live and work 
in the same area and have an interest in more development (Danielson 1976, Komesar 
1978). Urban populations tend also to be highly mobile/transient and it may be 
relatively more difficult for anti-development groups to identify free riders from those 
individuals genuinely opposed to the groups’ aims. Similarly, because population 
densities tend to be higher in urban areas, the potential membership of anti­
development groups may be that much larger, so the significance of an individuals' 
contribution to the supply of group benefits is reduced. Consequently, one might
6 The figure 560 000, is a rough approximation derived from the interview and from previous 
empirical work. For example, Short et al (1986) found from an analysis of local amenity societies in 
Central Berkshire that 47% had a membership of less than 200,20% had between 200 and 400 
members, 11% between 400 and 800 and 6% over 2 000. Assuming the average local CPRE has 
about 200 members, then the total membership covered by CPRE affiliation is probably about 
560 000, ie. 200 x 2574 + 46 000.
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Table 3.3 Rate of Mobilization for Rural and Urban Amenity Interests
Location Population Members %
of Population
Nottingham 278000 943 0.30
Wolverhampton 255000 50 0.02
Bromsgrove 90000 397 0.45
Chesterfield 90000 107 0.12
Rugby 85000 97 0.10
Shrewsbury 65000 375 0.62
Burton on Trent 60000 392 0.71
Stafford 60000 210 0.35
Leek 36000 45 0.12
Dronfield 26000 156 0.64
V of Evesham 15000 90 0.65
Arkwright 14000 215 1.50
Louth 13000 241 1.80
Knowle 12000 1208 10.00
Penkridge 12000 11 0.10
Uttoxeter 10000 70 0.70
Moseley 10000 776 8.00
Drayton 9500 100 1.00
Ludlow 9000 586 6.50
E.Lindsay 4000 108 2.40
Upton on Severn 3800 221 6.00
Hampton in Arden 1500 518 34.50
Source : Larkham (1993, p.355).
expect to find a negative relationship between settlement size and the proportion of the 
population organized in amenity interests.
In order to examine this relationship comprehensively would require a large data set 
relating to all the relevant independent variables affecting the rate of mobilization. 
Unfortunately such data are not available, but Table 3.3 which is an adaptation of 
material presented by Larkham (1993), does provide a possible indication of the 
processes in operation. Using population as a proxy for the factors affecting the 
impact of settlement size on the rate of mobilization, a bivariate correlation was 
conducted. The correlation coefficient obtained, -0.294 was the expected sign, but the 
relationship was not statistically significant. Although the relationship is not that 
strong - for every rise in the population there is not always a fall in the rate of 
mobilization - it is clear from Table 3.3, that the rate of mobilization in those towns 
and villages below 15 000 in population is much higher than in the very largest urban 
centres. It should also be noted that Larkham's data under-represent the mobilization
87
rate in the smaller settlements because they refer only to those amenity groups 
registered with the Civic Trust, a predominantly urban based amenity group and not to 
those registered specifically with the CPRE. Rural villages may have some groups 
affiliated to the Civic Trust and others to the CPRE, whereas towns and cities are 
likely only to have Civic Trust affiliations.
That the CPRE has been able to mobilize over half a million individuals through 
amenity groups and residents associations appears to confirm the importance of nimby 
incentives in helping to overcome the collective action problem for rural amenity 
interests. This does not imply a rate of mobilization as high as that obtained by more 
exogenous groups such as the agricultural lobby (see above) and the developers (see 
below), but it does mean that the nimby/conservation lobby is able to mobilize a 
relatively concentrated block against development proposals.
It is also significant that the rate of mobilization for CPRE is higher than for groups 
such as Friends of the Earth (120 000), concerned with a much broader range of 
environmental issues and which are not based on site specific campaigns. In theory 
the potential membership for any single issue on which FoE campaigns, could include 
any individual in the population and as a result, even where these groups do attract 
relatively large memberships - as they did during the 1980s, (FoE membership for 
example is higher than that of the NFU), the overall rate of mobilization is relatively 
low and it is not clear which particular issue/issues have stimulated participation. The 
CPRE by contrast is targeted at a smaller and more homogenous potential 
membership, found predominantly in rural villages and explicitly seeking to prevent 
urban development. Thus, the CPRE had mobilized over 300 000 individuals in local 
amenity societies by the mid 1970s (McCormick 1991) well before the growth in the 
wider environmental movement which occurred in the late 1980s. A primary 
implication of Olson's work is that groups with a larger potential membership (such 
as FoE), even if they are eventually able to mobilize, will take much longer to 
overcome the collective action problem (Olson 1982).
Other environmental interest groups such as the RSPB (membership 800 000), appear 
to have more in common with commercial trading organizations, than would normally 
be considered an interest group. A substantial proportion of RSPB membership is tied 
in with the purchase of private goods and selective incentives such as wildlife 
magazines and free entry into the 300 bird reserves which the society owns (Jordan & 
Maloney 1997). The CPRE by contrast does not engage in the marketing of 
'environmental merchandise', relying instead on its localized, site specific base.
The evidence on mobilization rates within the environmental lobby is broadly 
supportive of the basic public choice framework, but a note of qualification is 
appropriate at this juncture. In particular, although the ability of broader 
environmental interests such as FoE and RSPB to mobilize relatively large numbers of 
individuals may be explained in part with reference to selective incentives, the sheer 
scale in the growth of these groups in the late 1980s (FoE membership increased from 
12 000 in 1980 to 120 000 in 1989 -McCormick 1991,p.l52), does suggest that more 
pluralistic processes may also have been in operation. A key factor which may have 
influenced this degree of mobilization, which is perhaps underemphasized in 
conventional public choice accounts, is the importance of the macro-political context 
against which collective action takes place and in particular the significance of shifts in 
public opinion.
Dunleavy (1991) has suggested that external political conditions are a key variable 
which condition people's perceptions of the costs of group joining. Thus, if there is a 
shift in the external political climate in favour of the general stance taken by a 
particular interest group, then these changes may trigger additional group membership 
as individuals perceive the political viability of the group to have increased. In these 
circumstances, there is not always a straightforward negative relationship between 
potential group size and the rate of mobilization achieved. Ceteris paribus, people 
recognize that their individual contribution to group effectiveness is lower in larger 
groups, but they may also perceive a larger group to be more politically viable, thus 
lowering the perceived costs of membership. Faced with this situation, Dunleavy 
suggests that interest group leaders will send out mixed messages to potential group 
members and in particular will adopt 'size manipulation' strategies. Thus, because 
people may be more likely to support an apparently large and powerful interest group, 
political entrepreneurs may stress the scale of wider public support for the group aims 
in order to increase the perceived viability of the group. At the same time, however, 
and in order to counteract the disincentive effects of increased group size, leaders may 
create local branches or sections focused on smaller, more localized issues, where an 
individual may perceive her personal contribution to the supply of group benefits to be 
that much greater.
Political entrepreneurship of this genre may provide a plausible explanation for the 
scale of the growth in the wider environmental lobby witnessed in the late 1980s.
The shift in public opinion towards increased environmental concern, stimulated by 
media coverage and external pressure from bodies such as the United Nations and 
European Community (McCormick 1991,Robinson 1992, Skea 1995) may have 
increased the perceived political viability of these groups with potential members. At
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the same time, the adoption of the 'think global, act local' slogan by many groups and 
their development of local branches - FoE for example now has 300 local branches 
(Interview 4 )  - may have increased the perceived significance of personal 
contributions so as to encourage additional participation.
The account presented above does not contradict the basic public choice approach to 
group joining, but requires qualification of the analysis to take on board the periodic 
effects of shifts in public opinion. In particular, it suggests that whilst the structural 
incentives identified by Olson are a key factor underlying group mobilization these 
should be seen within the context of a macro-political climate where more pluralistic 
processes, operating through the mass media, external agencies and the political 
parties may also be at play. The logic of collective action model does not suggest that 
no individuals will join larger interest groups, but that ceteris paribus it will be harder 
to mobilize these interests. Changes in public opinion reflecting pluralistic processes 
at the macro-level imply the absence of ceteris paribus conditions and may help 
explain why the broader environmental lobby has been able to mobilize larger 
numbers of individuals in the recent past. It does not, however, alter the basic 
analysis of group joining incentives. Thus, that the local amenity lobby was able to 
mobilize over 300 000 individuals by the early 1970s, well in advance of the wider 
upswing in environmental concern and the subsequent explosion of group 
membership, tends to confirm that it is relatively easier to mobilize smaller and more 
concentrated interests than those which are larger and more diffuse. Similarly, 
following the recent growth in public environmental concern and the opportunities for 
'size manipulation strategies' which this affords, it is still easier for a group such as 
CPRE to stress the importance of local activism because the issues on which it 
campaigns are more obviously of a nimby nature. Even at the local level, it is 
probably more difficult to mobilize people against the effects of air pollution, which 
tend to be widely spread, than it is to mobilize against a new housing estate.
As noted earlier, the CPRE lobbies for the extension of statutory planning 
designations which restrict the transfer of rural and especially agricultural land to 
residential uses.7 When pressure for development is at a peak, nimby style lobbying
7 Working in the American context, Fischel (1985,1995) notes the tendency of environmental groups 
to lobby against residential development on the grounds of farmland preservation, arguing that loss of 
farmland will threaten the future security of food supplies. As such, the environmental focus appears 
lost to the forces of nimbyism, because at least in terms of habitat and species destruction, modem 
subsidized agriculture is by far the most ‘environmentally damaging’ pattern of land use. Species 
diversity may not do much for property values, but the exclusion of new houses certainly does. The 
CPRE stance is very similar, by arguing for the rigid enforcement of Green Belts and other controls 
the countryside is effectively balkanized into agricultural production, which as a result of massive 
subsidies, first under the Agriculture Act and now the CAP, is by far the most destructive use 
(Pennington 1996).
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Table 3.4 Planning Applications and Individual Membership of the CPRE : 1981/82 - 
1991/92
Year Applications
Received
%
Granted
CPRE
1981/82 372 86 23
1982/83 411 87 23
1983/84 430 87 24
1984/85 421 86 25
1985/86 432 85 27
1986/87 534 84 30
1987/88 598 84 32
1988/89 683 82 39
1989/90 628 80 44
1990/91 532 80 45
1991/92 511 81 45
Notes : Applications received and membership of group all in 000s.
CPRE figures are for individuals only and do not include local amenity societies - membership 
covered by affiliation is approximately 560,000, see above, p. 17.
Source : DoE and CPRE Annual Reports.
follows very closely, a phenomenon displayed in Table 3.4, which compares the 
growth of individual membership for CPRE with the number of planning applications 
submitted by private developers.
The membership levels of the conservation lobby, may be related in part to the level of 
activity within the property market - though this is not necessarily a causal 
relationship. When during the 1980s development boom, the number of planning 
applications soared, so did membership of the environmental lobby and when in the 
early 1990s property slump planning applications collapsed, growth in membership 
for CPRE and came to an abrupt halt.
These data may reflect the presence of a substantial nimby element in environmental 
groups or alternatively they may support the more general view that the demand for 
environmental goods is income elastic (Anderson & Leal 1991). As incomes rise with 
economic growth so does the demand for environmental amenity and when incomes
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fall during recession, demand falls with them. This view is further supported by 
detailed empirical work on the membership profile of environmental interests, which 
suggests they are predominantly middle class organizations drawing the bulk of their 
support from those in professional and managerial positions (Lowe & Goyder 1983).
In addition to 'nimby' membership, the CPRE is given active support by a number of 
other groups with a vested interest in the regulation of the rural land market. The NFU 
and CLA are associate members as both derive rents from the artificial maintenance of 
agricultural land and corporate groups including British Petroleum, Shell UK, 
Enterprise Oil, Esso and Unilever, provided donations totalling £400 000 in 1993 
(Annual Report 1994). The oil companies in particular, have a direct stake in the 
preservation of subsidized agricultural land, with a significant farming market in the 
form of fuels, drugs and fertilizers (Body 1984). Bureaucratic agencies such as the 
Countiyside Commission and English Nature, which are responsible for site 
designation are also major supporters and in 1991 the Countryside Commission grant 
of £68 000 was the largest single donation received by the group (Annual Report
1994).8
The political focus of CPRE mirrors the nimby oriented nature of its membership. The 
three major lobbying efforts in the decade 1981-91, in addition to regular 
representations on DoE planning advice, were the campaign against Green Belt 
liberalization in 1983/84, the campaign against the ALURE proposals in 1987/88 and 
the creation of the plan-led development control system in 1990/91. All of these 
campaigns met with a high degree of success and it was a CPRE sponsored 
amendment inserted during the final parliamentary stages of the Planning and 
Compensation Bill (1991) which resulted in the new plan-led development control 
system (Burton 1991, Marsden et al 1993).
The Planning and Compensation Act (1991) might be interpreted as the archetypal 
piece of nimby influenced legislation. The requirement for all planning applications to 
be judged in accordance with the local development plan has reduced the ability of the 
building lobby to use the DoE appeals procedure and placed a new emphasis on the 
local plan making process where nimby interest groups are highly mobilized. 
Moreover, the new powers of plan self-certification, which removed the requirement 
for plans to be formally approved by the DoE, have given local authorities additional 
discretionary powers and in some cases have enabled planning departments to 
virtually ignore national guidance. A good example is provided by the actions of
8 See Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of bureaucratic incentives in this regard.
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Berkshire County Council in preparation for the 2005 Structure Plan. The DoE 
advised that the county should accommodate an additional 48 000 new residential 
units in the plan, but when the county proceeded with self-certification only 35 000 
units were provided for in the final land allocation (Interview 11, District Planning 
Officers Society). In this particular case the Secretary of State resorted to the use of 
the residual 'call in' powers, but increased the allocation by only 3000 units, to 
38 000.
In securing the growth of containment regulation, the CPRE is recognized as the most 
successful of all the environmental interest groups. McCormick (1991) and Robinson 
(1992) classify the CPRE as an ‘insider’ interest, with relatively privileged access to 
bureaucratic organizations such as the DoE and local planning authorities, compared 
to the lesser influence of ‘outsider’ groups such as FoE (Interview 4, Friends of the 
Earth). Within this context the logic of collective action model offers a plausible 
explanation of why the environmental focus of the town & country planning system 
has been confined to the prevention of urban development, to the neglect of what 
actually happens in the countryside itself. Put simply, the wider environmental lobby 
is unable to mobilize sufficient numbers of individuals to campaign directly against 
habitat and species losses inflicted by modem agriculture, because the per capita stake 
in these issues is minuscule. Likewise, taxpayers are unable to mobilize against the 
continual reliance on subsidised farming, because the costs are so widely diffused 
across millions of individual payers. The benefits to be derived from the prevention of 
urban developments in the countryside however, are concentrated on readily 
identifiable, nimby based groups.
The logic of collective action model also offers a plausible explanation of why the 
structure of land use regulation has increasingly focused on the protection of rural 
sites and the concentration of new development in existing urban centres. As 
discussed previously, it is in rural areas and especially small villages where nimby 
interests accord most closely with the model of exogenous groups and where the rate 
of mobilization is highest. In urban areas by contrast, anti-development interests are 
less well organized because the population of cities is more heterogeneous and the 
potential membership of groups tends to be larger, thus raising the relative costs of 
mobilization.
A similar analysis may explain why it was that attempts to liberalize the planning 
system in the early 1980s faltered first at the local level rather than at the national 
scale. Thus, it is at the local government level where the preponderance of nimby 
incentives allows the CPRE to attain a relatively high rate of mobilization, whereas the
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group did not even have an individual membership scheme until 1983, relying almost 
exclusively on its network of local groups (Interview 3). Not surprisingly then, it was 
at the Department of the Environment level where development interests were able to 
exert proportionately more influence. In turn, it was the local uproar resulting from 
the liberalization proposals which enabled the CPRE to capitalize on its nimby base 
and to launch a national membership scheme.
The institutional incentives which allow CPRE to mobilize into a concentrated 
lobbying force are undoubtedly a critical factor in the success of the organization, 
however it is the nature of the rents available which underpins the basis of this 
success. In particular, the designation of environmental sites falls clearly within the 
category of indirect, regulatory wealth transfers discussed in the earlier section.
Environmental designations do not involve any direct transfer of monetary wealth as 
is the case with subsidies, but by regulating the use of private property they do confer 
concentrated benefits on key interest groups and disperse the associated costs. The 
nimby oriented membership of CPRE is a highly visible group with a concentrated 
interest in higher property values and private amenity. The losers on the other hand 
are almost invisible, first because of a serious free rider problem and second because 
regulatory transfers are subject to a high degree of rational ignorance.
The principal losers from restrictive planning controls are the marginal consumers 
who are no longer able to afford the purchase price or rent of private housing, the 
actual consumers of new residential units which are smaller and more cramped in 
terms of space as a result of the higher land prices, the commuters faced with longer 
journeys to work and the taxpayers who must continue to fund a subsidy dependent 
agriculture (chapter 2). The losers from nimby legislation are a diffuse, endogenous 
interest. Each of the many individuals affected loses only a small amount which is 
insufficient to outweigh the substantial costs of organizing a large potential 
membership. In addition in the case of housing consumers, the membership of the 
group is subject to a high degree of instability as today’s marginal consumers may be 
able to afford new housing tomorrow if their incomes rise.
More important however, it is highly likely that the losers from environmental rent 
seeking are not even aware that transfers are taking place due to the pervasiveness of 
rational ignorance in cases of statutory regulation. Survey evidence has repeatedly 
shown that public perceptions of the proportion of urban to rural land in the United 
Kingdom are almost totally divorced from reality. Cullingworth (1988) quotes a 
survey which indicated that over 70% of the population believed that at least 65% of
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the land area is in urban uses, when the actual figure is a mere 11% (see also Evans 
1991). Academic research may indicate that restrictive land use controls produce 
higher land and housing costs, but given that many of the effects of regulation do not 
show up in the monthly tax bill, there is little if any incentive for the average voter to 
trace the source and magnitude of interest group exploitation.
The House Building Lobby
The house building lobby is represented by the House Builders Federation (HBF), the 
Volume Builders Study Group (VBSG), the Building Employers Confederation 
(BEC), the National Housing and Building Council (NHBC) and the Federation of 
Master Builders (FMB).
These groups provide good examples of concentrated, exogenous interests and as one 
would expect, are highly mobilized in terms of membership and financial 
contributions. In 1994 the HBF had 3 500 members and an income of £5 million 
derived from large regionally based firms or corporate multinationals, whose 
combined output accounted for almost 80% of new housing construction in the UK 
(Interview 5 & 6, HBF/ BEC). The VBSG consists of 8 mega-corporate concerns 
including Christian Salvesen and Barratts.The BEC meanwhile with 12 000 members 
is the largest employers organization in the country, including all HBF members 
(HBF is a subgroup) and a range of other construction interests such as the road- 
building lobby. The FMB had 10 000 members in 1994 consisting mostly of small 
and medium sized firms operating on the local or regional scale (Interview 7, FMB).
All of the house building interests also employ selective incentives to firm up the 
membership participation, the HBF for example, offers a magazine service and is a 
member of the NHBC, which issues various design awards and charter marks and 
hence provides a valuable marketing ploy. Equally, the federation’s technical 
knowledge and expertise in the planning arena are often indispensable for firms 
attempting to secure a place for their projects in the local plan process. It is however 
the smaller firms represented by the FMB for whom selective incentives are most 
important. With over 20 000 small building firms in the country, the sector has a 
larger potential membership than the corporate interests represented by the HBF. In 
order to secure members the federation has attempted to license entry into the sector 
by developing a code of practice and using the FMB label as a guarantee against black 
market firms operating outside the realm of statutory building regulations.
95
For house building interests the rents extracted through the political process are 
dependent on the rate of land release for residential purposes via the planning system. 
As one might expect, all the developer based groups favour a greater level of release 
than either the conservation or the farming lobby, but it would be a mistake to view 
the building lobby as supporting levels of development which might be feasible in a 
land market free from statutory controls. On the contrary, the ability of the house 
builders and in particular the larger developers to extract rents is dependent on a 
regulated land use system and it is control over the regulatory process which forms 
the focus of lobbying activity (Rydin 1986).
House building firms require sites available for development as construction on 
existing sites nears completion, so that the firms resources can be transferred easily 
from one site to another (Goodchild & Munton 1985). Consequently it is necessary 
for many firms to hold ‘land-banks’ of sites with planning permission. Obtaining 
planning permission requires time and money to participate in the plan-making 
process where potential sites are identified for release and later on individual planning 
applications. The granting of planning permission for a parcel of land confers a 
monopoly right on the owner as other potential sites are excluded from the land 
market. Developers who are able to secure planning permissions for their land banks 
are able to secure higher prices and profits than in a fully competitive market system.
In accordance with Stigler’s (1975) theory of ‘regulatory capture’, the corporate 
builders favour a controlled system which provides permission to develop their own 
land, whilst restricting access to land for potential competitors. Thus as Evans (1988) 
argues, the bulk of profits derived from UK house building during the 1980’s were 
not the product of building homes, but rather the monopoly gains from land-banks 
with planning permission.
Given the importance of land-banks to the economic fortunes of the house builders, it 
is periods of economic growth and property market boom which bring forth the most 
vigorous lobbying by groups such as the HBF. As land prices soar due to restricted 
supply developers lobby for greater control over the regulatory process in order to 
reap monopoly profits from the controlled release of land which they own. In the 
1980s this was exemplified in the setting up of a ‘New Homes Marketing Board’ by 
the HBF/BEC to advertise the case for greater land release (Interviews 5 & 6) and the 
important role of the house builders in the formulation of DoE circulars 9/80,16/84 
and 14/85, all of which increased the involvement of developers in the identification 
of new housing sites (Rydin 1986).
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A second source of rent seeking gain for the large house builders is derived through 
the increasing exclusion of small firms from the housing market and hence a further 
reduction in competition.The acquisition of planning permissions requires the use of 
rent seeking expenditures in the form of planning consultancies, legal fees and the 
costs of application and appeal. Smaller firms are at a disadvantage because resource 
constraints limit the number of applications they can make, which increases the risk of 
not obtaining any planning permissions. Larger, corporate firms are able to afford a 
greater number of planning applications to spread the associated risks. This pattern is 
reinforced because the costs of application and appeal do not increase proportionately 
with the size of a development. The cost of a planning permission for a development 
of 500 homes is lower per house than the cost of permission to build 5 homes 
(Cullingworth & Nadin 1994, Evans 1988, 1991).
Small firms are often driven out of business due to the resultant land shortages and 
between 1972 and 1974 almost 2 000 firms were lost (net), largely due to corporate 
take-overs. As Table 3.5 indicates, the trend towards concentration in the building 
industry appears to have continued into the 1990s. According to the NHBC, in 1992 
the top 32 companies supplied almost half of total production, with each building 500 
units or more. At the other end of the market there were more than 6 000 companies 
building fewer than ten houses per year (Bramley et al 1995). Undoubtedly some of 
the concentration may be accounted for by genuine efficiencies due to economies of 
scale and the ability of large firms to spread the risks of production in what is often a 
highly volatile market, but as Evans (1988,1991) contends, the peculiar incentives in 
the planning system which favour land release on very large sites must be a critical 
factor, given the relatively low start-up costs for house building firms.
The advantages conferred on larger firms by the planning system appear to be 
reflected in the relative strength of the building lobbies. Previous research indicates 
that it is the larger building interests in the HBF and VBSG, controlling the bulk of 
new housing production, which have exerted the greatest political influence (Rydin 
1986). This pattern was confirmed by the present author's interviews which revealed 
the HBF and BEC to have full-time political lobbyists and a specialist team of 
planning experts, whereas the FMB simply did not have the resources to employ staff 
for these purposes (Interviews 5, 6 & 7).
It is important, however, to recognize that the dominance of the large firms and there 
ability to manipulate the regulatory process, stems from the way the planning system 
has operated since 1947, rather than from any intrinsic characteristics of the housing 
market. Prior to the advent of the 1947 act the building industry was highly diffuse,
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Table 3.5 Structure of the UK House Building Industry - Starts bv Size of Output (%)
Units 1977 1982 1987 1992
0 0 0 0 0
1-10 16 14 13 12
11-30 13 10 11 9
31-100 14 12 13 13
101-500 22 18 18 21
501-2000 35 17 16 18
2000+ Incl. Above 25 25 26
Source : Bramley et al (1995,p.89).
consisting predominantly of small and medium sized firms (Bramley et al 1995) and 
there is no evidence to suggest that these firms had any great influence on the initial 
legislation, at least when compared to the power of the agricultural lobby.
Rather, it was the conditions created by the 1947 system which facilitated the growing 
dominance of large volume builders which have since mobilized into a powerful rent 
seeking force.
As with the conservation lobby, the house builders attempt to control the regulatory 
apparatus in order to extract indirect wealth transfers. Housing consumers who are the 
losers from this rent-seeking behaviour are underorganized because of the free rider 
problem and the high degree of rational ignorance associated with regulatory 
transfers.The house builders are favoured by the fact that most of the losers from their 
actions are an invisible, endogenous group. However, there is one exception to this 
general pattern, which concerns the relationship between house builders and the 
conservationists.
Although both of these groups benefit from restrictions on development, the 
developers have a preference for higher levels of house building especially in 
designated environmental sites. In this case the conservationists are a highly visible 
group of potential ‘losers’ in the regulatory game and the ability of the building lobby 
to maximize profits on land-banks is dependent on their relative strength vis a vis the 
conservationists. Because both groups benefit from restrictive regulations it is difficult 
to decipher which is the most powerful interest at any one point in time. However 
given the centrality of land-banks to corporate developers and the importance of 
discretionary planning permissions in order to extract rents, it is reasonable to assume
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that any moves towards a less discretionary planning system indicate a relative 
weakness for the builders. This would appear to have been the case when the CPRE 
secured the section 54a amendment to the 1991 Planning and Compensation Act, 
which reduced the power of developers to achieve discretionary planning permissions 
through the appeals procedure. At present it would seem that the potential for new 
private sector housing development has been reduced below the already restricted 
levels which the organized builders would support.
The Professional Lobby
The fourth set of interests in the political market for urban containment is the 
professional lobby, consisting of the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI), the 
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), the District, County and 
Metropolitan Planning Officers Societies (D/C/M/POS) and the Town and Country 
Planning Association (TCPA). As professional organizations these interests are able 
to license entry into the planning bureaucracy and are consequently immune from the 
logic of collective action.
Founded in 1914, the RTPI is the state registered body for planners and under the 
Royal Charter devises the skills and examination standards to attain corporate 
membership as a professional town planner. In 1994 the Institute had an income of 
£2.5 million and had 17 000 members, 70% of whom worked in the public sector 
(60% in local government), 18% in private planning consultancies and a further 4% in 
education (Interview 8, RTPI, RTPI Annual Report 1995). The RICS meanwhile, 
represents a range of property professionals engaged in the assembly of land for 
development and planning consultancy. Entrance into the property surveyance 
profession is licensed under the Royal Charter and in 1993 the annual budget stood at 
£16.2 million with a membership of 80 000 ( Interviews 9 & 10, RICS, RICS Annual 
Report 1994).
D/C/M/POS are consultative bodies for leading local authority planners and the total 
membership is about 500 all of whom are RTPI members (Interviews 11 & 12, 
D/C/MPOS). The TCPA on the other hand is not a formally professional body and 
has no powers of license. Rather it acts as an educational institute and a debating 
forum for planners and most of its 600 individual members have professional status 
alongside 223 local authority members (Interview 13, TCPA, TCPA Annual Report 
1993).
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The professional lobbies have rent seeking interests on both the demand and supply 
sides of the political process. On the supply side planning professionals are public 
sector bureaucrats responsible for the enforcement of statutory land use regulations, 
whilst on the demand side they have a direct stake in the operation of the property 
market through the process of land assembly, private consultancy and a quasi-legal 
role in planning applications and appeals. A substantial section of the subsequent 
chapter considers the role of planners on the supply side through a detailed analysis of 
bureaucratic incentive structures, so this chapter presents a brief overview of rent 
seeking interests on the demand side.
Demand side rent seeking occurs through the manipulation of the regulatory process 
in order to maximize the income stream of planning professionals by inflating the 
demand for private consultancies, marketing and quasi-legal advise from those 
engaged in the construction of property.
In order to achieve planning permission for their proposed developments, private 
house builders must submit applications and appeals to the relevant planning 
authorities and may be required to present evidence at a public inquiry procedure. The 
professional planning bodies are a major source of representation for private 
developers, with approximately 55% of all representations presented by chartered 
town planners or chartered surveyors and the remaining 45% by barristers or 
solicitors (Adams 1995, p.203).
The professions are able to extract rents from private developers and hence add to the 
total cost of land use planning in two key ways. First, because all applications and 
appeals are judged by professional planners, it pays to employ qualified planners as 
representatives (Adams 1995) and given that entry into the profession is restricted by 
chartered status, planning consultants are able to extract monopoly charges from 
private developers. Second, because developers require expert knowledge of the 
legislative process in order to achieve planning permissions, the professions can 
extract rents by seeking to lengthen the planning process and to instigate more 
complicated legal procedures which they themselves are then required to interpret.
The rent seeking fortunes of planning professionals are tied closely to the fortunes of 
the development process and in particular the state of the property market. In periods 
of boom the demand for planning consultants and legal advisors is buoyant as private 
developers submit more planning applications and appeals in order to secure the 
release of their holdings. For example, in the property boom of the mid 1980s, 
Coombs (1991 quoted in Adams 1995) notes that the number of chartered town
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planners employed by private developers more than doubled between 1984 and 1988. 
In periods of recession however, many private planners and consultants may suffer a 
dramatic decline in their incomes as the demand for consultancies begins to run dry. If 
incomes are to be maintained then the professions must look to stimulate the demand 
for their services by lobbying for changes to the legislative apparatus which will 
heighten the demand for private consultancy. Initial gains will be extracted from those 
developers still active in a depressed market, but should the market improve then 
incomes might be increased above those derived during the previous period of 
growth.
Given these incentives it should come as no great surprise that the centrepiece of 
professional lobbying during recent years was the major changes in national planning 
legislation introduced by the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act and the 
subsequent 1991 Planning and Compensation Act. The RTPI,RICS, D/C/MPOS and 
the TCPA all joined with the CPRE in lobbying for the creation of the ‘plan-led’ 
development control system (Interviews 8-13 ), the implications of which appear to be 
very favourable for professional incomes.
As noted in the earlier section the enhanced status of the local plan has increased the 
significance of the plan making process and reduced the ability of developers to use 
the appeals procedure. It has become essential for rent seeking interests to make their 
representations during the plan making stage if they are to stand any chance of 
receiving a subsequent planning permission.
As the plan-making stage has increased in importance so has the length of the entire 
planning procedure and with it the demand for planning consultants and legal 
advisors. It is not uncommon for developers to pay out as much as £500 000 for 
consultancy and legal costs at a planning inquiry the average length of which 
increased from seven weeks in 1989 to twenty two weeks in 1992, ie. following the 
Planning and Compensation Act (Interviews 14,15 & 16, Hillier Parker, Gerald Eve 
and Weatherall, Green & Smith Planning Consultants, Cullingworth 1994, Adams
1995).
The rents extracted by the professional lobby during the planning procedure are direct 
transfers where private developers are forced to devote resources to consultancy and 
legal expenditures. These rents are subject to a low degree of rational ignorance 
because the building lobby is itself highly organized and its members frequently 
confronted with the effects of professional rent seeking. The larger developers 
themselves benefit from consultancies to the extent that smaller firms cannot afford
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these additional costs, but when their own margins are threatened as planning costs 
spiral, the big house builders campaign for a reduction in planning bureaucracy. The 
HBF, BEC and VBSG have thus lobbied against the ‘plan-led’ system (Interviews 5 
& 6, HBF 1992/1994 - unpublished submission to DoE Deregulation Task Force), 
but appear to have been defeated by a coalition of the professional and conservation 
lobbies.
Professional rent seeking is further protected because for the dispersed mass of 
housing consumers the transfers are indirect and virtually invisible, where each 
potential consumer incurs a relatively small loss as housing developers spend 
resources on consultancy and legal fees rather than increasing the number, quality, 
design and space standards of new residential units.
3.3 Conclusion: Urban Containment - Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs
The public choice/ rent seeking theory of politics, predicts that legislative processes 
will be dominated by the lobbying activities of organized interest groups. If a group 
undertakes a loud campaign in favour of a particular program, while the opponents of 
the program stay quiet, then the program will be adopted. It further predicts, that 
organizational success tends at least in part to depend inversely on group size and that 
policies whose costs are hidden or dispersed are more likely to be adopted and 
retained than ones whose costs are conspicuous or concentrated.
This chapter has examined the political market in urban containment from the 
perspective of public choice theory .The interest group data, summarized in Tables 3.6 
and 3.7, offers considerable support for the analytical framework. All the groups 
which have exercised influence in the political process and have benefited from the 
resultant legislation are examples of concentrated interests. Even the environmental 
lobby, which is often undermobilized, is able to overcome the collective action 
problem to a large extent with respect to land use regulation, because benefits are 
concentrated on members within locally specific sites. The principal beneficiaries of 
land use regulation are protected from retaliatory political action, because the rents 
which they seek are virtually invisible to the average voter and are often derived 
indirectly through the regulation of private property rights.
Concentrated interests lobby for the restriction of new development below the levels 
which might prevail in a land market free from statutory controls. Only the Federation
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Table 3.6 The Political Market in Urban Containment
Economic Formal Members Per Capita Rate of
Interest Group Stake Mobilization
Winners
Tenant Farmers NFU 114 000 1 1
Landed Farmers CLA 50 000 1 1
Nimby CPRE 560 000 3 3
Large Builder HBF/BEC 12 000 1 1
Planners RTPI/RICS 100 000 1 1
Losers
Small Builder FMB 10 000 2 2
Priv. Renter None Latent 5 5
Priv. Owner None Latent 5 5
Soc. Renter None Latent 5 5
Other Environmental FoE/RSPB 1 000 000 5 4
Taxpayer None Latent 5 5
Notes : 1 = High 5 = Low
of Master Builders lobbies for deregulation and even the major building interests in 
the HBF/BEC, although supportive of greater development, have a substantial stake 
in a tightly regulated land use system.
The diffuse interests which bear the costs of restrictive regulations - potential 
consumers of new residential units, be they public or private sector; commuters facing 
longer journeys to work; and taxpayers funding a subsidy dependent rural economy, 
provide the archetypal case of a diffuse interest, totally absent from the realm of 
organized politics and with little incentive to become so organized.
Of course, the assertion that interest groups play an important role in the British land 
use planning system is hardly novel; the works of Healey et al (1985), Rydin (1986) 
and Shucksmith (1990), have all suggested that planning policy is biased in favour of 
key groups. However, the public choice approach developed here provides a new and 
coherent frame of analysis which can explain why these biases have existed in the past 
and perhaps more important why they seem likely to persist in the future. The logic of 
collective action model in particular, offers a powerful explanation of why nimby 
environmental groups have been relatively successful in securing restrictive land use
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Table 3.7 Rent Seekers and Policy Change
Policy For Against H—
Land
Fate
of Policy
Wildlife & 
Countryside 1981
NFU/CLA - Passed
Green Belt 
Liberalization 1984
HBF/BEC CPRE/NFU/ 
FMB RTPI
+ Abandoned
Housing Circulars 
1980/84/85
HBF/BEC/ CPRE/NFU 
FMB RTPI
+ Abandoned
Agriculture Act 
1986
NFU/CLA/
CPRE
- Passed
ALURE 1987/88 HBF/BEC CPRE/RTPI 
FMB/CLA
+ Abandoned
MacSharry
1991/92
NFU/CLA/
CPRE
- Passed
Planning & 
Compensation 1991
CPRE/RTPI/ HBF/BEC/ 
RICS FMB
- Passed
controls over urban development, when environmentalists in general have failed to 
secure such controls over mechanized agriculture.
To summarize, the approach outlined in this chapter suggests that differential access to 
the political market in urban containment mirrors the institutional and informational 
asymmetries which are characteristic of ‘government failure’ on the 'demand' side of 
representative politics as a whole. Policy outputs however, should not be viewed as a 
purely demand driven phenomenon. Organizational success is worthless unless there 
are bureaucratic and political actors with sufficient willingness to supply an interest 
group’s demands. Thus, it is the potential for ‘government failure’ on the ‘supply 
side’ of the political market to which the subsequent chapters turn.
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4.
Budgets, Bureaucrats & Urban Containment
4.0 Introduction
Chapter 3 examined the role of interest groups on the 'demand' side of the political 
market, this chapter turns now to the role of the planning bureaucracy on the 'supply' 
side.Through a review of the theoretical literature and the presentation of empirical 
evidence, the aim is to apply a new analytical framework to understand the continued 
emphasis on urban containment within the British land use planning system.The 
chapter focuses on bureaucracies because of the important role of regulatory agencies 
in the management of land use change.
Previous studies of the political economy of planning have examined the important 
role of interest groups on the 'demand side' of the political process (for a public 
choice account see the previous chapter), confirming that the principal beneficiaries 
have been tenant farming interests who gain from production subsidies, artificially 
keeping land in agricultural uses; rural home owners, or NIMBY interests in groups 
such as the Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE), who derive gains 
from the appreciation of their assets, and corporate developers who are able to restrict 
entry into the land development market. (Herington 1984, Rydin 1986, Healy et al 
1988, Evans 1988, 1991, Shucksmith 1990, Barlow 1990).
Valuable though these studies are, it is significant that not a single author has 
highlighted the economic interests of the planning bureaucracy on the 'supply side'. 
This is a surprising omission for as public choice theory suggests, bureaucrats have 
economic concerns of their own which require the cultivation of supportive politicians 
and private claimants (Niskanen 1971 & 1975, De Alessi 1974, Peltzman 1976, 
Borcherding 1977, Libecap 1989, Blais & Dion 1991, Dowding 1995). Civil servants 
have an equal propensity towards self-interested behaviour as the rest of the 
population and may offer differential support for those policies and interest groups 
which add to their income, status, powers of patronage and job security. As William 
Niskanen (1971, p.5) contends,
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"Any theory o f the behaviour o f bureaus that does not incorporate the personal 
preferences o f bureaucrats will be relevant in only the most rigidly authoritarian 
environments."
Given the postulate of self-interested behaviour, any analysis of the British planning 
system must consider the economic interests of the government agencies involved. It 
is the purpose of this chapter to provide such an analysis. The argument is divided 
into four parts.
The first section reviews some recent theoretical refinements to the public choice 
theory of bureaucracy and drawing on Dunleavy's (1991) work, outlines a 
classification of bureaucratic agency types and incentive structures. The second 
section presents budgetary data on the primary agencies of the land use planning 
system within the context of the analytical framework. The analysis suggests that land 
use planning is dominated by agency types where bureaucrats can best advance their 
interests by seeking to expand their budgets. The final two sections argue that 
budgetary growth has coincided with regulatory growth which may account for the 
continued focus on urban containment.
4.1 Budgets and Bureaucrats: A Theory of Bureaucratic Behaviour
In Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Niskanen (1971) argues that 
bureaucratic entrepreneurs maximize their utility through the pursuit of budget 
appropriations. For a private firm operating in the market, the utility of the 
entrepreneur is performance related, because remuneration is dependent on the account 
of profit and loss. Bureaucracies by contrast are public sector organizations in which a 
significant proportion of revenue is derived from budgetary grants. Given the absence 
of profit incentives, Niskanen suggests that bureaucratic utility is a positive monotonic 
function of budget size and that budget maximization is the most likely utility 
enhancing strategy for civil servants. A growing agency will tend to employ more 
staff, add to job security and the perquisites of office and increase the status of the 
employees.
Government bureaucrats are monopoly suppliers of goods and services within the 
public sector and this position affords them considerable organizational and 
informational advantage over the electorate and its political representatives, which in 
turn facilitates budget maximization. First, unlike other pressure groups and the 
unorganized mass of voters, bureaucrats do not face substantial collective action
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problems.With the organizational apparatus of the state already in place, free rider 
problems are minimized and the ease of access to elected officials, characteristic of 
bureaucratic employment increases the likelihood of discretionary influence.
Second, as monopoly suppliers, bureaux are often the only source of output /cost data 
with respect to their services and may easily inflate cost estimates in order to obtain 
budget increments. And third, politicians supplying appropriations have few 
incentives to examine in detail the activities of specific bureaux, because any cost 
savings are thinly dispersed across the voting population, minimizing per capita gains 
and with little electoral award.
The above combination of incentives results in a radical oversupply of state provided 
services and regulation which has contributed significantly to the growth of the 
modem state. Figure 4.1 provides a graphical analysis of the oversupply thesis.
Figure 4.1 Bureaucratic Exploitation bv a Niskanen Bureau
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A private firm operating in a competitive market would expand its output to point E, 
where marginal value is equal to marginal cost. Production at this point would give the 
consumer surplus represented by the triangle GEH. Budget maximization in the 
public sector however will expand output to point F, creating an area of unnecessary 
production (EFR), which wipes out all the consumer gains in a process of 
bureaucratic exploitation.
In more recent work, Niskanen (1995) shifts from the oversupply thesis, towards an 
emphasis on bureaucratic inefficiency in the production of given outputs. The concept 
of waste in his original thesis refers specifically to 'allocative inefficiency' as opposed 
to oganizational or 'X-inefficiency'. In these circumstances, resources are devoted 
away from their most valued use, which does not necessarily mean that they are 
produced 'inefficiently' - for example by using too many staff. In his latest 
contribution however, Niskanen suggests that bureaucrats will focus less on the 
maximization of output per se and more on the maximization of their 'discretionary 
budget' - ie. the difference between the minimum cost of producing a given output and 
the maximum level of resources that can be extracted from the political authorities for 
its production. Thus, the emphasis shifts from oversupply - which may still occur - to 
the organizational inefficiency of supply, as bureaucrats maximize the level of inputs 
per unit of output (see also Peacock 1983).
Niskanen's approach remains the most influential account in the public choice 
literature, but the empirical evidence in favour of his straight-forward budget 
maximization model has been patchy to say the least. Given that staffing, job security 
and status are assumed to be a positive monotonic function of budgets, one would 
expect to find a significant correlation between expenditure and staff increases, when 
in fact the relationship is far from clear with regard to aggregate public sector trends in 
both the US and UK.
Peters' (1989) study of Federal bureaux in the USA revealed hardly any correlation 
between expenditures and staff increases in both growing (r = 0.08) and declining (r =
0.19) agencies (Dunleavy 1991, p.214) and Dunsire (1991) reports that during the 
general decade of cutback management in the UK (1974-1985), staffing as a whole 
was cut much more than expenditures. The only available evidence in support of the 
budget maximization thesis was a general tendency for bureaux to cut capital before 
current expenditures, the latter being the source of salary and administration costs.
In response to these difficulties, it is necessary to develop a more disaggregated 
account of bureaucratic behaviour which considers the variation of incentives towards
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bureaucratic growth within different types of government agency. Three factors 
appear to be particularly influential in determining the extent to which bureaucrats 
might seek to maximize their budgets; i) the institutional form of the agency budget, ii) 
the degree of professionalization within an agency and iii) the extent to which an 
agency is populated by ideologically motivated staff.
Dunleavy (1991) has modified Niskanen's model to produce an account which 
considers the variation of incentives towards budget maximization within agencies of 
differing institutional forms. His basic model distinguishes between three institutional 
types of budget and then categorizes five different agency types according to the 
character of the budget in their charge.1 The budget classification is as follows;
1. The Core Budget (CB) includes all spending deployed within the bureau itself on 
staff and administration.
2. The Bureau element represents all monies paid out to the private sector as contracts 
or transfer payments. The CB plus the bureau element is referred to as the Bureau 
Budget (BB)
3. The Program element encompasses all monies which the agency receives but then 
passes on to other public sector bureaux. The overall budget flowing through the 
agency is termed the Program Budget (PB).
The proportion of a bureau's total expenditure which falls into each of these categories 
varies according to the type of bureau, as shown in Table 4.1.
Keeping Niskanen's assumption that bureaucrats desire a mix of job security, 
perquisites of office and increased status, Dunleavy (1991) suggests that these are 
primarily associated with the Core Budget (CB) and in certain circumstances to the 
Bureau Budget (BB). Accordingly, he argues that incentives for budget maximization 
are strongest in those agencies where the CB represents a high proportion of the total 
budget - in Delivery agencies such as the Police Force or the Army, which produce 
output directly for the consumption of individuals or enterprises and in Regulatory 
agencies, such as Health and Safety Directorates, which act to control the behaviour of 
individuals and firms through the administration of licensing systems or regulatory 
laws.
1 Niskanen (1991) appears to accept the implications of Dunleavy's more disaggregated approach, but 
does not himself set out a fully developed model.
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Table 4.1 Bureaucratic Agency Types and Budget Form
Agency Type Budget Form
Delivery CB most of BB and PB
Regulatory CB most of BB and PB
Transfer CB small part of BB which is most of PB
Contract CB small part of BB which is most of PB
Control CB small part of BB which is small part of PB
Source : Adapted from Dowding (1995,p.90).
In Transfer agencies such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Contract agencies such as 
the defence procurement divisions within the Ministry of Defence, where subsidy 
payments or government contracts are destined for the members of highly organized 
interest groups, (farmers and defence contractors) bureaucrats might also seek to 
maximize BB subsidies in exchange for a flow back of benefits, including post­
retirement deals and political support. However in all other Transfer and Contract 
bureaux dealing with a fragmented clientele of consumers there are relatively fewer 
incentives to push for budgetary growth. As Dunleavy (1991,p. 194) puts it,
"Why should policy level staff at a welfare agency seek to push up payments to the 
unemployed - none o f whom can provide any reciprocal benefits to bureaucrats?"
Similarly, in Control agencies such as the Department for Education, where budget 
increments are simply passed on to lower level bureaucracies (individual schools and 
local authorities), there may also be fewer incentives to budget maximize.
Dunleavy (1991) has applied this approach to Dunsire and Hood's (1989) data on the 
decade of cutback management in the UK central state (1974 -1985). The findings 
were very supportive of the analytical framework, with none of the delivery agencies 
under examination suffering any real cutback in their budgets, but almost half of the 
transfer, contract and control agencies experiencing real cuts in their overall program 
budgets (Dunleavy 1991, p.215). Similarly in the period 1978-9 to 1987-8 the 
average annual increases in public expenditure were shown to be greatest in delivery 
bureaux such as law and order and defence and smallest in transfer and control 
agencies focused on welfare services (Dunleavy 1991, p.217).
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A second factor which may influence the tendency toward bureau expansion, is the 
degree of professionalization within different agencies. As Breton & Wintrobe (1975) 
argue, highly professionalized bureaux often have personnel whose expertise is 
relatively restricted with possibilities for career advancement residing mainly within 
the agency. Johnston (1985) cites the US Forest Service as an example of such an 
agency. Over 90% of the bureau staff have professional qualifications in forest 
management; skills and knowledge which are not easily transferred to other career 
paths, thus fuelling the pressure to push for bureau growth and the resultant job 
security. In less professionalized agencies by contrast, there are fewer incentives to 
push for expansion; first, because top bureaucrats may have greater opportunities for 
advancement outside the agency and second, because to the extent that senior 
professionals do budget maximize, these incentives will be confined to the relatively 
small proportion of the overall budget devoted to professional staff - there is less 
incentive in terms of job security or status for high grade officials to expand budgets 
and job opportunities on low skilled workers performing routine tasks. Thus, 
differences in the degree of professionalization and the rank structure of departments 
may result in different levels of growth between agencies of the same institutional 
agency form.
In further work, Dunleavy combines his 'bureau shaping' analysis with an account of 
professional behaviour to explain acquiescence to the growth of contracting out and 
competitive tendering in local government service delivery (Dunleavy 1991, Dunleavy 
& Biggs 1995). Niskanenesque accounts predict that contracting out exposes 
bureaucrats to greater competition and should therefore provoke strong opposition. In 
practice however, policy level bureaucrats have accepted contracting out with little in 
the way of resistance (Ascher 1987). Dunleavy explains this trend by arguing that so 
long as the impact of contracting out (ie. potential job losses) falls on low grade staff, 
senior bureaucrats in local delivery bureaux are unlikely to witness a decline in their 
opportunities for promotion and prestige, should routine tasks carried out by low 
skilled workers be 'hived off to private contractors. Why should senior bureaucrats 
care how many workers perform the refuse collection service or fill the potholes in the 
road? The greater the grade distinctions between policy level staff and implementation 
staff, the less likely it is that self-interested managers will pursue outright budget 
maximization and oppose contracting out. By contrast, highly professionalized 
bureaux with relatively few low grade functions are more likely to pursue open ended 
bureaucratic growth and to resist any transfer of functions to private contractors.
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A third and final variable which may affect incentives towards bureaucratic growth is 
the importance of ideological motivation. Wilson's (1989) survey of the literature on 
the US Federal bureaucracy suggests that professional agencies focused in 'activist' 
areas such as environmental protection, tend to attract staff motivated by an ideological 
commitment to the pursuit of agency mission, fuelling pressure for growth to a greater 
extent than in bureaux performing less politicized roles (for example street cleaning). 
Rowley (1992) makes a similar analysis of ideological bias and mission commitment 
in the US Legal Services Corporation. To use the terminology of Downs (1967), high 
profile politicized bureaux are more likely to attract 'zealot' personality types to their 
staffs.
In what follows, the analytical framework outlined above is applied to the agencies of 
the British land use planning system. Each agency is categorized according to its 
bureaucratic profile, the nature of its clients and its expected behaviour examined 
against the available evidence. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 consider the implications of 
bureaucratic behaviour for the pattern of land use change.
4.2 Land Use Regulation as Budget Maximization
Bureaucratic control of land use change is divided between several agencies operating 
at both the national and the local scale. The Department of the Environment (DoE) is 
the national sponsor body for the planning system as whole but is not directly 
involved in the implementation of development control, except in a quasi-judicial 
function in the appeals procedure alongside the Planning Inspectorate. Rather, the 
DoE issues advice to local authorities in the form of Planning Policy Guidance Notes 
and occasional policy circulars. Planning is only a minor function within the overall 
DoE remit accounting for less than 0.5% of its £37 billion budget, 95% of which is 
allocated as transfer payments to local authority service provision and variety of quasi- 
autonomous agencies operating in conservation, rural development, pollution control, 
housing and urban regeneration (DoE 1995). The DoE is thus a Control bureau, but 
the planning directorate within the DoE, for which no fully disaggregated budget 
figures are available (Interviews 17-19), is itself a regulatory agency.
The vast bulk of policy implementation is controlled by bureaucratic organizations at 
the sub-national level through local authorities and quangos. Primary responsibility is 
held by planning bureaucrats in individual local authorities who administer the 
development control system and draft the local development plans which lie at the core 
of the planning system.
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About 80% of local authority finance is derived from central government grants (UK 
National Accounts) - channelled predominantly through the DoE, the Department for 
Education, the Department of Health,the Department of Transport and, the Home 
Office. The level of planning expenditure is dependent on the share of central 
government grants (from the DoE), plus the 20% of finance drawn from local taxes 
and charges which local authorities choose to allocate to these agencies.2
A secondary role is played by two quangos3, English Nature (formerly the Nature 
Conservancy Council /NCC) and the Countryside Commission. Each of these bodies 
has its own budget voted through parliament, but the Secretary of State for the 
Environment holds ultimate responsibility for their policy actions.
A further role is played by a second central government department - the Ministry of 
Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF). With agriculture as the dominant land use, 
in particular through the various subsidy programmes of the European Common 
Agricultural Policy, MAFF has an important role in the land use system and often 
engages in consultation with local authorities, the conservation quangos and the DoE.
Table 4. 2 depicts the budget profile and agency classification of the major land use 
bureaucracies. With the exception of the DoE, which has a relatively small planning 
function, land use agencies predominantly take the form of regulatory bureaux. Local 
authority planning departments do not produce goods and services as such, but 
instead draft local land use designations such as Green Belts and administer these 
through the granting or refusal of planning permissions. The CB for local authority 
planning at the District, County and Metropolitan levels accounts for over 90% of the 
total program budget (£1.2 billion in 1991- at 1993 prices) and with only minuscule 
transfer payments to the private sector these bureaux may be classified as 'pure' 
regulatory agencies.
2 Central government grants to local authorities are based on the so called Standard Spending 
Assessment (SSA) in which central government estimates what local authorities should spend on the 
provision of various local services such as Education, Social Services, Planning etc. The block grant 
which central government provides to local authorities - Revenue Support Grant (RSG) is based on 
these spending estimates. Once local authorities receive this grant however, they still have 
considerable discretion in how they choose to allocate the block grant between different local 
departments. Even though central government control over total local authority spending has increased 
substantially in recent years, councils still retain discretion concerning how that money is actually 
used. Only 23% of central government grants are earmarked for specific projects and services (Wilson 
& Game 1994).
3 'Quango' is the term used for quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations. These bodies are 
state appointed boards employed to implement elements of government policy. They are nominally 
separate from the agencies of central government, but still constitute an arm of the state bureaucracy 
with discretionary decision-making powers.
113
Table 4.2 Land Use Planning - Budget Classification and Agency Types
Percentage of Total Budget
Staff Admin.& 
Running Cost
Transfers to 
Private Sector
Transfers to 
Public Sector
Agency
Type
CB CB BB PB
DoE 2 2 1 95 Control
Districts 45 53 2 0 Regulatory
Counties 42 57 1 0 Regulatory
Metros 33 57 10 0 Regulatory
NCC/EN 40 35 25 0 Regulatory
CC 14 20 38 28 Reg/Trans
MAFF 20 20 40 20 Reg/Trans
Source : Computed from CIPFA Planning and Development Statistics, DoE, EN/CC/MAFF Annual 
Reports.
A similar though smaller regulatory function (total budget £56.7 million in 1991- at 
1993 prices) is carried out by NCC/EN, empowered under the Wildlife & Countryside 
Acts (1981 & 1985). EN may purchase or lease land as National Nature Reserves (a 
delivery function) and more important may regulate the behaviour of private land 
owners via the designation of Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs). The CB 
represents 75% of the total budget with a subsidiary 25% taken in transfer payments 
usually paid to land owning farmers who agree to practice ecologically sensitive 
farming.
The CC and MAFF are both 'mixed' regulatory/transfer bureaux. The CC is the 
statutory body responsible for countryside conservation under the 1968 Countryside 
Act and the Wildlife and Countryside Acts (total budget £47.7 million in 1994 - at 
1993 prices). Its regulatory functions include the designation of Areas of Outstanding 
Natural Beauty (AONBs). The much bigger MAFF (total budget £3 billion in 1994 - 
at 1993 prices) supervises the transfer of agricultural subsidies under the Common 
Agricultural Policy of the European Union and domestic subsidies targeted at
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landscape conservation. It also performs a regulatory function in the designation of 
Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESAs).
Given the theory of bureaucratic behaviour outlined in 4.1, land use agencies conform 
to the theoretical types where budget maximization is a plausible utility enhancing 
strategy for bureaucrats. The planning directorate within the DoE is a regulatory 
bureau with an apparent incentive to maximize the length of the regulatory process and 
hence its budget, by drafting ever longer and more complicated planning guidances. 
Although as a control bureau and the major source of local government finance, the 
local government directorate of the DoE has few direct incentives to maximize these 
internal transfers, local planning bureaucracies do have an incentive to gain as large a 
share as possible of the relevant grants. Similarly, local planning bureaucrats have 
incentives to ensure that local authorities devote proportionally more time lobbying 
central government for grants which flow to their agencies, rather than those destined 
for other local services such as transport and housing, as well as maximizing their 
share of locally raised finance. Likewise, the conservation quangos have a powerful 
incentive to maximize their share of DoE payments relative to those housing quangos 
performing predominantly welfare related transfer functions.
Increases in land use budgets are spent almost entirely within the bureaux themselves 
on staffing, office equipment and administration. Moreover, to the extent that land use 
bureaucracies engage in transfer payments (CC and MAFF), these are destined for a 
highly organized lobby group (farmers), well able to organize a flow back of benefits 
to senior officials in exchange for greater subsidy payments. For example, half the 
current policy team employed by the Country Landowners Association (CLA) 
previously worked for MAFF (Interviews 2 and 20).
The incentives towards bureaucratic growth would appear to be especially strong, 
compared even with other regulatory and delivery bureaux because of the high degree 
of professionalization within planning agencies and a tendency towards an 
environmentalist ideology in planning staffs.
Professionalization in land use planning may be seen in the large proportion of agency 
personnel who are qualified planners. According to a survey by the Royal Town 
Planning Institute (RTPI 1992), 60% of local authority planning workers are in senior 
professional positions and 85% of these have proceeded through formal training in 
town planning. Poole's (1975, p. 146) classic study of the local government system 
revealed that planning was second only to social work in the proportion of qualified 
graduates recruited and that only estate management and financial administration had a
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higher percentage (36%) of staff in the top salary grades of principal officer/senior 
officer, compared to only 6% for education and 10% for housing (Poole 1975, p.206- 
207). Local authority planning departments appear to exhibit a higher degree of 
professionalization and staff seniority than the vast majority of the local government 
service.
In the case of ideology, although inner city planning has often been associated with a 
welfarist ideology committed to economic growth, numerous studies have 
documented the tendency for suburban and rural planners to be motivated by a strong 
environmentalist ethos and a commitment to the restriction of market forces (Hill & 
Bramley 1986 Ch.9, Reade 1987, Shucksmith 1990 - see Marren 1993 for the 
conservation quangos). Thus, together with the institutional form of planning 
agencies and the degree of professionalization within planning staffs, all the incentives 
within these bureaux appear skewed towards bureaucratic growth and to a greater 
extent than in most other government agencies.
In order to consider the relevance of this theory, it is necessary to compare the 
fortunes of the major planning bureaucracies with general trends in bureaucratic 
growth across comparable agencies in the rest of the public sector. The hypotheses to 
be considered are as follows:
1 .Bureaucratic growth in land use planning agencies will be greater than in 
government bureaux as a whole.
2. The growth o f staffs within land use planning agencies will be greater than in 
government bureaux as a whole.
3.Land use planning agencies are less likely to be subjected to contracting out than 
government bureaux as a whole.
The illustrative data presented in Tables 4.3 to 4.9 is helpful in considering the virtue 
of these hypotheses. In each case, the local government category which contains both 
delivery/regulatory bureaux and those which are less professionalized/ideologically 
motivated and are in a non-delivery/regulatory format, acts as a control panel to enable 
comparison with land use planning.
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Table 4.3 Revenue Expenditure for Town & Country Planning and Total Local 
Authority in England and Wales : 1979-1991
Town & Country Planning Total Local Authority
Year Spending 1979 Index Spending 1979 Index
1979/80 959 100.0 63160 100.0
1980/81 1031 107.5 63285 100.2
1981/82 1013 105.6 63096 99.9
1982/83 993 103.5 62313 98.7
1983/84 1083 112.9 64288 101.8
1984/85 1085 113.1 64355 101.9
1985/86 1100 114.7 62892 99.6
1986/87 1017 106.0 63975 101.3
1987/88 1080 112.6 67041 106.1
1988/89 1159 120.9 68782 108.9
1989/90 1222 127.4 69293 109.7
1990/91 1246 129.9 69642 110.3
+/-% +29.9 +29.9 +10.3 +10.3
Notes:All spending in millions (deflated 1993=100). Source : Computed from Annual Abstract of 
Statistics.
The Annual Abstract of Statistics does not publish full expenditure figures for local planning 
authorities after 1991.
Table 4.3 compares spending totals for local authority planning in England & Wales in 
the 1980s with overall local authority spending. The data do not contradict hypothesis 
1. Total local authority spending increased by 10% in real terms but town and country 
planning fared considerably better with a real increase of almost 30%, which was also 
far in excess of total public sector growth, 16% (UK National Accounts) in the same 
time series.
An 'ANOVA' test of variance was conducted on the Indexed data set to confirm 
whether the higher growth rate for planning was statistically significant. The results 
were as follows;
DF - Between Groups =1 F Ratio = 10.6190
DF - Within Groups =22 F Prob = .0036
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The F statistic is significant at the 1% level - ie. it is highly unlikely that the higher 
growth rate of planning was the product of random chance.
The increase in planning expenditure is particularly striking given that much of the 
general rise in local expenditure was accounted for by the police force, which was a 
target for spending increases by the Conservative government at the national and local 
scale and by spending on social services which may have increased partly due to the 
rise in unemployment and the effects of an ageing population.4 Planning on the other 
hand was a target for deregulation, but by the end of the decade appears to have 
emerged in a stronger position than ever before.
Suggestive though these data are, they are not sufficient to confirm a consistent trend 
towards greater bureaucratic growth within planning agencies. It might be argued for 
example, that planning expenditure is subject to swings in the property market and that 
the buoyant market in the 1980s may have led to increased spending. Similarly, the 
1980s witnessed a substantial growth in the environmental lobby and the latter half of 
the decade in particular, saw a substantial rise in the general electoral significance of 
the environment as a political issue (Robinson 1992), which may also have 
contributed to the increased expenditure. In order to confirm a consistent pattern of 
bureaucratic growth, a longer term analysis of spending trends is required. The data 
reported in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 do indeed indicate that expenditure increases for town 
and country planning have consistently outstripped the average for other local 
authority bureaux.
Table 4.4 displays planning expenditure as a percentage of total local authority 
expenditure for both revenue and capital accounts over the thirty year period 1960/61 
to 1990/91.The percentage of revenue expenditure (spending on employees, running
4 Social Services must be distinguished from the Department of Social Security (DSS). Social 
services at the local authority level is in a delivery bureau format - most of its budget is devoted to 
professional social service provision including the management of children's homes, supervision of 
child adoption and foster care, services for the elderly and disabled and various health related services. 
The DSS at the national level is a transfer bureau - most of its budget is devoted to transfer payments 
for the unemployed and old aged pensioners. Local social services is predicted to have a tendency 
towards budget maximization but the DSS is not.
Some of the enormous rise in social service spending may well be accounted for by the four fold 
increase in unemployment since the mid 1970s - greater unemployment may have led to more family 
breakdown, child delinquency etc. and hence a demand for more social workers. However, it is difficult 
to believe that the increase spending on social services, from 1.9 to 8.8% of a tripled local authority 
budget, can be explained solely by this trend. A more plausible explanation would point to budget 
maximization by the professional social workers who administer these services - see for example Lait 
(1980).
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Table 4.4 Planning as a Percentage of Local Authority Expenditure : 1960/61 - 
1990/91
Year Revenue Capital Year Revenue Capital
1960/61 0.67 1.59 1976/77 1.46 3.11
1961/62 0.64 2.21 1977/78 1.45 2.97
1962/63 0.70 2.03 1978/79 1.40 3.13
1963/64 0.74 2.08 1979/80 1.52 3.68
1964/65 0.77 2.57 1980/81 1.63 4.57
1965/66 0.88 2.72 1981/82 1.60 4.07
1966/67 0.88 2.40 1982/83 1.59 4.87
1967/68 0.98 2.53 1983/84 1.68 4.68
1968/69 1.03 3.06 1984/85 1.69 4.97
1969/70 1.00 3.06 1985/86 1.59 6.07
1971/72 1.10 3.29 1987/88 1.68 5.58
1972/73 1.16 3.53 1988/89 1.69 na.
1973/74 1.19 3.23 1989/90 1.76 na.
1974/75 1.46 2.58 1990/91 1.79 na.
1975/76 1.54 2.72
Notes : Change in % share for other major bureaux 1960/61-1990/91 - Education 37.3 to 33.8, 
Refuse 2 to 1.7, Highways 7 to 6.1, Buses 3.9 to 0.5 (1980), Libraries 1.1 to 1.2, Housing 15 to 
16, Fire 1.4 to 1.8, Parks 1.4 to 3.1, Police 6 to 8, Justice 0.6 to 1.1, Social Services 1.9 to 8.8, 
Environmental Health (1970) 0.8 to 1.7.
Source: Computed from Annual Abstract of Statistics.
costs and transfer payments) accounted for by planning rose consistently throughout 
the period, from 0.67% of the total budget in 1960/61 to 1.79% in 1990/91,whereas 
the less significant capital expenses (spending on buildings) increased from 1.59% to 
5.58%. These figures represent a substantial real gain for the planning bureaucracy, 
given that the percentage of Gross Domestic Product taken by local government 
revenue expenses also increased from 5.2% in 1960 to 8.2% in 1992 (UK National 
Accounts).
Table 4.5 presents the actual spending data from 1962 to 1991 (at 1990 prices). It may 
be seen that although planning and the local authority category experienced a 
substantial real gain, the growth rate for planning was well in excess of the other local 
bureaux with a total real increase of over 600% . Once again, an analysis of variance 
was conducted on the Indexed data set. The F statistics are displayed below;
DF- Between Groups =1 F Ratio = 34.5502
DF- Within Groups =56 F Prob = .0000
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Table 4.5 Revenue Expenditure for Town & Country Planning and Total Local 
Authority : 1962/63 - 1990/91
Year Town & Country Planning Total Local Authority
Index of Spending 1962 Spending 1962
Applications 1990 Prices Index 1990 Prices Index
1962/63 100.0 160 100.0 23295 100.0
1963/64 103.6 181 113.1 24562 105.4
1964/65 116.2 201 125.6 25894 111.2
1965/66 111.6 248 155.0 28139 120.8
1966/67 104.5 261 163.1 29659 127.3
1967/68 106.3 313 195.6 31881 136.9
1968/69 107.3 342 213.8 32994 141.6
1969/70 101.4 393 245.6 39140 168.0
1970/71 104.3 450 281.3 42107 180.8
1971/72 116.6 481 300.6 44034 189.0
1972/73 154.8 539 336.9 46482 199.5
1973/74 156.7 615 384.4 51769 222.2
1974/75 104.4 786 491.3 53802 231.0
1975/76 114.3 849 530.6 55208 237.0
1976/77 112.3 794 496.3 54251 232.9
1977/78 111.2 743 464.4 51293 220.2
1978/79 126.0 761 475.6 54037 232.0
1979/80 na 854 533.8 56231 241.4
1980/81 93.6 933 583.1 57228 245.9
1981/82 103.4 906 566.3 56392 242.1
1982/83 108.2 891 556.9 56112 240.9
1983/84 106.0 965 603.1 57263 245.8
1984/85 108.7 967 604.4 55331 246.1
1985/86 134.4 974 608.8 57723 239.2
1986/87 150.5 919 574.4 57732 247.8
1987/88 171.9 963 601.9 59733 256.4
1988/89 158.0 1039 649.4 61666 264.7
1989/90 133.9 1097 685.6 62195 267.0
1990/91 128.6 1122 701.3 62678 269.1
%+/- +28.6 +601.3 +601.3 +169.1 +169.1
Notes - All spending in £ millions. Index of Planning Applications - base year = 397 301. 
Source : Computed from Annual Abstract of Statistics and DoE Development Control Statistics.
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The difference in expenditure changes is highly significant (at the 0.1% level). In 
short, planning bureaux have consistently gained a greater share of an already 
expanding pie. Of all the local authority bureaux (see notes to Table 4.4), only the 
highly professionalized social services showed a more rapid rate of growth and in 
accordance with hypothesis 1, the less professionalized areas such as refuse 
collection, highway maintenance, buses, libraries, fire, housing (a transfer bureau) 
and education (a mixed delivery/transfer bureau), all experienced a decline in relation 
to planning, as did the rest of the public sector as a whole.5
The expenditure data does appear to suggest that bureaucratic growth in planning 
agencies has been of a considerably greater magnitude to that experienced in the wider 
public sector, but the figures on expenditure alone cannot be taken as proof that it is 
the bureaucratic power of planners which has been the cause of this expansion. 
Correlation in social science cannot be considered as proof of causation without 
considering alternative explanations of the available data (Caldwell 1994).
One alternative explanation might point to the increased political significance of the 
environment as an election issue, which may have inclined politicians towards a more 
generous treatment of planning bureaucracies throughout the period in question. 
According to this interpretation, the growth of planning expenditure might have had 
much more to do with the macro-political significance of the environment than the 
budget maximizing tendencies of planning bureaucrats. For example, given the rise in 
environmental interest, planners might have been required to take longer when 
preparing their development plans in order to take greater account of the environmental 
interest.
This account is not without merit and might well explain the greater growth rate in 
planning expenditure witnessed in the late 1980s when there was a major upswing in 
public environmental concern - culminating in the Green Party polling nearly 15% of 
the vote in the 1989 European Elections (Robinson 1992). Nonetheless, it seems 
unlikely that this explanation can account for the sheer scale of the difference in the 
growth rate of the planning budget, which has consistently ran at three times the level 
of real growth in the rest of the public sector over a period of thirty years. Even as
5 Apart from social services and administration of justice only planning saw a consistent year on year 
pattern of growth. The other agencies which saw a net gain between 1960/61 - 1990/91, Police and 
Housing - displayed a more erratic pattern - Police spending fell as a percentage during the 1960s and 
early 1970s before rising quickly during the 1980s.
Housing increased during the 1960s, fell back in the mid 1970s, increased in the early 1980s before 
falling back again later in the decade.
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early as the beginning of the 1960s, the planning budget was expanding rapidly, well 
before the rise in the political significance of the environment as an election issue. 
Thus, Butler & Stokes (1974) analysis of the most salient electoral issues in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, found unemployment, welfare services and health at the top of the 
political agenda, with the environment scarcely registering a mention in relation to 
these concerns. Similarly, Robinson (1992) suggests that it was not until 1987 that the 
environment ranked at all as an election issue. It is possible that some of the growth 
rate in planning was a product of such macro-political forces, but the magnitude of the 
expenditure growth is at least suggestive of an independent role for budget 
maximizing incentives within planning agencies.
A second alternative explanation might point to the significance of demand side factors 
derived from the activities of the building industry. According to this account, it might 
have been the case that developers had submitted more and more planning applications 
throughout the period and thus substantially increased the budgetary requirements of 
planning bureaucrats. If this was indeed the case, then the greater growth rate in the 
planning budget cannot be attributed to the actions of planning bureaucrats attempting 
to expand their budgets, but to the external demands being placed on their departments 
which would of necessity require greater budgets and staff.
Again, this explanation is not implausible and may possibly account for some of the 
additional growth rate. However, there is reason to question the extent to which 
demands from the building industry have indeed been the cause of bureaucratic 
growth. A reasonable indication of demand side pressures can be derived from 
consideration of the number of planning applications submitted to local authorities, 
compiled in the DoE Development Control Statistics. The left hand column in Table 
4.5 gives an index of applications from 1962 onwards, where it can be seen that the 
number of applications received increased by only 28.6% over the period in question, 
compared to the 600% increase in real expenditure over the same time period. Indeed, 
at one point in 1980/81, planning bureaucrats were actually processing fewer 
applications, even though real spending had increased by almost 500% at that time.
The development control data must,however, be treated with some caution, because 
the DoE statistics do not weight applications in any way to take account of the size and 
complexity of the development being proposed. Thus, it might be suggested that given 
increasing concentration in the development industry in favour of much larger firms, 
planning application statistics underestimate demand side pressures. With fewer firms 
operating in the house building market relatively fewer applications may have been
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submitted, but these may in turn have been considerably bigger and more complex 
(eg. more houses per application) and might have required additional expenditures.
This argument is not without foundation, but there is evidence from other sources to 
suggest that the shift in the structure of demand does not adequately account for the 
relatively small increase in the index of planning applications. The statistics on the 
number of new dwellings constructed between 1962 and 1991 show that apart from a 
brief rise in the mid 1960s, throughout the bulk of this period construction rates were 
falling, from 297 000 per annum in 1960 to 183 000 per annum in 1991 (DoE 
Housing and Construction Statistics, HBF 1996). Cullingworth (1988) notes that 
approval rates for planning applications show that the percentage of applications 
granted remained fairly constant throughout this period, fluctuating by only a few 
points. Given that there was no dramatic reduction in the number of planning 
applications approved, yet the number of newly constructed dwellings fell, it seems 
unlikely that the low increase in the applications index can be accounted for solely by 
the tendency for larger builders to submit proposals for more houses by way of fewer, 
but larger applications. If indeed there had been a substantial increase in demand, one 
would have expected the number of houses constructed to have risen or at the very 
least to have stayed constant, when in fact there was a substantial fall. Again, 
however, these figures should be treated with some caution because residential 
developments are not the only source of planning applications - office development, 
retailing and manufacturing development on average account for about 25% of all 
major proposals - compared to about 70% for residential uses (DoE Statistics of 
Planning Applications 1980-1994). Although it seems unlikely that the massive 
increase in expenditure can be accounted for by changes in the character of this 
relatively small proportion of the total applications, without more precise measures of 
the size and complexity of these developments it is not possible to judge the precise 
extent to which extra demands have been placed on planning departments.
Overall, the data do not contradict the hypothesis that incentives within highly 
professionalized land use agencies are more heavily skewed towards bureaucratic 
expansion. Given the limitations of the development control statistics however, it is 
not possible to say with certainty that bureaucratic growth was the product of budget 
maximizing behaviour. Nonetheless, there is sufficient evidence to suggest the public 
choice explanation as a serious working hypothesis which might best account for the 
observable trends.
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Table 4. 6 Local Authority Agency Types and Expenditure Shares : 1980/81 - 1990/91
Percentage of Revenue Expenditure
Agency
Type
Year
1980/81 1985/86 1990/91
Non - Delivery
Education Del to Control 36.1 34.5 33.8
Refuse Del to Contract 2.1 1.9 1.7
Highways Del to Contract 6.9 6.4 6.1
Parks Del to Contract 2.5 2.9 3.1
Housing Transfer 18.0 18.2 16.0
Other* Mixed 9.1 7.4 8.6
Other** Mixed 5.2 6.4 6.2
Total Non Delivery 7 9 .9 7 7 .8 7 5 .5
Del/Regulatory
Police Delivery 6.5 7.7 8.0
Justice Delivery 0.7 0.9 1.1
Social Services Delivery 7.1 7.5 8.8
Libraries Delivery 1.1 1.2 1.2
Fire Delivery 1.5 1.7 1.8
Planning Regulatory 1.6 1.7 1.8
Env. Health Regulatory 1.6 1.6 1.8
Total Del/Regulatory 20 .1 2 2 .2 2 4 .5
Total Local Authority 100 100 100
Notes : There are no nation-wide data examining the variations in agency type throughout the whole 
country. The agency classifications used here are based on Ascher (1987) which notes the trend toward 
contracting out in refuse collection and highways and empirical work by Dunleavy & Biggs (1995) on 
the London Boroughs. * Other refers to unallocated general administration and transfer payments.** 
Other refers to unallocated services.
Source : Computed from Annual Abstract of Statistics.
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Within this context, Table 4. 6 which compares the fortunes of the various theoretical 
agency types throughout the 1980s, offers additional, although relatively crude 
support for the public choice theory and for Dunleavy's wider account of bureaucratic 
behaviour. It is apparent that of the major local authority bureaux those which 
remained in a delivery or regulatory bureau format, fared best in terms of budgetary 
growth. The police force, administration of justice, fire services, libraries, social 
services, environmental health and town & country planning, all increased their share 
of the overall budget, whereas the major local government transfer bureau - housing 
and those agencies which were subject to various forms of contracting out - refuse 
collection, highway maintenance and education, which in the late 1980s shifted into a 
control agency format, all witnessed a decline in their share of the overall budget.6 
The one exception to this pattern was parks & open spaces which was subject to 
contracting out but nonetheless increased its budget share.
Again,however, these data are open to different interpretations and cannot be taken as 
conclusive proof that bureaucratic incentives were the cause of the observed 
expenditure patterns. It might be argued,for example, that macro-political factors offer 
a better explanation of the spending trends. Thus, the fall in the percentage revenue 
expenditure taken by housing may have been more the product of ideological hostility 
to public housing on behalf of the Conservative central government, rather than the 
product of institutional incentives within the agency. Similarly, professional social 
services expenditure could have increased because of the external demands brought 
about by rising unemployment and the effects of an ageing population, rather than the 
result of budget maximization by professional social workers. Likewise, the rise in 
police expenditure may have resulted from the rise in crime and the governments 
ideological commitment to law and order expenditures. Moreover, given that central 
government controls over local expenditure increased throughout this period, in
6 With the introduction of budget holding by individual schools following the 1988 Education Act, 
education bureaux shifted into a control agency format. It might be argued that teachers should be 
classed as professionals in the same way as town planners and should therefore have secured greater 
levels of growth and resisted the introduction of individual budget holding. It is not to denigrate 
teachers that I do not include them in the same professional category as town planners - what is 
important for the theory of professionalization and bureaucracy offered here, is the organization within 
these bureaux and in particular the status gap between high grade policy staff and low grade 
implementation staff. In education bureaux policy is developed by high grade professionals in the 
local authority, with a considerable status gap between these bureaucrats and the many hundreds of 
teachers implementing policy in the individual schools. There appears little incentive for high grade 
bureaucrats to be concerned about expanding opportunities for promotion in the lower ranks and so 
these bureaucrats are less likely to maximize the overall budget. In planning bureaux by contrast there 
is less gradation between ranks of bureaucrats. In the case of planning senior bureaucrats will often 
work in the same office and on the same policy documents as the rest of the staff. Increases in the 
budget and promotion prospects for top bureaucrats will trigger similar opportunities for most if not 
all of the other bureaucrats in the agency.
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particular through 'rate-capping', the provisions of the Standard Spending 
Assessment and the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering (cct), it could 
be suggested that bureaucratic incentive structures were not at all a significant factor in 
expenditure patterns.
The first of these counter-arguments has considerable force. Thus, with respect to 
housing, the ideological aversion of the central government to expenditure in this area 
may indeed account for most, if not all of the observed difference in spending 
patterns. Similarly, in the case of social services and police, macro political forces 
such as the effects of an ageing population and rising crime rates, might account for 
some of the expenditure pattern. Nonetheless, with respect to the overall picture 
presented in Table 4.6, what remains significant from the perspective of public choice 
theory is that all agencies which saw reductions in their share of expenditure were 
examples of less professionalized bureaux (refuse, highways and education) and were 
subject to some form of contracting out. As the public choice approach would 
suggest, none of the more professionalized services such as planning and social 
services saw the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering and a reduction in 
their share of expenditure. Whilst technical difficulties in the contracting out of 
professionalized services such as the administration of justice and less 
professionalized areas such as the fire service, might account for their exclusion from 
this process, no such difficulties exist in the case of professionalized areas such as 
planning and social services (Cullingworth & Nadin 1994), which is at least 
suggestive that bureaucratic resistance to this process may have been a significant 
factor at work.
Similarly, although central government control over total local authority spending has 
increased significantly in recent years, councils still retain considerable discretion over 
the allocation of expenditures between different departments which allows scope for 
differences in the relative strength of budget maximizing incentives, to affect the 
resulting distribution. Thus, in 1994 only 23% of central government grants were 
earmarked for spending on specific services and projects (Wilson & Game 1994).
The data on staffing are also broadly in line with the analytical framework set out here. 
In accordance with hypothesis 2 planning bureaux did better in terms of staffing, 
experiencing no net change in numbers by 1993, compared to a substantial decline for 
the local authority category as a whole (Table 4.7). The difference between the two 
categories is not however statistically significant. Nonetheless, a closer analysis of 
trends within local authority staffing does lend general support for the staffing 
hypotheses.
126
Table 4.7 Staffing Levels for Town & Country Planning and Total Local Authority : 
1979- 1993
Town & Country Planning Total Local Authority
Staff Index Staff Index
1979 22.4 100.0 2086.6 100.0
1980 21.9 97.8 2056.4 98.6
1981 19.8 88.4 1891.3 90.6
1982 19.7 87.9 1873.9 89.8
1983 19.8 88.4 1881.7 90.2
1984 19.9 88.8 1876.5 89.9
1985 19.9 88.8 1877.1 90.0
1986 20.1 89.7 1894.1 90.8
1987 20.8 92.9 1915.3 91.8
1988 21.6 96.4 1920.6 92.0
1989 22.5 100.4 1890.8 90.6
1990 23.1 103.1 1894.0 90.8
1991 23.2 103.6 1866.5 89.5
1992 22.8 101.8 1834.4 87.9
1993 22.4 100.0 1691.3 81.1
+/-% 0 0 -19.9 -19.9
Notes : All Staff in no.thousands
Source : Computed from Monthly Digest of Statistics.
The Indexed figures indicate that staffing in planning fell more or less in line with the 
local authority category during the early 1980s, but from the mid 1980s onwards, 
coinciding with the introduction of contracting out and compulsory competitive 
tendering (cct) throughout local government, a consistently widening gap opened up 
with the local authority category declining rapidly.
The impact of contracting out on staffing is significant given that highly 
professionalized agencies such as planning are predicted to be more resistant of 
transfers to private contractors. CIPFA (1994) indicate that only 2% of planning 
expenditure has been contracted out and significantly in the 1991 Department of the 
Environment Report recommending the extension of cct, planning services were 
excluded (Cullingworth & Nadin 1994). The services which have been exposed to 
cct, alongside education, have experienced the most dramatic decline in staffs.Those 
agencies which have been considered for cct but have largely resisted the trend are 
indeed the more professionalized agencies - planning, social services and 
environmental health. The non-contracted agencies have in general seen the smallest 
declines in staff, as can be seen from Table 4. 8. The data do not contradict 
hypotheses 2 and 3.
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Table 4.8 Local Authority Staff Changes bv Agency Type : 1979 -1993
Agency Agency Type Staff
1993
% Change1979 
-1993
Non-Delivery
Education Del to Control 698.6 -29
Construction Del to Contract 69.3 -48
Refuse Del to Contract 21.3 -58
Transport Privatization 1.4 -94
Parks/Leisure Del to Contract 65.6 -14
Housing Transfer 65.9 +29
Other Mixed 224.1 -15
Delivery/Regulatory
Police Delivery 121.1 + 6
Justice Delivery 9.8 +36
Social Services Delivery 231.9 +13
Libraries Deliveiy 31.9 -3
Fire Delivery 34.1 -16
Planning Regulatory 22.4 0
Environmental Health Regulatory 18.9 -13
Total Local Authority Mixed 1691.3 -20
Notes : Staff figures in thousands. Staff declines for Transport are exaggerated by the impact of bus 
privatization. Housing staffs increased due to the transfer of Housing Benefit responsibilities to local 
authorities.
Source : Computed from Monthly Digest of Statistics.
Turning to the fortunes of the three remaining land use bureaucracies, these too offer 
broad support for the view that regulatory agencies are prone towards greater 
bureaucratic growth. In a decade when overall public sector growth was contained to 
16% in real terms and staffs were cut, the conservation quangos in particular, 
experienced explosive growth in terms of expenditure and staffing (see Table 4.9) and 
both remained immune to any contracting out of the regulatory function. It is 
especially significant that both of these quangos fared far better than other agencies 
attached to the DoE in particular those transfer bureaux focused on housing where real 
spending barely increased at all throughout the 1980s (Interview 2, Housing 
Corporation, Housing Corporation 1994).7 Some of the increase may be attributed
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Table 4.9 Expenditure and Staffing in the Conservation Quangos : 1980/81 - 1994/95
NCC/EN CC
Year Spending Staff Spending Staff
1980/81 18.8 530 na. na.
1981/82 19.2 535 18.9 90
1982/83 20.4 559 19.8 95
1983/84 22.3 550 21.3 98
1984/85 29.6 577 20.9 100
1985/86 36.0 689 23.8 100
1986/87 44.4 750 27.0 118
1987/88 46.7 780 32.3 120
1988/89 47.3 800 27.9 128
1989/90 49.6 820 27.5 150
1990/91 56.7 858 28.1 180
1991/92 * * 32.6 230
1992/93 * * 46.2 300
1993/94 * * 48.7 310
1994/95 * * 47.7 319
%change +202 +62 +153 +254
Source : NCC/EN & CC Annual Reports
Notes : All spending in millions (deflated 1993 =100). All staffing in actual numbers.
*In 1991, the NCC was divided into three bodies, one each for England, Scotland and Wales. English 
Nature (the new body for England acquired 621 staff from the NCC in 1991 and by 1994/95 had 
recruited an extra 134 staff making a total of 755. Remaining NCC staff were transferred to the 
Scottish and Welsh bodies so the total employed in nature conservation is now over 1000. EN 
spending increased from 32.6 million in 1991/92 to 39.6 million in 1994/95 (at 1993 prices).
directly to the provisions of the Wildlife & Countryside Acts (1981/85), but the sheer 
scale of the increase combined with evidence that quangocratic salaries took a higher 
and higher proportion of total spending (Adams 1993) is at the very least suggestive 
of self-interested bureaucratic behaviour.
In the case of MAFF, it is more difficult to attribute bureaucratic growth directly to the 
actions of civil servants because spending decisions are made largely within the 
corridors of Brussels rather than in Westminster. Nonetheless, a 30% real increase in 
CAP spending over the last ten years (Winter 1996) is consistent with MAFF
7 Housing Corporation spending was flat throughout the 1980s until the 1988 Housing Act, through 
which the Conservative government greatly expanded the role of housing associations in the 
provision of social housing. Since then spending increased from £0.8 billion to £2 billion in 1993, 
before falling back to £1.4 billion in 1996 (Housing Corporation Fact File 1996).
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bureaucrats, maximizing transfer payments to the highly organized farm lobby and at 
the very least there is no indication that senior officials have sought to resist this trend
- real spending has actually increased following the so called MacSharry reforms 
which MAFF officials helped to negotiate (MAFF Annual Report 1995). More 
important, domestic MAFF spending on conservation, where UK bureaucrats do 
exercise a much greater degree of clout, has also expanded rapidly, from nil 
expenditure in 1984 to £116 million in 1995. The new agricultural regime of EU set 
aside payments combined with domestic conservation subsidies, as opposed to the 
previous policy of direct production support appears particularly amenable to 
bureaucratic interests. The new policies have reduced the level of surplus production 
which was becoming highly visible to politicians, yet at the same time have allowed an 
expansion of assistance to MAFF's major client group - the farm lobby. As a counter 
argument, it might be suggested that these developments owe more to external 
pressure from the European Union than they do to any budget maximizing behaviour 
in the MAFF. In actual fact, however, the veiy concept of ESAs was devised within 
the MAFF and then 'marketed' to the Europen Union (Cherry 1996, p.209, Winter 
1996).
4.3 Budget Maximization and Regulatory Growth
The apparent ability of the land use bureaucracies to secure greater budgets and to 
have largely resisted the major institutional reforms which have swept much of the 
public sector, is suggestive of a tendency for administrative incentives within these 
agencies to be skewed towards bureaucratic expansion. What is of particular 
significance with respect to land use change, is that budget maximization - if it occurs
- appears to be synonymous with regulatory maximization.
Thus, local authority planning departments in England & Wales perform five main 
functions, four of which may be described as regulatory activities. These are; planning 
policy which involves staff in the drafting of local development plans; development 
control - the day to day procedure of reviewing planning applications; environment 
and conservation - the drafting of local conservation orders and other site 
designations; and enforcement which includes the demolition of buildings erected 
without planning permission. The remaining function, economic development and 
promotion is a delivery activity. Planning staff employed in this area are responsible 
for the development of local authority owned land, the collection of rents from local 
authority owned industrial sites, the marketing of development opportunities and the 
handling of regional development grants.
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Table 4.10 Budgeted Employees bv Function in English Planning Authorities
Regulatory
Functions
Economic
Development
Total % Regulatory 
Functions
Non-Metro Districts 6602.8 608.1 7210.9 91.6
Counties 2208.0 526.0 2734.0 81.0
Metro-Districts 2093.5 696.5 2790.0 67.0
All Authorities 10904.3 1830.6 12734.9 85.6
Source : Computed from CIPFA Planning and Development Statistics 1991
The overall significance of the regulatory function to local authority planning 
departments is illustrated in Table 4.10, which shows the proportion of staff 
employed in regulatory activities in relation to those in economic development. The 
table indicates that the vast majority of staff - especially in the non-metropolitan 
districts where the majority of planners are employed, are engaged in regulatory 
activities. The lower figure for the metropolitan districts (67%) is a reflection of the 
greater role played by these agencies in urban renewal programmes focused on inner 
city regeneration.
Thus, the raison d' etre of non-metropolitan land use bureaux is to create and to 
enforce land use regulations and in order to secure greater budgets, planning 
bureaucrats may be expected to offer differential support for those policies and interest 
groups which will increase the level of regulation and the demand for staff and 
administrative expenses to enforce it. In particular, one would expect planners to 
increase regulation by producing longer and ever more complex planning documents, 
to lengthen the time taken to evaluate planning applications and to increase the number 
of site designations. In support of this thesis, one need only examine the rapid growth 
of environmental site designations, the increasing complexity of the planning system 
and the low productivity rate of local planning authorities within the context of the 
sustained bureaucratic growth discussed in the previous section.
One indication of regulatory growth is provided by Peacock (1984), who notes that 
the number of statutory regulatory instruments available to land use planners increased 
from 98 in 1959 to 386 in 1979 or +290%. Similarly, in the 1980s - allegedly a period 
of Thatcherite deregulation - the area of land designated as Green Belt by local
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planning authorities increased from 1.7 to 4.2 million acres (+147%), to account for 
14% of the land area of England. Likewise, the coverage of Local Conservation Area 
designations increased from 162 000 to 272 000 acres (+68%) in just the one year 
1990/1991 (CIPFA 1992).
In the 1990s, the new requirement under the Planning and Compensation Act (1991) 
for all rural district authorities to prepare statutory land use plans (many districts did 
not previously prepare such plans) and the introduction of the 'plan-led' development 
control system, has enormously increased the complexity of the regulatory process. A 
requirement that all development control decisions should be made in accordance with 
the local land use plan (Section 54 a) has replaced the previous system where the plan 
was but one of a number of 'material considerations' for the granting of planning 
permission and has reduced the ability of developers whose proposals are not in 
accordance with local guidance to use the DoE appeals procedure (Healy 1992). 
Consequently it has become imperative for developers and their opponents alike, to 
make their representations at the plan making stage, such that the length of the public 
enquiry procedure where it is not uncommon for developers to pay out over £500 000 
in planning consultancy and legal fees, increased from seven weeks in 1988 to 22 
weeks in 1992 (Cullingworth & Nadin 1994, p.59). At the same time, the DoE has 
substantially increased the number of Planning Policy Guidance Notes it produces, 
with new documents on transport (PPG 13, 'out-of town' retail development (PPG 6) 
and nature conservation (PPG 8) all adding to the complexity of the system and time 
taken to prepare land use plans (Interviews 17-19, Cullingworth & Nadin 1994).
In the meantime, the planning system continues to be plagued by a remarkably low 
level of productivity in the processing of development applications. According to 
Ehrman (1988) in the year to April 1988, the average cost per planning application 
was £2 000 and the productivity rate a mere one development processed, per month, 
per worker. Despite central government attempts to speed up the planning process, by 
the late 1980s fewer applications were being processed within the DoE target of 8 
weeks than at the beginning of the decade. This was partly due to the increased 
number of applications resulting from the property boom at the time, but it was also 
due to the complex web of local planning bureaucracy (Simmie 1993). Thus, figures 
produced by CIPFA (1992) indicate that the net cost per capita of planning 
applications in the English non-metropolitan districts, increased from £4.90 in 
1981/82 to £9.07 in 1991/92 (1993 prices) - a real increase of 85%. The reader will 
recall that real expenditure on planning increased by over 600% between 1962 and 
1991, but the overall number of planning applications increased by only 28%. The 
difference between the two figures must be accounted for at least in part, by the
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increasing complexity of the planning system and a lengthening of the regulatory 
process.
Consider also the substantial growth in the number of NCC/EN designated Sites of 
Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs). Between 1982 and 1993 the number of SSSIs in 
England increased from 2 600 to 3 800 (+46%) and they now account for 7% of the 
land area. In the immediate aftermath of the Wildlife and Countryside Act (1981), the 
NCC estimated that its site designation duties would be completed within two years, 
but ten years later bureaucrats were still designating additional sites (Marren 1993, 
Adams 1993). These sites have not been at all successful in controlling the 
environmental excesses of modem agriculture (Rowell 1991, Pennington 1996), but 
alongside other designations, they do discourage the granting of planning permission 
for urban developments in the countryside (Shucksmith 1990, Bramley et al 1995).
Countryside Commission designations have also increased apace - the coverage of 
Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONBs) increased by 26% between 1980 and 
1993 and they now represent over 15% of the land area of England. A further 518 sq 
km have been formally designated as a site for subsidized tree planting in a ’National 
Forest' spanning three counties in the East Midlands and 12 sites, each on the 
outskirts of the major conurbations have been designated as Community Forests (CC 
Annual Reports). MAFF meanwhile has rapidly expanded its own program of site 
designation through the Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ES As) scheme with the 22 
designated ESAs now accounting for over 10% of all farmland in England. These 
MAFF schemes in particular have produced few environmental benefits. A number of 
studies have suggested that the designation of ESA's makes little difference to the 
environmental practices of subsidized farming (FoE 1992, Morriss & Potter 1995). 
Again, site designation intensifies the process of urban containment but does little to 
protect the countryside from the depredations of modem farming.
It might be argued that the sustained growth in land use regulation is merely a 
response by the relevant agencies to increased demands for their services - for 
example the growth of the environmental lobby - and that larger budgets have been 
incidental to meeting these demands. However, a cursory glance at the behaviour of 
land use bureaucrats reveals that they have not acted as passive respondents to wider 
political forces but they have, as public choice theory predicts, sought to stimulate the 
demand for regulation through a combination of lobbying and in some cases funding 
of the relevant interest groups. The District, County and Metropolitan Planning 
Officers Societies (D/C/MPOS) and the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) for 
example, joined with conservationists in the Council for the Protection of Rural
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England (CPRE) in the campaign for the 'plan-led' development control system, 
which was itself finally adopted following a parliamentary amendment drafted by the 
CPRE (Interviews 10-12 & 3, Burton 1991, Marsden et al 1992).
The Countryside Commission has in the meantime, become one of the major financial 
donors to the CPRE following the group's successful campaign against a liberalization 
of Green Belt policy in 1984 (Elson 1986). Significantly, the recent chair of the CC, 
John Dower was the founder member of Rural Voice, an amalgam of rural interest 
groups including CPRE. The CC funded the conservationists during their national 
membership campaign throughout the 1980s and in the years 1991-1993 supplied 
subsidies to the tune of £120 000, which was the largest single contribution to the 
group (CPRE Annual Reports).
Likewise NCC/EN have close contacts with CPRE and with the Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds (RSPB), the latter having been a frequent recipient of financial 
support in the management of its bird reserves (Law 1996 forthcoming). The MAFF 
meanwhile invited CPRE to participate in the Agricultural Annual Review in 1990 and 
to provide advice on its program of ESA designations (Interview 3, Pennington 
1996). There is, it would seem, a symbiotic relationship between land use bureaucrats 
whose budgets are dependent on regulation and those sets of interest groups 
demanding additional regulatory growth.
Of course, the fact that planners and other land use bureaucrats have lobbied for more 
regulation, does not of itself prove they have been responsible for regulatory growth. 
In particular, the effect of external macro-political forces such as the electoral 
significance of the environment in the late 1980s, may have had much more impact on 
politicians than the exercise of bureaucratic power. What the lobbying actions of land 
use bureaucrats does suggest, however, is that they have actively sought to pursue 
bureaucratic self-interest in the political process and to the extent that they possess 
monopoly power these actions may account, at least in part, for the scale and 
consistent nature of bureaucratic growth which was well underway years before 
environmental issues reached the top of the political agenda.
4.4 Land Use Regulation and Urban Containment
How then have bureaucratic incentives and increased regulation contributed to urban 
containment ?
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As discussed earlier, the economic interests of planning bureaucrats lie in the 
expansion of the regulatory process which raises the demand for staffing and 
administrative expenses. The data in Table 4.10 (p. 123 above) indicate that these 
incentives are especially prominent in the non-metropolitan authorities and counties, 
where pressure for development is greatest. In turn, as the burden of regulation grows 
in these areas, development is discriminated against due to the substantial time delays 
engendered by the regulatory process (Ehrman 1988,1990), the deterrent effect of site 
designations (Bramley et al 1995) and the loss of projects which because of increased 
costs no longer proceed to implementation (Evans 1988). As a result, incentives in 
non-metropolitan areas are biased against new building and contribute directly to the 
process of urban containment.
In metropolitan and especially inner city authorities by contrast, where the economic 
development and promotion function employs proportionately more staff, the effects 
of increasing regulation may in part be offset by the much bigger budgetary stake 
these agencies have in increasing development activity through marketing and 
promotion. In these authorities there may be powerful incentives to allow more 
building especially if planning authorities are themselves involved in large scale re­
development projects.
Overall, the differing budgetary structure of planning departments at the district, 
county and metropolitan levels appears heavily skewed towards the support of 
containment policies. In the very areas where the demand for development and 
especially housing is at its highest - the non-metropolitan districts and counties, local 
planning authorities rely almost exclusively on the growth of regulation and support 
from the nimby lobby which reduces development opportunities. In turn, those areas 
which have the least development pressure and where market forces left to operate 
freely, would see a further loss of population and employment, are the areas where 
planning budgets are relatively less reliant on regulation and more on economic 
development. Little wonder then, that the RTPI and the D/C/MPOS have offered 
strong support for minimizing rural development and encouraging the recycling of 
'brown field' urban sites for high density city dwellings, because this pattern fits 
almost perfectly with the budgetary requirements of both their rural and urban 
members.
The budgetary interests of planners in areas where demand is high, suggest 
differential support for conservationist and other anti-development interests which 
seek the growth of regulation. However, it is important at this point to distinguish
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clearly between the overall bias against development which results from the growth of 
a complicated administrative system and the precise extent of this bias as reflected in 
the granting and refusal of individual planning permissions.
Planners may be biased towards conservation, because increasing environmental 
regulation benefits their budgets and this in turn discourages development by 
imposing substantial cost and time delays on private companies. The link between the 
refusal of individual planning permissions and bureaucratic budgets however, is at 
most indirect. In theory it would be possible for planners to increase the overall level 
of regulation, through the lengthening of the planning process and elongation of 
development control procedures, but still at the end of the day to rule in favour of 
development. Opting for a more pro-development stance by granting more planning 
permissions need not reduce the overall level of expenditure on the regulatory process. 
Thus, although planners may tend towards conservationist interests in order to defend 
existing regulation, the precise extent of the anti-development bias in the granting and 
refusal of applications must be determined by other, non-budgetary sources of utility. 
The effect of political visibility on bureaucratic utility seems the most likely candidate 
in this regard, which will in turn be a function of the external political context.
If the decision to grant planning permission is highly visible and stirs up a hornets 
nest of opposition from nimby style interest groups, or if the general political salience 
of planning issues rises, then planners concerned to avoid the subsequent political flak 
seem likely to refuse permissions for new development, especially in high profile 
designated sites such as green belts and AONBs. Thus, Wood's (1982) study of land 
use regulation in Buckinghamshire discovered that 85% of planning applications in the 
Green Belt were refused, rising to 100% in AONB's. Similarly, out of a sample of 
4850 representations at planning inquiries, Adams & Pawson (1991) found that 63% 
of changes made as a result of lobbying involved a reduction in the amount of 
development as against only 13% where development targets were increased. If 
however, the visibility of a more pro-development stance is relatively low there need 
be no detrimental impact on bureaucratic welfare from the adoption of such a stance.
This 'visibility' of decisions argument offers a plausible explanation of why in the 
early 1980s, the DoE at central government level was responsible for the various 
policy circulars which implied that local authorities adopt a more relaxed attitude 
towards developers and then in the late 1980s, when there was an upswing in public 
concern over environmental issues reversed this advice.
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The fundamental difference between the DoE and the local authorities in this regard is 
the degree of political visibility attached to their actions. Local authority planners are 
directly involved in the day to day process of development control, a highly visible 
process especially in the case of designated sites and in order to avoid flak from anti­
development interests may adopt a very restrictive stance. The DoE by contrast, issues 
only general planning guidances which are then left open to interpretation by local 
authorities and are consequently much less visible. As a result, it may have been a 
relatively low cost action for DoE officials to allow influence from construction 
interests such as the House Builders Federation in the preparation of circulars 9/80 
and 15/84 (see also chapter 3 for an additional account), whereas it was at the local 
level where planners implement actual development control decisions on the ground 
that bureaucratic opposition was at its greatest.
Similarly, it is significant that circulars 9/80 and 15/84 which recommended that 
planners adopt a more relaxed stance in only very general terms, were dropped after 8 
and 10 years respectively, whereas the more specific and hence more visible 1983/84 
draft guidance referring to the rolling back of green belts was dropped within months. 
Moreover, it may have been the increased number of planning appeals taken to the 
DoE in the late 1980s, coupled with the upswing in general public concern for the 
environment, which raised the political visibility of the department, that civil servants 
in consultation with the CPRE sought moves towards the plan-led development 
control system. In turn this system has now limited the ability of developers to use the 
appeals procedure and hence reduced the political visibility of the DoE in the 
regulatory game.
Overall, it is not unfair to suggest that most aspects of the regulatory process act to 
discriminate against the transfer of land from agricultural to urban uses. Although the 
precise extent of the anti-development stance may be affected by the visibility of 
particular planning disputes, in general land use bureaucrats have few incentives to 
simplify the regulatory process because their budgets are inextricably linked to the 
support given by anti-development interest groups and the increased complexity of the 
system. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the contemporary British planning 
system is the virtual absence of any bureaucratic interests which would favour a 
greater level of urban and in particular residential development in rural areas. The only 
government agencies which have a direct stake in the provision of new developments 
are bodies such as the Housing Corporation and the Urban Development 
Corporations. Many of these bodies are transfer bureaux with consequently fewer 
incentives for budget maximization and their activities are focused on urban 
regeneration rather than rural development.
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It is perhaps significant that the post-war decades to have witnessed the greatest 
amount of green-field development were the 1950s and 1960s, which corresponded 
with the highest levels of state involvement in the actual provision of new housing. In 
these circumstances, government housing bureaux were in a delivery/contract bureau 
format and their budgets were linked, in part at least, to the provision of new 
buildings (see Dunleavy 1981). It has often been argued that government agencies 
have a tendency to be excluded from the controls governing the rest of the population 
(Di Lorenzo 1987), a tendency which in the 1950s and 60s may have acted as a 
counterbalance to the effect of growing regulation.8
As a parallel to this argument, consider the fortunes of the Department of Transport 
throughout the 1980s. The overall transport budget for this decade fared badly and the 
total programme was slightly smaller in real terms than under the Labour 
administration of 1979 (Cullingworth & Nadin 1994, p.233). However, the roads 
budget element, where government contracts are destined for a highly mobilized lobby 
group (British Roads Federation), well able to secure post retirement positions and 
other perquisites for senior bureaucrats, fared disproportionately well, with spending 
on trunk roads 60% higher in real terms for the year 1989 than a decade earlier. As 
Dowding (1995, p. 114-115) reports, the DoT, using highly dubious cost/benefit 
techniques, openly advocated the building of major roads projects such as the M3 
extension which cut across designated AONB and SSSI and secretly promoted a 
strategy on behalf of the roads lobby of building 'bypasses' around towns, which 
often linked together to create major new roads. The overall effect on the rate of rural 
to urban conversion however, was negligible, because transport planning permissions 
account for only about 3% of total development proposals - compared to over 70% 
(DoE Statistics of Planning Applications 1994) for residential developments where no 
such bureaucratic incentives appear to exist. In short, with the vast bulk of new
8There are numerous examples of government enterprises or government supported enterprises 
operating without the constraints imposed on the wider population. Consider the enforcement of anti­
trust laws in the US. or the actions of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in the UK.
Industrial mergers in the private sector or co-operative arrangements between firms are often subject to 
rigorous scrutiny, supposedly to avoid actions which will reduce competition. Government enterprises 
on the other hand are often granted monopoly status, with all or most forms of competition outlawed, 
as was the case with telephones and other 'public utilities' before privatization. In many cases 
government provision of utilities is given the justification that these are publicgoods where 
competition in supply is not possible. But, if competition is impossible, why the need to outlaw the 
entry of private competitors?
In the case of UK planning laws, is it merely coincidental that the two forms of land use where the 
state itself is an active player - agriculture through the enormous post war subsidy programmes and 
forestry where the state owns a high percentage of commercial plantations through the Forestry 
Commission, are also the two forms of land use excluded from statutory planning control 
(Pennington 1996).
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housing development now supplied by the private sector, bureaucratic interests within 
the state are linked almost exclusively to the expansion of the regulatory regime. This 
is not to suggest that state provided housing should be seen as an answer to an overly 
restrictive planning system, but rather might be viewed as further evidence that state 
bureaucrats as a whole are far from selfless guardians of the public weal.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to apply a public choice analysis of bureaucratic incentives in 
the British system of land use planning. Given the limitations of the available data, the 
analysis does not permit the conclusion that planning bureaucrats do seek to maximize 
their budgets, but there is sufficient evidence to treat the budget maximization theory 
as a serious working hypothesis which might explain the consistent and rapid growth 
of land use regulation throughout the last thirty years. A political response to the 
growth of the environmental lobby may account for some of the increase, but the 
sheer scale and consistent nature of bureaucratic growth, combined with evidence of 
cost escalation in planning departments, suggests that the peculiar set of incentives 
within land use agencies may be responsible, at least in part, for the enormity of this 
expansion. In turn, it appears that the growth of regulation associated with land use 
budgets, in particular through environmental site designations and the increasing 
complexity of the planning system, is a major cause behind the declining rate of rural 
development. It should be considered as a serious possibility, that the continued 
emphasis on urban containment owes more to bureaucratic expansionism than it does 
to selfless public concern.
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5.
Votes, Parliamentary Patronage & Urban Containment
5.0 Introduction
Chapter four examined bureaucratic incentive structures in the town and country 
planning system through the lens of public choice theory. This chapter turns to the 
second ‘supply side’ element - the legislature. As with the previous chapters, the 
opening section sketches out the key theoretical concepts which are then used as a 
framework through which to evaluate the available evidence. The chapter builds on the 
analysis presented in chapters 3 and 4, suggesting that in addition to the transactions 
costs of association which favour groups demanding containment regulation and 
bureaucratic incentives towards regulatory maximization, the electoral and economic 
incentives facing members of parliament, may also point towards the support of strict 
containment policies.
When considering the nature of the electoral pressures facing politicians from a public 
choice perspective, care must be taken to distinguish those political actions which are a 
response to the concentrated power of interest groups, from those which reflect a 
response to the more general macro-political climate within which these groups 
operate. Such care is of particular relevance to the analysis of trends in the British land 
use planning system presented in this thesis. Thus, the rapid growth in public 
environmental concern throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s poses particular 
problems for a public choice account which seeks to portray the growth of 
containment regulation as a reaction to the power of interest groups, rather than a 
response to a macro-electoral climate more generally sympathetic to environmental 
concerns. The material presented in this chapter seeks to account for these difficulties 
by considering evidence which highlights both the potential significance of special 
interest forces and those derived from more general movements in public opinion. The 
analysis suggests that whilst macro-political factors have undoubtedly been an 
important set of variables in the cost calculus of British legislators, there is sufficient 
evidence to suggest that in the case of urban containment special interest pressures 
have indeed been a powerful factor affecting the form and content of land use 
legislation. Thus, parliamentary incentives, in part at least, help to complete an 'iron- 
triangle' of special interest control, restricting the rate of development and the transfer 
of land from rural to urban uses.
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5.1 A Theory of Legislative Behaviour
In public choice theory, politicians are viewed as self-interested actors who seek the 
benefits of income, power, and patronage which are afforded by a position in elected 
office. In order to secure re-election, politicians 'supply' legislation to the electorate in 
exchange for a combination of votes, favourable publicity and campaign 
contributions. Many public choice accounts and especially those of the Virginia school 
(see for example Tullock 1993), stress the tendency for politicians to court support 
from majority coalitions of special interest groups rather than from the unorganized 
mass of the general electorate. According to this perspective, because of collective 
action problems, the effect of rational ignorance and the phenomena of concentrated 
benefits and dispersed costs, vote-seeking politicians tend to supply legislation which 
is to the benefit of rent-seekers with a high per capita stake in a particular policy area. 
Politicians attempt to win elections by a process of log-rolling or vote-trading in which 
they make promises to different interest groups in order to secure their votes 
(Buchanan & Tullock 1982, Tullock 1993).
Special interest theories often stress the important role of institutional arrangements 
within the legislature in the quest for interest group support. Thus, in order to reap the 
political benefits of legislation, politicians require arrangements which facilitate the 
passage of laws conducive to their interests (Spiller 1990). One way to achieve this 
goal is through the use of specialized legislative committees. By providing committees 
with agenda control of issues under their jurisdiction, politicians each with limited 
knowledge, may devolve scrutiny of legislation to representative individuals 
specialized in a such a way as to maximize the benefits from the passage of laws. 
Because committee members command more power over issues under their 
jurisdiction than do general members of the legislature, politicians may self-select 
across committees according to the nature of their constituents interests. For example, 
those politicians dependent on the support of a health workers union may self-select to 
the committee on health and those dependent on industrial interests may self-select to 
the committee on trade and industry. Self-selection affords politicians a greater ability 
to influence the flow of legislation and hence to maximize votes or other benefits 
necessary to maintain elected office (Spiller 1990).1
1 Most public choice work on the structure of legislative committees has taken place in the American 
context, focusing on the Congressional appropriations committees, see Shepsle & Weingast (1987) 
and Weingast & Marshall (1988). I am not aware of any analysis of UK parliamentary committees 
working from an explicitly public choice perspective.
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The expression of special interest demands may also be facilitated by committee 
scrutiny of the bureaucratic bodies charged with the implementation of specific policy 
statutes. Given certain institutional conditions it is in the economic interests of civil 
servants to maximize budget appropriations and to offer differential support to those 
interest groups and coalitions of groups with an economic stake in the expansion of 
the relevant agency. Committee members have an incentive to monitor bureaucratic 
behaviour so as to ensure that income is diverted to their most powerful constituent 
groups. Should bureaucratic interests coincide with those of an interest group vital to 
electoral success of a politician then committee members may fuel the tendency 
towards bureaucratic growth pushing for increased appropriations and the transfer of 
income to special interest groups.
The precise form which rent-seeking takes is a product of the particular institutional 
make-up of the constitution. In highly 'fragmented' political systems such as the 
United States, rent-seeking and log-rolling behaviour exhibit different characteristics 
to that found in European parliamentary democracies based on a more centralised 
governmental system (Tullock 1977,1993). In the United States for example, 
legislation, whether initiated by the President or the Congress, needs to pass through 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Rules in both these houses allow 
legislation to be amended, especially by the powerful congressional appropriations 
committees which are often dominated by representatives of powerful constituent 
groups. As a result, rent-seeking behaviour may result in the attachment of all manner 
of conditions, targeting expenditure at particular states or projects in order to secure 
the support of organized interests (Dowding 1995). Thus, as the American 
Congressman Armey found when trying to pass an amendment to reduce the level of 
federal agricultural support, "There are no weak sisters on the agriculture committee. 
They do what the committees do very well. They spend five years filling their silos 
with chits and then they call them in," (quoted in Tullock 1993, p.27 ).
In more centralized parliamentary systems such as Britain however, overt forms of 
log-rolling are limited by the fact that legislation is initiated almost entirely by the 
government (cabinet) or the bureaucracy (civil service) and where strong party 
discipline allows the government to push through legislation in much the form that it 
desires (Jordan & Richardson 1979). Similarly, in Britain although their significance 
has increased markedly in recent years (Judge 1991), parliamentary committees (select 
committees) have much less power to amend legislation than their American 
counterparts. This does not mean that rent-seeking and log-rolling are unimportant 
however, but that they take on a different institutional form. In particular, in more 
centralized systems, log-rolling is more likely to occur in a relatively informal way, as
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rent seekers try to influence the central government behind the scenes, or to exert 
pressure on it by way of senior MPs. Given the importance of party discipline in these 
systems, where there may be severe career costs for members who challenge the party 
line, evidence of overt lobbying of MPs by interest groups and of the executive branch 
by MP's themselves is likely to occur only when the stakes are very high, as is the 
case when the governing party has only a tiny majority (Dowding 1995).
Other things being equal the power wielded by interest groups is likely to reflect their 
ability to provide support for politicians and political parties. As Denzau & Munger 
(1986) suggest, political support may be supplied directly in the likelihood that interest 
group members will vote for a particular politician or provide campaign contributions, 
or more indirectly in terms of a group's ability to control the flow of political 
information to the rest of the voting public. In the latter case, access to the media may 
be an important source of interest group power as groups may be able to 'advertise' 
their aims to a rationally ignorant electorate and to present an appearance of political 
popularity or unpopularity for the governing party.
The ability of special interests to wield political influence either directly or indirectly 
may depend on a number of variables characteristic of the group. These variables may 
be summarized as follows;
E = P + S + M  + I + W
Where E stands for interest group effectiveness, P is an index of pivotality, S = size, 
M = rate of mobilization, I = intensity of members preferences, W = wealth, and the 
parameters vary according to the interest group, the policy concerned and the 
particular period of time in which the decision is made.
In turn, each of the above variables affects the power of an interest group in the 
following ways;
Pivotality : A group whose support is pivotal to the success of a politician/political 
party is likely to be more influential than one which falls in the main body of a 
coalition because the former may be more willing to switch political allegiance in 
recognition of their pivotal power (Dunleavy 1991).
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Size : Politicians favour those interest groups with the largest membership, because 
they are likely to sway more votes at an election (Posner 1974, Peltzman 1976).
Rate o f Mobilization : Groups which represent the majority of their potential members 
are more powerful than those where a substantial proportion remain weakly 
mobilized, because undermobilization may indicate a lack of popular support (Posner 
1974, Peltzman 1976).
Intensity o f Preferences : Groups whose members have an intense preference for a 
particular policy will be more influential because they are more likely to switch their 
votes than groups whose members have a less concentrated stake (Dunleavy 1991).
Wealth : A wealthy group will be more influential than a less wealthy group, because 
the former may be more likely to supply campaign contributions or other forms of 
financial support (Libecap 1989).
Of these five variables, pivotality is likely to be the first consideration for the politician 
contemplating the route to electoral survival. The politician with a small majority is 
more likely to offer support for interest groups if their members votes are vital to her 
re-election chances. In these circumstances, the key to legislative sensitivity is the size 
of the parliamentary majority relative to the number of votes controlled by a particular 
group. More specifically, legislative sensitivity will be greatest where an interest 
groups’ votes are equivalent to half the current parliamentary majority, plus one. To 
give a numerical example, we can envisage a parliamentary seat with a total electorate 
of 70 000, a majority of 200 and an interest group controlling 101 votes. In this case, 
the result at the next election can be changed if all group members switch allegiance, 
assuming all of them voted previously for the winning party and that all other voters 
stay faithful to their previous allegiance.
Ceteris paribus, the extent to which a politician or political party seeks to secure 
additional votes will be dependent on the present size of the majority coalition. A 
politician with a large and established majority will be less likely to pursue a vote 
maximizing strategy than one with a more precarious coalition because the marginal 
utility of votes declines the more politician already has (Rowley 1992, Tullock 1993). 
The politician with a large majority may be prepared to sacrifice additional votes in 
order to pursue her personal economic interests or to indulge her ideological 
preferences. Legislators have economic and ideological interests of their own and 
given a monopoly status in the period between elections they may pass legislation
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which reflects their personal interests or commitment to a particular cause irrespective 
of public support (Tullock 1993).
An effective interest group need not score highly on all of the variables in the influence 
equation. For example, a highly mobilized and concentrated group may lose out to a 
less concentrated opposition if the former does not form part of the ruling party's 
majority coalition. Thus, the resistance of the UK Conservative government to the 
strike led by National Union of Mineworkers during the 1980s may largely be 
explained by the NUM's irrelevance to the governing coalition. Although a highly 
mobilized and concentrated interest group, the vast majority of NUM members had 
never voted for the Conservative Party, such that to defy the union would lose the 
government hardly any votes at all (Dunleavy 1991).
Likewise, a small wealthy group may be more influential than a large heterogeneous 
group, because the withdrawal of campaign contributions rather than votes may be 
more important if this reduces the ability of the ruling party to fight an effective 
electoral campaign. Thus, the refusal of the UK Conservatives to impose a ban on 
cigarette advertising, may be seen as a reflection of the substantial campaign 
contributions given to the party by leading firms in the tobacco industry (Mitchell & 
Bretting 1991). The advocates of a ban by contrast, though far more numerous, 
represented a loose and disparate coalition unlikely to switch political allegiance over 
this issue alone and unable to provide the scale of financial support necessary to 
contribute towards an election campaign.
The special interest processes described above are undoubtedly an important factor in 
the legislative cost calculus, but there is a tendency in some public choice work, 
especially of the Virginia school, to overemphasize the electoral response of politicians 
to concentrated interests and to neglect the importance of more general macro-political 
factors and the wider context of public opinion against which these processes are set. 
In order to appreciate the potential significance of these factors it is necessary to 
explore some of the theoretical implications derived from the Downsian analysis of 
electoral incentives and its spin-off contributions (Downs 1957).
One of the major advances in political science in the last century was provided in 
Downs (1957) analysis of electoral competition. In this theory, Downs suggested that 
office-seeking politicians would converge on the favoured policy platform of the 
'median voter', in order to secure the necessary support. According to Downs 
assuming that voters' opinions are evenly spread out along an ideological spectrum, a 
party that wants to win an election should offer a policy platform which appeals to the
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voter with exactly as many voters on one side of her as on the other, i.e. the median 
position. In these circumstances, the best that another party can do in order to increase 
its electoral appeal is to come as close as possible to the policies offered by the other. 
As a result, parties will converge, offering almost identical bundles of policies to the 
electorate in order to attract the maximum level of support. This simple analysis is, of 
course, appropriate under only very restrictive circumstances2, but it does go a long 
way to explain the observed sensitivity of politicians to opinion polls (Forman 1985, 
McLean 1982,1985, Kuran 1991) and the tendency for parties to move towards the 
centre of the political spectrum, especially when an election is imminent (Forman 
1985, McLean 1982,1985). In turn, this sensitivity to public opinion, implies 
constraints on the power of rent seekers, especially if support for these groups is 
likely to drag politicians away from the median position.
The basic Downsian theory outlined above, assumes that the policy space in which 
politicians operate is uni-dimensional, i.e. that the opinions of the electorate can be 
ranked along a single scale - from left wing to right wing, for example. In practice 
however, policy space in most societies is multi-dimensional in nature. Of itself, this 
need not alter Downs' view that politicians will converge on the position of the median 
voter - assuming that a median position can be found (Enelow & Hinich 1984). 
However, unless opinion is distributed in an implausibly symmetrical way (so that 
every voter who stands on one side on each issue is matched by another who stands 
on the opposite on every single issue), then no such median position exists. Thus, a 
fundamental result in social choice theory (Arrow 1951, Black 1958) is that stable 
majorities typically exist when politics takes place over a single issue dimension, but 
majorities are almost always unstable when politics takes place over multiple issue 
dimensions (Riker & Ordeshook 1973, Riker 1982, chapter 7). Under multi­
dimensional conditions the set of winning platforms will be 'cyclical', where there is 
almost always the chance of a new set of policy bundles gaining support against the 
status quo.
Building on this analysis, (Riker 1982, chapter 9) suggests that politicians, especially 
those who are the current losers in the political process, have a constant incentive to 
seek out those issues which might be used to break up the existing winning coalition. 
The greater the number of issue dimensions, the more likely is cycling and as a result
2In particular it ignores the possibility of 'extremist' abstention if a party moves too far away from 
its more 'extreme' supporters. Similarly, it ignores the possible loss of support from party workers 
should a moderate position be adopted. Party activists on whom most politicians rely to 'get the 
voters out' - through campaigning, canvassing etc. also have a tendency to be more 'extreme' in their 
opinions than the general electorate. Thus, if a moderate position is adopted and party activists lose 
the incentive to work for their party this may reduce the party's ability to fight an effective election 
campaign (McLean 1982).
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the greater are the opportunities to mobilize different bundles of policies to defeat the 
status quo. A primary implication of this theory is that politicians will be eager to 
detect emergent trends in public opinion, seeking out new emphases in policy which 
will bring about increased support as the basis of a new winning coalition, without 
alienating their core supporters (Riker 1982). As a result, elections are especially 
prone to agenda manipulation, with the winners being the politicians best able to 
promote those issues which might break up existing coalitions. This analysis implies 
that legislators will be particularly sensitive to movements in public opinion in order to 
capture those issues, new dimensions and new emphases within the macro-electoral 
context which will bring about increased levels of support. In these circumstances 
policies may be offered, not to get the votes of special interests as the Virginia analysis 
suggests, but to secure additional support from sections of the unmobilized mass 
electorate.
Riker's analysis assumes that politicians and their parties respond to the demands of 
the electorate in a 'preference accommodating' mode. As Dunleavy & Ward (1981, 
1991) have suggested however, the standard analysis of vote-seeking behaviour 
neglects the ability of political parties who have already attained elected office, to use 
the enormous powers of the modem state in an attempt to 'mould' or 'shape', the 
preferences of the electorate. In so doing, politicians may seek to strengthen their 
existing coalitions by seeking to shape the distribution of public opinion in ways 
which will add to the mainstay of their support. In turn, if politicians are to pursue 
such strategies successfully they must again be keenly aware of the macro-political 
factors and movements in public opinion which affect the content of that support.
Dunleavy & Ward (1981) cite the example of British housing policy as a classic case 
of 'preference shaping' behaviour in this regard. Thus, throughout the post-war era, 
private homeowners have voted disproportionately in favour of the Conservative 
Party, whereas public sector tenants have tended to favour Labour. As a result, 
housing policy has been manipulated by both major parties in an attempt to maximize 
the number of individuals in the relevant tenures and to alter the pattern of voting in 
the desired direction. In the 1960s for example, the Labour administration launched a 
substantial programme of council house building in an attempt to increase the number 
of pro-Labour tenants, whereas in the 1980s the Thatcher government with its 'right 
to buy' scheme sought to sell off council houses into the private owner-occupied 
sector in order to increase the number of pro-Conservative home-owners (Dunleavy
1991).
In order to pursue a successful preference shaping strategy, parties must develop a
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clear identity - the equivalent of a brand name in the private market - such that when a 
party implements policies the beneficiaries will continue to associate their well-being 
with support for that party (the equivalent of brand loyalty). In turn, if a preference 
shaping strategy and the associated party identity is aimed at securing the support of a 
particular winning coalition, then a party cannot simply abandon this stance in order to 
placate opposition from elsewhere, because to do so would be to threaten the basis of 
its wider electoral appeal (Przeworski & Sprague 1986). Returning to the example of 
housing policy, Labour administrations have been unwilling to push up rents to 
council tenants even under severe financial pressure, in order to preserve their image 
as the party of council tenants (Dunleavy 1991). Likewise, Conservative governments 
have been unwilling to end tax relief on mortgages due to their concern to maintain an 
image as the party of home ownership (Ricketts 1986). Clearly, these developments 
have reflected the need for politicians to strengthen potential winning coalitions by 
maintaining a very clear party identity and have not as the Virginia school would 
suggest, reflected a response to concentrated groups of rent seekers.
The theoretical analysis outlined above suggests that successful political parties must 
exhibit an ability to respond to changes in the macro-political climate and to trends in 
public opinion in order to maintain a position in elected office. In turn, this analysis 
requires qualification of the special interest theory of political behaviour propounded 
by the Virginia school, sketched out at the beginning of this chapter. In particular, it 
implies that the ability of politicians to respond to special interest rent seekers in an 
attempt to secure concentrated blocks of support, will be constrained by the general 
electoral background, shifts in public opinion and the constraints imposed by party 
identification strategies, which form the context of their wider political appeal. Thus, 
if a policy platform supported by an interest group runs counter to general currents in 
opinion, then politicians are less likely to respond to its' demands, unless their are 
other benefits such as campaign contributions or the dispensing of patronage which 
the group might supply. If however, the general political climate provides a more 
favourable backdrop to interest groups then politicians may be keen to secure their 
support in an attempt to strengthen a prospective winning coalition. In these 
circumstances, the problem for the analyst is to decipher the extent to which the 
adoption of particular policies represents a response to special interest forces, or is a 
more general reflection of the macro-electoral climate and an attempt to secure support 
from unmobilized sections of the population. Care must be taken to separate those 
changes in legislation which may be purely a response to macro shifts in public 
opinion from those which bear the more distinct mark of a response to organized rent 
seekers.
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Irrespective of whether parties are pursuing preference accommodating strategies, 
preference shaping strategies, responding to rent seeking interests, responding to 
macro-electoral conditions, or a combination of all these factores, the decision to 
legislate in a particular area will be influenced by politicians perceptions of the 
potential electoral and economic benefits to be gained from the passage of a new law. 
Formal legislation requires full parliamentary approval through voting and in terms of 
the time spent preparing documentation, persuading members to accept the legislation, 
the drafting of amendments and parliamentary debate, is a relatively high cost method 
of adjusting policy to match changing electoral conditions (Alston & Spiller 1992). 
This is especially the case when policies are administered in an uncertain political 
environment. If the future benefits to constituents and legislators from the passage of a 
new law are uncertain then formal law may not be the best option, because once 
enacted legislation may not easily be amended to match the shifting electoral 
pressures. A specific law requires another specific law to override it, which may be 
costly in terms of the opportunities forgone in satisfying the demands of other 
constituent groups (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987).
In periods of political uncertainty, legislators are more likely to leave policy adaptation 
in the hands of bureaucrats and senior government officials. Agency delegation of this 
sort is a relatively low cost transaction method of administering policies in an 
uncertain environment (Alston & Spiller 1992, Home 1995). Policy changes can then 
be undertaken without formal parliamentary approval and the subsequent level of 
discretion in the interpretation of policy may provide for low cost adaptation in 
response to the demands of constituents. Only when the political costs and benefits 
from a particular policy appear to be certain is formal legislation likely to occur 
(McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987, Alston & Spiller 1992, Home 1995).
In what follows, the analytical framework outlined in this section is used as a 
refractive lens through which to view the 'supply side' behaviour of the UK political 
parties with respect to recent changes in land use legislation. Chapters 3 and 4 
developed a public choice account of institutional incentives within the land use 
planning system and suggested that the progressive decline in the rate of rural-urban 
land transfer owes much to structural incentives which allow the winners from 
restrictive policies, aided by an expansionist bureaucracy, to mobilize into an effective 
lobbying force. In the subsequent pages, these demand and supply factors are coupled 
with the theory of legislative behaviour outlined above. Evidence of the voting 
significance of interest groups, trends in public opinion, media influence, political 
patronage and the structure of the parliamentary committees is reviewed to analyse the 
legislative stake in support of urban containment.
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Similar studies of land use legislation conducted in the United States offer strong for 
the public choice approach. These studies use multivariate regression analysis to 
provide statistical correlations between membership of interest groups, size of 
constituency majority, campaign contributions and the voting behaviour of 
Congressmen and Senators (Kau & Rubin 1987). Such an analysis is not appropriate 
in the United Kingdom context however. First, because these studies have failed to 
provide any account of the macro-political factors discussed above. And second, 
because of the different character of the parliamentary process. As noted earlier, in 
more centralized political systems where legislation emanates from the executive or the 
bureaucracy and where party discipline is very strict, rent seeking is more likely to 
take on a less overt, behind the scenes form, so it is not possible to provide direct 
measures linking individual voting patterns to the support given by organized groups. 
Similarly, unlike the United States, the disclosure of campaign contributions to 
political parties is not required by law, so quantitative data on the impact of financial 
contributions is not particularly reliable. Rather, the data presented here is designed to 
provide a general indication of the structure of interest representation within the House 
of Commons, balanced with an account of macro developments in public opinion 
which may be significant in determining the pattern of land use legislation.
5.2 Votes and Urban Containment
In public choice theory, politicians are seen as office-seekers, who must 'supply' 
legislation to the electorate in exchange for votes. Virginia school/ special interest 
accounts stress the tendency of politicians to court votes from concentrated groups of 
rent seekers rather than from the unmobilized mass of the electorate. According to this 
perspective, politicians are more likely to perceive vote potential from groups with a 
high per capita stake in a particular policy area and will attempt to win elections by 
putting together coalitions of organized interests through a process of log-rolling. 
Other things being equal, the most highly mobilized groups and those which might 
prove pivotal to a politicians chances of re-election are likely to be more influential.
Set in this context, of the interest groups considered in chapter 3, the largest in terms 
of absolute size and hence the potential to exercise electoral power is the 
nimby/conservation lobby. The Council for the Protection of Rural England has a total 
membership, including local amenity societies of approximately 560 000 organized 
around predominantly nimby concerns.
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The 560 000 members of the CPRE/local amenity lobby account for approximately 
1.3% of the total electorate (42 million). Membership however, is not evenly spread 
throughout the country with a focus in non-metropolitan constituencies (Lowe & 
Goyder 1983). Removing the 213 metropolitan seats from the 524 English 
parliamentary constituencies leaves 311 seats where the conservationists are most 
likely to be situated.3 Assuming that membership is evenly spread throughout these 
constituencies then the average non-metropolitan parliamentary seat (70 000) is likely 
to have approximately 1 800 voters or 2.6% with a direct nimby/conservationist 
interest.
To discover the potential electoral power of the conservation lobby from a special 
interest perspective, requires an extension of the analysis to consider the political 
significance of these votes in relation to the size of the parliamentary majorities in the 
constituencies where they are situated. Political significance/pivotality is maximized 
where the conservationist vote is equivalent to half the parliamentary majority plus 
one. This definition indicates the maximum number of seats in which the 
conservationist vote alone could theoretically affect the result, because it includes 
those seats where every conservationist would need to switch their vote, which is 
most unlikely. The larger the proportion of the conservationist vote required to exceed 
half the majority, the less significant will be the seat.
An examination of special interest power must also consider the elasticity of a set of 
votes. In this particular case, what proportion of the conservationist vote would shift 
its political allegiance away from a party which proposed a relaxation of the 
regulations which restrict urban developments in the countryside. Ceteris paribus, the 
greater the intensity of members preferences for or against a particular policy, the 
more likely it is that individuals will be willing to switch their votes in an attempt to 
affect that policy. There is little in the way of hard data to test the extent to which 
voters would indeed switch allegiance over nimby issues, because with the exception 
of the early 1980s, when the Conservatives supported a marginal liberalization, the 
position of the major parties has been virtually identical in favouring the maintenance 
or extension of statutory controls. Of itself, this might indicate a perception that there
3 The distinction between metropolitan seats - defined by the Times Parliamentary Companion as 
those falling within the boundaries of the old metropolitan counties - does not provide a perfect urban/ 
rural distinction. There are actually about 30 seats within the metropolitan area which are on the 
suburban fringe of the major conurbations and are likely to exhibit more rural characteristics, 
including a conservationist membership. Equally however, there are a number of seats within the non­
metropolitan shires which are predominantly urban in nature and are likely to lack such members, so 
the distinction drawn here does not bias the analysis in any particular way.
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Table 5.1 Green Belt Marginals in England : 1992-1997
Constituency Majority % Winner Second
Warrington S 190 0.30 Lab Con
Bolton NE 185 0.38 Con Lab
Halifax 478 0.83 Lab Con
Slough 514 0.90 Con Lab
Hazel Grove 929 1.07 Con Lib
Dewsbury 634 1.09 Lab Con
Cambridge 580 1.10 Lab Con
Bury S 788 1.46 Con Lab
Bolton W 1079 1.80 Con Lab
Chester 1101 2.07 Con Lab
Thurrock 1172 2.17 Lab Con
Batley & Spen 1408 2.31 Con Lab
Cannock 1506 2.46 Lab Con
Cheltenham 1668 2.60 Lib Con
Basildon 1480 2.75 Con Lab
Nuneaton 1631 2.75 Lab Con
Stockport 1422 3.00 Lab Con
Lancashire W 2077 3.25 Lab Con
Ellesmere Port 1989 3.30 Lab Con
Kingswood 2370 3.94 Lab Con
Sherwood 2190 4.60 Lab Con
Notes : Lab = Labour, Con = Conservative, Lib = Liberal Democrat
Source : Dods Parliamentary Companion - cross referenced with local Green Belt boundaries.
has been a substantial number of votes to be won. Witness for example, the joint letter 
to The Times newspaper on February 26th 1996 from the three main party leaders to 
celebrate the 70th anniversary of the CPRE. This perception may indeed be accurate 
given the geographic concentration of CPRE membership in areas where statutory 
designations provide a concentrated stake in the defence of amenity and property 
values. In many cases, the ownership of property in a designated zone may account 
for a substantial proportion of an individuals' personal wealth and as a result the 
preference intensities of these individuals are likely to be relatively high.
Assuming therefore that a proportion of the nimby/conservation lobby has indeed been 
willing to switch its vote, what have been the likely repercussions for the political 
parties at Westminster?
Table 5.1 provides a rough indication of the significance of the nimby/conservationist 
lobby, following the 1992 General Election.The seats listed in the table are defined as
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‘Green Belt’ marginals, ie. those parliamentary constituencies which fall within the 
boundaries of the various Green Belts. There are in fact more constituencies which are 
sensitive to the land release question - for example some seats may contain designated 
SSSI or AONB, but not Green Belt. For present purposes Green Belt constituencies 
were chosen for ease of cross reference with the relevant parliamentary boundaries 
and provide at least a reasonable proxy for the areas where the relaxation of national 
land use designations might have proven politically sensitive.
It can be seen from Table 5.1, that following the 1992 General Election there were 21 
constituencies where the conservationist vote alone could theoretically have altered the 
result of an election. However, in 3 of these constituencies this would have required 
a swing of 50% or more - an unrealistic assumption. On the assumption that 50% or 
less might have switched their vote, there were 18 constituencies where the 
conservation vote might have been pivotal.
Given a House of Commons majority of only 21 for the Conservatives in 1992, these 
seats would appear to have been highly significant to the electoral fortunes of both the 
Conservative and Labour parties. Moreover, although there were only 21 
constituencies where the conservationist vote alone could theoretically have affected a 
result, on the assumption that politicians with smaller and less stable majority 
coalitions are more likely to vote maximize, then these constituencies together with 
others where MP’s are sitting on less than substantial majorities, were likely to have 
been highly sensitive to conservationist concerns. In addition, those MP’s from 
constituencies with highly organized and vocal nimby/conservationist interests may 
have been more likely to prefer a ‘quiet life’ to the likely storm of organized protest 
and the potential image of unpopularity which might result should the ire of the 
conservationist lobby be raised.4
The position depicted in Table 5.1 marks a substantial increase in the political 
significance of the ‘Green Belt Marginals’, when compared to the high water mark of 
the Thatcher adminstration in 1983 (Con Maj 144). Of the 21 seats which could 
theoretically swing on the strength of the conservationist vote alone, only 7 were in a 
similar position in 1983, plus Chelmsford and Mansfield, making a total of 9. With 
the exception of Thurrock and Mansfield (Labour), all the constituencies were held by
4 We might also add the likely protest from local party workers and councillors concerned about the 
fate of local council seats, a phenomenon witnessed following the proposal to build the Foxley Wood 
new town on a designated SSSI in North East Hampshire during the late 1980s (Ehrman 1990).
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the Conservatives. The switch to 12 Labour, 8 Conservative and 1 Liberal Democrat 
since 1983, coupled with a doubling of conservationist membership, reflects the 
importance of these seats to the overall result of a general election. Labour and 
Conservatives have had an equal stake in capturing green belt seats and the Liberal 
Democrats have had the prospect of capturing at least one more of these constituencies 
(Hazel Grove).5
Aside from the conservation lobby, the only other large voting block with a significant 
stake in the urban containment question are the farmers. As discussed in chapter 3, the 
continual reliance of the farm sector on agricultural subsidies and more recently 
conservation subsidies provides the farm lobby with a vested interest in restricting the 
transfer of land out of agricultural production and into urban uses. Throughout much 
of the post war era, the agricultural lobby possessed a considerable degree of electoral 
clout and according to the seminal analysis by Self & Storing (1962), the Labour 
Party courted the farmers vigorously by offering agricultural subsidies to match those 
offered by the Conservatives, because it believed that a 25% swing in its favour of 
farmers, farm workers and their wives could have won it 19 more seats in 1955. 
According to Howarth (1990), there can be no explanation for the Labour Party 
passing the 1947 Agriculture Act and continuing thereafter to take an extremely 
generous attitude to capitalist farmers other than a belief on its behalf that a 
concentrated block of votes could be won.
In the intervening years the electoral power of the farm vote has declined significantly. 
From a peak of 210 000 in 1953 (Howarth 1990), NFU membership has fallen in line 
with the number of farmers and in 1993, although still maintaining a mobilization rate 
of 80%, membership was down to 114,000 (see chapter 3). Assuming that wives and 
dependent adults were likely to vote the same way and including the votes of farm 
workers, there were some 60 seats following the 1970 general election where the 
agricultural vote alone could theoretically have affected the result (Howarth (1969). In 
over half of these constituencies however this would have required a swing of 50% or 
more and accepting that farmers have a general propensity to favour the 
Conservatives, there were about 16 seats where the farm vote might have proved 
pivotal (Howarth 1990). Following the 1983 General Election the number of seats 
where the farm vote was significant had fallen to only 8.6 With NFU membership
5 This analysis was confirmed at the time of final editing when the election of a Labour 
administration on May 1st 1997, saw all of these seats fall to Labour, with the exception of Hazel 
Grove which returned a Liberal Democrat.
6
Based on the 1981 Census data, Howarth (1990) estimates the maximum voting strength of British 
agriculture, including farmers, farmworkers,wives and dependents to be approximately 840,000 or
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having declined still further since 1983, by the time of the 1992 general election there 
were only a handful of seats where the farming lobby had any real clout, although 
given the much smaller parliamentary majority for the Conservative Party in the 
subsequent years the overall significance of these seats may itself have been somewhat 
higher. In so far as the farm lobby has had any potential to exercise electoral clout, 
this is likely to have been confined to its forming part of a broader, rural based anti- 
urban coalition with the nimby/conservation lobby.
Aside from the conservationists and the farmers, none of the other major interest 
groups with a stake in containment appear to have had any potential to exercise direct 
electoral clout. There are 20 000 RTPI members and of the 80 000 RICS membership 
only half are involved directly in the land release question. Given their substantial 
bureaucratic stake in land use regulation (chapter 4) the planners of the RTPI might be 
added to the conservationists in part of the voting block opposed to the deregulation of 
the rural land market.
The total membership of the house building lobby numbers 32 000 (firms) which are 
closely aligned to the Conservatives. Of these only the 10 000 FMB members favour a 
radical liberalization. It is possible to include the construction workers unions in the 
house building lobby, but there would appear little in the way of benefit to building 
workers from a substantial liberalization as the likely increase in competition for the 
larger developers would add pressure to cut prices and costs. The major beneficiaries 
from only a minor degree of liberalization would be the larger corporate firms able to 
realize the capital gains on their land banks (chapter 3).
The principal beneficiaries of a radical liberalization would be the consumers of owner 
occupied housing and tenants in both the private and public/social housing sectors. 
However, whereas there are incentives for subsets of homeowners in their capacity as 
'nimbies' to mobilize against deregulation, there are no incentives for homeowners in 
their capacity as consumers to organize because of the problems of collective action 
and the phenomena of concentrated benefits/ dispersed costs facing such groups. It is 
this differential ability to mobilize around highly focused nimby issues and hence to 
have a potential effect on the electoral strategies of the political parties which appears 
to offer the nimby/conservation lobby a decisive advantage in the political stakes.
The simple analysis of voting strength presented above, suggests that nimby/
about 2% of the total electorate.
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conservationist opinion as represented by the CPRE has had the potential to exercise a 
degree of electoral clout. From the position of the Virginia/ special interest theory this 
would indeed be a significant factor in the political cost calculus and might go a 
considerable way to explain the willingness of politicians to allow the growth of urban 
containment regulations. In the light of the theoretical significance of macro-political 
factors outlined earlier however, it might be argued that this style of analysis simply 
misses the wood for the trees. Thus, at the very time when there was an apparent 
increase in the electoral significance of the green belt marginals and the apparent 
power of the nimby lobby, there was also a major upswing in public concern for the 
environment and a substantial growth in the wider environmental movement - 
membership of Friends of the Earth for example increased from 27,000 in 1985 to 
120,000 in 1994 or +900% (McCormick 1991, DoE 1994) .These factors may well 
have swamped the importance of CPRE nimbyism in terms of the likely electoral 
effect on the support for pro-containment policies. A cursory glance at the history of 
environmental politics in the United Kingdom over the last thirty years reveals the 
importance of the shift in the general electoral significance of the environment and 
requires serious questioning of the special interest interpretation.
Most accounts of British environmental politics stress the relatively recent arrival of 
environmental issues on the political agenda, with the late 1960s and early 1970s 
widely recognized as the period when environmental concern emerged as a potentially 
significant political issue. Indeed, it was not until the General Election of 1970 that the 
major political parties even referred to the term 'environmental policy' in their election 
manifestos and the creation of the Department of the Environment in that same year 
was the first time any kind of central responsibility for the environment was 
established (McCormick 1991, chapter 1 Robinson 1992, chapter 1). This same 
period also witnessed a sustained growth in the number of environmental 
organizations, especially those focused on local amenity concerns (Lowe & Goyder 
1983). Even so, there was little indication that environmental issues ranked 
significantly highly with the mass of the electorate, at least in relation to the more 
traditional electoral battlegrounds focused on the delivery of welfare services, 
unemployment, economic policy and foreign defence.Thus, Butler & Stokes (1974) 
analysis of the most salient electoral issues in the 1960s and early 1970s found that the 
environment barely registered a mention in comparison to unemployment, housing 
and other welfare services which were still clearly at the forefront of public concern.
Throughout the 1970s and up to the election of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative 
administration in May 1979, environmental issues maintained their position on the 
political stage but there was no indication that they might make a significant enough
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breakthrough to affect the general electoral support of the political parties (McCormick 
1991, Robinson 1992). Thus, although all the three major parties reserved separate 
sections for environmental policy in their 1979 election manifestos, the impact of these 
concerns on their fortunes seemed minimal given the over-riding themes of recession, 
inflation, falling productivity and rising unemployment which characterized this period 
in British political history. It was not until the re-emergence of economic growth in the 
mid 1980s, after the deep recession of the early Thatcher years, that major changes in 
public opinion and government attitudes towards the environment seemed to be 
underway.
In her initial period of office, Mrs Thatcher's government appeared to show relatively 
little interest in environmental matters, but from the mid to late 1980s onwards and 
into the subsequent Major administration, this position was to change radically. 
McCormick (1991) highlights the now famous speech given by the Prime minister to 
the Royal Society in September 1988, in which she highlighted the potentially 
disastrous consequences of global warming, the emission of ozone depleting gases 
and continued population growth, as the turning point in the Conservative approach. 
Prior to this speech, the Thatcher administration had been preoccupied with economic 
policy and in particular its drive to stimulate economic revival through a policy of 
'rolling back the state' - including the privatization of nationalized industries, the de­
regulation of the financial services sector and a more general attempt to minimize the 
scope of state controls. Indeed, in the eyes of many commentators the emphasis on 
minimizing state intervention suggested that the administration might actively oppose 
the environmental agenda as a potential source of red tape which would further stifle 
productive efficiency (McCormick 1991).
The movement towards a more pro-active stance on the environment appears to have 
been stimulated by a series of events, which included public reaction to some of the 
government's own policies, the emergence of the environmental issue on the public 
agenda following high profile international environmental disasters and pressure from 
external authorities such as the European Union and the United Nations.
In the early 1980s the first signs of the new significance of the environmental agenda 
emerged when the government proposed the loosening of green belt restrictions 
around the major metropolitan areas and especially in the South East. As was noted in 
chapter 3, these proposals prompted vigorous opposition from anti-development 
campaigners and in particular the CPRE. Taken aback by this opposition, much of it 
derived from traditional Conservative constituencies, the government withdrew the 
proposals within months, but the intensity of protest stimulated by the proposals and
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the successful media campaign launched by the CPRE, appeared to raise the 
environment up the political agenda (Marsden et al 1993, Robinson 1992).
In the mid 1980s, a series of unforeseen events on the international stage acted as a 
further catalyst to public concern. The meltdown of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant 
in the Ukraine in April 1986 and the resultant radioactive fall-out, stimulated a wave of 
environmental interest throughout the whole of Western Europe. Similarly, the 
publication of scientific reports indicating a process of global warming due to carbon 
dioxide and other gaseous emissions and the discovery of a 'hole' in the ozone layer 
over Antarctica, achieved massive media attention acting to raise public consciousness 
to unprecedented heights (Robinson 1992, Pearce & Maddison 1995).
A still further stimulant appears to have resulted from the actions of international 
organizations and in particular the European Union. Throughout the 1980s the British 
government came under constant pressure from the EU (European Community at the 
time) to limit the emission of industrial pollutants and in particular sulphur dioxide in 
response to growing concern over the effects of trans-national acid pollution (acid 
rain) in Scandinavia and West Germany .The result of such high profile lobbying, 
again contributed to the growth of mass environmental concern (Haigh and Lanigan 
1995, Skea 1995).
All told, the combined effect of these internal and external forces was to shift the 
environment from its position as a relatively 'fringe' issue, to the very centre of the 
political stage. Evidence of this shift is apparent from a variety of sources. Thus, an 
opinion poll conducted by Mori in July 1989, found that more people (35%) rated the 
environment as the top political issue than concern for the National Health Service 
(29%) and unemployment (24%) (McCormick 1991, p. 151). Similarly, attitudinal 
research published in the new reports on British Social Attitudes show a rapid rise in 
public recognition of environmental concerns from the mid 1980s onwards (Robinson
1992) In addition, the membership of environmental organizations witnessed 
unprecedented growth in the late 1980s with the combined membership of groups 
such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth increasing by almost half a million 
(McCormick 1991, DoE 1994) Perhaps most significant of all however, was the 
unexpectedly strong performance of the UK Green Party at the European 
Parliamentary Elections in June 1989. Having previously never managed to achieve 
more than 4.7 % of the vote in any sort of election (local, general or European) the 
party polled almost 15%, illustrating most graphically the shift in public concern 
(Robinson 1992, p.209) .
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In response to this change in public sentiment, Mrs Thatcher's government appeared 
to adopt a new line on environmental policy which ran against its wider more anti­
interventionist approach. One of the first signs of this new stance came in 1989 with 
the replacement of Nicholas Ridley as Secretary of State for the Environment with 
Chris Patten. Ridley, an outspoken advocate of de-regulation and market liberalism 
had long since raised the ire of the environmental lobby. Patten on the other hand was 
widely perceived as more sympathetic to the environmental interest (Marsden et al
1993). This change of personnel was to herald the passage of new environmental 
legislation under subsequent Secretaries of State and the publication of a whole raft of 
new government statements and policy documents all of which appeared to indicate a 
pronounced tightening of existing environmental regulations and an overall expansion 
of the regulatory regime. Amongst the most important of these was the passage of the 
1990 Town & Country Planning Act, the 1990 Environment Protection Act, the 
publication of the 1990 White Paper This Common Inheritance (Cmd 1200), the 1991 
Planning and Compensation Act and the policy document Sustainable Development: 
The UK Strategy, published in 1994.
Taken at face value this summary of recent history in British environmental politics 
would appear to imply serious questioning of the special interest interpretation of 
urban containment policy presented at the outset. In particular, was not the move 
towards an increase in planning regulation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a 
reflection of the wider shift in environmental policy in response to the movements in 
public opinion documented above ?
In these circumstances, the Rikerian analysis of electoral processes (pp. 137-140, 
below) may seem more appropriate than the rent seeking/special interest approach put 
forward by the Virginia school. According to a Rikerian interpretation, given the 
instability of majority coalitions under conditions of multi-dimensional policy space, 
the environment was an emergent issue in public opinion, which each party and 
especially the then losers (Labour and Liberal Democrats) would want to capture in an 
attempt to break up the existing Conservative winning coalition. Under these 
conditions, parties would be keen to develop a 'brand image', to capitalize on 
movements in public opinion in order to succeed in attracting support from 
unmobilized and unattached sections of the general electorate, without alienating their 
core supporters. Thus, many accounts of British environmental politics in the 1980s 
stress the importance of the apparently more pro-environment stance adopted by the 
Labour and Liberal Democrat parties as a final stimulus to the shift in Conservative 
policy adopted in the late 1980s (Robinson 1992, Young 1995). A Rikerian analysis 
of these events might suggest that the Conservatives, having recognized the
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environment as an emergent election issue, sought to increase environmental 
regulation, including planning controls on urban development, in an attempt to 
'neutralize' the environment as a threat to their majority coalition. In this case, the 
growth of containment regulations represented a response not to the power of rent 
seeking interests, but was more a reflection of its electoral pulling power with 
members of the unmobilized mass electorate.
There is surely little doubt that the growth of public environmental concern was indeed 
a major factor determining the support given by the Thatcher and Major adminstrations 
for an increase in planning regulation. However, accepting that these macro-political 
pressures were a significant element in the political cost calculus does not discount the 
relevance of the special interest theory presented earlier. On the contrary, it will be 
argued below that whilst macro-political developments in the late 1980s and early 
1990s provided a more favourable backdrop for the growth of environmental 
regulation, the actual nature of the policy changes adopted bore the hallmarks of 
special interest processes operating underneath.
A primary reason for holding to a modified version of the special interest thesis 
requires a re-emphasis of the concentrated benefits/ dispersed costs phenomena 
discussed at length in chapter 3. It was argued there, that interest groups lobbying 
against urban development in the countryside are structurally advantaged in the 
political process, because the benefits which they lobby for are highly concentrated on 
members living within locally specific sites. As a result, 'nimby incentives' allow 
these groups to form a concentrated, socially homogenous block of opposition against 
development proposals and to defend amenity/property values. By contrast, taxpayer 
and consumer interests who are the principal losers from urban containment represent 
a large and diffuse set of interests, unable to mobilize against the effects of planning 
restrictions. Similarly, non-nimby environmental interests campaigning on much 
broader environmental concerns (such as habitat losses due to mechanized farming) 
lack a concentrated focus for their lobbying activities; i) because many of these issues 
are dispersed in the nature of their effects; and ii) because even when the groups are 
able to mobilize it is not at all clear which issues have stimulated participation given 
the heterogeneity of the interests concerned.
The significance of these asymmetries in costs and benefits may help to rebut a 
potential charge levied against the evidence on the significance of the 'nimby vote' 
presented earlier (p. 144 below). Thus, it might be argued that the re-emphasis on 
urban containment owed more to the wider growth of environmental groups in the late 
1980s and environmental awareness in public opinion, than it did to the theoretical
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chance that nimby interests alone might swing political fortunes in marginal 
constituencies. This interpretation has considerable merit, but it does miss the 
significance of cost/benefit asymmetries in stimulating political action and in particular 
assumes that politicians are likely to perceive equal electoral advantage from the 
adoption of different environmental policies irrespective of the nature of the 
environmental issue concerned. The significance of the potential nimby vote results 
from its position as a geographically concentrated group, with a high per capita stake 
in urban containment and its' potentially greater willingness to switch allegiance 
according to this issue (see for example, Robinson's 1992 highlighting of green belt 
issues in key South East seats prior to the 1987 General Election, p. 157). By contrast, 
other environmentalists campaigning across a much broader range of policies 
represent a much more diffuse and heterogeneous set of interests. Because the per 
capita stake in issues such as species diversity and urban air pollution is much smaller 
and because the heterogeneity of the issues concerned prevents any clear focus which 
a vote seeking politician might respond to, it is plausible to suggest that politicians 
perceive these issues to have less vote pulling power than examples of nimbyism. 
Thus, whilst politicians may have been willing to increase planning regulations as part 
of a more general response to environmental concerns in order to attract votes from 
unmobilized sections of the electorate (the Rikerian interpretation), they were 
especially likely to increase containment regulations, because the greater concentration 
of gains conferred on the beneficiaries (as opposed to other aspects of environmental 
policy) may have resulted in their securing a more geographically concentrated block 
of votes as well (the Virginia/ special interest interpretation).
A further defence of the special interest account might accept the Rikerian view that 
support for containment reflected the need for the Conservatives to 'neutralize' the 
environment as an issue, increasing regulation in order to create a favourable public 
image, but would suggest that CPRE/nimby interests have had a particular advantage 
in the political stakes because of their own ability to threaten party identification 
strategies in this regard. Within this context, the specific electoral power of the 
CPRE/nimby lobby may have derived from its position as the representative of a key 
sub-group within the middle class owner-occupier population, geographically 
concentrated in areas which are under particular threat from development pressure.
The membership of CPRE is composed almost completely of owner occupiers and 
middle class professionals (Lowe & Goyder 1983), representing a distinctive, socially 
homogeneous set of voters which are important to the electoral fortunes of all the 
political parties. Unmobilized middle class professionals living in rural and suburban 
constituencies and yet to have been faced with development proposals, share many of 
the same interests in property and amenity values as CPRE/nimby groups and are an
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important target group of floating voters (Marsden et al 1993, Murdoch & Marsden 
1995). Should a lobby such as CPRE have been seen to oppose the policies of one of 
the major parties then that parties image may have been seriously damaged with these 
electors given their similar social position and geographical location. Should any party 
and in particular the Conservatives which have long marketed themselves as a party of 
the countryside and the suburbs (Johnston et al 1988, Ehrman 1990, Winter 1996), 
have acted to liberalize the planning system, then any of the other parties could 
immediately have rushed to fill the subsequent identity vacuum to portray themselves 
favourably in a whole swathe of rural and suburban constituencies which were vital to 
their chances of forming a majority government.
In these circumstances, the effect of CPRE campaigning against the government might 
have been more likely to have lost the Conservatives votes from latent sections of the 
rural/suburban middle class to an extent which would not have resulted from the 
actions of other environmental campaigners, who are much less socially homogenous 
and geographically concentrated in their origins. There is no quantitative data available 
to test this hypothesis directly, but at the very least its inferences are not inconsistent 
with existing accounts of the environmental policy process which have stressed the 
long standing 'insider' status of the CPRE, compared to the relatively more 'fringe' 
status of environmental lobbies such as Greenpeace and until recently Friends of the 
Earth (Jordan & Richardson 1987, McCormick 1991, Robinson 1992).
As further support for the theory that the nimby lobby has exercised differentially 
more power, it is useful to recall the pattern of events involved in three of the most 
high profile environmental disputes in the 1980s, which brought about the swiftest 
responses from the then Conservative administration - all of which involved apparent 
examples of nimbyism. The first of these examples has already been referred to in this 
chapter (see also chapter 3) - ie. the Conservative government's 1983 proposals to 
liberalize the metropolitan green belts. In this case, following a high profile campaign 
in the national media, the CPRE/local amenity lobby was able to secure the support of 
almost one hundred Conservative MPs, drawn predominantly from green belt and 
surrounding seats in the South East, who signed a House of Commons Early Day 
Motion protesting at the draft DoE circulars on Green Belts. There seems to have been 
little doubt that this geographically concentrated storm of protest by organized nimby 
lobbies, was a key factor in the decision of the then Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Patrick Jenkin, to drop the proposals after only two months (Robinson 
1992, p.87).
A further example of the nimby phenomenon was displayed in the run up to the 1987
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general election and concerned proposals to develop new dumping sites for nuclear 
waste. Thus, the attempt by the Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive 
(NIREX) in the period 1985-1987, to assess areas such as Billingham, Bradwell, 
Fulbeck, Killinghome and Elstow for radio-active waste disposal, triggered off 
immediate and intense public opposition in the areas concerned. The political pressure 
exerted by the anti-NIREX groups proved too hot for the government to handle and 
the proposals were dropped just weeks before the general election in June 1987. 
Although NIREX's decision to pull out was said to be based upon revised cost 
estimates, it seems more likely that the potential political ramifications in areas where 
four Conservative MPs, including the Chief Whip, were in danger of losing their 
seats, was the decisive factor concerned (Robinson 1992, p. 108).
As a final and perhaps more significant illustration, consider the role played by 
nimby/urban containment issues in the run up to the changes in planning legislation 
which occurred in early 1990s. It was noted earlier that the replacement of Nicholas 
Ridley with Chris Patten as Environment Secretary in 1989 was seen to have marked a 
major shift in Conservative attitudes towards environmental policy. However, it is 
worth recalling that perhaps the defining issue which led to the installation of Chris 
Patten was Ridley's proposal to allow the development of new settlements in the home 
counties and most notably his decision to grant on appeal the proposed development 
of 4800 houses on a designated SSSI at Foxley Wood - ie. a nimby/urban 
containment issue. It has been suggested by a number of commentators that the threat 
of electoral losses reflected in the formation of the 90 strong Conservative back bench 
pressure group SANE Planning in response to this policy, representing one of the 
most concerted examples of backbench action on an environmental issue, was a 
determining factor leading to the appointment of Patten (Marsden et al 1993). 
Significantly, Patten announced the reversal of Ridley's decision on Foxley Wood and 
effectively put an end to all new settlement proposals in the South East on the very eve 
of the 1989 Conservative Party conference. Moreover, it was the announcement on 
the Foxley Wood case which put into train the legislative movements which were to 
culminate in the 1991 Planning and Compensation Act, the new provisions of the 
'plan-led' development control system and the subsequent strengthening of 
containment regulations introduced following an ammendment drafted by the CPRE 
(Marsden et al 1993, Murdoch & Marsden 1995).
The examples presented above suggest that nimby/urban containment issues have been 
a particularly significant factor in the legislative cost calculus. Whilst the movement 
towards stricter urban containment policies may in part have been a reflection of the 
wider significance of environmental issues on the macro-political agenda, politicians
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may have been especially inclined to increase containment regulations : il because the 
concentration of benefits concerned will have been more likely to sway votes and ii) 
because middle class nimby groups may have been better able to threaten the 
identification strategies of the major political parties. A primary implication of this 
analysis is that urban containment issues should have witnessed a much stronger 
legislative response than other aspects of environmental policy where the pattern of 
political incentives does not conform to these criteria. Whilst it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to examine in depth the full spectrum of British environmental policy there 
is sufficient evidence to suggest this as a serious working hypothesis. As a result the 
growth of containment regulation cannot be attributed solely to the growth of an 
amorphous environmental movement and shifts in the pattern of public concern.
In order to illustrate this interpretation, it is useful to contrast the continual growth of 
planning controls designed to curb urban developments in rural areas, with the 
decidedly more patchy development of regulatory powers in other fields of 
environmental policy. Perhaps the most striking example of this phenomenon can be 
seen in the continued reluctance of the British government to control the environmental 
consequences of subsidized farming. If indeed the growth of containment regulation 
was purely a reflection of a more general environmental agenda, then one would have 
expected a corresponding growth of controls on the agricultural sector. In actual fact 
and in spite of evidence that mechanized farming is one of the most environmentally 
destructive forms of land use, farming operations have remained largely immune from 
regulatory control. Thus, Young (1995) has described the developments in this area as 
akin to 'running up the down escalator'. Government policy has remained a 
hotchpotch of subsidized voluntary conservation programmes such as the 
Environmentally Sensitive Areas Scheme, paid for with additional outlays of 
taxpayers money, leaving most forms of agricultural development, such as the 
construction of farm buildings outside the scope of statutory control. The fundamental 
difference between this issue and examples of nimbyism is that the former is much 
more dispersed in the nature of its effects, whereas the latter affect more concentrated 
groups of voters in geographically specific areas. Moreover, it may be the case that 
unmobilized sections of the electorate, especially those in the suburban/rural middle 
class, identify their own interests more closely with those of nimby groups because 
they themselves are more likely to face the immediate consequences of urban 
development than they are the effects (eg.loss of species diversity) of mechanized 
farming. As a result, party identification strategies might be especially sensitive to 
nimby concerns.
A similar pattern is discernible in other areas of environmental policy where a
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substantial nimby element does not exist. Thus, Pennington (1996) has noted the 
continued ability of the British forestry companies to resist the imposition of planning 
controls on industrial forest plantations, in spite of their well known environmental 
side effects. Skea (1995) meanwhile, argues that the UK government's position on 
the reduction of sulphur dioxide emissions has been driven by the costs considerations 
of the major economic actors and in particular the electricity generating companies 
rather than environmental concerns. The government has been reluctant to increase 
targets for sulphur dioxide reductions for fear of closing down the remaining coal 
fired electricity generators. Similarly, Bade & Button (1990) and Button (1995) 
examine the lack of a coherent strategy to reduce the emission of transport related 
pollutants. According to these authors, UK transport policy has been dominated by 
short term policy solutions aimed at localized problems such as noise (where there is a 
nimby element), to the neglect of a more strategic approach aimed at the reduction of 
transport externalities (where there is not a nimby element). This analysis has been 
confirmed by Rydin (1996) who highlights the reluctance of policy makers at both the 
national and the local level to act in order to improve urban air quality.
Diverse those these issues are, the fundamental similarity between them is that the 
environmental interest is diffuse in its nature. Nimby issues by contrast, of which 
urban containment is perhaps the clearest example, affect relatively more concentrated 
sets of voters and are perhaps more likely to be perceived by politicians as a source of 
special interest support. Thus, the growth in containment regulation which has 
occurred since the late 1980s may be attributable in part to the wider upswing in public 
environmental concern, but the speed with which the government has responded to 
this issue - including the abandonment of new settlements, a moratorium on out of 
town shopping development, the introduction of the plan-led development control 
system and the commitment to confine the majority of new housing to urban sites; 
compared to the relative levels of inaction elsewhere, is at least suggestive that special 
interest processes have been in play.
5.3 Patronage, Money and Urban Containment
The electoral considerations documented above may be the primary motivation in the 
cost calculus of the politician, but the ability of special interest groups to obtain 
political support is not only a function of their electoral size. Smaller interest groups in 
particular may have little in the way of electoral clout but may prove influential 
nonetheless because of their ability to supply other forms of utility enhancement to 
legislators.
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The typical politician may be concerned not only with the number of votes she 
receives and the size of her majority coalition but also with the personal economic 
benefits to be derived from a position in elected office. Other things being equal, 
wealthy interest groups are in the best position to provide direct economic support to 
parliamentary decision-makers. This support may take the form of campaign 
contributions and election expenses or alternatively direct financial inducements to 
individual legislators in exchange for legislative favours. Where financial payments 
are forbidden, economic benefits may occur in alternative forms, including wining and 
dining, the offer of directorships on company boards or a senior position in a union 
hierarchy. In other cases an individual legislator may herself be a member of an 
interest group with a financial stake in a particular policy and may be able to influence 
the passage of legislation accordingly.
Patronage relationships of this genre may act to reinforce the vote motive, where a 
legislator derives economic benefits from an interest group which is an important part 
of her majority coalition, or may act against the vote motive where the legislator has a 
safe seat and may be willing to sacrifice a few votes in order to secure the benefits of 
patronage power.
Tables 5.2 to 5.4 depict the potential for patronage power within the House of 
Commons for the agricultural, building and environmental lobbies for the 
parliamentary session following the 1992 general election. The figures were derived 
from cross references of the lists of members interests within the published 
parliamentary directories - Dods, Roth, Times and Vachers, supplemented by the 
official list of members interests published in The Guardian newspaper on 8th May 
1996. The data should be treated with some caution because there are undoubtedly 
some MPs who do not properly disclose the full extent of their interests. A good 
example is provided with respect to the building lobby. The House Builders 
Federation had 20 MPs who acted as vice-presidents to the regional branches 
(Interviews 5 & 6 HBF/BEC), but only 9 registered this particular interest. Similarly, 
the fact that members have a particular interest or affiliation does not necessarily mean 
that they will act on the basis of this interest. Rather, the tables indicate the potential 
for patronage relationships, which may or may not show up in the pattern of land use 
legislation.
The figures presented reveal the potential for patronage relationships, especially on 
behalf of the agricultural and building lobbies. What is particularly striking is the 
number of Conservative members who were themselves active farmers and in many
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Table 5.2 Agricultural Interests in the House of Commons : 1992-1997
Con Lab Lib Dem Total
General 28 10 2 40
Special Interest* 40 1 1 42
Total 68 11 3 82
♦Includes all active farmers/large landowners, directors of agricultural firms and registered NFU 
members
Source : Dods/Roth/Times/V achers Parliamentary Companions and The Guardian 8 th May 1996.
Table 5.3 Construction Interests in the House of Commons : 1992-1997
Con Lab Lib Dem Total
General 20 9 0 29
Special Interest* 14 1 0 15
Total 34 10 0 44
♦ Includes members of construction company boards and BEC/HBF/FMB consultants.
Source : Dods/Roth/Times Parliamentary Companions and The Guardian 8th May 1996.
Table 5.4 Environmental Interests in the House of Commons : 1992-1997
Con Lab Lib Dem Total
General 65 56 3 124
Special Interest* 6 5 2 13
Total 71 61 5 137
♦Includes registered members of CPRE/FoE/RSPB.
Source : Dods/Roth/Times/Vachers Parliamentary Companions and The Guardian May 8th 1996.
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cases actually members of the NFU.The 40 Conservative members who were farmers 
represented 12% of the parliamentary Conservative Party, whereas the farming 
population itself accounted for a mere 0.55% of the total electorate. This over­
representation of fanning interests continues a pattern which has existed since the 
introduction of the 1947 Agriculture Act. In the inter-war period there were on average 
only 10 MP’s with an occupational background in farming (Howarth 1990), but by 
1950 this figure had risen to 25, by 1951 to 33, by 1955 to 36 and by 1959 there 56 
legislators with an occupational background in the agricultural sector.
It is not only in the legislature that the patronage potential of the farmers has been 
apparent, on the contrary in the cabinet itself there has been a remarkably high level of 
representation for the agricultural lobby. In 1984, Dods Parliamentary Companion 
indicated no fewer than 10 Cabinet ministers with close affiliations to farming. In the 
intervening years the level of representation has not been quite so high, averaging 4 or 
5, but there have been periods notably during William Waldergrave's tenure as 
Secretary of State for Agriculture when active farmers have been at the very pinnacle 
of decision-making in this regard. With such a high representation of farming interests 
in both the legislature and the cabinet there may have been opportunities for 
Conservative members to adopt legislation which has not only been in the economic 
interests of the farm lobby as represented by the NFU and the CLA, but to their 
personal economic advantage as well.
A similar pattern of patronage potential is discernible with respect to the building 
lobby, where 14 Conservative members listed either a position on a company board 
and/or a consultancy role with one of the major lobby groups representing the house 
building industry. The reader will recall that there are actually 20 Conservatives who 
act as vice presidents to the HBF/BEC. Previous data available on the building lobby, 
reported in Rydin’s (1984) work showed 41 members expressing an immediate 
interest in the construction industry, some of whom were to lose their seats. In 
addition it must be remembered that construction companies have been major sources 
of financial contributions to the Conservative Party itself. Although only a minority of 
business organizations have been shown to supply political donations7, Mitchell and 
Bretting (1991) discovered that of those that do, over 50% were concentrated in either 
property and construction or in the tobacco industry. Thus, it is reasonable to assume 
that the potential for corporate patronage on behalf of individual legislators was added
7 A comprehensive survey by Labour Research covering the period 1990/91 found that out of 3000 
stock exchange companies and 2400 private companies, only 282 made political donations (Labour 
Research 1992).
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to by a weight of corporate donations to the Conservative Party.
Of the three interests presented in the tables the data on the environmental lobby is the 
most difficult to interpret. Although a large number of legislators list ‘the 
environment’ as one of their primary concerns it does not follow that this is 
necessarily a reflection of the potential for parliamentary patronage. Unlike the 
agricultural and building lobbies, a much smaller proportion of MPs with 
environmental interests actually declare a direct interest as either a consultant to, or as 
a member of a major group. There are a number of possible explanations for this. On 
the one hand it may be the case that many of the MPs listing the environment do so, 
not because they have a direct personal interest but because of their desire to create the 
'right' public image given the increased significance of the environment on the macro­
political stage. Alternatively, it may simply be the case that MPs do not consider 
environmental groups in the same terms as the more traditional economic lobbies and 
so do not feel it necessary to document these interests in full.
In spite of these difficulties, it is perhaps reasonable to suggest that environmental 
interests have a rather lesser potential to exercise patronage power because in general 
they tend to be financially less well endowed than the agricultural and building lobbies 
and may be less able to supply paid consultancies to MPs 8 - though this potential may 
be increasing as the environmental lobby grows over time. It is perhaps more 
plausible to suggest that MPs interests in this area are related to electoral 
considerations more than any direct economic interests. As indicated previously, this 
may be especially the case with regard to 'nimby' issues in their constituencies, 
exhibited most clearly by the formation of the 90 strong Conservative parliamentary 
lobby group SANE planning which contributed significantly to the pressure for the 
introduction of the plan-led development control system in the 1991 Planning and 
Compensation Act.
With the relative lack of patronage support for the environmental lobby, one would 
have expected self-interested legislators to offer support to the conservationists due to 
the power of the vote motive alone. Otherwise there would appear to have been the 
prospect of patronage benefits to be derived from the support of either the agricultural 
or the building lobbies. In practice, the electoral clout of the nimby lobby may indeed 
have been a serious consideration and under such conditions one would not expect 
patronage on behalf of the builders to have been exercised to a significant degree. By
8 Recall that NFU coffers totalled £21 million in 1993 compared to £3 million for the nimby 
dominated CPRE (see chapter 3).
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contrast, the patronage stake of the agricultural lobby may have acted to reinforce the 
electoral power of the conservationists because the interests of these two groups in 
restricting urban development coincide. MPs with agricultural interests benefit from 
the continual increase in farm subsidies (for production and conservation) and nimbies 
support such subsidies in order to keep land out of urban uses and thus to maintain 
amenity and property values. From a public choice perspective one would only expect 
agricultural patronage to act against environmental interests in those cases where these 
groups seek a reduction in the prosperity of the farming sector and where such 
interests do not exercise electoral weight. This is indeed the form that land use 
legislation has taken over recent years. On the one hand, urban containment regulation 
and farm subsidies (domestic as well as European) have continually increased, whilst 
on the other the environmental effects of subsidised farming - where the 
environmental lobby may have less electoral clout because of the lower per capita 
stake in these issues - have remained immune from regulatory control.
5.4 Public Choice and The Parliamentary Select Committees
The preceding sections have indicated the potential sources of utility gain for self- 
interested legislators. On the one hand, the local amenity conservation lobby has 
represented a concentrated sub set of the environmental lobby which may have had the 
potential to swing votes in a number of marginal constituencies and on the other the 
agricultural and building lobbies have been over-represented in the House of 
Commons, with many legislators especially Conservatives displaying close economic 
ties to these sectors and the potential to exercise patronage power.
The public choice theory of legislative behaviour suggests that self-interested 
politicians will seek to maximize the benefits of legislation to themselves by devolving 
powers to subsets of legislators with specialist knowledge of the demands of their 
constituent groups. A primary way for legislators to perform this role is to self-select 
onto the parliamentary committees which monitor the flow of legislation in an area 
which is central to their political and economic concerns.
As noted at the outset, parliamentary committees in the United Kingdom have far less 
power to influence the immediate content of legislation than their American 
counterparts because the committees themselves are devoid of law making powers and 
cannot attach amendments to proposals emanating from the executive. Nonetheless, 
the parliamentary committees do provide a point of access to the political system for 
rent seeking interest groups, and may be expected to mirror the incentive structure
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within the rest of the political system. If the public choice account of political 
behaviour is appropriate and Members of Parliament do act to secure their personal 
interests then one would expect the membership of the committees to reflect these very 
processes. The committee system of the House of Commons thus provides a useful 
testing ground for the public choice approach and should provide further indication of 
the significance of the motivating forces discussed in the previous two sections. In 
particular, it should allow consideration of the extent to which agricultural interests 
have exercised disproportionate influence and allow further indication of the extent to 
which politicians have been sensitive to the geographically concentrated 
nimby/conservationist lobby, as opposed to the environmental movement as a whole.
The current system of parliamentary committees, or Select Committees, originated in 
1979 following a Procedures Committee report on the operations of the House of 
Commons published the previous year (HC 588-1 1977/78). This report voiced 
concerns from back bench parliamentarians that the House of Commons (the 
legislature) was unable to exercise sufficient control over the workings of government 
and the civil service bureaucracy (Judge 1992). According to the report, Members of 
Parliament had become progressively less well informed about the business of 
government and were correspondingly less well able to exercise their functions and 
question government activities. As a consequence, the Conservative government 
elected in May 1979 introduced the select committee system based on the Procedures 
Committee recommendations. Under the provisions of a parliamentary standing order, 
twelve select committees were established, 'to examine the expenditure, administration 
and policy of the principal government departments and associated public bodies' 
(quoted in Drewry ed.1985, p.30).
The twelve committees were : Agriculture, Defence, Education, Science & Arts, 
Employment, Energy, Environment, Foreign Affairs, Trade & Industry, Social 
Services, Transport, and Treasury & Civil Service. These bodies were given powers 
to send for persons, papers and records from the major government departments and 
were allotted budgets to publish specialist reports. Membership was to consist of 
between nine and eleven members, nominated by the House of Commons itself by 
way of a specialist Committee of Selection.
In the intervening years, academic commentators have focused on the limited nature of 
the powers available to the select committees and in particular their continuing lack of 
ability to have a direct impact on policy which remains the product of internal 
negotiation within the party system and between the government and the civil service 
(Judge 1992). Even within this relatively limited remit however, there are strong
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indications that public choice processes have been in operation. A number of examples 
point to the significance of political self interest in the exercise of the power by the 
select committees. These include; the failure of the committees to hold civil servants 
and ministers to account over public expenditure plans; the tendency for the 
committees to focus on their own publicity operations; evidence of self selection in the 
membership structure; and the penetration of the system by special interests, in 
particular via the provision of information (Drewry et al 1985, Judge 1992).
The terms of reference for the select committees specifically permit them to scrutinize, 
'the expenditure ... of the principal government departments and associated bodies'.
In practice however, academic research on the activities of these committees has 
suggested that Members of Parliament have shown little interest in providing a detailed 
analysis of the government's public expenditure plans and assessing value for money 
in existing government programmes. Thus, as Drewry et al (1985) discovered in the 
most comprehensive study of the committee system to date,
"Committees have not used their financial powers to undertake regular and systematic 
inquiries into public spending and .... have made it clear that they are not prepared to 
undertake regular and complete scrutiny o f the main public spending estimates each 
year as a matter o f routine," (Robinson 1985, in Drewry et al, p.307).
Referring to the specific operations of the Social Services Select Committee, Rush 
(1985, p.313) suggests that,
"Although the committee has held one or more sittings each session on public 
expenditure on social services, it can hardly be said that this amounts to an adequate 
scrutiny o f expenditure."
Far from seeking to provide an institutional check on public expenditure, according to 
Robinson (1985) eight out of the twelve committees could be categorised as 
'unremitting spenders' of public money. Thus, according to Ganzs,
" The Transport Committee acted as a pressure group asking for more public 
expenditure, untrammelled by the responsibilities o f government to suggest cuts 
elsewhere" (Ganzs 1985, p.258).
This apparent failure of the select committees to scrutinize expenditure plans is closely 
in accord with public choice accounts of legislative oversight which suggest that 
politicians have relatively little incentive to put downward pressure on spending totals
172
given that costs savings are thinly dispersed across the mass of the electorate, 
minimizing per capita gains and the associated political rewards. Rather, committee 
members are more inclined to push for additional expenditure in response to organized 
rent seekers demanding transfer payments which will be highly concentrated on their 
own members in exchange for electoral or other forms of political support.
The importance of special interest pressures leads on to the second important feature 
of the select committees - the tendency towards self-selection according to the personal 
interests of MPs. In the House of Commons, self-selection is facilitated by the method 
of appointment where individual MPs express an interest in becoming a committee 
member, in some cases lobbying other members and are then appointed by a specialist 
parliamentary Committee of Selection drawn from both sides of the House. A number 
of studies examining the membership structure of the select committees indicate strong 
support for the self selection thesis. Judge's (1991) analysis of the Trade & Industry 
Select Committee showed that members from predominantly industrial constituencies 
or those sponsored by industrial/ manufacturing trades unions tended to be over­
represented. Similarly, in the case of the Education Committee, Rush (1985) found 
that the majority of committee members were ex-teachers, ex-members of local 
education committees or affiliated in some way to a teachers union. Writing in a 
similar vein, Ganz (1985) found that opposition spokespersons on the Transport 
Committee were dominated by trades union interests, with four out of five sponsored 
by railway workers unions. From a public choice perspective, it is not surprising that 
there has been little attempt by committee members to examine expenditure plans in 
detail, because the committees have tended to be dominated by individuals 
representing interest groups or constituencies with a vested interest in increasing the 
level of public spending which is of particular benefit to them.
The importance of rent seeking pressures has been further reflected in the high 
proportion of their time which the committees have devoted towards achieving 
publicity for their recommendations and in particular the publication of policy reports, 
rather than scrutiny of expenditure. According to Judge (1992), the select committees 
produced no fewer than 591 reports, including 231 specialist policy reports between 
June 1979 and June 1990. Although the committees have not been able to influence 
policy directly, they have recognized the importance of their information generating 
role. In particular, by publishing specialist reports the committees can place issues on 
the political stage and accelerate their concerns up the agenda of the executive. The 
content of these reports has however tended to reflect the interests of the legislators 
and their rent seeking supporters. Analysis of policy reports has found that the vast 
majority of the sources quoted are derived from pressure groups, professional
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organizations and other government bodies. Research conducted in the mid-1980s 
revealed that over half of oral and written evidence presented to the select committee 
inquiries came from pressure groups or quangos (Marsh 1986, Rush 1990). Thus, 
according to Judge (1992) there is evidence of a symbiotic relationship between 
interest groups and the select committees, in which interest groups provide the 
evidence on which the select committees base their policy recommendations. Again, 
from a public choice perspective it is not surprising that select committees have tended 
to argue for additional government expenditures (Robinson 1985), given this pattern 
of political exchange.
In so far as the select committees reflect the overall structure of interest representation 
and rent seeking pressures within the parliamentary system as a whole, the 
membership structure of the committees impacting on urban containment should 
provide a good indication of the underlying incentives responsible for recent trends in 
land use legislation. If, as membership of the other committees seems to suggest the 
relevant bodies are dominated by high demand, rent seeking interests then it cannot be 
expected that there will be pressure to reduce the trend towards stricter containment 
regulation on the one hand and increased subsidies to the rural lobby on the other. 
Although the committees may not be able to influence policy directly, if the public 
choice account is accurate one would certainly expect the membership structure to 
reflect the electoral strength of the conservationists and the patronage power of the 
farmers.
There are two House of Commons Parliamentary Select Committees which have a role 
to play in the question of urban containment, the Agriculture Select Committee and 
the Environment Select Committee. The agriculture committee is responsible for the 
monitoring of farm policy and in particular the MAFF, and has the power to make 
recommendations which might lead to either an increase or decrease in the rate of 
agricultural support. Increases in subsidies reduce the likely rate of new urban 
development as farmers are encouraged to maintain their holdings in agricultural uses. 
The Environment Select Committee meanwhile, scrutinizes the behaviour of the 
Department of the Environment and its associated quangos with a remit covering the 
whole gamut of issues ranging from local government finance to inner city 
regeneration and a raft of environmental policies from nuclear waste disposal to the 
preservation of ancient monuments. The principal area of jurisdiction which impacts 
on urban containment is land use planning, where the committee is able to 
advance policy proposals on planning law and countryside policy.
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Table 5.5 Membership of the Agriculture Select Committee : 1985 -1995
1985 1987 1989
Spence (C) * Wiggin (C) * Wiggin (C)*
Body (C) Body (C) Alexander (C)
Harris (C) Alexander (C) Boswell (C) *
Hunter (C)* Hunter (C) * Marland (C) *
Spicer (C) Winterton (C) Winterton (C)
McQuarrie (C) Tomey (L) M Martlew (L)
Maynard (L) M Maynard (L) M Morley (L)
Nicholson (L) Nicholson (L) Jones(L)
Tomey (L) M MacDonald (L) MacDonald (L)
Strang (L) M
1991 1993 1995
Wiggin (C) * Wiggin (C)* Wiggin (C) *
Alexander (C) Alexander (C) Alexander (C)
Amos (C) Browning (C) Moate (C)
Bradley (C) Winterton (C) Winterton (C)
Winterton (C) Marland (C) * Marland (C) *
Marl and (C)* Gill (C) * Gill (C) *
Gill (C)* Pickthall (L) Pickthall (L)
Martlew (L) Stevenson (L) Stevenson (L)
Morley (L) Corston (L) M Corston (L) M
Jones(L) Campbell (L) Campbell (L)
Key : C = Conservative, L = Labour, * = Active Farmer, M = Metropolitan Seat 
Source : Dods/Times/Vachers.
Table 5.5 displays the membership structure of the agriculture select committee for 
alternate years between 1985 and 1995. The data were derived from the Dods 
Times and Vachers parliamentary companions and were then cross-referenced with the 
list of members interests. The committee has little direct influence on the 80% of 
agricultural spending which derives from the CAP, but insofar as it is able to 
recommend increases in appropriations for domestic subsidies including those on 
landscape conservation, there is some indication of which set of interests this body 
represents.
In each of the years under discussion farming interests were a major force on the 
agriculture committee. In 1985,3 of the 6 Conservative members were active farmers
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and according to the Dods Parliamentary Companion, Andrew Hunter, the member 
for Basingstoke was both a member of the NFU and a participant on the CLA 
agriculture policy committee. In addition, another Conservative, James Spicer had a 
previous career background in farming although no longer himself an active farmer.
The position was little different in 1989, with 3 of the 6 Conservative members active 
farmers. The committee chairman Jerry Wiggin, the member for Weston Supermare 
owns a 300 acre tenancy; Paul Marland the member for Gloucestershire West owns a 
1000 acre arable farm near Cheltenham and Tim Boswell the member for Daventry, a 
member of the NFU and former NFU County chairman owns a 450 acre farm and 
was reported to be in receipt of an annual payment of £22 000 to restrain grain 
production on his holdings (Roth 1991). In 1988 Boswell tabled a CLA amendment to 
the Finance Bill, which proposed that farmers be given tax reliefs for subsidised tree 
planting. In 1995, there were still 3 out of the 6 Conservative members who were 
active farmers (Wiggin, Marland and Gill).9
Throughout the period urban interests were consistently under-represented on the 
committee, with none of the Conservatives derived from urban seats, even though 
between 25 and 30% of Conservative MPs hailed from metropolitan areas (Times 
Parliamentary Companion 1983-1992). Even on the Labour side members derived 
from predominantly non-metropolitan constituencies, in spite of these accounting for 
less than 30% of the parliamentary Labour Party (Times Guide to the House of 
Commons Companion 1983-1992).
The data in Table 5.5 demonstrates that between 1985 and 1995 there was consistently 
a 25-30% representation of active farmers on the agriculture committee and these 
typically accounted for at least half of the majority Conservative group. Given that 
farming interests are already over-represented in the House of Commons (12% of 
Conservative members), the data are consistent with the view that legislators self­
select onto those committees which best reflect their economic or electoral fortunes (in 
this case economic). Similarly, metropolitan constituency representatives have never 
accounted for more than 30% of the committee membership and for the vast majority 
of the period numbered 10% or less, even though these constituencies account for 
over 40% of seats within parliament (Times Guide 1983-1995).
9 The addition of Roger Moate to the committee in 1995 gives further support to the self selection 
thesis. Moate is a consultant to the British Paper Federation which has a close connection to the 
Forestry Commission, a Quango attached to the MAFF.
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With such a high proportion of members who were either active farmers or 
representatives of rural seats, there would appear relatively few incentives for 
committee members to provide a check on any expansionist tendencies in the domestic 
MAFF budget and to resist the continual transfer of resources to the farming sector. 
The only exception to this pattern was, until 1987 the position of Richard Body 
(Conservative), the member for Holland with Boston, himself a former farmer and 
NFU member who has long been a vitriolic critic of the CAP and agricultural support 
in general. In 1986, Body was elected as chairman of the committee, but lasted only 
one year following a campaign by back bench Conservatives who saw his views as 
antithetical to those of the NFU (Roth 1996).
Giddings (1985, p.66-67) study of the behaviour of the agriculture committee, offers 
further support for the above analysis. Commenting on the committees inquiries into 
MAFF expenditure plans, he states,
"No one can be under any illusion that these committee inquiries amount to in-depth 
investigations o f this block o f public expenditure. In particular, it is disappointing that 
outside evidence has not been taken either on the priorities within the agricultural 
programme or on the value for money obtained."
Robinson (1985) proceeds to note that apart from the MAFF itself, almost all the 
evidence presented to the committee, comes from groups which have a direct interest 
in maintaining and enhancing the level of state support for agriculture. This 
penentration of the committee by rural interests has in turn ensured that its published 
reports almost invariably involve recommendations to increase spending. Not 
surprisingly following lobbying by the NFU, CLA and the CPRE, the agriculture 
committee was at the forefront of moves to introduce conservation subsidies to 
farmers on top of production support, which were confirmed in the provisions of the 
1986 Agriculture Act (Winter 1996).
If the agriculture committee offers support for the public choice/ self-selection thesis it 
is rather more difficult to decipher the precise nature of representation on the 
environment committee. In part this relates to the wide range of issues covered under 
the DoE remit. Unlike MAFF, which has a relatively narrow focus centred around the 
administration of agricultural support, the DoE has a much wider policy scope than 
environmental protection, including matters such as local government finance.
With so many policies encompassed within this jurisdiction it is difficult to detect any 
systematic trend towards the self selection of particular economic or electoral interests.
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Table 5.6 Membership of the House of Commons Environment Committee : 1985-
1995
1985 1987 1989
Rossi (C) M Rossi (C)M Rossi (C) M
Alexander (C) Bellingham (C) * Bellingham (C)*
Chapman (C) M Holt (C) Holt (C)
Jones(C) Jones(C) Jones(C)
Mackay (C) Hunter (C)* Hunter (C)*
Miscampbell (C) Mans (C) Mans (C)
Pike (C) Squire (C) Squire (C)
Roberts (L) Pendry (L) M Pendry (L) M
Mark-Taylor (L) Pike (L) Pike (L)
Smith (L) M Cummings (L) Cummings (L)
Boateng (L) M Boateng (L) M
1991 1993 1995
Rossi (C) M Jones(C) Ainsworth (C)
Bellingham (C)* Clifton-Browne (C)* Clifton-Browne (C)*
Holt (C) Field (C) Dover (C)
Hunter (C)* Streeter (C) Elletson (C)
Mans (C) Pickles (C) Patnick (C)
Steen (C) Thomason (C) Thomason (C)
Pendry (L) M Raynsford (L) M Stephen (L)
Lewis (L) M Jackson (L) M Gerrard (L) M
Pike (L) Barron (LI M Olner (L)
Howells (L) Bennet (L) M Taylor (LD)
Summerson (L) M
Key : C = Conservative, L = Labour, LD = Liberal Democrat
* = Active Farmer, M = Metropolitan Seat
Source : Dods/Times/Vachers Parliamentary Companions.
Nonetheless, a general bias in favour of non-metropolitan or rural constituencies is 
detectable in Table 5.6, which is of particular significance with respect to the 
committees position in terms of urban containment and the planning system and the 
earlier argument concerning the voting influence of the nimby/local amenity lobby.
The data presented in Table 5.6 indicates that MPs representing English metropolitan 
constituencies - defined by the Times Parliamentary Companion as those seats falling 
within the boundaries of the old metropolitan authorities - accounted for an average 
28% of members on the environment committee throughout the period in question,
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ranging from a high point of 36% in 1991 and 1993, to a low of 10% in 1995. This 
compares with a 41% (213 out of 523) representation of metropolitan constituencies 
in the House of Commons as a whole, the remaining 59% being non-metropolitan, 
shire county seats.10 Thus, at no point in the decade 1985-1995 were the metropolitan 
areas accorded a degree of representation in line with their parliamentary numbers.
The same pattern was discernible on both sides of the party divide. With the exception 
of 1985, when two Conservative members were drawn from metropolitan seats, 
Conservative representation in terms of these constituencies has been below the 
average for the parliamentary party as a whole. Metropolitan representation was 
16.6%, 14.2%, 14.2%, 0 % and 0 % for the years 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995 
respectively, whilst the percentage of the Conservative parliamentary party accounted 
for by such seats in the equivalent years was 28%, 26%, 26%, 21% and 21% . On the 
Labour side metropolitan seats accounted for over 70% of the parliamentary party 
throughout the period, but only in 1993 was a comparable level of representation 
achieved (when all Labour members were from metropolitan seats). In short, the 
membership of the environment select committee appears to have exhibited a distinct 
bias towards the non-metropolitan shire counties.
In turn, this bias offers some additional, if rather crude support for the theory 
advanced earlier in this chapter - that politicians have been differentially sensitive to 
the nimby oriented section of the environmental lobby. If indeed legislative action has 
been driven largely by the general electoral significance of the environment as an issue 
then one might have expected a more even pattern of representation on the committee 
between urban and rural areas - urban areas in particular suffering from problems such 
as air pollution. That non-metropolitan interests have tended to be over-represented is 
consistent with the view that politicians are more sensitive to rural nimby groups, 
whose members have a higher and geographically more concentrated per capita stake 
than the members of non-nimby environmental groups and the populace at large.
Farming interests have also been well represented on the environment committee, 
though predictably not to the same extent as on the agricultural equivalent. In 1989 
and 1991 for example 2 of the 7 Conservatives were active farmers one of which, 
Andrew Hunter, (an NFU/CLA member) was previously on the agriculture 
committee. In 1995 meanwhile, Geoffrey Clifton Browne, the member for 
Cirencester and Tewkesbury and also an active farmer was in receipt of over £60 000
11 Scottish members are not represented on this committee, because environmental affairs in Scotland 
are dealt with through the Scottish Office. Welsh members are rarely represented because of the role 
played by the Welsh Office - although there is occasionally some overlap with the DoE.
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in agricultural Set Aside payments to restrain production on his 900 acre holdings.
As with the agriculture committee, the membership structure of the environment select 
committee does not appear to offer incentives for the checking of expansionist 
tendencies within the system of land use regulation. Non-metropolitan areas, where 
anti-development interests are strongest have consistently been over-represented on 
the committee. Thus, recommendations for increased spending and regulatory controls 
from conservation quangos, planning bureaucrats and anti-development interest 
groups would concentrate benefits on key groups within members constituencies and 
thinly disperse costs across under-represented urban taxpayers and consumers.
Indeed, far from seeking to restrain regulatory expansion, the membership structure 
would point to this body acting as a pressure group lobbying for still greater controls. 
This appears to have been what the select committee has done, lobbying for increased 
conservation subsidies on the one hand (NCC 1990, EN 1991, CC 1993, Winter 
1996), in response to bodies such as English Nature and the Countryside Commission 
and following pressure from the CPRE, arguing for stricter urban containment on the 
other. In the latter case, the recommendations in the committee report on 'Out of Town 
Development' (HMSO 1994), mirroring the sentiments of an earlier report in defence 
of green belts (HC 275 1984) are closely reflected in a raft of DoE PPGs which argue 
for the concentration of new development within existing urban centres (chapter 2). 
Similarly it appears far from coincidental that government policy on housing location 
seeks to confine the majority of new residential units to 'recycled' urban sites, 
minimizing development in green-field zones (DoE 1996). If the structure of the 
parliamentary select committees is anything like a representation of pressures in the 
legislative system as a whole then parliamentary incentives would appear to complete 
an 'iron triangle' of interest groups, bureaucrats and politicians, restricting the rate of 
new development and the transfer of land from rural to urban uses.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to use a public choice account of legislative behaviour to 
understand the pattern of land use legislation in the United Kingdom over recent 
years. Given the inherent difficulty of separating out the importance of rent seeking 
pressures from those reflecting the general electoral significance of environmental 
issues, the analysis cannot be taken as proof that politicians have responded to the 
electoral and patronage benefits associated with the support of rent seeking interest 
groups. Nonetheless, there is sufficient evidence to treat this theory as a serious 
working hypothesis. In particular, although macro-political calculations have been an
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important factor the speed with which politicians have acted on the containment issue - 
in relation to their relative inaction in other areas of environmental concern - and the 
over-representation of rural areas on the House of Commons committees, suggests 
that they have been differentially sensitive to the power of the nimby/local amenity 
lobby, because of the higher per capita stake held by the members of these groups. 
Similarly, that subsidies to the farm sector (both domestic and european) have 
continually increased and that agricultural operations have remained largely immune 
from regulatory control is suggestive of the patronage power exerted by the 
agricultural lobby and the lesser vote swinging potential of environmentalists in this 
regard. Politicians appear to have responded to the demands of their constituents, but 
these demands have been affected by concentrated interests and have been supplied at 
the expense of a diffuse, unorganized mass of taxpayers and consumers.
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6.
Public Choice and the Political Economy
of Urban Containment in Chester
6.0 Introduction
The previous three chapters have presented a public choice analysis of institutional 
incentives within the British land use planning system. The evidence adduced offers 
support for the view that adherence to stringent urban containment policies results 
from a combination of incentives favouring the continual growth of restrictive 
planning regulation. The principal winners from planning controls are interest groups 
who are more able to overcome collective action problems than the principal losers, a 
bureaucracy with an economic interest linked to the growth of regulation and a 
legislature whose members electoral and in some cases financial interests are also 
associated with urban containment. In this sense the evidence on land use planning is 
supportive of the wider institutional public choice approach to the operation of 
representative government as a whole.
Suggestive though these chapters are, the analysis remains open to a charge often 
levied at work emanating from the public choice tradition; that in the search for 
empirical confirmation of public choice models there is a tendency for many theorists 
to examine only that evidence which is supportive of their conclusions rather than to 
explain that which is not. As Hodgson (1988) argues, the true test of a theory is its 
ability to provide convincing explanations to account for the those empirical facts 
which are not in accord with its initial suppositions. This chapter attempts to address 
this issue by examining the history of an individual planning dispute, chosen 
specifically because it appears to differ from the overall account of decision-making 
incentives presented thus far.
The chapter adopts a case study approach focusing on the land use planning system in 
Chester and the decision-making process involved in the proposal to release land for 
residential and commercial purposes between the late 1980s and the beginning of the 
new millennium. The introductory section sets out the contextual background to this 
dispute, a chronology of the main decision-making events and an outline of the key 
differences distinguishing the case from the broader pattern presented in the earlier 
chapters. The case study material is divided into two parts; the first examines 'demand 
side' factors in Chester focusing on the mobilization of interest groups whilst the
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second considers the role of bureaucratic organizations and politicians on the 'supply 
side'. Both sections consider the empirical anomalies demonstrated by the Chester 
case and attempt to reconcile these with the public choice models presented earlier in 
the thesis.
Given the difficulties of deriving general conclusions from case studies the chapter 
should be viewed as an attempt to grapple with a particular anomalous case for the 
public choice approach and as an opportunity to generate new research questions 
which might be analysed on a more comprehensive scale in the future.
6.1 Urban Containment in Chester: Contextual Background and Chronology o f 
Events
Case Study Rationale
The Chester location was chosen for the purposes of this study because its recent 
planning history appears to have differed in a significant way from the overall 
characterization of land use planning in Britain presented in this thesis. The three 
empirical chapters in particular, suggested a combination of institutional incentives 
favouring strict urban containment policies in non-metropolitan England. Thus, 
chapter 3 argued that the commitment to containment reflects an asymmetric 
distribution of costs and benefits between the winners and losers in the planning 
system. In particular, nimby/conservation groups and the agricultural lobby 
campaigning for a reduction in urban development and an increase in rural subsidies, 
are better able to overcome the problems of collective action than consumers, 
taxpayers and non-nimby environmental groups who lose out as a result.
Chapter 4 suggested that the anti-development bias is reinforced by institutional 
incentives within planning agencies on the 'supply side' which lead bureaucrats 
towards a strategy of budget maximization. Although the degree of anti-development 
bias may vary according to the political visibility of the relevant decisions, being 
particularly strong in designated areas -, in general bureaucratic interests are opposed 
to greater levels of urban development because budget maximization, especially in 
non-metropolitan areas is synonymous with a policy of regulatory maximization.
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Chapter 5 provided the final link in the 'iron-triangle' against urban development, 
focusing on the electoral and patronage incentives associated with containment.The 
chapter argued that due to the electoral clout of the conservation lobby and the 
patronage stake of agricultural interests in parliament, political incentives on the 
supply side compound those within the bureaucracy pushing for a still stronger 
emphasis on urban containment.
Decision-making in Chester however, appears to have departed fundamentally from 
this characterization of incentives within the planning system as the chronology of 
events in Table 6.1 shows. In the autumn of 1987 a consortium of private housing 
developers joined with other business interests in seeking the release of three large 
sites for a combination of housing and industrial developments and a new road 
bypass. These sites, Upton By Chester (to the north of the city), Wrexham Road (to 
the south west) and Mannings Lane (to the east), if developed, would have resulted in 
the removal of 400 ha from the Greater Chester Green Belt.
On the demand side the proposals generated strong opposition from nimby interests as 
one would expect from the previous analysis. On the supply side however, 
bureaucrats and politicians far from supporting the anti-development camp, actively 
campaigned on behalf of the proposals to release green belt land. In this case a set of 
non-metropolitan planning bureaucrats appear to have acted against their budgetary 
interests in urban containment as depicted in this thesis and a set of non-metropolitan 
politicians acted against their electoral stake in the same way.
When using non-random case studies for comparative purposes in political science, 
care must be taken to ensure that the research does indeed examine observable 
phenomena which are distinctive to the case study and are not simply a reflection of 
underlying processes which may also occur elsewhere, but have yet to be picked up 
because of inadequate research coverage (Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987, p.347). In order 
to confirm that Chester had indeed exhibited significant differences two steps were 
taken in this regard : first, a comprehensive literature search of existing case studies; 
and second, a media scan using the Financial Times Media Database.
The results of these examinations do indeed appear to confirm the distinctiveness of 
the Chester case. All empirical studies of major planning disputes in non-metropolitan 
areas - Connell (1972) in Surrey, Lowe (1977) and Buller & Lowe (1982) in East 
Anglia, Short et al (1986) in Berkshire, Shucksmith (1990) in the Lake District, 
Adams (1995) in Cambridgeshire and Murdoch and Marsden (1995) in
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Table 6.1 Land Use Planning in Chester - Chronology of Decisions : 1987-1997
Date Key Planning Decisions
November 1987 Chester City Council publishes Draft Revised 
Local Plan. Proposes release of land for 7800 new 
dwellings and 210 ha of employment land. Proposed 
removal of 400 ha from the Green Belt around the 
Countess of Chester Hospital, Wrexham Road and 
Mannings Lane.
November-December 1988 Public Inquiry on Greater Chester Local Plan.
March 1989 Inspectors Report on Greater Chester Local Plan 
rejects proposals to release Green Belt land 
except a reduced amount at the Countess of Chester 
Hospital.
October 1989 Chester City Council rejects Inspectors Report and 
attempts to adopt plan without modifications.
February 1990 Cheshire 2001 draft replacement Structure Plan 
published. Supports Chester City Council in 
its proposal to release 320 ha of Green Belt.
March 1990 Department of the Environment imposes 
Statutory Holding Order on the Greater Chester 
Local Plan forbidding the release of Green Belt 
land until the completion of the new 
Cheshire Structure Plan in 1991.
October 1990 Examination In Public (EIP) of the Cheshire 
2001 Revised Structure Plan.
February 1991 Report of the EIP Panel reduces the amount of 
land to be released from the Green Belt from 320 
ha to 100 ha, situated around the Countess of 
Chester Hospital and at Wrexham Road.
July 1991 Secretary of State refuses to affirm Cheshire 
2001 and the Greater Chester Local Plan unless all 
Green Belt developments are withdrawn.
March 1992 Secretary of State forces the adoption of Cheshire 
2001 without the proposed removal of Green Belt land.
Summer 1992 Developer Consortium instigates legal proceedings 
against the Secretary of State.
November 1994 Developer Consortium takes Secretary of State to the 
High Court, but loses the case.
January 1997 Chester City Council publishes new local plan 
confirming support for the green belt as part of a 
'sustainable development' agenda.
185
Buckinghamshire, have found local councillors and planners to oppose the relaxation 
of containment policies, or at the very least have been reluctant to see them relaxed. 
Similarly, Elson et al's (1993) report for the DoE on the effectiveness of Green Belts 
indicated in its case studies that none of the other relevant authorities had proposed the 
release of designated land on the scale witnessed in Chester. This research confirms 
the earlier work of Wood (1982) in Buckinghamshire, which found that 85% of 
planning applications were refused within Green Belts, rising to 100% in AONBs. 
Likewise, it is significant that of over 200 proposals put forward by developers for 
'new settlements' in the 1980s and early 1990s, only 7 were granted with planning 
permission (Interviews 17& 18, Pennington 1996). Although some empirical work 
has suggested that urban districts within the non-metropolitan counties have on 
occasion sought to allow more development as a way of expanding their jurisdiction 
into surrounding rural districts (Simmie 1981, Herington 1984), there is little evidence 
in the published literature to suggest that planners and bureaucrats in non-metropolitan 
authorities and especially rural districts have actively lobbied for the release of 
designated land on the scale proposed in Chester. Although Chester is itself a city, its 
jurisdictional boundaries already encompass a substantial rural hinterland, especially 
to the south, so it is unlikely that the option of expanding jurisdictional reach was a 
major factor at play.
The evidence from the literature review was also confirmed by a scan of the national 
media using the Financial Times Media Database (FT Profile). The Profile system 
contains a computerised catalogue containing continually updated full text from the 
major UK newspapers and allows any word in the text or key word to be searched in 
the entire file. The Profile data should be treated with some caution because it is only 
since 1991 that universal coverage has been established, the coverage for earlier years 
being somewhat patchy.
A scan of the years 1988 (the beginning of the Chester dispute) to 1995 found only 
one other case where the release of designated land on a similar scale to Chester, 
appeared to have been supported by local planners. This involved the dispute 
surrounding the preparation of the Newcastle Upon Tyne Unitary Development Plan, 
which proposed the release of over 450ha of green belt land (10% of the designated 
area) - proposals which were referred to the Department of the Environment. 
Newcastle is however, a metropolitan planning authority and is unusual in relation to 
other such authorities in having a substantial green belt within the metropolitan 
boundary.
186
Figure 6.1 The Research Location : Chester
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Figure 6.2 Chester and the Green Belt
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To summarize, the evidence from the literature review and from the media scan 
appears to confirm the distinctiveness of the Chester case and thus its appropriateness 
for purposes of comparative analysis.
The Research Location
The city of Chester is located in a bend of the River Dee just to the south of the 
Merseyside conurbation (Figure 6.1 & 6.2). As the administrative centre for the 
county of Cheshire and with a population of 117 000 within the greater Chester 
district, the city functions as a commercial and shopping focus for a large and 
prosperous rural hinterland, ranked as the fifth most profitable retail centre in the UK. 
The central core of the city is famed for its Roman/ medieval origins and attracts a 
great number of tourists. In 1990 Chester was the recipient of £47 million in tourist 
expenditures, making it the fourteenth most popular local authority district for tourism 
in the country (Cheshire County Council 1992).
Throughout the 1980s commercial and industrial development was attracted to the 
area, in particular to the Chester Business Park located on the southern fringe of the 
city. Shell UK and Marks & Spencers relocated their headquarters from London and 
following the completion of the business park in 1987 a number of high technology 
firms and foreign banks (for example Citi Bank) located their activities in Chester.The 
financial services sector of the economy grew substantially throughout the period with 
employment in banking and finance up by over 20% between 1987 and 1992.
The above indicators suggest that Chester is subject to economic trends affecting many 
areas throughout non-metropolitan England. Pressure for development is intense and 
the operation of the land use planning system in the greater Chester area reflects many 
of the political conflicts concerning urban containment which are to be found in 
comparable areas. The city is surrounded by a green belt formally designated in 1962, 
which together with other green belts in the county accounts for over 40 % of the 
Cheshire countryside. Opportunities for urban development within the greater Chester 
area are severely constrained with the green belt drawn tightly around the central core 
of the city and extending to an area of 14 000 hectares which includes almost 100% of 
the rural area within the district. Designations within Chester are particularly restrictive 
given the city's official status as an historic town (alongside others such as Bath, 
Oxford, Cambridge and York) and the presence of various archaeological designations 
with additional statutory protection.
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Table 6.2 Average House Prices in Chester : 1981-1991 (1991 Prices^
Year £000 3 bedroom
Semi-Detached
1981 42 000
1982 42 000
1983 44 000
1984 48 000
1985 48 000
1986 50 000
1987 55 000
1988 52 000
1989 60 000
1990 70 000
1991 75 000
Source : Estimates from Local Estate Agents and Cheshire County Council 1992.
To the north and west of the city the Chester green belt joins with the western flank of 
the Greater Manchester and the southern flank of the Merseyside green belts. These 
designations merge to form an uninterrupted swathe of land which extends across the 
entire northern boundary of Cheshire. The situation is no less restrained to the west, 
with the close proximity of the Welsh border and protective designations in the county 
of Clwyd adding to the physical limits to expansion provided by the Welsh hills. 
Within the county as a whole planning designations confine opportunities for green­
field development to a relatively small tranche of land in the south and around Crewe.
The analysis in chapter 2 suggested that restrictive planning controls combined with 
high demand conditions throughout the 1980s were responsible at least in part for the 
explosive growth in house prices. These forces appear also to have been present 
within the greater Chester area such that by 1991 real house prices were 78% higher 
than a decade earlier (Table 6.2). These increases were not as great as those witnessed 
in South East England, but were in line with the national average increase and 
substantially above the average for the rest of the North West region (40%), thus 
confirming Chester's status as a high demand district.
Given the apparent similarities between Chester and much of non-metropolitan 
England, one would expect the pattern of decision-making within the planning system 
to conform with that outlined in the previous chapters.
What are the implications of the Chester case for the public choice account of decision­
making incentives presented thus far ? Two possibilities appear worthy of particular
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note. The first would posit that since this case departs from the public choice 
framework, the earlier analysis is flawed and cannot be generalized to account for the 
pattern of decision-making in the planning system as a whole. The second would posit 
that the analytical framework remains valid and that the Chester case represents a 
peculiar set of institutional circumstances which happened to produce a different set of 
results from those characteristic of the rest of the planning system.
In what follows each of these alternative explanations is considered within the context 
of the demand and supply sides of the political market in Chester. The first section 
examines the mobilization of interest groups and the pattern of rent seeking in terms of 
Olson's 'logic of collective action' framework. The second analyses the behaviour of 
planning bureaucrats on the supply side using the Niskanen/ Dunleavy model of 
bureaucratic action. The analysis suggests that the Chester case does lend support to 
the public choice framework. In particular, that supply side actors in Chester 
supported a substantial incursion into the green belt was a product of a particular set of 
institutional circumstances not found in comparable areas of non-metropolitan 
England, where substantial increases in development were of benefit to bureaucratic 
budgets. In so doing, the focus on identifiable institutional variations distinguishing 
the case study from the earlier analysis, explicitly avoids the risk of untestable and 
tautological explanation.
6.2 The Demand Side : Rent Seeking and Collective Action in Chester
Chapter 3 presented a public choice account of interest group behaviour with the 
respect to urban containment policy and in particular adopted the logic of collective 
action model to account for the differential rates of organization within the planning 
system. At the core of this conceptual framework lies a set of incentives which affect 
the relative rates of mobilization between different sets of interests. This framework 
can be summarized formally so that for a rational individual to join an interest group 
the conditions given in the following inequality must be met in fu ll;
(Gi * P/N) + Ii > Ci
Where G is the net gain to the individual if the group realizes collective benefits; P is 
the probability of the group achieving its objectives - ie. the chance of influencing the 
political authorities; N is the potential membership of the group, I is the private 
benefits of group membership to the individual and C is the cost of group 
membership.
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The analysis presented in the inequality can be modified beyond the individual's 
decision to join an interest group to account for the pattern of lobbying/rent seeking 
behaviour exhibited once the group is mobilized. In these circumstances the terms of 
the inequality represent the decision structure facing group leaders when deciding how 
to allocate resources between different lobbying alternatives.
(Gi * P) - Ci > Ai
Where G is the expected group benefit; P is the probability of additional political 
pressure affecting the ability of the group to achieve its objectives ; C is the cost of 
applying political pressure and A is the value of alternative strategies.
The Olson model predicts that groups with a relatively small potential membership and 
a concentrated membership stake will be relatively more organized and exert greater 
political influence than large interests with a diffuse stake. The model does not predict 
that no individuals will join large groups, but that ceteris paribus, it will be more 
difficult to mobilize larger than smaller groups. The same conceptual framework can 
be used to assess the validity of the public choice framework for the pattern of 
decision-making in Chester.
The Conservation Lobby
The principal source of opposition to the proposed release of green belt land around 
Chester came from the conservation lobby, representing an amalgam of groups 
ranging from local residents, to the Cheshire Conservation Trust, to the national 
CPRE. For the purposes of this analysis it is appropriate to separate these groups into 
two categories; the nimby conservationists and the general environmentalists.
Throughout the period in question, the nimby conservation lobby in Chester consisted 
of three groups; the Upton Green Belt Preservation Society, representing 223 
members in the north of the city around the Countess of Chester Hospital; the 
Westminster Park Community Association, representing 200 members to the south 
west of the city around the Wrexham Road site and the Chester district branch of the 
Council for the Protection of Rural England, with almost 200 members.The public 
choice analysis presented in chapter 3 argues that 'nimby' interests are motivated by 
self interest and are able to overcome the 'logic of collective action', at least in part, 
because their members possess a concentrated stake in the maintenance of site specific
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property values. The evidence of interest group mobilization in Chester is broadly 
supportive of this interpretation.
The Upton Green Belt Preservation Society (UGBPS) was formed in November 
1987, following the publication of the draft revised local plan which proposed the 
release of green belt land in Upton by Chester around the Countess of Chester 
Hospital. The founder/leader of the group - a retired nurse - occupied a property 
immediately opposite a field allocated as housing land in the draft local plan and 
together with a further 8 individuals living on the same estate, helped to form the 
UGBPS action committee.The committee subsequently mobilized 223 individuals in 
the wider Upton area by the time of the local plan inquiry (Chester Local Plan 
Inspectors Report 1989, Interview 22, UGBPS Leader). An additional 320 
individuals in the Upton Anglers Association, which used a large pond within the site 
for fishing were also included in the group. UGBPS also liaised with the Wirral 
Green Belt Council, a grouping of 50 local amenity societies centred around Ellesmere 
Port and concerned about the erosion of the 4 mile strip of green belt separating the 
town from the northern fringe of Chester. In 1988 the UGBPS joined the national 
CPRE in order to obtain advice on the conduct of the campaign and to attract wider 
attention to the Chester situation (Interview 22).
The bulk of the rent seeking costs for the UGBPS were bome by the nine members of 
the committee living within the immediate vicinity of the proposed housing site. The 
committee members organized the hiring out of a local hall for the purposes of a public 
meeting, compiled a petition and were also responsible for the printing and postal 
costs involved in the dissemination of leaflets publicizing the likely impact of the 
development within the rest of Upton. Costs of group membership were split 
unevenly with no membership fees or donations solicited from the wider public. 
Instead, the UGBPS committee requested that individuals write formal letters of 
objection to the city council, in exchange for representation by the committee members 
at the local plan inquiry (Interview 22). The costs of participation in the anti­
development campaign for the 223 individuals mobilized by the committee were thus 
relatively small, stretching only to the completion and posting of a letter.
That the major costs of group mobilization should be bome by the those with the 
largest stake is fully in accord with the public choice account of political 
entrepreneurship. According to this perspective, individuals expecting to gain 
disproportionately from the political activities of a group will devote proportionately 
more time and effort to its organization than those with a less direct interest. In the 
specific case of UGBPS the organizational committee derived exclusively from an
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estate immediately adjacent to the proposed site, whereas the remaining members of 
the group were drawn from the rest of the Upton area.
Similarly, the rapid mobilization of a previously latent interest, stimulated by a 
development proposal also corroborates the public choice account of nimby interests 
presented in chapter 3. In cases such as this, the potential gains from collective action 
(ie. maintenance of property values) are concentrated on a relatively small and spatially 
defined group (ie, residents in the vicinity). A good indication of this incentive 
structure can be seen in the spatial concentration of the objections received by the city 
council for the plans to develop the Countess of Chester site. Of the 307 objections to 
the plan, 223 derived from local residents represented by the UGBPS, plus the Upton 
Anglers Association - an amenity interest with a concentrated stake in the consumption 
of the site. A further 37 residents were represented by a local Liberal Democrat 
councillor who was also a CPRE member, leaving a maximum of only 47 objections 
from individuals living in other parts of Chester and representing general 
environmental concerns (Chester Local Plan Inspectors Report 1989). The 260 
objections from local residents accounted for approximately 1 in 10 of the eligible 
voting population (2 600) in Upton (Interview 22). Thus, although the UGBPS did 
not mobilize the entire population with a potential stake in the dispute, the collective 
action problem was overcome to an extent which did create a relatively concentrated 
block of opposition to the development proposals.
The Westminster Park Community Association (WPCA) was not formed as an 
immediate response to the green belt dispute. In contrast to UGBPS, WPCA is a long 
standing residents group representing 200 members in Westminster Park, a large 
suburban estate consisting of interwar semi-detached and detached houses, adjacent to 
the proposed housing and business park development in the Wrexham Road area. The 
group was formed in the late 1970s to supervise a children's play area and more 
recently has been involved in the Neighbourhood Watch crime prevention scheme 
(Interview 23, WPCA ex Secretary). Prior to the preparation of the district local plan 
and the county structure plan, the association had not engaged in formal lobbying with 
the authorities. However because the marginal cost of applying political pressure for 
existing community organizations is relatively small, it is not surprising that WPCA 
transformed into a nimby lobby. Following the proposals to develop the Wrexham 
Road site, the leaders of WPCA launched a joint campaign with the UGBPS. Through 
a combination of public meetings, leafleting and by obtaining group membership of 
the CPRE, WPCA mobilized opposition within the association and from other 
individuals in the south west of the city. Between 1987 and 1993 lobbying
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expenditure on the anti-development campaign amounted to approximately £1 000 or 
approximately £3.30 per member (Interview 23).
The third group mobilized against the green belt proposals was the Chester District 
Society of the CPRE. This group originated in the early 1950s and with an individual 
membership of just under 200 in 1994, had grown to become the largest of the six 
district societies under the umbrella of the Cheshire County branch (Interview 24 
Secretary District CPRE). As noted in chapter 3, individual membership figures tend 
to underestimate CPRE mobilization because the bulk of its support derives from 
residents associations and local amenity societies. These societies form the local 
backbone of the organization's support and can rapidly transform into nimby lobbies 
under the CPRE label. This is especially the case in Chester where four local amenity 
societies (including UGBPS and WPCA) are members, alongside all parish councils 
in the greater Chester area, the local branch of the National Farmers Union and the 
Chester Civic Trust. Thus, the total affiliated membership is well over 1 000 
(Interview 24).
The district branch makes frequent representations to the Chester City planning 
authority and following the instigation of the green belt proposals in 1987, launched a 
campaign which more than tripled the individual membership from 50 to 170. The 
society has an annual income of £3 000, including grants provided by the County 
Branch (annual income £15 000 with 700 individual members) and by the London 
based organization. In the period 1988 to 1992 approximately 25% of the groups' 
income was spent on the campaign against the proposed development of the green belt 
sites (Interview 24)
The Chester district branch represents the base of the pyramid structure which 
characterises the organization of CPRE nation-wide. Typically, district branches 
consist of a relatively small core of activists - not dissimilar to the UGBPS committee, 
who organize site specific campaigns in conjunction with amenity interests. Indeed, at 
the time of interview, the leader of UGBPS was herself chairperson of Chester CPRE 
(Interviews 22 & 24). Above this level, the county branch co-ordinates the activities 
of the district societies, often providing help with specific campaigns and reflecting the 
views of the district societies when county wide planning decisions are made in the 
structure plan procedure. At the top of the pyramid is the national CPRE which 
lobbies Westminster and offers media and campaign related advice to local groups. 
Thus, the national organization is in effect the central co-ordinating body for a host of 
spatially concentrated local amenity lobbies.
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Although it frequently offers advice to the local branches, the London based CPRE is 
rarely if ever involved directly in specific planning disputes because the opportunity 
cost of staff time lobbying locally is relatively high (Interview 3, Head of Planning 
Policy CPRE,). In most cases there is little point diverting staff away from 
Westminster lobbying when there are already local CPRE groups, often backed by 
planners who are likely to defeat development proposals. In the case of Chester 
however, CPRE London launched a full scale campaign against the plans for the green 
belt, the biggest site specific campaign the organization has ever pursued. National 
representatives such as Tony Burton appeared at the local plan inquiry and later at the 
structure plan EIP. Combined with a saturation leaflet drop in the affected areas of 
Chester, the total cost to the national organization amounted to approximately £15 000 
(Interview 3).
That the national CPRE became involved in this dispute appears to have been a 
response to the unusually high stakes associated with political action in Chester. In 
this case, the scale of the green belt release proposed by Chester City Council was so 
great as to threaten the status of green belt policy nation-wide. In particular, the 
Chester dispute opened the prospect of speculative planning applications around other 
designated historic towns, such as York, Cambridge, Oxford, Bath and Norwich, 
where green belt restraints were also very tight. If the proposals had been approved 
then national planning guidance in PPG2, which states one of the primary purposes of 
green belts as preserving the appearance of historic towns, would have been ripe for 
revision. This would have encouraged many more speculative applications by 
developers which would in turn have damaged the credibility of CPRE with its 
members, not to mention the additional costs of fighting still further green belt 
campaigns.
In contrast to the level of lobbying from CPRE interests, general environmental 
groups appear to have been relatively under-represented in the planning process. The 
only group to make repeated representations to both the city and county councils 
throughout the period was the Cheshire Conservation Trust (CCT) - a natural history 
society with a county wide membership of 4 000 individuals, 200 of which were 
situated in Chester (Interview 25, Leader CCT).
In some respects the CCT is similar to the CPRE in terms of its objectives and 
organizational form. The group, like the other county wildlife trusts, focuses on the 
conservation of specific sites, usually local woodland or meadow land. The Chester 
CCT for example, had previously fought a campaign to save meadow land to the north 
east of the city from a proposed equestrian site identified in the Manchester bid to host
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the Olympic Games (Interview 24). There is a distinct element of amenity value, such 
as rambling or fishing in these areas and hence a relatively clear focus for membership 
amongst users of the sites. However, in general these interests are not specifically 
associated with individuals actually living adjacent to a proposed development and the 
stake is correspondingly less. Significantly, unlike the CPRE, the CCT did not record 
any increase in membership throughout the period of the green belt dispute.
The Chester branch of Friends of the Earth, with only 50 members was the least 
mobilized of all the recognized environmental interests (Interview 26 FoE Local 
Organizer). The group did make a written representation in response to the county 
structure plan, but unlike the UGBPS, WCPA and the district CPRE, it did not lobby 
the council directly by making representations to councillors or by organizing anti­
development petitions. Similarly Chester FoE did not increase its membership during 
the dispute unlike FoE UK, which doubled in numbers (75 000 to 150 000) over the 
same period.
A possible explanation for this relative undermobilization, would point to the lack of 
selective incentives provided by the local FoE group, given the diffuse nature of the 
costs and benefits associated with the issues on which it campaigns. At the national 
level, FoE UK - which is itself relatively undermobilized, provides a range of 
selective incentives to individual members in the form of environmental merchandise 
and information, but there was no evidence of similar operations in Chester. 
According to public choice, groups campaigning on diffuse issues need to offer 
relatively more selective incentives to encourage participation than nimby groups 
where the concentration of prospective benefits is greater.
Overall, the pattern of mobilization in Chester appears to corroborate the public choice 
account of group-joining. The conservation lobby in Chester is dominated by spatially 
concentrated interests. If public choice processes were not in operation, one would 
expect a much more even participation rate from environmental interests mobilized on 
the basis of shared values. Groups would mobilize and make representations, 
irrespective of whether there members have a concentrated stake in a particular 
planning decision. It might be argued that where development proposals do affect a 
concentrated group, general environmental interests will guess that these individuals 
are already involved and that time would be better spent dealing with other matters. 
However, far from refuting the public choice framework, this analysis confirms that 
individuals will not join in a political campaign if their additional contribution is 
unlikely to increase its probability of success. Similarly, the public choice approach 
provides a convincing explanation of why total affiliated membership of local amenity
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Table 6.3 Rent Seeking Costs for the CPRE in Chester : 1991
Costs UGBPS WPCA CPRE (District) Total
Printing 200 150 600 950
Post & Telephone 250 150 400 800
Hiring of Rooms 50 50 100 200
Travel 100 na 300 400+
Other 400 150 300 850
Total 1500 500 1700 3200
Time Cost
(leaders) 300 hrs 200hrs 350hrs 850hrs
Source : Estimates based on Interviews 22, 23 & 24.
Table 6.4 Rent Seeking Costs for the Cheshire CPRE : 1992 - 1993
1993 1992
Wages 5670 5491
Rent & Rates 891 653
Printing 1345 1353
Postage & Telephone 1727 1362
Insurance 300 153
Annual Report 271 358
Annual General Meeting 202 191
Hire of Rooms 216 272
Audit Fee 309 294
Training 380 476
Various Charges 1174 323
Travel 988 906
Depreciation of Fixed Assets 427 907
Contribution to Trafford Green Belt Action Fund 215 -
District Plan 255 -
Total 14420 12947
Source: Cheshire CPRE Annual Reports.
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interests in Chester, focused on the conservation of specific sites, was at least twenty 
times that of FoE, lobbying across the full range of environmental concerns.
Although the general pattern supports the public choice approach, the Chester example 
does call into question the specific motives which lie behind the formation of groups 
such as the CPRE. In the account presented in chapter 3 it was argued that groups 
mobilize in order to achieve monetary transfers of wealth and in the rent seeking 
account of nimbyism, it was argued that the driving force behind mobilization is the 
desire to inflate property values by restricting the level of new development within a 
particular area (see also Frieden 1978, Fischel 1985,1995).
Consideration of the data presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4,which contain estimates of 
total lobbying costs for environmental interests in Chester and in the county as a 
whole, requires modification of this specific interpretation. It can be seen from the 
table that total monetary lobbying costs throughout the period of the planning dispute 
amounted to no more than £19 000 of which £15 000 came from the national CPRE.
It is not possible to estimate the exact 'consumer surplus' derived from such an 
investment because this is subjective and known only to the individuals concerned, 
but on the assumption that groups will allocate resources in proportion to the expected 
gain from political success, it may be concluded that the prospective monetary gain 
from restricting development is rather small.
On reflection, this is not a particularly surprising finding, for whilst it is true that the 
overall effect of the planning system nation-wide is to reduce the supply of new 
development and thereby to raise the price of existing units (especially housing), it is 
far from clear that the granting of planning permission in one particular area would 
serve to reduce local property values significantly. Indeed, in some cases where high 
status development is proposed, for example executive housing or a business park, 
property values might actually increase as the market profile of the area is raised 
(Benson 1984). Rather it would take a much more general relaxation of controls to 
have any significant impact on property values. At the most therefore, it would seem 
that nimby groups seek to maintain property prices at their current level rather than 
inflate them significantly.
That pecuniary incentives are not the dominant factor in the mobilization of nimby 
groups, is given further weight when considering the scale of the non-monetary costs 
involved in lobbying and the personal characteristics of the group leaders concerned. 
The major lobbying cost for most of these groups is not the direct monetary cost, for 
example in publishing leaflets, hiring out rooms for public meetings and telephone
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calls to bureaucrats and politicians, but the sheer amount of time required to conduct 
the anti-development campaign. Group leaders in nimby lobbies do not pay private 
consultants to conduct a high profile campaign on their behalf, because they do not 
have the resources for such investment and presumably the financial gain from a 
successful campaign is insufficient to warrant borrowing money to risk on such a 
venture.
This interpretation is strengthened by the total absence of younger age groups in the 
profile of group leaders. All leaders of environmental interests in Chester were over 
55 years of age and all were retired professionals. If money was the dominant motive 
then younger interests - who would need to take time off work in order to attend 
public inquiries and at the very least sacrifice a large amount of a relatively limited 
leisure time, would be more likely involved. That older individuals dominate the 
profile of groups such as CPRE (see Lowe and Goyder 1983 for confirmation) is not 
at all surprising. These individuals have relatively more spare time to conduct 
campaigns and to organize group activities, ie. the opportunity cost of time applying 
political pressure for retired individuals is probably quite low compared to those still 
in work.
Pecuniary motives associated with increasing property values would appear not to be 
the prime motivation of nimby lobbies, suggesting that non-pecuniary sources of 
satisfaction or welfare are more likely to be the objective of these interest groups. In 
the case of CPRE, perhaps the conservative desire to keep a place as it is, irrespective 
of the effect on property prices. Again, such motives provide a plausible rational 
choice explanation for the absence of younger age groups in the membership profile. 
Ceteris paribus, younger individuals will have many more opportunities to move 
house, should new development alter the character of a particular area. By contrast, 
older people have relatively fewer options to move and as a consequence the stake in 
maintaining the character of the area in which they currently live is that much greater. 
Older individuals may also derive considerable personal utility from neighbourhood 
ties and social networks which might be lost should they move, again increasing the 
size of the stake.
It should be noted that the relative absence of pecuniary incentives behind the 
mobilization of nimby interests, does not in itself undermine the public choice account 
of group joining. In the specific case of CPRE, it remains the case that the non- 
pecuniary benefits at stake are spatially concentrated and confined to a relatively small 
identity set of individuals. It is this spatial concentration which raises the significance 
of individual participation above the level characteristic of more diffuse interests and
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which allows nimby lobbies in large part to overcome the logic of collective action 
where other environmentalists do not. In turn, it is the ability of nimby groups to 
organize and to resist development which contributes to the restrictiveness of the 
planning system overall and which raises property values significantly on a much 
wider national scale.
The Development Lobby
Support for the development proposals in the Chester green belt derived from a mix of 
private sector interests, including a consortium of private house builders, the House 
Builders Federation, local landowners and the local chamber of commerce.
The principal source of support came from a private consortium consisting of three 
major house building firms, all of which owned land on the Wrexham Road site. The 
three companies; Wainhomes Ltd - a large regionally based company and Redrow 
Homes North West Ltd and MacAlpine Northern Ltd - both regional branches of 
national corporations, first approached the city council in early 1986, prior to the 
purchase of the site (Interview 27, Managing Director Wainhomes, Interview 28,
Head of Planning Redrow North West). A year later the consortium, alongside 
representatives from the North West branch of the House Builders Federation, 
participated in a joint housing study with the city council and the Wrexham Road area 
was subsequently identified for land release in the draft revised local plan published in 
November 1987.
House building interests in Chester were largely immune from the logic of collective 
action, with only three firms in the consortium the collective stake was highly 
concentrated on the members, all of whom would be assured an extremely powerful 
position within the Chester housing market, should the proposals be approved. The 
draft local plan proposed the development of 900 houses on 38 ha at Wrexham Road, 
which in a single planning permission would have given the consortium 
approximately 11% of the new build homes market in the Greater Chester area (each 
of the individual firms also had other sites under consideration).
In a sense, developers pursuing planning applications do not actually face a genuine 
collective action problem, because they lobby for planning permissions which convey 
private benefits confined to the successful firms. Nonetheless, the development of 
consortia seeking large block allocations of development land as in Chester and in 
many other areas in the late 1980s, may be seen as a collective strategy on behalf of
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Table 6.5 Rent Seeking Expenses for House building Consortium in Chester : 1987 -
1994
Consultancy/Surveyors Chester Local Plan Inquiry £ 80 000
Consultancy/Surveyors Cheshire Structure Plan EIP £ 40 000
Legal Costs - QC and Court Costs £ 70 000
Other Costs (Promotion etc.) £ 50 000
Total Costs £240 000
Source : Interviews 27 & 28.
Notes : These figures are estimates based on interviews with member firms in the consortium. Precise 
figures are not available because the companies concerned were not prepared to allow detailed analysis 
of their accounts.
the larger property companies to cartelize local markets for new housing by ensuring 
that only land collectively owned by the consortia would be released for development, 
rather than have competition between firms for planning permissions.
Given the tight constraints on development within Chester, it should come as no 
surprise that the estimated value of the Wrexham Road site for house building was far 
in excess of its agricultural value. In 1994 local estate agents judged that the site with 
planning permission for housing would sell for in excess of £2.5 million or 40 times 
its agricultural price. The figure of £2.5 million represents an approximation of the 
present value of expected profits of house construction, net of construction costs to 
the house builders and so one would expect a substantial investment in rent-seeking 
costs given these prospective gains. The data presented in Table 6.5, which contain 
estimates of expenditure by the housing consortium between 1987 and 1994 on a 
combination of planning expenses and legal costs would appear to confirm the 
presence of such large scale rent seeking. That the consortium was willing to take the 
Secretary of State for the Environment to the High Court, in response to his 
overturning of both the local plan and the structure plan, is in itself an indication of the 
potential gains to be derived from the release of green belt land at Wrexham Road.
The rent seeking costs displayed in the table refer only to the Wrexham Road site, but 
each of the individual firms in the consortium also reported substantial lobbying costs 
for other sites within the greater Chester area. Wainhomes for example, spent 
£100 000 trying to obtain planning permission for a site it owned in the Blacon 
Meadows area and a further £100 000 on another site in the Sealand Basin (Interview 
27).
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In addition to the developer consortium itself, house building interests were also 
represented at the local plan inquiry and the structure plan EIP by the North West 
branch of the House Builders Federation (Interview 29, Director HBF North West). 
That the HBF chose to be involved actively in the Chester case is again a reflection of 
the size of the potential gains at stake. Under normal circumstances HBF do not 
involve themselves in site specific planning disputes, because this might be seen to be 
favouring particular firms in the membership over their potential competitors, thus 
undermining the claim of the HBF to represent the interests of the house building 
lobby as a whole. However, as was the case with the national CPRE, in this instance 
the proposed release of green belt land was on such a scale as to challenge the basis of 
green belt policy with respect to historic towns nation-wide. Thus, the opportunity 
cost to the HBF of its more general lobbying was likely to be lower than normal in 
comparison to the potential gains from site specific lobbying in Chester.
The coalition of private sector development interests also included 7 individual 
landowners and property companies with assets close to the allocated sites. Of these 
interests only three, including the estate of the Duke of Westminster (which owns land 
adjacent to the Wrexham Road site), employed consultants and surveyors to press the 
case for still greater land release, in particular for more housing and the provision of 
additional business parks (Interview 30, Cheshire Senior Planning Officer; Interview 
31, Cheshire Chief Planning Officer; Interview 32, Chester City Chief Planning 
Officer, Chester Local Plan Inspectors Report, 1988; Interview 33 Head of Planning, 
Regional DoE; Cheshire 2001 Inspectors Report, 1991).
Actual estimates of lobbying costs for these interests were not obtainable, but on the 
basis of the fees quoted by house builders in the area, these would probably have 
amounted to about £30 000. That these interests devoted relatively less expenditure on 
consultancy than the housing consortium is not surprising. Whereas the house 
builders land had already been identified in the draft local plan for release, other land 
owning interests sought additional releases, over and above that proposed and given 
the likely opposition to these proposals, probably estimated a lower chance of 
achieving success.
The same logic may also be applied to explain the relatively low rent seeking expenses 
from the Chester Chamber of Trade, the least organized of all the pro-development 
interests in the city. This group consisting of approximately 200 small business 
owners did not employ specialist planning consultants as representatives at either the 
local plan inquiry or the structure plan EIP and probably spent no more than £5 000
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overall by way of involvement in the dispute (Interview 34, Chairman Chester 
Chamber of Trade). In part this may be explained by the diffuse nature of the gains - 
in the form of increased trade - from the development proposals. Gains from more 
development would have been spread widely across all businesses in the city and the 
chance of the chamber of trade itself influencing the decision of the authorities as 
opposed to the major development consortium were probably rather slight.
Summary
The pattern of interest group mobilization and rent seeking expenses, summarized in 
Table 6.6 is broadly supportive of the public choice analysis of interest groups 
presented earlier in this thesis. The most highly mobilized interest and that with the 
greatest rent seeking expenditures was the house building lobby, followed by the 
landowners. According to public choice theory, this is to be expected because these 
were the groups with the largest potential gains to be derived from the allocation of 
planning permissions and the smallest groups in terms of potential membership.
Table 6.6 Interest Group Mobilization and Rent Seeking in Chester
Interest Group
Per Capita 
Stake
Members Rate of 
Mobilization
Rent Seeking 
£'s
House builders 1 3 1 £240 000+
Landowners 1 7 1 £ 30 000
CPRE/NIMBY 3 1 0 0 0 2 £ 20  000
Other Business 4 200 3 £ 5 000
Other Environmental 5 50 4 £ 100
Housing Consumers 5 0 5 £ 0
Notes 1 = High, 5 = Low.
204
The second most mobilized group was the UGBPS/WPCA/CPRE, organized around 
predominantly nimby concerns. These groups were not able completely to overcome 
the logic of collective action because the potential membership was much greater than 
for pro-development interests. Nonetheless, because of the site specific nature of 
nimby campaigns, the CPRE was able to mobilize a significant number of individuals 
with a relatively concentrated stake in the preservation of amenity interests and thus to 
form a powerful anti-development force.
General environmental interests were relatively undermobilized as would be expected 
given the diffuse nature of the issues concerned. However, the least mobilized of all 
the potential winners and losers in Chester was the interest as yet unmentioned. As 
public choice predicts, housing consumers remained totally unrepresented in the 
political process - excluding the house builders not a single representation at either the 
local plan inquiry or the structure plan stage was heard from an individual consumer 
campaigning for the provision of additional housing development.
6.3 The Supply Side : Bureaucrats and Politicians in Chester
Confirmation of public choice incentives on the demand side of the political market, 
makes the actions of supply side actors in Chester all the more surprising in their 
departure from the pattern of decision-making presented in earlier chapters. In that 
account it was argued that the bureaucratic interest of land use planners lies in the 
expansion of their budgets which in turn requires an expansion of regulations 
restricting development and which imposes substantial cost and time delays via a 
complicated administrative process. Although the growth of regulation does not imply 
that planners will rule against all new building proposals, the highly visible nature of 
many large scale planning decisions, combined with the political clout of the nimby 
lobby means that planners are at the very most ambivalent to development interests.
In Chester however, far from being reluctant to permit additional growth, local 
planning bureaucrats in both the city and county councils actively promoted the 
proposed release of green belt land in a concerted campaign with the building lobby. 
Thus, the experience of Chester contradicts the evidence of all the major planning 
disputes throughout the 1980s in non-metropolitan England. In none of the attempts 
by private developers to obtain planning permission for the large scale release of green 
belt or other designated land, did local planning bureaucrats support these proposals.
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The plans to develop new settlements at Foxley Wood, Tillingham Hall and Stone 
Basset were all opposed by planners (Ehrman 1990) and out of a total of 200 similar 
schemes in the late 1980s, a mere seven were finally granted with planning 
permission. Most empirical studies of major planning disputes in non-metropolitan 
areas summarized at the beginning of this chapter, suggest that planners are extremely 
reluctant to relax controls, especially in politically contentious designated zones.
Similarly, local politicians in Chester far from courting the anti-development vote, 
offered their backing for the rolling back of the green belt and the eventual defeat of 
the city council's proposals resulted from intervention by national level bureaucrats 
and politicians via the DoE. The analysis of electoral incentives in chapter 5 focused 
on the potential clout of the conservation lobby at the Westminster level, but if 
anything from a public choice perspective, one would expect local politicians to be 
even more susceptible to the power of the nimby vote because local councils are 
subject to annual elections and are correspondingly closer to the political fall-out 
which might result from the adoption of a pro-development stance. Again, most 
empirical studies in non-metropolitan areas have found local councillors to be 
opposed to relaxation of containment policies.
On the face of it, supply side decision-making in Chester appears to contradict the 
public choice account. Both bureaucrats and politicians in promoting development, 
appear to have acted in a way that the public choice analysis suggests they should not. 
If this is indeed the case then the account presented in earlier chapters is called into 
doubt. It will be argued below however, that far from refuting the public choice 
perspective, closer analysis of bureaucratic and political incentives in Chester actually 
offers additional support for the analytical framework. What makes the Chester case 
stand out is a peculiar set of institutional incentives, where public sector interests were 
linked to a relatively more pro-growth rather than an anti-growth stance. Public sector 
action in Chester can be reconciled with economic and political self interest, but given 
peculiar institutional conditions this interest was manifested in a different way to that 
found in most of non-metropolitan England.
Local Bureaucrats and Politicians
Bureaucratic control of land use change in Chester is divided between two agencies - 
the Chester City Council planning department and the Cheshire County Council
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Table 6.7 Land Use Planning in Chester - Budget Classification
Percentage of Budget
Staff and Transfers to Transfers to
Admin. Private Sector Public Sector
CB BB PB
City Council 88 12 0
Other English Districts 98 2 0
County Council 92 8 0
Other English Counties 98 2 0
Source : Chester City Council/Chartered Institute for Public Finance 1992.
planning department. The city council is responsible for the day to day administration 
of the planning system through the granting and refusal of planning permissions, 
whereas the upper tier of local government focuses on strategic planning issues 
through the structure plan system, laying out the general guidelines under which the 
district authority implements its own local development plan.
In terms of the bureaucratic agency types outlined in chapter 4, both the city and 
county planning departments may be classified as regulatory bureaux, though as may 
be seen in Table 6.7, the city council has a somewhat higher bureau budget 
percentage, consisting of transfers to private sector firms, than is the case in most 
English district planning authorities. These transfer payments consist mostly of 
Regional Development Grants administered through the Assisted Areas Scheme 
(AAS).
The earlier analysis suggested that regulatory bureaux have a bureaucratic stake in the 
expansion of their regulatory activities and hence are biased against new development. 
First because their budgets are dependent on a complicated adminstrative process and 
second because of the high level of political flak associated with decisions to grant 
planning permissions in highly visible designated sites.
To some extent this view is supported by the pattern of bureaucratic activity in 
Chester. In 1983 the city council confirmed a substantial extension to the greater 
Chester green belt and during the 1980s the number of local conservation designations 
doubled to cover an area of 890 ha. Similarly, there was little evidence of any
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substantial house building activity within designated zones. As in other areas the green 
belt has a strong deterrent effect, greatly reducing the proportion of medium and large 
scale planning applications made. On average about 75% of development applications 
in the Chester green belt relate to some aspect of housing, but these represent less than 
twenty applications per year, the majority of which are for extensions or alterations to 
existing dwellings. The city council has also adopted a strict line against small scale 
housing developments in the green belt such that in 1991, only 10 new units were 
granted planning permission (Interviews 30 - 33).
Why then did planning bureaux push for a relaxation of some of these constraints 
which one might think would run counter to their interests ? A plausible answer to this 
conundrum, which supports rather than refutes the validity of the public choice 
framework points to the particular institutional make-up of both the city and county 
planning departments, which distinguishes them very clearly from planning 
departments in other parts of non-metropolitan England.
Local authority planning departments in England perform five main functions, four of 
which ; planning policy, development control, enforcement and environment/ 
conservation, may be described as regulatory activities. The planning policy remit 
involves staff in the drafting of local development plans (districts) and structure plans 
(counties) and also includes the public consultation and inquiry procedures before 
planning policies are given formal approval. Development control involves the day to 
day procedure of reviewing planning applications and the granting or refusal of 
particular development proposals. Enforcement, as its name suggests, is concerned 
with ensuring that development control decisions are complied with and includes 
demolition of buildings erected without statutory approval. The fourth regulatory 
activity, environment/conservation involves staff in the drafting of local conservation 
areas, tree preservation orders and the maintenance of local nature reserves within the 
jurisdiction, in consultation with other statutory bodies such as English Nature and the 
Countryside Commission.
According to the theory of bureaucratic behaviour presented in chapter 4, planning 
bureaucrats have an economic stake in the expansion of these activities, all of which 
are staff and administration intensive. As these activities expand, alongside planning 
budgets, there is a pronounced bias against new urban developments; in a direct sense 
with the case of environment /conservation, which specifically designates against 
development and more indirectly for planning policy and development control. In the 
the case of planning policy, bureaucrats have an economic incentive in the expansion 
of plan-making procedures, producing longer and more complex planning documents
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and introducing regulatory requirements which discriminate against or delay 
development proposals. Through development control itself, planners can impose still 
further cost and time delays by elongating the period over which planning applications 
are evaluated. In addition the highly visible nature of planning applications, especially 
large scale applications in designated sites, reduces the incentive for planners to grant 
planning permission because of the unfavourable publicity and political flak emanating 
from organized nimby interests.
The incentive structure would appear rather different with respect to the fifth function 
performed by planning departments - economic development and promotion (a 
delivery function). Planning staff employed in this activity are responsible for the 
development of local authority owned land, land reclamation and site assembly, the 
collection of rents and charges from local authority owned industrial sites and factory 
units, the payment of grants and subsidies to encourage inward investment and the 
marketing and promotion of development opportunities within their jurisdiction. 
Clearly, the expansion of these activities does not discriminate against development 
but would appear to imply the active promotion of new building. If these bureaucrats 
are to expand their budgets this would imply that more local authority owned land is 
developed, more rents and charges are collected from firms locating in the areas 
concerned and additional marketing and promotion of potential development sites 
occurs.
If the public choice approach is appropriate one would expect that ceteris paribus, 
those local authorities with the highest proportion of staff employed in the economic 
development and promotion function would be more inclined towards a pro- 
development stance, whereas those with the lowest proportion of such staff would 
rely exclusively on the expansion of regulatory activities for their bureaucratic well 
being. This hypothesis would appear to correspond with the institutional regime in 
Chester.
Throughout the 1980s the economic development and promotion function in many 
English district planning departments was cut back as the Thatcher administration 
actively sought to curtail the role of the state in the economy. Regional development 
grants were removed from many areas and local planning authorities were severely 
limited in the extent to which they could play an active role in the development 
process. Regional development grants and Assisted Area Status became largely 
confined to the conurbations of the north and to Scotland and Wales (see Figure 6.3)
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Figure 6.3 The Assisted Areas Scheme
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and responsibility for economic development was transferred to the county level, but 
this role was confined to the provision of general strategic planning guidance rather 
than an active role in the development process itself (Cullingworth & Nadin 1994).
In Chester by contrast, the role of the district and county planning departments in the 
economic development and promotion function actually expanded, largely due to the 
granting of Development Area Status (DAS) in 1984 under the Assisted Areas Scheme 
(AAS), which made the city eligible for a range of central government and European 
regional development grants aimed at marketing and promotion of development 
opportunities. For example in 1987, Chester City Council, supported by the European 
Regional Development Funds, spent a total of £4.5 million on reclaiming and 
servicing of the Chester West Employment Park, a site which the council also owned 
(Adams et al 1994, Interviews 30 - 33).
That Chester was able to secure DAS is somewhat surprising given the relatively high 
demand conditions for housing and industrial land within the area. At 9.1% in 1989, 
the unemployment rate was below the average for the rest of the North West region 
(11.2%) and only 1% higher than the national average. However, according to the 
Regional Office of the DoE, city and county planning bureaucrats lobbied the 
Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) for DAS, on the basis that the greater Chester 
area should be included in the Wirral Travel to Work Area where the average 
unemployment rate was 15%. It was on this basis that DAS was eventually extended 
from the Wirral Peninsular to include Chester in 1984 (Interviews 30 - 33).
For planning bureaucrats to lobby for DAS status and hence to expand their remit is 
fully compatible with the public choice analysis of expansionist bureaucracy. In this 
sense Chester planners had a wider range of budgetary options than those which face 
planners in other non-metropolitan parts of the country. It is very difficult to say the 
least, for planners in most of non-metropolitan England and especially in the South to 
lobby for economic development and promotion budgets when demand conditions are 
already so high.
Confirmation of the relatively greater importance of the economic development and 
promotion function to the Chester City planning department is provided in Table 6.8 
which compares the structure of staffing arrangements in 1991, i.e. at the height of the 
green belt dispute, with those of other district authorities in England. Table 6.9 
presents some further statistics on staff structure for selected districts in southern 
England, known for pursuing a more anti-development stance.
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Table 6.8 Budgeted Employees by Function in English District Planning Authorities : 
1991
Economic
Development
Other Planning Total % Economic 
Development
Chester 8.0 24.0 32.0 25.0%
Non-Metro Districts 608.1 6602.8 7210.9 8.4%
Metro-Districts 696.5 2093.5 2790.0 33.0%
Source : CIPFA Planning and Development Statistics/ Chester City Council 1991.
The contrast between Chester and the other non-metropolitan English districts is very 
marked indeed. In 1991,25% of budgeted staff time was allocated to the economic 
development and promotion function in Chester compared to an average of only 8.4% 
in the other non-metropolitan districts. The Chi Square Statistic comparing Chester to 
the rest of the non-metropolitan category (12.21, DF 1) is significant at the 0.1% 
level. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the 25% figure is comparable to that found in 
the metropolitan English districts (33%), where one would expect to find a higher 
proportion of staff engaged in urban regeneration type programmes.
The contrast is even more stark when comparing Chester to the southern districts 
listed in Table 6.9, with highly restrictive districts in counties such as East Sussex, 
Oxfordshire, Surrey and Hampshire on average all employing less than 5% of their 
staff in the growth related function. In part, this might appear to be a statement of the 
obvious - one would expect high demand areas to employ fewer staff in economic 
development and promotion activities. However, the data are significant because 
Chester is a relatively high demand district and yet still employs more staff in 
economic development than far less prosperous areas in metropolitan England. One 
has to reach depressed areas such as Barnsley (51%) and Rotherham (28.5%) to find 
districts with comparable levels of staffing in this activity (CIPFA 1991). The city of 
Chester would appear to be unique amongst English non-metropolitan authorities in 
being both a high demand area and at the same time employing a high proportion of 
staff in promotional functions.
A similar pattern emerges on examination of staffing structures at the county level. 
Table 6.10 presents data on staffing structures for all the English non-metropolitan 
county planning departments, where it may be seen that compared to Cheshire only 
two other counties (Durham and Shropshire), employ a higher proportion of their staff
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Table 6.9 Budgeted Employees by Function - Selected English District Planning
Authorities: 1991
Economic
Development
Other Planning Total % Economic 
Development
Cambridgeshire
Cambridge 1.0 55.0 56.0 1.8 %
East Cambs. 0 .2 13.8 14.0 1.4%
Fenland 2 .6 27.8 30.4 8.5%
Peterborough 5.0 51.0 56.0 8.9%
Devon
East Devon 1.8 33.2 35.0 5.1%
South Hams 3.8 35.2 39.0 9.7%
Teignbridge 4.6 36.4 41.0 11.2 %
Mid Devon 1.2 26.2 27.4 4.4%
Torridge 0 .6 14.4 15.0 4.0%
Torbay 0 .2 35.8 36.0 0.5%
West Devon 1.4 18.6 20 .0 7.6%
East Sussex
Eastbourne 1.5 17.5 19.0 7.9%
Hastings 0 .2 29.8 30.0 0 .6 %
Hove 0.9 22 .0 22.9 3.9%
Lewes 0 .0 27.6 27.6 0 .0 %
Wealden 1.0 42.0 43.0 2.3%
Hampshire
Basingstoke 0.3 50.7 51.0 0 .6 %
East Hants 0 .0 34.0 34.0 0 .0 %
Eastleigh 2 .6 33.4 36.0 7.2%
Fareham 3.0 30.0 33.0 9.0%
Gosport 2.5 15.6 18.1 13.8%
Hart 2 .0 30.9 32.9 6 .0 %
New Forest 2 .0 45.4 47.4 4.2%
Test Valley 1.0 43.4 44.4 2.3%
Winchester 0.1 46.4 47.5 0 .2 %
Oxfordshire
Cherwell 2.9 34.1 37.0 7.8%
South Oxon 0.3 54.0 54.3 0.5%
V of White Horse 0 .0 32.5 32.5 0 .0 %
West Oxon 1.0 29.0 30.0 3.3%
Surrev
Reigate 0 .8 34.2 35.0 2.3%
Runnymede 0 .0 22.0 22 .0 0 .0 %
Spelthome 0 .2 19.8 20 .0 1.0 %
Surrey Heath 1.4 18.6 20 .0 7.0%
Tandridge 1.4 34.6 36.0 3.9%
Waverley 1.8 37.2 39.0 4.6%
Woking 1.5 17.5 19.0 7.9%
Source : Computed from CIPFA Planning and Development Statistics 1991.
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Table 6.10 Budgeted Employees bv Function in English Countv Planning Authorities
: 1991
County Economic
Development
Other
Planning
Total % Economic 
Development
C H ESH IR E 4 6 .0 8 1 .0 12 7 .0 36 .2% **
Durham 41.0 61.0 102.0 40.2%**
Nottinghamshire 40.7 98.0 138.7 29.3%
Lancashire 33.2 62.8 96.0 34.6%**
Humberside 31.6 55.9 87.5 36.1%**
Staffordshire 27.5 107.0 134.5 20.4%*
Leicestershire 26.6 50.6 77.2 34 .4 %**
Kent 26.6 110.4 137.0 19.4%
Cleveland 24.9 55.5 80.4 30.9%**
Essex 23.0 157.0 180.0 12.7%
Cornwall 20.5 41.1 61.6 33.3%**
Warwickshire 18.6 38.3 56.3 33.0%*
Shropshire 17.0 28.8 45.8 37.1%*
Northumbria 16.8 46.2 63.0 26.6%
Cumbria 13.5 52.5 66.0 20.4%**
Devon 11.2 66.9 78.1 14.3%
E. Sussex 11.0 56.0 67.0 16.4%
Lincolnshire 9.0 26.0 25.0 36.0%**
Bedfordshire 9.0 69.0 78.0 11.5%
Gloucestershire 8.3 41.3 49.6 16.7%
North Yorks 8.0 46.5 54.5 14.7%
Hereford 8.0 38.0 46.0 17.4%
Derbyshire 7.6 89.4 96.0 7.9%
Northants 7.4 30.7 38.1 19.4%
Somerset 7.0 45.0 52.0 13.5%
Wiltshire 6.0 22.5 28.5 2 1 .0 %
Suffolk 5.8 39.8 45.6 12.7%
Norfolk 5.5 52.5 58.0 9.5%
Surrey 4.6 86.4 91.0 5.0%
Cambridgeshire 4.0 30.0 34.0 11 .8 %
W.Sussex 4.0 50.0 54.0 7.4%
Hampshire 1.1 125.9 127.0 0.9%
Isle of Wight 1.0 10.5 11.5 8.7%
Hertfordshire 0.5 80.0 80.5 0 .6 %
Berkshire 0.3 59.7 60.0 0.5%
Dorset 0.3 54.2 54.5 0.5%
Oxfordshire 0.0 18.5 18.5 0 .0 %
Buckinghamshire 0.0 33.0 33.0 0 .0 %
All Counties 526 2208.0 2734.0 19.2%
** = DAS within county * = IAS within county
Source : Computed from CIPFA Planning and Development Statistics 1991. 
Notes : Figures for Berkshire and Buckinghamshire are 1992.
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in the economic development and promotion function and in absolute terms the 
Cheshire figure is the highest in the country. The figure 36.2% of budgeted staff time 
allocated to this activity is at least three times the average for most of the counties in 
southern England and almost double the average for all the non-metropolitan counties 
combined (19.2%). Comparing the difference between Cheshire and the non­
metropolitan counties as a whole the Chi square statistic (25.78, DF 1) is significant at 
the 0.1% level. Judging from Table 6.10, it would also appear that the proportion of 
staff employed in the economic function is related to the presence of DAS or the lesser 
Intermediate Area Status (IAS). Thus, all of the authorities with at least 30% of staff 
employed in economic development and promotion had an element of DAS within 
their county boundaries.
Once again, those counties known for pursuing a particularly restrictive planning 
regime also appear to be the authorities with the lowest proportion of staff in economic 
development. Indeed, the figures for counties such as Buckinghamshire, Berkshire, 
Hertfordshire, Hampshire and Surrey, which have repeatedly come into opposition 
with central government for setting overly restrictive development targets, are 
massively lower - 0.0, 0.5, 0.6, 0.9, and 5.0 respectively.
The implications of this analysis for the apparently anomalous case of supply-side 
decision-making in Chester would appear clear. Put simply, a significantly high 
proportion of bureaucratic interests at both the district and county levels in Chester had 
an economic stake in the expansion of the economic development and promotion 
function, which in turn required the release of green belt land. Access to DAS funds 
and grants from the European Union were dependent on the promotion of additional 
growth within the greater Chester area. The provision of new business parks, large 
scale housing development and a new transport link would complete a large package 
deal ensuring the continual growth of the economic development function within both 
the city and county planning departments, an option for bureaucratic expansion which 
is absent from most other non-metropolitan district or county planning departments in 
the rest of the country.
It might be argued that the importance of the economic development function in 
promoting a pro-growth stance is overemphasised in this account, because even in 
Chester/ Cheshire, the economic function did not employ the majority of staff in 
planning bureaux and as a result one would still have expected anti-development 
sentiment amongst the regulatory staff to have prevailed.Such an analysis however, 
would miss the significance of key arguments presented in this chapter and in chapter 
4.
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It was noted in chapter 4 that planners' budgetary interests in non-metropolitan 
authorities correspond with the growth of a complicated administrative system and an 
expansion of regulation. It was also noted, however, that although these processes 
lead to a general anti-development bias, opting for a more pro-development stance by 
granting more planning permissions need not reduce the overall level of expenditure 
on the regulatory process. It is conceivable that planners could increase the overall 
level of regulation through the lengthening of the planning process and elongation of 
development control procedures, but still at the end of the day rule in favour of 
developers. That most planners are reluctant to allow development proposals and 
especially large scale development is rather a product of the high profile nimby 
opposition they would face, especially in designated zones such as Green Belts.
In the case of Chester, there need not have been a direct budgetary trade off between 
expanding the economic function and maintaining regulation. Increasing the budget of 
the economic development and promotion function as a result of DAS status, did not 
imply a reduction in the level of expenditure on regulatory functions. On the contrary, 
budgetary increases due to the expansion of the economic function were likely to be 
on top of the existing regulatory budget and implied no reduction in the overall level of 
regulatory activity in Chester. In these circumstances, the total budget of the agency 
would have been enlarged, improving job security for all its members. It seems likely 
that in the Chester case, bureaucrats had an incentive to overcome the political flak 
from the nimby lobby because the existence of DAS status gave them an additional 
option for bureaux expansion on top of their regulatory functions. That such 
processes do not appear to occur in most other parts of non-metropolitan England is 
due in part to the absence of DAS status. In these areas, there is little if any scope to 
expand the agency budget through economic development and promotion and there is 
consequently less incentive to overcome the political opposition from organized nimby 
lobbies.
However, a note of caution is appropriate, relating to the aggregate nature of the data 
presented in the earlier tables and the focus of previous empirical work suggesting an 
anti-development bias in non-metropolitan authorities. Many previous case studies 
suggesting a restrictive planning stance have focused on rural districts, but there is 
some evidence to suggest that urban districts, even within the non-metropolitan group 
might on occasion opt for a more pro-development stance (Simmie 1981, Herington 
1984). A primary reason for this is that urban districts can, by allowing development 
to threaten expansion into neighbouring rural districts, make a case for the redrawing 
of urban boundaries in order to expand the geographical scope of their remit and hence
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expand revenues and budgets. As a result, some commentators have noted periodic 
conflicts between rural districts seeking to maintain a strict anti-development stance 
and their neighbouring urban districts opting for a more pro-development position 
(Simmie 1981, Herington 1984). In this case a rural /urban divide within the non­
metropolitan authorities - not picked up in the earlier tables - might open up another 
possible cause of difference in the degrees of planning restraint operated by different 
institutional types of authority, in addition to the relative significance of the economic 
function. The contrast drawn here between Chester and the general tendency for non­
metropolitan authorities to be biased against development does not pick up on the 
possibility of a rural /urban divide. Thus, although Chester is a city the actual district 
boundary includes a substantial rural hinterland into which it might expand, without 
the possibility of conflict with neighbouring rural authorities.
Overall, the evidence of bureaucratic behaviour in Chester is consistent with the theory 
already hinted at in chapter 4. That is, when public sector budgets are linked to the 
expansion of development, as was the case with state provided housing in the 1960s 
and 1970s and still to this day in the provision of state owned roads, regulatory 
controls on urban growth are more likely to be relaxed.
In order to offer conclusive support for this theory, it would be necessary to develop a 
fully specified empirical test correlating the budget structure of planning departments 
and rural district/urban district differences, to relative degrees of planning restraint. 
The published data sources are not however amenable to this form of quantitative 
analysis. The major source of nation-wide data on development control - the 
Development Control Statistics published by the DoE, does not provide a reliable 
measure of planning restraint. In particular, published figures on the percentage of 
planning applications granted do not take into account the deterrent effect which a 
restrictive planning stance may have on the number and location of applications 
received and may produce perverse results. Thus, local planning authorities pursuing 
the most restrictive regimes may actually approve a very high percentage of the 
planning applications which they do actually receive. In these circumstances, the 
aggregate data conceal the fact that restrictive authorities may receive relatively fewer 
applications or may see their applications concentrated into existing urban areas where 
they may be more likely to grant planning permissions. Controlling for such factors 
would require a special enquiry through individual local authorities in order to obtain a 
large enough sample of planning agencies, a task in terms of time and financial cost 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Setting aside the problems associated with the development control statistics, other 
sources of evidence do however indicate additional support for the theory presented in 
this chapter. Thus, in Chester itself, the presence of other pro-development public 
sector interests, in addition to the city and county planning departments offers further 
evidence in accord with the analytical framework. Both the Mersey Regional Health 
Authority and the Cheshire County Highways department lobbied vigorously for the 
relaxation of the greater Chester green belt. From a public choice perspective, the 
interests of these agencies in securing the release of land for development were quite 
clear.
In the case of the regional health authority, bureaucratic interests were linked directly 
to the release of land at Upton by Chester and around the Countess of Chester 
hospital, because the health authority itself was the owner of the land. The estimated 
value of the site with planning permission was around £1.3 million and the authority 
lobbied at both the local and structure plan enquiries, on the grounds that release of the 
site for housing development would pay for a major expansion in local health services 
(Interview 35, Mersey Regional Health Representative).
In terms of the agency types outlined in chapter 4, the health authority is a delivery 
bureau with powerful incentives to push for budgetary growth. Increases in budgets 
are concentrated on the recruitment of more staff and on administrative expenses. It 
should not be surprising therefore, that during a period of relatively tight public 
expenditure control, the health authority should seek to expand its budget by selling 
off landed assets in order to reap a substantial capital gain.
Similar incentives appear also to have been present with respect to the county 
highways department. In this instance, the proposals to release green belt land around 
the Wrexham Road site were tied in with plans for a new road bypass scheme to the 
west of the city. The scheme was to be financed in part by a budget appropriation 
from the county council and by planning gain contributions from the developers of the 
Wrexham Road site (Interview 36, Senior Officer, Cheshire County Highways). Once 
again, prospective increases in bureaucratic budgets would appear to have been linked 
to the release of green belt land.
Still further support for the theory emanates from the most recent actions of the city 
council itself in publishing its new local plan. Contrary to the proposal to release green 
belt sites pursued in the late 1980s and early 1990s which has been the focus of this 
chapter, at the time of writing the new local plan sets out a much more restrictive 
approach, affirming commitment to the green belt as part of a 'sustainable
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development' agenda. At first sight, this policy appears to contradict the argument 
concerning the institutional effect of DAS and the economic development and 
promotion function within the planning department. It now transpires however, that 
the DTI has down-graded the DAS in Chester and Wirral to that of Intermediate Area 
Status with a corresponding reduction in the level of regional grants which are now 
available (DTI 1997). Due to the actions of the DTI, the institutional conditions in 
Chester appear to have changed and in particular the ability of the planning authority to 
expand its budget through economic development and promotion has been reduced. 
Thus, relatively speaking budgetary options point towards the planning authority 
adopting a more restrictive urban containment stance, in particular there is now less 
incentive for planners in Chester to withstand the highly visible political opposition 
from organized nimby lobbies.
Additional evidence for the theory is found in recent events surrounding the 
preparation of the Newcastle Upon Tyne Unitary Development Plan, which proposed 
the release of over 450 ha of green belt land (10% of the designated area) for a 
combination of residential and commercial developments similar to that proposed in 
Chester (CPRE 1993, The Planner, 13th October 1994). The media scan with FT 
Profile revealed Newcastle to be the only other example in recent years where such 
large scale development in a designated site had been supported by a local authority, 
indeed the case is reported by the CPRE (1993) as being the biggest single incursion 
ever proposed in a green belt. Unlike most other metropolitan authorities, Newcastle 
has a substantial green belt fringe within the metropolitan boundary, a fringe which 
local planners have wanted to release for development. As in Chester, the plans to 
relax the green belt provoked strong opposition from residents groups and were 
blocked by the DoE. Again, contrary to the experience throughout non-metropolitan 
England, local planning bureaucrats have actively lobbied for large scale development 
proposals on a green-field site. In confirmation of the institutional regime found in 
Chester, the CIPFA Planning and Development Statistics also reveal Newcastle Upon 
Tyne to have had a far higher proportion of its budget which has been devoted to the 
economic development and promotion function and as in Chester, Newcastle has also 
enjoyed DAS status. Thus, 53 staff out of a total 124, or 42.7% were employed in 
promotional activities, compared to an average of only 8.4% for the non-metropolitan 
English districts CIPFA (1992).
A note of qualification is, however, required with respect to the Newcastle case. In 
particular, whilst the institutional effect of DAS status may have been a key factor 
influencing the local authority stance, it is also possible that these incentives were 
compounded by the fact of Newcastle being an urban district which might have
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wanted to expand its jurisdiction and hence its revenues by stretching its boundaries 
into neighbouring rural authorities. As noted above, there has on occasion been a 
tendency for urban and rural districts to be in conflict over proposals to extend city 
boundaries with the rural districts taking a much tougher anti-development stance, in 
part because of fears of institutional take-over by their urban neighbours. Thus, there 
is some indication that Newcastle's neighbouring rural authorities in Northumberland 
have been strongly opposed to the stance adopted by Newcastle City Council (CPRE 
1993). Again, this is perhaps suggestive that an urban district/rural district divide may 
provide a further institutional variable affecting the stance taken by planning 
authorities in addition to the effect of DAS status and the proportion of the budget 
devoted to economic development and promotion.
Further and somewhat unlikely support for the theory advanced in this chapter can be 
found in Dunleavy's (1981) classic study of post-war housing policy in the UK. 
Although working from a neo-Marxist frame of reference, Dunleavys's account of the 
behaviour of local authority housing, planning and architects departments can easily 
be squared with a public choice approach. In "The Politics o f Mass Housing", 
Dunleavy argues that the pursuit of large scale redevelopment projects based on the 
construction of high rise public sector housing was the product of a closed 
relationship between bureaucrats and private sector construction and design 
professionals who pushed the schemes through at highly inflated costs, at the expense 
of taxpayers and local authority tenants. In these circumstances, the relevant local 
authority agencies were in a delivery or contract bureau format and bureaucrats stood 
to gain from the resultant increase in budgets either directly in terms of staffing or 
from the potential kickbacks derived from the big construction firms in exchange for 
the granting of large monopoly contracts. Again, where public sector budgets have 
been linked to the provision of new development, then such projects appear to have 
been far more likely to go ahead.
The theory of bureaucratic behaviour presented in this section is clearly in need of 
additional empirical investigation. In particular, more rigorous statistical analysis of 
variables linking the budget structure of planning departments to relative rates of 
planning restraint is required. Nonetheless, the available evidence from Chester does 
offer preliminary support for the view that the decisions of local authority planning 
departments are made on the basis of budgetary considerations. Throughout most of 
non-metropolitan England these decisions are based almost exclusively on the 
expansion of a regulatory process which restricts the rate of development. It is surely 
significant that those areas pursuing the most restrictive planning regimes are almost 
devoid of economic development related functions. By contrast, the city of Chester
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has been unique amongst non-metropolitan areas in having a significant bureaucratic 
stake in the promotion of urban growth and hence has been unique in the relatively 
more liberal planning policies which it has attempted to pursue.
The above theory of bureaucratic incentives may also be modified to reconcile the 
apparently anomalous case of political behaviour in Chester with those of the wider 
public choice approach. It has been suggested thus far that non-metropolitan 
politicians, are biased against development because an anti-development policy is 
more likely to generate a concentrated block of electoral support than a pro­
development stance. In Chester however, a coalition of politicians at both the city and 
county council levels supported developers and planning bureaucrats in the case for 
allowing development in the green belt. Taken at face value such behaviour would 
appear to contradict the public choice approach. Again however, closer analysis of the 
specific institutional circumstances allows an account fully compatible with public 
choice theory without running the risk of tautological explanation.
From a public choice perspective politicians must consider a number of potentially 
decisive arguments in their utility functions when deciding whether to side with pro or 
anti-development interests. Positive sources of utility in support of development may 
include campaign contributions, wining and dining and other perquisites derived from 
business interests. Alternatively politicians may grant applications in exchange for the 
support of these interests in other areas of policy formation where they themselves 
have less of a direct stake. Against these considerations must be weighed the potential 
votes lost by adopting a pro-development stance and the politicians own preference for 
conservation. Aside from the developers themselves there are no organized interests 
who lobby for more building, because of the collective action problem facing 
consumers and the fact that many potential consumers do not actually live and vote in 
the areas concerned. Organized nimby lobbies however may represent a substantial 
block of votes, the threatened loss of which may exert leverage over the politician. 
Loss of political support may be direct, as members of environmental interest groups 
withhold their votes from the party/politician concerned, or indirect, stemming from a 
wider appearance of unpopularity stirred up by a particular planning dispute.
In most cases local politicians appear more inclined to side with the anti-development 
camp, opting for the perceived electoral payoff rather than the potential perquisites 
from business interests. This is unsurprising, because planning applications especially 
those in designated sites are highly visible and usually stir up a concentrated block of 
nimby opposition. Allegations of political corruption in support of developers are 
easily made and the often high profile media coverage of such cases creates a political
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climate largely unfavourable to pro-developer concerns. Faced with these 
circumstances the weighting of the utility function is likely to be heavily skewed 
towards the consideration of anti-development interests. If politicians are seen to rule 
in favour of development, one would expect to find evidence of institutional factors 
which might alter the relative weightings in the utility function. In Chester the 
presence of DAS provides a plausible explanation of why politicians were more 
sympathetic to developer concerns than is the case in similar non-metropolitan areas.
Faced with the presence of highly vocal amenity interests the only conceivable way for 
a politician to maintain support is to mobilize a pro-development constituency beyond 
the developer lobby itself. One such tactic is to promote proposals on the grounds of 
increasing local employment opportunities and benefits from the expansion of the local 
economy. In so doing, political entrepreneurs may attempt to counter the influence of 
the nimby lobby by stimulating wider public support for growth. One need only refer 
to the speed with which politicians have attempted to claim the credit for attracting 
high profile foreign investors to the UK in recent years, often at an enormous cost to 
the taxpayer - with subsidies up to £70 000 per job according to some estimates (The 
Economist, February 1st 1997). However, just as it is difficult for planning 
bureaucrats to lobby for economic development budgets where demand conditions are 
already high, so politicians in high demand areas face a similar institutional constraint 
in attempting to market development in terms of the benefits from additional 
employment.
In Chester however, the presence of DAS may again have been responsible for 
producing a somewhat different pattern of incentives. Throughout the entire dispute 
over the future of the greater Chester green belt, local politicians on both the 
Conservative and Labour sides repeatedly used the DAS of the city and the need to 
create employment opportunities implied by the designation as justification for the 
release of green belt land. Politicians stressed the importance of a pro-growth stance if 
the city was to continue in receipt of European and DTI regional development grants 
and other employment related subsidies (Cheshire County Council 1992). The 
opportunity to receive such grants would itself raise the patronage benefits of 
supporting development as politicians have the potential to use their discretion not 
only to grant planning applications, but also to influence the flow of subsidies and 
grants into the coffers of business interests. It is reasonable to assume that it was 
partly the prospect of augmenting such patronage powers which led local politicians to 
support planning bureaucrats in lobbying the DTI for the extension of DAS in the first 
place.
222
In addition to these factors, the political composition of the city council would also 
indicate a possible lowering of the vote motive and hence the incentive to adopt a more 
anti-development stance. At the commencement of the dispute in 1987 the Chester 
City Council was controlled by the Conservative Party, though following the district 
elections in 1990 the position changed to no overall control, with the Conservatives 
the largest single party, Labour second and the Liberal Democrats third. Of the three 
sites chosen for development, one (Wrexham Road) was a safe Conservative area 
represented by two councillors, and the others (Countess of Chester and Mannings 
Lane) were safe Liberal Democrat wards (Interview 37, Head of the Conservative 
Group Chester City Council, Interview 38, Head of the Labour Group).
Under these circumstances Labour councillors had relatively little incentive to vote 
against the proposals given that the affected areas offered little prospect of immediate 
electoral gain. Significantly however, Labour support was partly conditional on 
assurances that land release would not be extended to include the Blacon Meadows 
site (owned by Wainhomes) and the Sealand Basin, both in Labour held wards - a 
typical example of logrolling. Similarly, that the majority of Conservatives supported 
the proposals is unremarkable, given that two of the sites were in Liberal wards, 
though again one Conservative councillor representing an affected area (Wrexham 
Road) voted against. The most concerted opposition came from the Liberal Democrats 
representing affected areas in Upton and Mannings Lane and in particular from one 
member in the Upton area who was also a member of the local CPRE. Not 
surprisingly the prospective Conservative parliamentary candidate for Chester (Gyles 
Brandreth), sitting on a Westminster majority of only 4 500, was also opposed to the 
scheme.
It seems highly unlikely that the composition of the council would have changed as a 
result of the ramifications from the green belt dispute.Thus, from the assumption of 
the self interested political actor it is not surprising that the potential increase in 
patronage benefits from a pro-growth policy was able to secure a majority coalition 
between Conservatives and Labour on the council. It is equally unsurprising that the 
major source of opposition came from councillors in wards directly affected by the 
plans and likely to receive the greatest flak from nimby opposition.
From a public choice perspective, it is plausible to suggest that the pro-growth stance 
of Chester politicians stemmed at least in part from a set of institutional circumstances 
which increased the value of benefits and reduced the political costs of development. 
On the one hand, the presence of DAS raised the prospect of additional patronage 
power for local politicians and at the same time afforded a propaganda opportunity to
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deflect opposition from the nimby lobby. On the other, the political makeup of the city 
council may have lowered the potential significance of anti-development votes. 
Combined with the relatively greater economic stake of planning bureaucrats in 
supporting growth, the institutional conditions in Chester would appear to have been 
far more conducive to the development of a public sector growth coalition than in 
comparable areas in non-metropolitan England.
National Bureaucrats and Politicians
The proposals to release green belt land in Chester were eventually defeated following 
repeated intervention by bureaucrats and politicians at the national level. This 
intervention culminated in the decision in March 1992, by the then Secretary of State 
for the Environment Michael Heseltine, to force the adoption of the Cheshire 2001 
Structure Plan, without the removal of green belt land in Chester.
The action of DoE bureaucrats in this regard seems most likely to accord with the 
visibility of decisions element of bureaucratic utility first discussed in chapter 4. In 
that chapter, it was argued that DoE officials having initially advanced a more pro­
development stance than their local authority counterparts following pressure from the 
House Builders Federation, increasingly moved towards an equally restrictive stance 
given a political context which significantly raised the visibility and hence the political 
costs of planning disputes on the national stage.
The late 1980s and early 1990s were marked by a number of attempts by large house 
building consortia to secure the release of green belt and other designated sites. In a 
number of highly publicized cases, national DoE bureaucrats and their political 
masters were faced with appeals by developers to release land against the wishes of 
both local planners and groups such as CPRE. Tillingham Hall in Essex, Stone Basset 
in Oxfordshire, Upper Donnington in Berkshire and Foxley Wood in Hampshire, to 
mention the most famous, achieved national media prominence, as test cases of central 
government commitment to maintaining the integrity of designated environmental 
sites. All of these applications proved highly contentious and placed bureaucrats and 
politicians on a tightrope political situation. In the case of Foxley Wood and Upper 
Donnington, the Secretary of State Nicholas Ridley originally granted the appeals, but 
following a storm of opposition organized by the CPRE and a number of 
Conservative MPs, these decisions were overturned by his replacement Chris Patten 
(Ehrman 1990, Pennington 1996).
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The highly visible nature of the appeal cases significantly raised the costs to DoE 
bureaucrats of co-operating with the building lobby and as a result not a single one of 
the above proposals was granted with final approval. Moreover it was as a response to 
these disputes that DoE bureaucrats under pressure from the CPRE began drafting 
proposals which would culminate in the introduction of the plan-led development 
control system in the 1991 Planning and Compensation Act. As discussed previously, 
these proposals have placed increasing emphasis on the local plan process and have 
reduced the ability of developers to challenge local decisions through the appeals 
procedure. DoE participation in the planning system has thus shifted from one of high 
profile and controversial appeal rulings, to relatively low profile and clandestine 
consultation with local authorities in the preparation of their development plans. In this 
sense DoE bureaucrats have adopted a form of regulation which reduces their political 
visibility in the regulatory game.
Set in this context it is not difficult to see why DoE bureaucrats should have been so 
opposed to the Chester proposals, even though in this particular case, development 
had the active support of local planners. Put simply, if the DoE had allowed 
development of the Chester green belt, then this may have triggered a new wave of 
speculative applications around other historic towns, such as Bath, Oxford, 
Cambridge, York and Norwich, thus raising the profile of civil servants just at the 
time when their interests pointed to a reduction in their political visibility.
It is equally unsurprising that the Secretary of State, should adopt such a strong anti­
development stance. The final decision to force the adoption of the Cheshire structure 
plan without modifications to the green belt, was made in March 1992, just one month 
before the general election. Significantly the Conservative majority in Chester (for the 
Westminster seat) prior to the election was only 4 500 and with similar green belt 
historic towns (Bath, Cambridge, Norwich and York) having Conservative majorities 
of less than 2 000 ( in York as low as 100) the implications of rejecting such high 
profile development could only be of benefit to the national electoral interests of the 
Conservative Party.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to examine an example of decision-making in the British land 
use planning system which on the 'supply side' in particular, appears to contradict the 
public choice models of political behaviour presented in earlier chapters. Far from
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refuting this approach however, the analysis presented here offers additional, if 
tentative support for the framework of reference provided by public choice theory. In 
particular, it can be argued that the policy of planners and councillors in Chester to 
allow substantial incursions into the green belt, stemmed from an unusual set of 
institutional circumstances where increases in development were of benefit to 
bureaucratic budgets and where the political costs of allowing such development were 
relatively lower than is often the case in other non-metropolitan and especially rural 
districts in England.
Inevitably, the conclusions derived from a single non-random case study can provide 
only tentative indications of support for a theory. Nonetheless, given the available 
evidence, the analytical framework set out here provides a useful set of working 
hypotheses which might in the future form the basis of more rigorous empirical 
investigation. In particular, multivariate regression analysis, correlating the budget 
structure of planning departments and rural/urban district distinctions, to differing 
degrees of planning restraint might be conducted. Additional case studies using the 
budget categorizations set out here as a framework of reference could also be 
employed to analyse on a more qualitative level the effect of institutional variations on 
the decision-structure which land use planners face. Most, if not all previous work on 
urban containment which has picked up an anti-development stance, has been 
conducted in non-metropolitan areas in the South East or in other areas where DAS 
has not been in evidence. Future research needs to be conducted in additional areas 
where DAS might alter the structure of incentives facing planners. A particularly 
useful line of inquiry might attempt to provide more detailed information on the nature 
of the budgeting process within planning departments in an attempt to pick up 
variations in inter-bureaux dynamics depending on the budget structure of the agency. 
These are questions for future research, the particular attraction of which is their 
potential to avoid the intellectual trap of untestable and tautological explanation. Thus, 
the focus on identifiable institutional variations which may affect the relative costs and 
benefits of political action, might help avoid the tendency in some public choice work 
to explain away empirical anomalies by way of indiscriminate addition to the content 
of utility functions.
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7 -Conclusion : Land Use Planning - Public or Private Choice ?
7.0 Introduction
The previous pages have sought to examine whether the external costs imposed by 
the British land use planning system and its commitment to urban containment, are a 
product of institutional incentives inherent to state-regulated property rights. In so 
doing, the thesis has represented the first attempt to examine the dynamics of the 
planning system from a public choice perspective. This framework is crucially 
necessary for any examination of public policy designed to improve on the workings 
of the market system, the importance of which cannot be overstated given current 
trends towards still greater levels of government regulation in response to the 
emerging environmental agenda. Through an in depth analysis of urban containment
. the present thesis has attempted to assess the theoreticafand empiricalf contributions 
of public choice theory with respect to a key aspect of British environmental policy.
cx
The theoretical framework set out in this thesis suggested a focus on the importance 
of transactions costs and decision making incentives in the private and public 
sectors. The environmental failures of private markets, often used to justify land use 
planning, are a product of high transactions costs which prevent individuals making 
agreements with one another and prevent the effective monitoring of individual 
behaviour. However, as public choice theory suggests, the mere existence of 'market 
failures' should not necessarily be considered a prima facie justification for 
government intervention. The alternative to markets is not a costless world where all 
externalities are internalized, but the reality of an institutional setting where 
transactions costs may pose an equal threat to successful environmental 
management. It is to commit the 'nirvana fallacy' to suggest that the alternative to 
markets is a government immune from institutional failure.
7 There is now a considerable body of empirical research, examining the 
consequences of the British land use planning system and its commitment to urban 
containment, which suggests that planning may itself be responsible for the creation 
of unintended externalities. In particular, planning has contributed to an increase in 
the relative cost of housing and therefore a transfer of wealth from consumers to 
property owners; has increased dwelling densities and urban congestion; has 
lengthened commuting distances; and has ensured a continued context for 
subsidized, environmentally damaging farming practices. The presence of these
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external costs does not prove that they outweigh the potential benefits of land use 
planning - principally the maintenance of open countryside - but what it does 
suggest, is the need to avoid the 'nirvana fallacy' when considering the case for 
government intervention in the market for land. In particular, the public choice 
framework suggests an examination of whether the commitment to urban 
containment is a reflection of underlying incentives within the policy-making 
process itself. If institutional defects within the planning system allow costs to be 
passed on to others, if wealth is not dependent on the quality of the decisions made 
and if there is a chronic lack of information, then it is possible to question the 
commitment to urban containment on the grounds of institutional failure.
Based on this framework, three general hypotheses provided the focus for empirical 
investigation : that the commitment to urban containment reflects i) an asymmetric 
distribution of costs and benefits between different actors on the 'demand' side of the 
political process; ii) the economic interests of the administrative bureaucracy on the 
'supply' side; and iii) the electoral and economic interests of politicians on the 
'supply' side. If indeed the external costs associated with containment are attributable 
to institutional defects within the state, then far from seeking a further extension of 
controls perhaps it is time to question the existing level of public intervention.
Within this context, this final chapter reviews the main research conclusions in light 
of the central hypotheses. The first half of the chapter sketches out the main 
empirical findings, examining the strengths and possible weaknesses of the public 
choice approach in relation to alternative analyses of the planning system. It then 
goes on to consider the primary limitations of the current work and the implications 
for future research in this regard. The second half of the chapter examines some of 
the normative implications for the planning system which might be derived from the 
public choice approach. In particular, how might a private property rights alternative 
help to avoid the external effects produced by the contemporary British planning 
system?
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7.1 Positive Analysis: Urban Containment and the Power o f Public Choice
Empirical Findings
The empirical analysis which formed the core of this thesis commenced with an 
account of interest group behaviour on the 'demand' side of the political system. 
Following Olson (1965) and the contributions of the Virginia school ( Buchanan & 
Tullock 1982, Tullock 1989,1993), public choice theory suggests that the 
organizational success of interest groups tends to depend inversely on group size and 
that policies whose costs are hidden or dispersed are more likely to be adopted than 
ones whose costs are conspicuous or concentrated. The analysis of interest group 
representation in the British planning system (chapter 3) was shown to offer broad 
support for this analytical framework. All the groups which have benefited from the 
commitment to urban containment are examples of concentrated interest groups. The 
farm lobby has been protected by the planning system and has achieved concentrated 
benefits through the growth in subsidies at both the domestic and European level, 
without regard to the cost in terms of habitat destruction; the nimby/conservation 
lobby has benefited from the enhancement of amenity values in locally specific 
sites; the house building lobby and especially the large developers have received 
concentrated benefits from the reduction in competition as a result of regulatory 
growth; and the professional lobby has benefited in terms of the increased demand 
for consultancies resulting from an ever more extended bureaucratic process.
By contrast, the interests which bear the costs of containment policies; the marginal 
consumers of housing who are no longer able to afford the rent or purchase price of 
residential units; existing consumers who must accept smaller and more cramped 
living conditions; the commuters faced with longer journeys to work; and the 
taxpayers who must continue to fund a subsidy-dependent and environmentally 
destructive rural economy, provide the archetypal case of a large and diffuse set of 
interests, largely absent from the realm of organized politics and with little incentive 
to become so organized.
The public choice analysis summarized above, is not the first theoretical stance to 
highlight the importance of interest group pressures in the land use planning system. 
As chapter 2 indicated, four alternative perspectives ; structural political economy, 
pluralist political economy, elite theory and Weberian sociology - have also 
attempted to explain the development of urban containment policy. It is, however,
one of the over-riding arguments of this thesis that the public choice approach 
appears better placed, in both theoretical and empirical terms, to explain the pattern 
of interest group representation.
With respect to structuralist approaches, the apparent willingness of politicians to 
allow the continued growth of land use regulation, indicated by the rapid retreat 
from a de-regulation strategy by the Thatcher government, questions the foundations 
of these analyses, whether they are neo-Marxist or corporatist in origin. In general, 
these approaches suggest that politics will be dominated by the demands of 
corporate business interests resulting in a fragile commitment to urban containment 
(Ball 1983). As the analysis presented in this thesis has suggested, however, 
regulation on urban development has continually increased and although, as the 
occasional corporatist theorist (Rydin 1986) has recognized, business interests such 
as house builders may gain from this process (through the reduction in competition), 
it appears that regulatory growth in recent years has been inspired, at least in part, by 
non-buisness interests and in particular rural homeowner groups organized around 
predominantly 'nimby' concerns. Thus, the tightened regulatory regime introduced 
following the 1991 Planning and Compensation Act appeared to owe much to the 
lobbying activities of the CPRE, in spite of opposition from the building lobby. That 
the CPRE should exercise this degree of influence on the legislative processes of the 
central state tends to contradict the structuralist analysis, including its more 
sophisticated 'dual state' variant which allows for a more pluralist decision-making 
process at the local level only (Short et al 1986). It should be recognized that some 
variants of neo-Marxism and corporatism have suggested that the state may allow 
periodic concessions to non-business interests in an attempt to maintain the political 
legitimacy of capitalism in the longer term and might thus be reconciled with the 
available evidence (Ambrose 1986). In so doing, however, the structuralist position 
tends towards tautological argument, claiming that whatever the state does must 
somehow serve the interests of the corporate sector.
With its emphasis on a competitive political system, allowing access not only to 
powerful business interests, the approach of pluralism seems to offer a more 
empirically accurate account than the structuralist alternative (Healey 1990). As 
argued in chapter 2, however, a difficulty with pluralism is its tendency to focus on 
organized interests and its neglect of the possibility, highlighted by public choice 
theory, that some interests may face structural disincentives to mobilization and as a 
result may be excluded from the political process. A similar critique applies to much 
Weberian sociology (Shucksmith (1990), which tends to observe the groups which 
have exercised political power without examining any of the organizational
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advantages which allow these particular interests to achieve such a position. With 
respect to urban containment policy this is a potentially serious theoretical failing, 
because the principal losers from the planning system - housing consumers, 
taxpayers and those environmental interests not focused on 'nimby' concerns - are 
indeed groups which may face substantial collective action problems.The number of 
individuals concerned is so large and diffuse and the per capita stake so low that 
these groups have often remained absent from the planning system and as a result 
their interests appear not to have been a focus of political concern.
Public choice theory appears to offer a plausible explanation for the absence of 
consumer and taxpaying interests in the planning system and the tendency for 
broader environmental movement to be less well mobilized than nimby interests. 
However, the approach is on weaker ground in relation to pluralism, when 
explaining the wider context of collective action and the effect this may have on the 
actual rate of mobilization observed. In particular, as chapter 3 suggested, the 
substantial mobilization of the broader environmental lobby which occurred in the 
late 1980s, although still below the level experienced by nimby groups, cannot 
simply be explained with reference to selective incentives as public choice theory 
would imply. Rather, macro-movements in public opinion, open to pluralistic 
pressures from the media and external organizations, may also affect the ability of 
groups to mobilize by altering public perceptions of the groups' political viability 
and creating new opportunities for group leaders to encourage higher levels of 
membership than a conventional Virginia public choice account would suggest. 
Thus, collective action problems on the demand side of the political process are an 
important explanatory variable, but they sometimes need to be considered against a 
macro-political background where more pluralistic pressures may also be at play.
A further perspective on interest groups - elite theory - has also attempted to 
overcome the neglect of latent interests within pluralism, which public choice theory 
has exposed. Theorists in this tradition stress the ability of groups who have seized 
control of the state to suppress the ability of latent interests to mobilize and therefore 
to induce 'non-decision-making' (Bachratz and Baratz 1962,1970). The difficulty 
with elite theory, however, is that many cases of undermobilization appear not to be 
the result of interests being actively squashed, but are a more a product of the 
structure of incentives faced by the potential members of latent groups (Dowding et 
al 1993). Thus, the fact that housing consumers and taxpayers have been excluded 
from the land use planning system, does not appear to have resulted from the actions 
of the principal winners in the system, but has rather been the product of the
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substantial disincentive to collective action and the phenomena of concentrated 
benefits and dispersed costs which disadvantage these particular groups.
In general, the analysis of demand side pressures put forward by public choice 
theory appears to offer a theoretically sound and empirically accurate account of 
interest group processes in the British planning system. In particular, it is able to 
explain the continued commitment to urban containment and the distribution of 
gains and losses resulting from it, as a product of collective action problems and 
fundamental asymmetries in costs and benefits to the different actors concerned. 
Public choice theory is not, however, without its weaknesses and may need to be 
supplemented with more pluralist accounts which may better explain the general 
movements of public opinion at the macro-political scale which in turn provide the 
context in which collective action occurs.
Collective action problems may indeed be an important factor affecting the ability of 
interest groups to wield political power, but the capacity to overcome these 
constraints may be worthless unless there are political actors willing to respond to an 
interest groups' demands. Within this context, a further strength of public choice 
theory is its ability to specify the economic incentives which may drive the actions 
of 'supply-side' actors such as bureaucrats and politicians, the importance of which 
has tended to be underemphasized in existing interpretations of the planning system. 
Thus, chapter 4 presented a public choice analysis of bureaucratic incentives, 
focusing on the role of regulatory agencies in the management of land use change.
Following Niskanen (1971), public choice theory argues that public sector 
bureaucrats are predominantly self interested actors who seek the benefits of job 
security, power and patronage and that in order to pursue these goals may seek to 
maximize their agency budget. Chapter 4 identified three variables in particular, 
which have been shown to influence incentives towards budget maximization; i) the 
extent to which budgetary increments are spent within a bureaux or are destined for 
lobby groups able to supply perquisites to civil servants; ii) the degree of 
professionalization within an agency; and iii) the extent to which an agency is 
populated by ideologically motivated staff. Those agencies which score highly in 
terms of these variables have been shown to be more inclined towards bureaucratic 
growth. Applying this framework to the planning system it was argued that 
institutional, professional and ideological incentives with planning bureaux tend to 
be skewed towards budget maximization and to a greater extent than in comparable 
agencies across the rest of the public sector.
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The above theory was examined in the light of comparative time series data on 
expenditure and staffing. The analysis suggested that the growth rate in the planning 
budget over the last thirty years has consistently outstripped that of other 
government bureaux. In turn, this theory was shown to be of particular relevance to 
urban containment because the process of budget maximization in planning agencies 
may be synonymous with regulatory maximization and the adoption, especially in 
non-metropolitan areas of a strong anti-development stance. Planners tend to be 
biased against development because their budgets are linked to the growth of a 
complex administrative system and there may often be little incentive to rule in 
favour of new building because of the high level of political hostility attached to 
such decisions.
In order to consider some potential counter-evidence to the analysis in chapter 4, 
chapter 6 presented a case study of decision-making in a major non-metropolitan 
authority which appeared to contradict the earlier account and the many previous 
studies of the planning system which have suggested a general anti-development 
bias. Far from refuting the account of institutional incentives however, the analysis 
offered additional, if tentative support for the public choice approach. Thus, it was 
suggested that the policy of local planners in Chester to allow substantial incursions 
into the Green Belt, resulted from an unusual set of institutional incentives within a 
non-metropolitan authority, where increases in development were of benefit to 
bureaucratic budgets. Whereas most other non-metropolitan planning authorities are 
almost devoid of pro-growth functions, the presence of Development Area Status 
(DAS) in Chester, raised the relative benefits to bureaucrats from allowing 
development above the level to be found in otherwise comparable areas of non­
metropolitan England. In these circumstances, planning bureaucrats had a greater 
incentive to resist demand side pressures from the nimby lobby in order to widen 
their options for bureaucratic expansion.
By specifying the pursuit of clear objectives and their association with budget 
maximizing strategies, the public choice approach summarized above, offers a 
plausible explanatory link between the interests of land use planners and the growth 
of the policies which these individuals have tended to support. In so doing, public 
choice theory appears in a rather better position than alternative theoretical analyses 
which have tended to neglect the role of supply side agents in the planning system. 
Structuralist and pluralist perspectives have, for example, tended not to specify what 
the individual interests of planning bureaucrats actually are. In the former case, 
planners are often seen as part of a state machine which is functionally programmed 
to preserve the political legitimacy of capitalism and to act in the long term interests
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of the corporate sector (Ambrose 1986). In the latter case, planners are viewed as 
neutral arbiters of public preferences acting as an impartial referee over the claims of 
competing interest groups (Healey 1990). Both of these perspectives seem somewhat 
out of tune with the empirical evidence on urban containment policy, which suggests 
that planners actively lobby for policies which reflect their own bureaucratic self 
interest, and in particular the growth of controls on urban development.
One perspective which has emphasized an independent role for planning bureaucrats 
is Weberian sociology and some related versions of elite theory (Reade 1987, 
Shucksmith 1990). These approaches, unlike structuralism and pluralism, have 
stressed the importance of bureaucrats' professional values and ideology and have 
argued that planners offer differential support for those policies which are in accord 
with these values. Thus, metropolitan planners committed to a welfarist ideology 
associated with economic growth, have tended to be more sympathetic to developers 
than those in non-metropolitan and especially rural districts who are often associated 
with a conservationist ethos and a commitment to urban containment. Such an 
approach is not dissimilar to the public choice analysis presented in this thesis, 
which includes professional ideology as a key component in bureaucratic utility 
functions.
Where Weberian theories do differ from public choice, however, is in the attribution 
of political power to planners. For most Weberians, the actions of planners are 
fundamentally constrained by the prevailing economic and political context in which 
they operate (Pahl 1979). Public choice theory, by contrast, whilst recognizing that 
bureaucrats operate within economic constraints, stresses the relatively privileged 
position of planners in the political process in relation to other groups such as 
taxpayers and consumers. In turn, this privileged monopoly position may help 
explain the apparent ability of planning bureaucrats to enlarge their budgets and to 
fuel the process of regulatory growth and urban containment. Public choice is, 
however, on rather weaker ground when explaining how the wider economic and 
political context may have structured or even created the institutional environments 
in which bureaucrats attempt to maximize their budgets. Thus, the possible 
difference in bureaucratic incentive structures between areas with and without DAS, 
highlighted in chapter 6, seems unlikely itself to have been created by the actions of 
land use planners. Rather, the creation of these different institutional regimes seems 
more likely to have been a product of broader political and economic forces 
operating at the macro-scale and in particular the actions of the Thatcher government 
in confining DAS to predominantly metropolitan authorities, with notable 
exceptions such as Chester. Similarly, the heightened significance of the
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environment in public opinion in the late 1980s, may have created a more favourable 
political context for non-metropolitan planners to push for regulatory maximization. 
Planners themselves, however, cannot be held responsible for the creation of this 
particular context. Consequently, a Weberian sociological approach, which 
recognizes the importance of broader economic and political factors, without the 
rigid functionalism of structural political economy, may provide a useful supplement 
to the public choice analysis.
Just as alternative explanations of urban containment policy have neglected the 
interests of bureaucratic actors on the supply side, so too they have tended to neglect 
the personal incentives facing politicians. Public choice, on the other hand, suggests 
that politicians are self-interested actors who seek the benefits of income, power and 
patronage which are afforded by a position in elected office and that they attempt to 
win elections by a process of log-rolling or vote-trading in order to secure political 
support.
Using evidence of voting significance, parliamentary patronage and an analysis of 
the select committee system, chapter 5 suggested that although the macro-electoral 
shift towards environmental concern in the late 1980s was a key factor in the 
government's decision to reinforce urban containment regulations, politicians were 
particularly quick to adopt such measures (compared to their relative inaction in 
other areas of environmental policy), because the nimby/conservation lobby 
represented a more concentrated set of environmental interests which may have 
exercised an increasing degree of electoral clout; directly in terms of a growing 
number of marginal constituencies which might theoretically have changed hands on 
the strength of the nimby/conservationist vote; and indirectly through the ability of 
this lobby to threaten the party identification strategies of the major parties. The 
analysis also revealed the potential for the exercise of patronage relationships within 
the House of Commons, especially on behalf of the agricultural lobby and suggested 
a coalition of interests in favour of containment regulation between the agricultural 
and conservation lobbies. On the one hand these groups have joined in a campaign 
for additional wealth transfers to the farming sector through the expansion of 
domestic conservation subsidies - discouraging the transfer of land into urban uses - 
and on the other have argued for the continuation of strict containment based 
regulations.
The case study material from Chester was again used to explore some possible 
counter evidence to the public choice approach. Although chapter 5 focused on 
electoral pressures at the national level, from a public choice perspective one would
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have expected non-metropolitan politicians at the local level to be even more 
susceptible to the electoral pressure from the nimby lobby, because of their greater 
proximity to the planning process and the greater frequency of local authority 
elections - an analysis confirmed by most previous research. In Chester, by contrast, 
local councillors lobbied alongside planners and developers for a substantial release 
of green belt land. Again, however, it was suggested from the perspective of public 
choice theory that the presence of Development Area Status - absent from most 
other non-metropolitan authorities - may have been responsible for raising the 
potential benefits to politicians of a more pro-development stance and providing 
sufficient incentive to counteract the influence of the nimby lobby.
As in understanding the bureaucracy, one of the strengths of public choice theory is 
its ability to specify clear motivational links between the self-interested actions of 
politicians - ie. the pursuit of votes and patronage power, and developments in urban 
containment policy. Alternative theoretical analyses have tended to lack a fully 
specified account of why individual politicians should offer their support for a given 
set of economic and social institutions. In the case of neo-Marxism and corporatism, 
for example, it is not at all clear what the individual interests of politicians in urban 
containment policy are and why in particular politicians should seek to maintain the 
legitimacy of capitalism as opposed to any other set of social arrangements. 
Similarly, Weberian and elite theory accounts have tended to view politicians as 
captive agents of whichever particular interest has seized control of the state. In the 
case of urban containment policy there is little indication that politicians might have 
independent objectives such as the pursuit of re-election.
Again, however, a possible area where Weberian sociology might provide a useful 
supplement to public choice theory concerns the importance of the broader 
economic context which structures the environment in which politicians attempt to 
secure votes. In the specific case of urban containment, for example, the growth of 
middle class owner occupation has been a key element in the economic context 
against which nimby collective action and the vote seeking response of politicians 
has occurred (Marsden et al 1993). Similarly, the presence of DAS in Chester, which 
may have altered the structure of incentives facing these politicians in relation to 
those in other non-meropolitan areas, owed much to the broader context of the 
economy in the 1980s and the actions of the Thatcher administration. Public choice 
theory itself, because of its reductionist approach, tends to say very little about such 
socio-economic trends and may well benefit from some of these broader insights.
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Of all the alternative explanations of politicians behaviour on the supply side, 
pluralism appears to offer the approach which has the greatest potential to rival the 
explanatory power of public choice analysis. In particular, with its emphasis on an 
impartial state responding to societal preferences, a pluralist account is compatible 
with the empirical evidence on the more recent growth in containment regulation, 
explaining this as a response to the macro-shift in public opinion towards increased 
environmental concern. As noted in chapter 5, this is a powerful explanation and 
there can be little doubt that movements in public opinion have been an important 
factor influencing the moves towards regulatory growth. A key limitation of public 
choice analysis is its tendency to underemphasize the more pluralistic processes 
which may affect the content of public opinion at the macro scale. Although some 
public choice accounts stress the ability of politicians to shape the contours of public 
opinion (Dunleavy & Ward 1981), even these approaches do not sufficiently account 
for the relevance of more pluralistic processes operating through the mass media and 
the pressure of daily events. Thus, much of the shift in public concern which has 
occurred in recent years may be attributed to the effect of environmental disasters 
highlighted by the mass media and external pressure from bodies such as the 
European Union and the United Nations (McCormick 1991, Robinson 1992).
Where the public choice approach does maintain an advantage, however, is by 
stressing the importance of collective action problems and asymmetries in the 
structure of costs and benefits to different actors in the political process and the 
likely impact of these on legislative incentives. In the specific case of urban 
containment, politicians may have been especially willing to propose the growth of 
containment regulation, compared to their relative failure to regulate in others areas 
of environmental concern, because the greater concentration of benefits involved 
may have been more likely to secure additional sets of votes. Similarly, unlike 
pluralism the public choice approach can also account for the continued lack of 
legislative attention paid towards consumer and taxpayer interests, with particular 
reference to the collective action problem and the phenomena of concentrated 
benefits/ dispersed costs which disadvantage these particular groups.
Given the limitations of both pluralism and public choice theory, a better approach 
might, as in chapter 5, seek to combine a pluralist account of the macro-electoral 
context, with a public choice analysis of the special interest processes which operate 
underneath. In turn, elements of Weberian sociology which emphasize the 
importance of the economic context as a constraining variable on political action 
might also be integrated with public choice theory to provide a less reductionist and 
more comprehensive account.
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To conclude, the over-riding strength of the public choice approach is its ability to 
highlight underlying institutional incentives in the political process which can be 
linked to observed policy outputs in the British planning system. On the demand 
side, the public choice account of urban containment stresses the differential ability 
of those actors demanding additional controls over urban development to overcome 
the collective action problem. On the supply side, public choice emphasizes the 
economic imperative of budget maximization in planning bureaucracies and its 
association with an expansion of the regulatory regime. Similarly, on the supply 
side, public choice highlights the lack of incentives for politicians to constrain 
regulatory growth because the benefits of regulation are concentrated on key 
constituent groups with costs invisibly dispersed across the mass of the urban 
population. In turn, this transactions costs approach provides a plausible explanation 
which may account, at least in part, for the continued expansion of restrictive urban 
containment regulation in the British planning system.
Public choice theory is not, however, without its weaknesses and cannot provide an 
all encompassing account of the policy making process. In particular, its reductionist 
approach offers insufficient attention to the broader political and economic context 
in which self-interested political action occurs. Thus, at the macro-political level, 
the general climate of public opinion may affect the ability of interest groups to 
overcome collective action problems, of bureaucrats to maximize their budgets and 
the ability of politicians to respond to the demands of concentrated groups of rent 
seekers. Given the tendency for public choice theory to neglect such forces, more 
pluralistic accounts focusing on the role of the mass media and of external political 
pressures in the formation of public opinion, may be required to supplement the 
underlying public choice analysis. Similarly, public choice theory has relatively little 
to say with regard to the political and economic forces which often shape the actual 
institutional arrangements in which self-interested behaviour occurs. Aspects of 
Weberian sociology which lay emphasis on the importance of the constraints 
imposed by broader socio-economic processes, without resorting to the crude 
functionalism of structuralist approaches might provide a useful supplement in this 
regard. In turn, the synthesis of pluralist and Weberian insights, with an underlying 
public choice account of institutional forces in representative democracy, might 
allow a still better understanding of urban containment policy to be achieved.
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Data Limitations and Implications for Future Research
The summary of empirical findings presented above suggests broad support for the 
view that the development of urban containment policy within the British planning 
system is a product, at least in part, of the institutional incentives identified by 
public choice theory. It is important to recognize, however, that because the public 
choice account can be reconciled with the available evidence, does not of itself 
establish a causal link between public choice processes and the pattern of policy 
development observed.
The problem of confusing correlations in social science with causal processes is of 
particular relevance to arguments internal to public choice theory itself and in 
particular the inherent difficulty of distinguishing the precise role played by 
'demand' and 'supply' factors in the 'political market'. If, for example, the argument is 
based on the assertion that incentives facing all the key actors lead to an increase in 
regulation (interest groups, bureaucrats and politicians), is it actually possible to 
distinguish specific public choice processes operating independently on each side of 
the ‘political market’? Could not, for example, the increase in regulation be 
explained solely by 'demand' side factors without reference to the operation of self- 
interest within the bureaucracy and the legislature?
In these circumstances, the extent to which it is possible to identify causal 
relationships is dependent on the quality of the available data. The evidence 
presented in this thesis does suggest the significance of public choice processes 
operating on each side of the political market, but the data are not without significant 
weaknesses which would need to be addressed in future research if the public choice 
approach is to move beyond the status of a working hypothesis. In what follows the 
nature and quality of the empirical evidence presented in this thesis is considered 
and implications for future research design are outlined.
The empirical material presented in chapter 3 suggested an independent role for 
public choice processes on the demand side. In particular, that the logic of collective 
action was in operation was evidenced by the differing degrees of mobilization 
within the environmental lobby. Using a combination of primary interview material 
and secondary data sources the analysis suggested that nimby groups are better able 
to overcome the collective action problem than other environmental interests and 
taxpayers/consumers because of the higher per capita stake involved in the 
preservation of amenity and property values. The evidence on relative rates of
239
mobilization within the environmental lobby and in particular evidence that local 
amenity societies were able to mobilize much earlier than other environmental 
groups was supportive of this interpretation. A principal weakness of this data, was 
however, its rather aggregate quality. Thus, although it is possible to reconcile the 
differing degrees of mobilization within the environmental lobby with the public 
choice approach, in the absence of more localized studies along the lines of the 
Chester material (chapter 6), it is not possible to say conclusively that nimby 
incentives are the crucial variable at play. There is a paucity of UK literature 
examining participation/mobilization rates for environmental issues such as air 
pollution and water quality (ie. non-nimby concerns) at the local level to form a 
comprehensive base for more rigorous comparative purposes. Future research would 
need to develop a typology of environmental issues according to the expected 
relevance of nimby incentives and then examine mobilization rates and participation 
in the political process across a representative group of case studies. If indeed non­
nimby issues could be shown to exhibit lesser degrees of mobilization/participation 
then this would provide additional confirmation of the public choice analysis. Until 
this data is available then the public choice explanation must remain as a working 
hypothesis.
Turning to the evidence on the role of bureaucrats, one of the strengths of the data 
presented in chapter 4 was the actual attempt to quantify the level of expenditure 
growth in planning departments. A substantial body of work on the land use 
planning system has built up over recent years, but until now few if any authors have 
presented any empirical data on the level of resources available to planners. The 
presentation of expenditure data over a thirty year period displays with a degree of 
clarity the trend in the finances available to planning departments and highlights the 
inadequacies in previous work (see for example Thomley 1991), which has often 
claimed that resources have been cut (especially under the Thatcher administration) 
without any recourse to the actual expenditure figures.
In turn, the material in chapter 4 did point to the independent role of the planning 
bureaucracy in the growth of expenditure. In particular, the sheer scale of the 
difference in the growth rate of the planning budget over the last thirty years, which 
has consistently ran at three times the level of real growth in other areas of the public 
sector, offered a possible indication of the role played by the peculiar incentives 
within planning bureaux. Similarly, there was some evidence of a tendency towards 
cost escalation in the evaluation of planning applications, with the 600% real 
increase in expenditure between the early 1960s and early 1990s far outstripping the 
growth in the number of applications. A significant weakness of the data in chapter 4
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however, resulted from its' lack of a more precise indication of demand side 
pressures and in particular those derived from the building industry. The material on 
planning applications in particular, can at most give only a general indication of the 
growth of demand and in the absence of measures which can account more 
rigorously for the effects of the size and complexity of development proposals the 
contention that planners were responsible for bureaucratic expansion may only be 
viewed as a working hypothesis. In order to offer conclusive support for the public 
choice account, future research needs to develop a more reliable measure of demand 
in relation to expenditure. In particular an index of planning applications, weighted 
to account for the size of applications would be most valuablein this regard. The 
national Development Control Statistics published by the DoE are, however, 
notoriously difficult to weight successfully (Rydin 1989). Given the inadequacies of 
the published data sources , a more fruitful approach might be to select a 
representative group of case studies and to access the relevant local authorities own 
databases which are more detailed in their documentation of applications in terms of 
size/complexity criteria. If it can be shown that the growth in spending continues to 
outstrip demand then this would indicate additional support for the public choice 
explanation.
Alternatively, a more qualitative approach using participant observation techniques 
within planning departments, might glean additional insights on the extent to which 
planners attempt to inflate costs in the process of development control and are as a 
result, responsible for bureaucratic expansion. Such methods might be particularly 
useful given the tendency in public choice analysis, in spite of its individualistic 
basis, to examine rather aggregate general trends, without due regard to the actual 
behavioural patterns of individuals operating in particular institutional environments 
at the micro scale (Friedman 1995).
The case study material presented in chapter 6 was also used to illustrate the 
independent role of the planning bureaucracy on the supply side. In particular, the 
apparently anomalous case of a non-metropolitan authority lobbying for the 
substantial release of green belt land was explained in terms of the effect on 
bureaucratic incentives provided by the designation of Development Area Status. 
Thus, a major strength of the empirical material in this chapter was its ability to 
locate a quantitative difference in the relative importance of the economic 
development function as a variable which might account for the observed difference 
in behaviour. The principal weakness of this material however, resulted from its 
status as a single, non-random case study. When using such studies for comparative 
purposes care must be taken to ensure that the research does indeed examine
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phenomena which are distinctive to the case study. Although the Chester case 
fulfilled these criteria it is still possible that further case studies might locate other 
variables in addition to the presence of Development Area Status which may also 
affect the degree to which planning bureaucrats are sympathetic/unsympathetic to 
development proposals. Thus, it was noted that there is some indication that urban 
districts within the non-metropolitan group may be more likely to allow 
development than their rural neighbours, as part of an attempt to expand their 
jurisdictional boundaries and hence revenues.
In order to judge the relative significance of these factors a more rigorous empirical 
investigation is required. Multi-variate regression analysis, correlating budget 
structures of planning departments and rural/urban distinctions to a measure of 
planning restraint might prove an appropriate technique in this regard. If an adequate 
measure of planning restraint can be devised, statistically significant correlations 
would yield additional support for the public choice approach. Such techniques are 
not, however, without problems and in particular there is often a serious question of 
data reliability when comparing the aggregate figures derived from planning 
agencies. Different planning departments in different authorities do not always 
collect the relevant data on planning applications and budget structures on a 
consistent and reliable basis, reducing the value of a quantitative approach. 
Alternatively, a comparative methodology using additional case studies conducted in 
both DAS/ non-DAS authorities and in rural/urban authorities within the non­
metropolitan category, might be employed to analyse on a more qualitative level the 
relative significance of the institutional variables identified in this thesis. Again, if 
these studies were to identify policy differences according to authority types then 
this might indicate strong support for the public choice explanation.
With respect to the evidence on legislative incentives one of the strengths of chapter 
5 was its provision of empirical examples indicating the possible incentives which 
politicians might face. Previous studies of the planning system have, for example, 
simply stated the potential electoral importance of the nimby lobby without ever 
producing sufficient evidence to examine the potential significance of this 
phenomenon (see for example Marsden et al 1993). The material indicating the 
potential significance of green belt marginals, agricultural patronage in parliament 
and the membership structure of the select committees, at least helps to provide 
some indication of the underlying incentives which may be at play. The data 
suggested that although macro-political processes were an important factor in the 
development of urban containment policy, special interest forces and in particular 
those of nimbyism and agricultural protectionism were also in operation. In order to
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support the argument that the macro-significance of the environment alone did not 
fully account for recent developments in the planning system, the growth of 
containment regulation was contrasted with legislative inaction in other areas of 
environmental concern. The principal weakness of this evidence, however, relates to 
the still rather inadequate coverage of the full range of environmental policy areas in 
the existing literature which was used as a base for comparative analysis. In order to 
remedy this defect, comparative research needs to be conducted on a much wider 
range of environmental issues (as with chapter 3 above). In particular, a typology of 
environmental policies could be developed, with issues categorised according to the 
asymmetries in costs and benefits which might be associated with particular 
environmental concerns. The development of such a typology for comparative 
policy analysis would allow for more rigorous evaluation of the extent to which the 
concentration of the prospective benefits is a key determinant of regulatory growth.
Overall, the limitations of the data presented in this thesis are such that it is not 
possible to say conclusively that the institutional incentives identified in the public 
choice framework are causally linked to developments in the British planning 
system. Nonetheless, given the weaknesses of the alternative theoretical perspectives 
there is sufficient evidence to treat the contention that public choice theory explains 
the continued commitment to urban containment as a serious working hypothesis.
As such, the normative implications which might be derived from the public choice 
framework are due equally serious consideration and it is to these implications 
which attention now turns.
7.2 Normative Analysis : A Private Property Rights Alternative
The public choice analysis presented in this thesis suggested that policy failures 
within the British planning system may be attributable to defects within the very 
process of decision making itself. If this is indeed the case, then the external effects 
resulting from the commitment to urban containment should not be dismissed as an 
unfortunate example of ad hoc policy bungling, but instead may be viewed as a 
product of institutional failures which have been the focus of more general public 
choice critiques of the regulatory state. In turn, the normative implications of this 
analysis, at a time when still greater levels of government regulation are being 
proposed, merit serious consideration.
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In recent years and in particular following the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro 
(1992), advocates of land use planning have coalesced around an environmental 
agenda (Healey 1992, Blowers 1994, Thomley 1994). According to these authors, 
the planning system should now act as a strategic device, integrating land use 
policies into a wider framework to provide an appropriate balance between the goals 
of development and conservation. Indeed, even many critics of the post-war 
planning system hold to the view that statutory regulation by the state is essential if 
the ‘environmental failures’ of the market system are to be avoided (Simmie 1993). 
These arguments appear well to the fore in government policy documents which 
speak freely of an important role for land use planning in the achievement of 
‘sustainable development’ (DoE 1996).
In putting this case, however, defenders of the planning system appear to be 
committing an example of the nirvana fallacy. It is not clear, for example, why the 
planning system as presently constituted, should be capable of producing an 
‘integrated land use policy’ now, when it has been unable to do so in the past? If, as 
the present thesis has suggested, the external effects resulting from urban 
containment are linked to political transactions costs, then the market failure 
justification for the planning system should be treated with greater circumspection. 
Thus, deciding the appropriate boundaries of the state requires a careful examination 
of the transactions costs question, considering the relative merits of market and 
government decision-making on a case by case basis. What makes the continued 
adherence to the nirvana fallacy all the more unfortunate is that there may be much 
greater scope for harnessing the positive aspects of markets than is commonly 
recognised. In particular, a private property rights alternative may be able to reduce 
many of the external effects resulting from urban containment, allowing additional, 
but environmentally sensitive development in rural areas and a pattern of 
development considerably closer to the original ideals of the town planning 
movement than the present system of bureaucratic administration. The market 
alternative to the planning system will not be 'perfect' and there may still remain a 
residual role for the state in some key areas of concern. At the very least, however, 
the insights of the property rights approach might be utilized to suggest appropriate 
institutional reforms within a rather slimmer public sector. Thus, as Bennett (1991) 
explains, the general objective of environmental policy should be to integrate more 
environmental goods with the market economy, relying on government intervention 
only where transactions costs are extreme and making the greatest possible use of 
market forces when designing remaining intervention mechanisms. This may require 
a degree of government action to establish the relevant markets, but thereafter the
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actions of individuals , coordinated only by market forces, will deliver the policy 
outcomes.
In what follows, the potential contribution of a private property rights approach to 
the reduction of externalities associated with the British planning system is outlined. 
The first part sketches out the general theoretical basis of a property rights 
alternative, focusing in particular on the ability of private contractual arrangements 
in the market to internalize costs. The second and concluding part, examines the 
more specific contribution which such approaches might make to the reduction of 
the external effects associated with the continued commitment to urban containment.
Private Property Rights in Theory
The transactions costs framework set out at the beginning of this thesis, suggested 
that the presence of externality and collective/public goods problems which are the 
most frequently cited causes of market failure, are a product of the high cost of 
enforcing private property rights in certain resources. Examples of external benefits/ 
costs mean that markets fail to reflect the true values attached to these resources by 
the members of society. It is these external costs which are often used as a 
theoretical justification for land use planning.
When considering the case for a property rights alternative to planning, it is 
important to recognize that the ability of individuals to capture the full benefits and 
to bear the full costs from resource use, is not a static phenomenon (Anderson &
Leal 1991). Market failures are a product of high transactions costs, but the market 
process itself continually offers incentives for individuals to devise ways of reducing 
these costs and to internalize costs/benefits by developing new methods of 
converting what are currently collective/public goods into private marketable 
commodities. As Anderson & Leal (1991) note, any case of external benefits/costs 
provides fertile ground for an entrepreneur who can define new sets of property 
rights. Thus, a land owner or property developer who can devise ways of excluding 
non-payers from the benefits of a scenic view may reap a profit by attempting to the 
define the appropriate set of rights. If there is no demand for scenic views or other 
environmental amenities then few will attempt to internalize their external effects, 
but if people are willing to pay for these goods, profits will reward those who are 
most successful at marketing the relevant environmental values. In other words, 
property rights will tend to be defined when the benefits of doing so exceed the costs 
(Demsetz 1967). Profits will tend to reward the most innovative property rights
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entrepreneurs as the creative forces of competition lead to a diversity of 
environmental schemes to suit the desires of the consumers (Anderson & Leal 
1991).
From a public choice perspective, the virtue of private property rights solutions is 
that they may encourage the development of institutions which can make individual 
actors bear the full opportunity costs of their actions by bringing decisions within the 
realm of the competitive market system. Under these circumstances, consumers pay 
directly for the resources they use and have an incentive to monitor alternative 
suppliers in order to make the best choice possible, whilst entrepreneurs who 
succeed in satisfying the desires of their fellows may reap the rewards of their 
actions. The political process by contrast, tends in its very nature to externalize costs 
through the mechanism of collective decision.
Working from this perspective, public choice theorists and their cousins in the 
Coasian/property rights tradition have presented numerous examples which 
demonstrate the ability of market institutions to overcome transactions costs and to 
supply many of the environmental goods which it is often thought should be the 
monopoly preserve of the state.1 This approach is particularly appropriate to many 
of the questions which have been the focus of the land use planning system, given 
that there are a variety of relatively low cost transaction measures which can bring 
amenity values within the realm of the market.
One of the most frequently cited examples of the property rights approach is the use 
of private covenants and deed restrictions in contracts. In these circumstances, 
developers have an incentive to specify in contracts the particular activities which 
are to be permitted with respect to a set of properties for sale, in order to internalize 
external effects and capture the returns through higher asset prices (Ellickson 1973, 
Siegan 1974, Veljanowski 1988, Anderson & Leal 1991). Property rights 
entrepreneurship of this type facilitates trade in amenity values and may produce 
outcomes which are sensitive to individual preferences for environmental quality.
The case of restrictive covenants provides useful clarification of a key element in the 
property rights approach which is often misinterpreted by critics. Sagoff (1994) for
1 Coase himself was one of the first authors to follow such an approach. In an article entitled ,’The 
Lighthouse in Economics’, Coase showed that Lighthouses - often considered a collective good by 
many welfare economists and therefore unlikely to be provided by the private sector, were actually 
supplied privately in Britain before nationalization. Neo-classical analysis assumed that vessels could 
benefit from the lighthouse facility irrespective of payment. In fact, lighthouses were provided by 
harbour companies with fees charged on entrance to harbour. Those refusing to pay were simply 
excluded from the port (Coase 1989).
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example uses a famous illustration from Pigou. Suppose a firm wishes to build a 
factory in a quiet residential area; the residents will have to grin and bear the ugly 
face of the factory or pay the owners not to build in their neighbourhood. According 
to Sagoff (1994, p.225), a free market advocate would argue that the residents could 
express their wishes by compensating the factory owner for the marginal advantage 
between building in their neighbourhood and going to the next best location. 
Environmentalists he points out, would then see the possibility of a developer having 
received a 'bribe' not to build in one area, proceeding to extort payments from other 
communities by threatening to build there as well. Thus, Sagoff argues for statutory 
land use planning in order to eliminate similar 'market perversities'.
Sagoff s example, however, illustrates a failure to appreciate what the property 
rights approach would actually mean in practice. Under a market system there would 
be incentives for 'developers of quiet residential areas' to supply restrictive 
covenants in the initial terms of contract which forbid noxious land uses within 
particular neighbourhoods. In turn, these covenants would increase the sale prices of 
such developments, assuming that people would not purchase a house in an area 
where their neighbours could convert their property into a factory site. Those 
individuals choosing to live in an area where such controls were absent would 
already have expressed a preference for lower house prices and a higher level of 
environmental risk and so would not experience a breach of their property rights if 
the factory was built in the area. Where covenants exist, the factory developer would 
not be able to threaten the community because the residents would own the relevant 
rights. It is not the factory owner who receives compensation in this case, but the 
initial developer who marketed the covenants and hence defined the relevant set of 
property rights. There is no prospect of 'market perversities' under such a system 
because any breach of the restrictive covenant as any other breach of property rights 
(eg. theft) would be punishable through the courts.
In a more recent theoretical development, Foldvary (1994) advances the idea of the 
‘private proprietary community’ as an effective way to deal with the problem of 
externalities and collective goods. According to this perspective, most countryside 
goods categorized as non-excludable are in practice 'territorial goods' and are thus 
excludable by definition. The benefits of a scenic view or of attractive woodlands 
are present within a site specific area and since most of these goods involve some 
form of leisure or recreation activity or are associated with residential environments, 
so long as the relevant area is privately owned individuals must reveal their 
preferences to access the territory in question and the free rider problem is resolved 
(see also Buchanan & Stubblebine 1962 and Demsetz 1964, for a similar approach).
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The collective facilities provided by private shopping malls are another, smaller 
scale example of the ‘tie-in’ concept. Shopping centre merchants provide an array of 
collective goods through the market, such as malls, security forces, parking lots and 
a pleasant shopping environment, tied-in to the purchase of private merchandise. 
Welfare economists have typically objected that tie-ins of this genre are inadequate 
because competitors are able to enter the market offering comparable private goods 
at a lower price, by not bothering to tie-in a surcharge for the collective goods 
(Varian 1994). As Schmidtz (1994) has argued, however, there are many goods 
whose value is contingent on being provided as part of a package deal. Thus, 
shopping centre merchants who do not provide car parking or a litter collection 
service might well be able to charge less for food - but they will also lose the custom 
of those who value these services (witness the trend from town-centre to ‘out of 
town’ shopping in Britain). Likewise, a housing developer who fails to provide a 
package of restrictive covenants to protect amenity values, will lose custom to those 
competitors who do. As Schmidtz (1994) proceeds, "One does not have to be a 
visionary to realize that market forces can in theory provide shopping malls. But the 
point is that there is no a priori reason why similar structural tie-ins could not lead to 
the provision of a variety of other public goods as well,"(see also Brubaker 1975, 
Cowen 1985, 1988, Boudreaux 1993).
The private proprietary community model provides a relatively low cost transaction 
method of dealing with free rider problems in the provision of collective goods. So 
long as the relevant territorial area is owned by a single private agency or group of 
co-operating agencies able to charge for collective goods, free riding is not an 
option. Privately owned settlements provide the opportunity to capture amenity 
values through real market trades and to subject this provision to the discipline of 
competition on a range of territorial scales.
There are of course, clear similarities between the proprietary community approach 
and Tiebout’s (1956) public goods theory of local taxation. Tiebout suggested that 
citizens could select the communities which best satisfied their preferences for 
collective goods by choosing in which areas to live on the basis of local service 
provision and that competition between local authorities for citizens would prevent 
the exercise of monopoly power. The fundamental difficulty with the Tiebout 
approach however, is that local authorities are not private, profit making entities and 
as result cannot go bankrupt if they fail to deliver the services which consumers 
desire. Thus, the trend in many Western democracies has been for local authorities 
which have lost revenues over time, to turn into ‘demand side’ interest groups
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lobbying for central government transfer payments to make up for financial deficits 
and therefore to externalise costs. In the proprietary community model by contrast, 
all the rewards and penalties from community management accrue to the relevant 
developers removing the potential for such rent seeking behaviour (Foldvary 1994).
From the perspective of public choice analysis, each of these examples illustrates the 
potential for private property rights institutions to overcome transactions costs 
problems and to market environmental amenities. In each case, property rights are 
held privately and individual owners have an incentive to supply a level of 
environmental quality corresponding with consumer preferences in order to reap the 
rewards. By internalizing costs, the property rights approach allows individuals to 
make their own personal trade-offs between development and environmental 
amenity and to bear the full opportunity cost of their actions as the price system 
indicates the relative value placed on amenities by other individuals.
The private property rights approach suggests that entrepreneurial initiative within 
the market system provides an effective way of allocating environmental resources, 
but it does not however, imply the absence of all governmental activity. Rather, the 
property rights approach suggests that governments perform a radically different 
function to that envisaged in the welfare economics paradigm on which the 
advocates of land use planning draw. Thus, instead of acting in the role of central 
planner and regulator, government should confine itself to the provision of a stable 
legal system which can ensure the enforcement of contracts agreed to by private 
individuals. The former role implies that government concerns itself with 
discovering the wants and desires of the public in order to bring about central 
planning, an informational impossibility according to the Austrian school (Hayek 
1948). The latter involves government merely as a facilitator of voluntary exchange, 
strengthening rather than supplanting the market system in its vital information 
generating role (Buchanan 1986, Kwong 1990, Anderson & Leal 1991, Shaw 1994).
The private property rights approach will not be perfect and there may remain a 
residual role for the state in some key areas of environmental concern. For example, 
it should be apparent from the above analysis, that the property rights approach is on 
the strongest ground where private property rights can be defined over a relatively 
localized area, as when a developer includes deed restrictions and covenants to 
market environmental amenities. The property rights analysis is much weaker where 
transactions costs are extremely high and where environmental externalities may 
occur over a much larger territorial scale, atmospheric pollution control and species 
diversity being perhaps the most obvious examples. Consequently, there may remain
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a regulatory role for the state in seeking to limit the most serious externalities of this 
genre. In these circumstances, given the informational difficulties of central planning 
and the often inadequate incentives to efficiency in public sector agencies, attention 
should turn to the restructuring of institutional arrangements within the public sector 
in order to emulate the more positive aspects of markets. In particular, institutional 
reform should try to encompass an element of competition, in order to generate the 
maximum level of information and to limit the worst excesses of state monopoly 
control (Anderson & Leal 1991, Bennett 1991).
Private Property Rights and Urban Containment
The above analysis has sketched out in theoretical terms some examples of private 
property rights alternatives to the provision of goods which it is often thought may 
only be provided by the land use planning system. The final pages now examine 
more specifically how such an approach might help to reduce the main external costs 
which have been shown to result from the commitment to urban containment in the 
British planning system. Given the relative lack of actually existing property rights 
alternatives the analysis should not be seen as a comprehensive blueprint for policy 
change, but should rather be seen as a speculative exercise indicating the possible 
benefits of a property rights approach. In particular, how might such an approach 
contribute to a reduction in house prices, a reduction in dwelling densities, produce 
shorter commuting distances and contribute to a reduction in the environmental 
excesses of subsidized agriculture?
The key to understanding how a property rights approach might reduce the external 
costs associated with contemporary urban containment policy is to recognize that 
solutions such as restrictive covenants, private proprietary communities and other 
contractual devices, tend to ensure that costs are internalized to the greatest possible 
degree and as a result may allow individuals to make their own personal trade-offs 
with respect to greater levels of development and the protection of environmental 
amenity. Under these conditions individuals may be more likely to bear the full 
opportunity costs of their actions and as a result may be less likely to transfer costs 
to other sets of actors. The possible contribution of a property rights approach to a 
reduction in house prices provides a useful illustration in this regard.
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Under the current British planning system, land use designations such as Green Belts 
and AONBs restrict the supply of land for housing and as a result contribute to 
increased prices. In turn, the interest groups which lobby for these controls and the 
bureaucrats who enforce them are not faced with the full opportunity cost of their 
actions in the political system. Thus, the members of local amenity societies who 
gain from the increase in property values and the preservation of amenities do not 
take into account the cost imposed on future consumers of housing. Similarly, 
planning bureaucrats who obtain additional job security through the growth of a 
complex administrative system, have little incentive to consider the costs imposed 
on consumers and on other groups such as small developers who lose out as a result. 
In short, because regulations are obtained through the political process they are 
supplied at a political 'price' which does not reflect their full opportunity cost. In the 
specific case of the British planning system, the demand for containment regulation 
may be artificially high because it is catered for through the political system at 
below its true opportunity cost.
Under a restrictive covenant or private communities model by contrast, individuals 
seeking to restrict development in order to preserve amenities may have to compete 
directly in the market for land with other individuals who value the land in 
alternative uses. Consumers of residential amenity may have to pay developers 
directly for the provision of land use controls via contracts and may be more likely 
to face the full and immediate cost of their actions. A key feature of such a system 
might be a reduction in the overall level of restriction, because individuals no longer 
able to obtain restrictions at a subsidized level through the state, might cease to 
demand the equivalent level of control (Fischel 1985). As a result, a more diverse 
and flexible pattern of land management may emerge. Covenanted developments or 
proprietary communities might prevail where individuals were still prepared to pay 
the price for preventing additional development, but a more permissive system may 
prevail elsewhere. Thus, Siegan's (1974) classic study of the land use system in 
Houston, Texas, the one American city which has operated without a comprehensive 
system of land use regulation, found that restrictive covenants tended to be less 
comprehensive in their coverage of the city than land use controls in comparable 
cities with statutory regulation.2 According to Siegan, the increased flexibility of 
land use brought about by such a system facilitated greater levels of new residential
2It should be noted that the Houston system was not totally privatized - there were for example some 
minimum standards building regulations. What does make Houston distinctive and thus a good 
example of what might happen under a privatized system, is that unlike any other major American 
city there was no statutory planning/zoning ordinance. As late as the mid 1980s, the population of 
Houston voted down proposals to introduce zoning controls by way of referendums. I am not, 
however, aware of the precise situation at the present time.
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development and substantially lower land and house prices than in comparable 
American cities.
Prior to the advent of land use planning, restrictive covenants had a long history of 
use in the United Kingdom. One of the earliest examples of these privatized 
planning arrangements was at Victoria Park near Manchester. Originally laid out by 
a private developer in 1837, the park was operated privately until 1954 and the sale 
of its lots carried with them 'certain conditions, the "laws" of the Park, which 
protected its open spaces' (Spiers 1976, p. 13). Similarly, many of the most beautiful 
urban developments in Westminster, Bloomsbury, Chelsea, Hampstead, Oxford and 
Cambridge have been preserved through private restrictive covenants. These 
covenants have included restrictions on noise, chimney smoke and permitted 
alterations to exterior design in order to internalize external effects (West 1969).
It is important to note at this point that a property rights approach would not 
necessarily result in a sudden and dramatic fall in property prices, as might occur if 
all planning controls were removed overnight. Such an approach would not be at all 
desirable, wiping off billions of pounds from property and commercial investments 
(Evans 1988). The point of the property rights approach is not to remove all 
controls, but rather to have the level of restriction determined in the market, by way 
of covenants or contractual equivalents, rather than a system of administrative 
regulation. Covenants may exist in order to conserve areas where amenity and 
landscape values might be very high, but because individual consumers would have 
to pay directly for the preferred level of restriction, such a system may be more 
flexible than conventional land use planning with other areas operating free of 
controls. Siegan's (1974) analysis in particular, suggested a wide range of 
contractual arrangements which might emerge under restrictive covenant systems as 
the market responds to differing individual preferences for land use restriction. Thus, 
in some areas of Houston covenants were very strict with high levels of amenity 
provision and correspondingly higher asset prices. In other areas, however, 
covenants tended to be more relaxed and in some parts of the city there were no 
controls at all (see also Ellickson 1973, Foldvary 1994). Under British land use 
planning by contrast, statutory designations such as Green Belts and AONBs 
account for close on fifty per cent of the land area, but in addition those areas 
without formal designations are still subject to the full scope of urban planning 
controls. The principal effect of a covenant system may be to bring about a more 
flexible approach, allowing a greater level of development and a slow but steady fall 
in house prices and other property values over a longer period of time.
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There is, of course a distributional issue here, where given the income elasticity of 
amenity goods, those‘expressing a preference for lower levels of amenity’ are more 
likely to be the lower income groups. The public choice theorist would respond, 
however, that there is little evidence to support the view that government regulation 
reduces the propensity for less attractive land uses to be located within the poorest 
sections of the population. Motorway developments in most British cities have, for 
example, typically been routed through the poorest neighbourhoods (Goodman 
1972, Lowe & Goyder 1983). Similarly, almost every study of the British planning 
system has concluded that urban containment has redistributed wealth from the poor 
to the higher income groups, in particular by reducing opportunities for low price 
housing development (Hall et al 1973, Simmie 1993).
From a public choice perspective the poor may be absent from the political market 
because of their particular vulnerability to the logic of collective action. In these 
circumstances, low income people are a large, diffuse and heterogeneous interest 
prone to the imperatives of free-riding and with little time to devote to organized 
politics given their immediate requirement to secure the basic essentials of life. 
Green Belts, AONBs and other planning controls are in effect subsidized restrictive 
covenants, obtained through the political process by organized nimby lobbies. Under 
a property rights alternative such individuals would have to pay the full opportunity 
cost of preserving amenity values and may be less likely to redistribute wealth from 
less mobilized sections of the population. This is a question which cannot properly 
be resolved here, but there is at least the possibility that a property rights approach 
may offer a more balanced consideration of the costs and benefits involved in the 
location of new developments and might as a result improve the relative position of 
low income people compared to the inequitable operations of land use regulation.
A second possible reason why low income groups may benefit from a property 
rights approach, even if new houses were to be built at the top end of the market, 
relates to the possible enhancement of the so called ’filtering effect'. As more houses 
are built and the total housing stock increases, prices may fall and there may be 
correspondingly more used housing available for low income people to occupy. 
Urban containment regulations may have slowed down the filtering process by 
which affluent homes reach the lower income groups.
Critics of filtering theory have often argued that it is an apology for assisting the 
better off (Short 1982,p. 198-201), but as Fischel (1985) points out, there is 
sometimes a tendency to confuse a deliberate policy of subsidizing the construction 
of homes for the affluent - as has been the case in the USA and UK through
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mortgage tax relief - with the beneficial process of filtering itself. Many empirical 
studies of filtering have suggested that the process does not actually work very 
effectively, with relatively few units of accomodation transfering to the lower 
income groups. It is possible, however, that the process has been inhibited by other 
institutional interventions in the housing market. The presence of rent control and 
security of tenure legislation, for example, over much of the post-war period, may 
have discouraged the process where previously owner-occupied homes are split up 
into smallers flats and let out to lower income people (Minford et al 1987). Given 
these uncertainties, it is not possible to say conclusively whether the filtering effect 
might work to a sufficient degree, but there is at least a possibility that a property 
rights approach, combined with the removal of other government interventions in 
the housing market, might enhance the filtering process and thus improve housing 
access for low income groups.
In addition to the reduction in prices brought about by the elimination of nimby 
activities, there are other reasons to believe that a property rights alternative might 
result in lower prices. In particular, one of the key reasons why house prices in the 
UK have tended to rise is the costs of delay brought about by the complicated 
administrative procedures of the planning system. These delays prevent developers 
from responding to an increase in demand and so fuel the tendency toward price 
inflation. Moreover, the often substantial rent seeking costs which developers face in 
the administration of the system are eventually passed on to consumers by way of 
higher prices. Under the present system, planning bureaucrats have little incentive to 
minimize delays and costs because their job security and budgets are partly a 
function of the administrative load. Nor do the larger construction companies which 
dominate the housing market have sufficient incentives to seek a substantial 
reduction in the burden of regulatory costs, because it is these costs, together with 
the discretionary granting of planning permissions which discriminate against the 
smaller developers and add to the monopoly power of the larger corporate 
developers.
Under a property rights approach by contrast, such as a system of restrictive 
covenants, developers may be more likely to minimize administrative costs and 
delays because they would no longer be assured the monopoly profits associated 
with the discretionary granting of planning permission. In a land market free from 
statutory regulation market entry into the house building industry might be eased 
considerably and the ability of developers to make profits may be more a reflection 
of their ability to supply the types of housing development (with or without 
covenants or equivalents) which match the preferences of the consumers
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(Veljanowski 1988). In turn, the possible increases in competitive forces brought 
about by an end to discretionary land use planning might contribute still further to a 
reduction in prices.
Critics of contractual approaches contend that these 'solutions' would simply transfer 
the incentive for over-elaboration and the expansion of costs associated with 
administrative regulation over to the legal professions and the courts, which would 
necessarily have to enforce the relevant contractual arrangements (Weale 1993). 
There have in actual fact been very few empirical studies examining the 
administrative costs associated with property rigths solutions and there is 
insufficient evidence to provide a conclusive answer to this question. However, in so 
far as there is empirical evidence it does not tend to support the view that property 
rights alternatives encourage an escalation of legal costs and administrative 
expenses. Siegan's (1974) study of restrictive covenants in Houston, for example, 
found no evidence of cost escalation in the supervision of covenants. On the 
contrary, developers had an incentive to ensure that contractual obligations were laid 
out clearly in advance in order to minimize the costs of subsequent litigation and to 
avoid losing custom to rival developers who supplied better contractual provisions. 
The number of lawsuits and the associated costs of restrictive covenant disputes in 
Houston, were a fraction of those involved in the administration of statutory 
regulation in comparable cities across the United States (Siegan 1974, p.31). 
Similarly, Foldvary's (1994) case studies in Reston (Virginia), Fort Ellsworth 
(Virginia) and Arden (Delaware) suggested that proprietary communities would go 
so far as to market 'constitutional provisions' for the settlement of disputes within the 
terms of residential contracts, in order to minimize the administrative costs of legal 
wrangling and thus to make the communities more attractive to prospective 
customers. An additional study of the private resolution of land use disputes in 
North Eastern California (Ellickson 1991) also found that private individuals would 
seek to avoid recourse to the courts in the settlement of neighbourhood disputes.
Turning now to the question of densities, just as a private property rights approach 
might remove the price effects associated with British urban containment policies, 
so there is reason to believe that such an approach might contribute to a reduction in 
dwelling densities as well. The principal factor which points to a reduction in 
densities relates again to the downward pressure on land prices for development 
which may emerge under such a regime. As noted above, restrictive covenants and 
other contractual devices are unlikely to be as comprehensive in their coverage as 
state imposed controls and as a result the supply of land for development may 
increase, contributing to a reduction in prices. Falling land prices over time, may
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allow developers to purchase more land for their money and so afford the 
opportunity to supply additional garden space and other amenities associated with a 
more low density living environment (Evans 1988).
A second factor which may point to a reduction in dwelling densities follows from 
the possible reduction in rent seeking and administrative costs which might result 
from a property rights alternative. As early as 1984, Evans (1988, p.35) estimated 
these costs to be over a billion pounds per year, which represents a substantial 
diversion of resources away from production and into rent seeking and bureaucratic 
activity. Under a property rights approach the reduction of the cumbersome 
administrative bureaucracy associated with land use planning might free up 
resources which could then be diverted to more productive activities, including a 
possible improvement in the architectural quality of the housing units for sale.
Similarly, the increased competition in the house building market which may result 
from a property rights approach might also encourage a lowering of residential 
densities and the improvement of residential amenities more generally. Under the 
current planning system, the artificially scarce supply of housing has meant that the 
profitability of obtaining a planning permission for developers, arising from land 
development gains, is far higher than the profits to be made from the design of 
attractive developments. Or, to put it another way, given the absolute shortage of 
development land due to planning, the value of a house, or any building per se is 
exceptionally high, but the marginal profitability of that building being well 
designed is very low. Increases in the total supply of housing which might be 
brought about by a property right alternative might increase the marginal 
profitability of well designed developments and might thus contribute to a lowering 
of densities and an improvement in amenity provision (Veljanowski 1988).
The private proprietary community model advanced by Foldvary (1994) provides an 
example of the low density, high quality developments which might emerge under a 
private property rights approach. Thus, the town of Reston, Virginia, provides an 
illustration of the private provision of territorial collective goods. The development 
of the town was modelled on the garden city concept, envisaged by the very founder 
of the town planning movement, Ebenezer Howard. The first settlements proposed 
by Howard were to be developed and owned entirely by a private corporation or co­
operative, which would plan the design features of the town and then collect 
revenues for the associated collective goods in the form of ground rents (Howard 
1902). Before the advent of land use planning and new towns nationalization, 
Letchworth, the first garden city in Britain was developed on precisely this basis. In
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the specific case of Reston, the development of the town was financed entirely by 
the Reston Corporation, a private company which bought the site and financed the 
project including the provision of roads and country parks through the collection of 
rent (Foldvary 1994). The town has a population of 50 000, housed in 18 000 
residential units, alongside some 2100 firms (34 000 jobs) on a 7400 acre site. The 
grounds are landscaped with thickly wooded areas separating the main residential 
districts, all of which are covered by restrictive covenants. A total of 1045 acres is 
left for open space, alongside four lakes and a 70 acre nature reserve. In stark 
contrast to government planned new towns in other parts of the United States and 
the failure of the nationalized new towns project in Britain, the Reston development 
has continually run at a profit in the absence of state subsidies (Foldvary 1994).
Moving on to the third external effect associated with urban containment, it is rather 
more difficult to see of how a property rights approach might help to reduce 
commuting distances. Nonetheless, some general speculation is appropriate in this 
regard.
Existing research on the effects of land use planning suggests that environmental 
designations and especially green belts are responsible, at least in part, for an 
increase in commuting distances. Green Belts in particular, by preventing 
development on the rural/urban fringe act to shift development pressure further out, 
which in turn increases the commuting distance to work and the demand for more 
roads and longer distance travel (Herington 1984, DoE 1993, Simmie 1993).
It has already been established, that a property rights approach would not result in 
the same level of restrictive control and there is certainly no indication that such an 
approach would see controls equivalent of the Green Belts which surround major 
cities such as London. Thus, under a property rights alternative there may be a 
greater level of development on the edge of the major urban boundaries and 
relatively less of the 'leap-frog' development which tends to result from Green Belts 
and other controls. In so far as these developments may reduce the tendency for 
people to live further and further away from their place of work they might also 
contribute to a reduction, however marginal, in the demand for commuting.
Alternatively, there is some indication of the potential for the proprietary 
communities model to make a more significant contribution to a reduction in 
commuting distances. In particular, the case studies examined by Foldvary (1994) 
such as Reston, Virginia were often mixed developments, with businesses, shopping 
and leisure facilities situated within the community boundary and with many of the 
residents living and working within the same town. In this sense, the proprietary
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communities model may have the potential to put into practice the original idea of 
the self contained town, originally formulated by Ebenezer Howard. A principal 
theme behind the idea of such towns, which still appeals to many academic planners 
today, is the notion of combining living, working and recreational environments 
within one site and thus reducing the need for travel between different locations 
(Blowers 1994). Under a free market property rights model, one of the ways which 
developers might seek to provide a competitive edge, might be to market the 
advantages of proprietary communities in terms of their reducing transport costs and 
in particular those associated with excessive car use.
Ultimately however, the property rights approach to land use management alone, 
seems unlikely to provide a sufficient remedy to the problem of excessive 
commuting. In order to deal with this problem, a still more radical application of 
private property rights may be required and in particular the privatization of the 
trunk road network itself. In addition to the problems created by green belts, perhaps 
the major cause of excessive commuting is the continued provision of state owned 
roads - 'free at the point of delivery' (ASI 1988). Under these conditions, consumers 
of the road network and in particular car users, do not pay directly for the use of road 
space and do not face the full opportunity cost of their actions. Because the 
provision of road space is not priced in the market, consumers have no incentive to 
reduce their consumption rates or to search for other less costly forms of travel. 
Subsidized road use, combined with green belts shifting development pressure out 
beyond the rural/urban fringe is a recipe for transport chaos. The property rights 
solution to this problem would be to privatize the trunk road network itself and thus 
to allow road owning companies to charge for the use of road space through tolls or 
similar devices and thus to discourage over-use (Anderson & Leal 1991). Combined 
with the possible benefits of the private communities model such an approach might 
well result in the reduction of commuting distances.3 In these circumstances, it is 
ironic that many environmentalists blame excessive commuting on the operation of 
the free market when roads are supplied by the public sector, railways have until 
recently been nationalized and the entire pattern of land use has been distorted to
3 The environmental economist Herman Daly (1993 p. 175) has criticized the proposal by Anderson 
& Leal (1991) that highways should be privatized. "More important, one might have expected 'free 
market' economists to be a bit more sensitive to the problems of monopoly ownership - or are we to 
envision many parallel highways competing for the motorist." In so doing Daly exhibits little 
appreciation for the Hayekian approach to competition outlined in chapter 1. Thus, the fact there may 
be only one supplier of roads between two places on a map does not mean that the competitive 
market process has ceased. If there is only sufficient demand for one road to exist then it makes no 
sense to speak of 'monopoly power'. All that is required for rivalrous competition to be effective is 
freedom of entry into the relevant market. In addition, Daly commits another common fallacy - the 
principal source of competition in road travel need not come from 'parallel highways', but from other 
modes of transport such as rail.
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increase commuting distances by one of the most comprehensive systems of land 
use regulation anywhere in the western world.
Turning finally to the question of subsidized agriculture and its environmental 
consequences, again it is rather more difficult to see how a property rights 
alternative might solve this problem directly. The land use planning system has not 
itself been directly responsible for the environmental side effects associated with 
modem fanning, but has rather provided a context for the continued protection of 
the agricultural sector, by preventing the transfer of land out of agricultural uses. 
Agriculture has itself remained exempt from planning controls through what appears 
to have been a classic example of 'regulatory capture'. It might thus be argued that 
the imposition of statutory regulation on agriculture, combined with the abolition of 
the CAP might provide the best solution. This argument deserves examination.
The abolition of farm subsidies may indeed be the most environmentally beneficial 
course of action, as the recent experience of New Zealand's farm policy has 
suggested (Ridley 1996). It is less clear, however, that the imposition of statutory 
regulation on the farming sector would necessarily be all that beneficial. In 
particular, it seems possible that agricultural regulations might be manipulated in 
much the way that urban planning controls have been by the larger developers, in 
order to reduce competition. In this case, external costs might be pushed onto 
consumers in much the way that occurs under the CAP by way of direct subsidies. 
Similarly, even if an appropriate form of agricultural regulation could be devised, 
this would still imply that a reasonable level of environmental protection in the 
countryside is dependent on maintaining agricultural land uses and that other and 
especially urban developments such as housing, however badly needed, should not 
be considered over the agricultural alternative.
It is possible that under a property rights approach, however, there may be a greater 
number of ways of combining new developments in rural ares with high levels of 
environmental quality. In particular, the lower land prices which may result from a 
property rights alternative may, as indicated earlier, allow developers to purchase 
more land for their money and provide a lower density form of development 
including more garden space and the provision of other amenities associated with 
open space. Low density developments of the sort documented by Foldvary (1994), 
which included the provision of country parks, thickly wooded zones separating 
residential districts and the provision of nature reserves, might provide an 
environmentally acceptable way of accomodating much needed housing 
development in rural areas by allowing the transfer of land out of agricultural uses.
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Nor would the property rights approach necessarily result in a diminution of the 
aesthetic qualities of the countryside. Thus, as property prices fall and as incomes 
rise with economic growth, the demand for environmental amenity may rise and 
with it the incentives for developers to devise all manner of contractual devices to 
maintain aesthetic quality. Foldvary (1994) cites numerous examples of private 
condominium developments which specify an array of contractual restrictions to 
ensure the provision of amenities and open spaces. In parts of the Rocky Mountains 
and the Appalachian chain, developers have supplied contractual arrangements to 
preserve the appearance of scenic views. Stroup (1990, p. 176), for example, notes 
that at Big Sky Valley in Montana, developers bought up an entire valley, which 
they then subdivided, selling tracts with restrictive covenants allowing only 
aesthetically acceptable development. Under a property rights alternative there may 
be considerable potential for such schemes which might combine high 
environmental quality with much needed housing development.
In addition, there are many other alternative uses of land which may flourish under a 
private property rights alternative and which may improve environmental quality in 
response to consumer demand. Thus, in the case of recreational developments 
Foldvary (1994) cites the example of the Disney Corporation as a further illustration 
of the private, territorial provision of collective goods. The Corporation owns a 28 
000 acre site in South East Florida, including 8 200 acres devoted to open space and 
wildlife conservation. In so doing, the Corporation maximizes the number of 
positive externalities within the site in order to maximize the rents it receives from 
residents and entrance fees from visitors. Consider also the successful tourist 
developments of Center Parcs in the UK, where a wide range of leisure and 
recreational facilities are provided in thickly wooded sites. The bird reserves of the 
Wildfowl Trust, provide a further demonstration of Foldvary’s (1994) theory of 
territorial provision. At places such as Martin Mere (Lancashire) and Slimbridge 
(Gloucestershire), the Trust holds large tracts of land which are a haven for migrant 
ducks and geese. Birdwatchers and other recreationists are charged entrance fees 
through a turnstile system and a wide range of visitor facilities is provided.
Similarly, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) acts in a commercial 
capacity charging entrance fees for visits to its 118 nature reserves. In the United 
States meanwhile, the North Maine Woods, a private company formed through an 
association of 20  landowners manages recreational activities in a 2.8 million acre 
park - an area half the size of Wales. Entrance to the park is controlled through 17
260
checkpoints and access roads situated around the perimeter with fees charged 
according to the length of stay (Anderson & Leal 1991).4
Each of these examples illustrates the potential for the developments which might 
flourish much more widely under a property rights approach, encouraging the 
transfer of land out of the agricultural uses which prevail in Britain today. As with 
all the other examples presented in this chapter, the advantage of property rights 
solutions is that they encourage the internalization of external costs and may result 
in a more balanced consideration of the costs and benefits associated with different 
types of development in the countryside.
7.3 Conclusion
The private property rights approach outlined in this chapter has presented a positive 
alternative to the institutional provisions of the British land use planning system. In 
particular, it suggests that a market system of land use control may help overcome 
many of the externalities associated with urban containment, by providing incentives 
to internalize costs through an ongoing process of property rights entrepreneurship. 
Markets are, however, far from perfect institutions and there may remain a residual 
role for the state in certain key areas of environmental concern. The private property 
rights approach is best suited to internalize externalities which occur over a 
relatively local scale and in site specific territorial areas, where transactions costs are 
relatively low or may be overcome in response to rising environmental demand. In 
other cases, however, where transactions costs are likely to remain prohibitive for 
the foreseeable future, the private property approach may be less appropriate. In 
these circumstances, there may remain a residual role for a slimmer land use 
planning system, confining its activities to the regulation of those external costs 
associated with urban development, such as the emission of airborne pollutants, 
which are unlikely to be captured by a property rights alternative. Similarly, there 
may be a role for the state in helping to lower transactions costs in the private sector 
through the development of land recording systems, strict liability rules and the 
adjudication of property rights disputes in courts, all of which would be required for 
a market system to operate smoothly.
4 Contrary to welfare analysis, the charging of entrance fees where consumption is potentially non­
rival does not detract from efficiency. When deciding how to use a resource, the relevant cost is its 
value in alternative uses and not the marginal cost of admitting additional consumers. Thus, the only 
way to discover whether consumers prefer the preservation of a country park to a new housing 
development is to charge a fee for entrance to the park (Baden & Leal 1990, Anderson & Leal 1991).
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The private property rights approach does not imply that there is no role for the state 
in the management of land use change, but rather that this role should be minimized 
in order to reduce the instances of government failure. Where it is not possible to 
have a properly functioning market then attempts should be made to restructure 
public sector institutions in order to encourage the internalization of costs to the 
greatest possible degree. In the case of the land use planning system, for example, 
the contracting out of the regulatory function and the introduction of compulsory 
competitive tendering might help to reduce the tendency towards bureaucratic 
expansionism and regulatory growth.
Ultimately, perhaps the greatest obstacle to the private property rights approach, is 
likely to be the political opposition to institutional change generated by those who 
benefit most from the present regime. In any programme of political change there 
are always losers, as well as winners and since the former are rarely compensated by 
the latter, the route to institutional reform is never clear (North 1990). Under these 
circumstances, the best option is to try to change the macro-climate of public 
opinion which sustains the existing regime. In the case of land use planning, this is 
the widespread belief that only a system of state regulation can ensure a balance 
between development and environmental conservation. If people become more 
aware of the deficiencies in the land use planning system and realize that there are 
viable alternatives to it, then there may be some hope for constructive institutional 
reform. For too long, land use planning has been based on nirvana economics. 
Perhaps this thesis has gone some way to redress this imbalance.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 : List of Persons Interviewed
The following is a list of individuals interviewed during the 'fieldwork'. Unless 
otherwise stated, interviews took on an in-depth, semi-structured format and were 
conducted on a face to face basis. Interviewing was carried out between September 
1994 and March 1996. For the Chester case study, officials in the City and County 
planning departments were interviewed at first and the names of other key actors 
were subsequently obtained through a snowballing technique.
Interview
1 : B. McCloughlin : National Farmers Union.
2 : R. John : Country Landowners Association
3 : T. Burton : Council for the Protection of Rural England
4 : T. Juniper: Friends of the Earth (Personal Communication)
5 : D. Coates : House Builders Federation
6 : L. Bennam : House Builders Federation
7 : C. Cole : Federation of Master Builders (Telephone)
8 : J. Griffiths : Royal Town Planning Institute
9 : M. Chambers : Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors
10 : T. Boxall: Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors
11 : J. Colby : District Planning Officers Society
12 : M. Ashley : Metropolitan Planning Officers Society
13 : D. H all: Town and Country Planning Association
14 : A non.: Hillier Parker Planning Consultants
15 : R. Goodchild : Gerald Eve Planning Consultants
16 : J. Edge : Weatherall, Green & Smith Planning Consultants
17 : K. Evans : Department of the Environment
18 : M. Quinn : Department of the Environment
19 : A non.: Department of the Environment
20 : A non.: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
21 : S. O njeri: Housing Corporation
22 : A. Jones : Upton Green Belt Preservation Society
23 : M. Woodward : Westminster Park Community Association (Telephone)
24 : M. Renner : Chester Branch, Council for the Protection of Rural England
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25 : M. Pairslow : Cheshire Conservation Trust
26 : A non.: Chester Friends of the Earth (Telephone)
27 : G. Harrop : Wainhomes
28 : S. Milligan : Redrow Homes
29 : J. Findley : North West Branch, House Builders Federation
30 : B. Lloyd : Cheshire County Council Planning Department
31 : N. E lliot: Cheshire County Council Planning Department
32 : A. Wright : Chester City Council Planning Department
33 : K. Birchall: North West Regional Office : Department of the Environment
34 : B. Clough-Parker : Chester Chamber of Trade (Telephone)
35 : A non.: Mersey Regional Health Authority Estates Representative
36 : A non.: Cheshire County Highways Department
37 : R . Short: Leader Conservative Group Chester City Council
38 : C. Russell: Leader Labour Group Chester City Council
The following individuals not referred to in the text were also interviewed;
39 : D. Baize : Association of County Councils
40 : A. Benn : Confederation of British Industry
41 : C. Body : Chester Chronicle
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Appendix 2 : Statistical Data Sources
Annual Abstract of Statistics (1960-1991), Central Statistical Office, London : 
HMSO.
Council for the Protection of Rural England Annual Reports (1991-1995), London : 
CPRE.
Country Landowners Association Annual Reports (1993-1994), London : CLA.
Countryside Commission Annual Reports (1980-1995), Bristol: CC.
Development Control Statistics (1960-1991), DoE, London : HMSO.
Dods Parliamentary Companion (1979-1996), London : Dods.
DoE Annual Reports (1979-1995), London : HMSO.
DoE Planning Applications Statistics (1980-1994), London : HMSO.
DTI Annual Report (1990), London : HMSO.
English Nature Annual Reports (1991-1995), Peterborough : EN.
Farm Incomes Survey (1980-1995), MAFF, London : HMSO.
Friends of the Earth Annual Reports (1993), London : FoE.
Housing and Construction Statistics, (1975-1991) London : HMSO.
House Builders Federation Annual Reports (1993-1994), London : HBF.
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Annual Reports (1980-1995), London: 
HMSO
Monthly Digest of Statistics, Central Statistical Office, (1979-1995), London : 
HMSO.
National Farmers Union Annual Reports (1993-1994), London : NFU.
Nature Conservancy Council Annual Reports, (1979-1990), London : NCC 
Planning and Development Statistics, (1991-1994), London : CIPFA.
Roth Guide to Parliament, (1979-1996), London : Roth.
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors Annual Reports, (1993-1994), London : 
RICS
Royal Town Planning Institute Annual Reports, (1993-1994), London : RTPI.
The Guardian 8th May 1996, Special Pullout on MP's Financial Interests.
Times Guide to the House of Commons, (1979-1996), London : Times Newspapers
Town and Country Planning Association Annual Reports, (1993-1994) London : 
TCPA.
UK National Accounts, (1979-1995), Central Statistical Office, London : HMSO.
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Vachers Biographical Guide to Parliament, (1992-1996), London : BBC and 
Vachers.
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